Das Verständnis des Ethischen : eine hermeneutisch-phänomenologische Analyseder alltäglichen Erfahrung des Ethischenanhand der Methode und der Daseinsontologie Martin Heideggers

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2019
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In the following essay, the ontology of Dasein and the hermeneutic-phenomenological method, developed by Martin Heidegger in the years 1919-1929, are used to analyze both the everyday experience of what is ethical as well as the ethically experiencing being. In accordance with the hermeneutic-phenomenological method, the presented analysis focuses on the ontological level, which means that what is analyzed is not the (ontic) state of affairs, but the meaning attested in it and the existential structures of the being which constitutes this meaning. Throughout this essay, two everyday experiences of what is ethical are recognized and analyzed: 1. The experience of what is good in reference to the moral norms and the corresponding idea of what is good. 2. The experience of what is good in reference to a specific situation that calls for an ethical response. In these experiences two different meanings of what is ethical are revealed: 1. In the first experience, a meaning of what is ethical as a (inner-worldly) limit universally imposed on existence is constituted. 2. The experience of what is good in reference to a particular situation constitutes a meaning of what is ethical as a limitation (bracketing) of the limit imposed by the moral norm. This makes the meaning of a situational duty experienceable. Along with these meanings, three conditions of the possibility of experience of what is ethical are presented: freedom (transcendence, nothingness, truth), modality and understanding of one's being as a being, which can set a limit. These results have been obtained in relation to the elaboration of phenomenological problems. Among these, the following could be mentioned: 1. The problem of appearance: The phenomena are usually understood in terms of their public meaning, and not in terms of their direct experience. 2. The problem of covering and distortion: The understanding gained through the public meaning loses the direct reference to the original meaning of the phenomenon. As for the experience of what is ethical, the analysis of these problems show that what is ethical is understood immediately with reference to the moral norm, and accordingly, the experience of the concrete ethical situation is prevented. This causes a concealment or distortion of the original meaning of what is ethical, which results in a third (methodological) problem: 3. How can the original meaning of what is ethical be phenomenologically accessed if its direct experience is habitually prevented? According to this problem, the method of attestation is put forward, and the phenomenon of irregularity between the public command and the moral sense is methodically used to access the original meaning of what is ethical. The elaboration of these problems allows the present essay to define both the different meanings of what is ethical and the conditions of their experiences.
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Tesis (Doktorwürde der Philosophischen)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2019
Tesis (Doktorwürde der Philosophischen)--Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 2019
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