Enhancing the Stability of Coalitions in Cross-Border Transmission Expansion Planning

Simple item page
dc.catalogadorjlo
dc.contributor.authorChurkin, Andrey
dc.contributor.authorSauma Santis, Enzo Enrique
dc.contributor.authorPozo, David
dc.contributor.authorBialek, Janusz
dc.contributor.authorKorgin, Nikolay
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-31T13:16:06Z
dc.date.available2024-05-31T13:16:06Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractCooperative Game Theory has recently attracted attention in power systems research as a tool for expansion planning analysis. However, this analysis is usually performed in an ex-post manner, i.e., planning and operation decisions are separated from the allocation mechanisms themselves. The existing paradigm implies selecting an allocation rule (say, the Shapley value) to share the value of cooperation and verifying its rationality (e.g., by checking the Core of the cooperative game). Additional metrics of coalitional stability are omitted. Such an ex-post approach could lead to coalitional stability issues, which may hamper the establishment of cooperation. For example, there could be a severe imbalance in players' positions, and the contribution of some players could be underestimated in the grand coalition. This paper proposes a bilevel optimization framework for explicitly incorporating Cooperative Game Theory principles into transmission expansion planning problems. Using a simple 4-system case study and a real-world case of cross-border power interconnections in Northeast Asia, we demonstrate that it is possible to make planning decisions in an anticipatory manner subject to the stability of coalitions. The identified expansion plans with enhanced coalitional stability indicate the ways of making parties more equally involved in electricity trading. Finally, we discuss the applicability of the bilevel TEP model, the properties of resulting cooperative games, and the compromise between coalitional stability and economic efficiency in transmission expansion planning.
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TPWRS.2021.3124988
dc.identifier.issn0885-8950
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2021.3124988
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/86142
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Sauma Santis, Enzo Enrique; 0000-0002-8555-9123; 74184
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectBilevel optimization
dc.subjectCoalitional stability
dc.subject.ddc620
dc.subject.deweyIngenieríaes_ES
dc.subject.ods07 Affordable and clean energy
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa07 Energía asequible y no contaminante
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleEnhancing the Stability of Coalitions in Cross-Border Transmission Expansion Planning
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados74184
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2024-05-27
Files
Collections
Artículos de revistas