3.13 Tesis magíster
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Browsing 3.13 Tesis magíster by Author "Asahi Kodama, Kenzo Javier"
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- ItemInformation acquisition in the context of a centralized school admission system(2021) Correa Besoain, Felipe Antonio; Asahi Kodama, Kenzo Javier; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés; Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de EconomíaIn the context of a centralized school admission system—specifically a Deferred Acceptance- we study the process of information acquisition over the quality of a school. Under the assumption of homogeneous agents in everything except on their cost for acquiring information, we analyze the different equilibriums that can arise and how they differ from what a Social Planner does. We present two versions of the model, one where the agents' valuations over the school are independent of each other, and a second where agents have common valuations over the school. In the first model, we find both positive and negative externalities of the agents' information acquisition. The result depends on what the uninformed agents prefer to do. In the second one, the behavior of the uninformed agents' is endogenous to the model because of what we call the ``curse of the uninformed", produced by those with small information acquisition costs taking advantage of that, and avoiding the school when it is of bad quality; giving those who do not acquire a greater probability of being selected in that case. There, in almost all cases, we found negative externalities from the acquisition of information. This work suggests that, under certain conditions of the uninformed agents' behavior, when the preferences over schools are horizontally differentiated, there could be gains if a central authority implements policies to reduce the information's cost. However, if the agents' valuations are common, it is difficult to improve the aggregate welfare by making information cheaper. In almost all cases, it will make aggregate welfare fall. Making those with the highest cost worse off.
- ItemWorthwhile or not? Estimating the impacts of AI-based recommendation systems on Chile’s school choice system(2020) Icaran Sagaceta, Rodrigo Ignacio; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés; Asahi Kodama, Kenzo Javier; Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de EconomíaThis paper studies the effects of implementing a recommender system in the context of the Chilean School Choice System. We develop an artificial intelligence-based algorithm for suggesting schools to students. Using these suggestions as input, and conjecturing different levels of acceptance rates by the population, we evaluate the general equilibrium effects of this policy. If, on average, students accepted one suggestion each, this technology could decrease the percentage of non-assigned students by 1.5pp. However, since good schools are a scarce resource, not everyone benefits from this policy. We find minor effects on commuting distances and assigned schools’ SIMCE scores. Also, we show that this technology has small but negative impacts on social welfare from a utilitarian perspective. Our results offer powerful insight for public policy and suggest that the impacts of a recommender system in a context of rival goods may be counterintuitive.