List prices and collusion in industrial markets

dc.contributor.advisorMontero Ayala, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.advisorFigueroa González, Nicolás Andrés
dc.contributor.authorCussen Sanhueza, Diego
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date2021-10-27
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-04T15:52:56Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.date.updated2021-10-25T22:57:02Z
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2021
dc.description.abstractIn several industrial markets secret discounts are the rule. Standard models suggest that if suppliers in these markets want to collude, they must develop an allocation structure to avoid discounts, but many antitrust cases are centered on their list price announcements. We build a testable theory that (i) rationalizes the publication of list prices, (ii) shows collusion through coordinated publication is possible, and (iii) informs the policy debate by pointing to indicators antitrust authorities should be concerned with.
dc.description.version2021-10-27
dc.format.extent83 páginas
dc.fuente.origenAutoarchivo
dc.identifier.doi10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/62918
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/62918
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/62918
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Montero Ayala, Juan Pablo ; 0000-0002-6815-0158 ; 87534
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés ; S/I ; 1010172
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Cussen Sanhueza, Diego ; S/I ; 1019393
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subject.ddc338.52
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.subject.otherPrecioses_ES
dc.subject.otherFijación de precioses_ES
dc.titleList prices and collusion in industrial marketses_ES
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados87534
sipa.codpersvinculados1010172
sipa.codpersvinculados1019393
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Tesis_Diego_Cussen_Sanhueza.pdf
Size:
4.41 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
0 B
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: