Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation

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dc.contributor.authorLlanes, Gaston
dc.contributor.authorTrento, Stefano
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T23:57:06Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T23:57:06Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes-patents, no-patents, and patent pools-and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-010-0591-5
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0591-5
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/95191
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000307556700007
dc.issue.numero3
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final725
dc.pagina.inicio703
dc.revistaEconomic theory
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectSequential innovation
dc.subjectPatent policy
dc.subjectPatent pools
dc.subjectAnticommons
dc.subjectDouble marginalization
dc.subjectComplementary monopoly
dc.titlePatent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen50
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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