La negación y la afirmación en el estoicismo: Apuleyo, Alejandro y Boecio
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Date
2024
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Abstract
El artículo trata sobre la negación estoica y su crítica a la fórmula aristotélica según los testimonios de Apuleyo, Alejandro de Afrodisias y Boecio. La crítica se divide en tres aspectos: (i) sistematicidad (ya que una misma regla no se aplica a todo tipo de proposición); (ii) universalidad (ya que todo par contradictorio no divide la verdad y la falsedad sin excepción alguna); y (iii) rigurosidad (ya que el sujeto de la proposición puede no existir o no ser lo que creemos que es). Se concluye que el fondo de la crítica no se relaciona con que una fórmula es inconsistente o hace imposible la lógica y sus operaciones, sino que tiene relación con cuál fórmula es más ambigua y menos preferible.
The article deals with the Stoic denial and its criticism of the Aristotelian formula according to the testimonies of Apuleius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Boethius. The criticism is divided into three aspects: (i) systematicity (since the same rule does not apply to all types of propositions); (ii) universality (since any contradictory pair does not divide truth and falsehood without exception); and (iii) accuracy (since the subject of the proposition may not exist or may not be what we think it is). It is concluded that the background of the criticism is not related to the fact that a formula is inconsistent or makes logic and its operations impossible, but rather which formula is more ambiguous and less preferable.
The article deals with the Stoic denial and its criticism of the Aristotelian formula according to the testimonies of Apuleius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Boethius. The criticism is divided into three aspects: (i) systematicity (since the same rule does not apply to all types of propositions); (ii) universality (since any contradictory pair does not divide truth and falsehood without exception); and (iii) accuracy (since the subject of the proposition may not exist or may not be what we think it is). It is concluded that the background of the criticism is not related to the fact that a formula is inconsistent or makes logic and its operations impossible, but rather which formula is more ambiguous and less preferable.
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Aristotelismo, Lógica contemporánea, Lógica estoica, Negación, Aristotelism, Contemporary logic, Stoic logic, Negation