A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part I: Regulatory Framework

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dc.contributor.authorMolina Castro, Juan David
dc.contributor.authorContreras, J.
dc.contributor.authorRudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-18T14:04:50Z
dc.date.available2022-05-18T14:04:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractDifferent regulatory frameworks have implemented competitive mechanisms to increase efficiency in transmission, a natural monopoly. Conflicts of interest and hidden costs make necessary to define methods to obtain an appropriate valuation of new transmission assets. This paper is the first one of a two-paper series and presents the fundamentals of transmission project valuation and cost allocation. We show the fundamentals of non-cooperative game theory, different concepts of game equilibria (Nash, Stackelberg, and Berge), and solutions to the bilateral negotiation problem (Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Rubinstein). In addition, the design of mechanisms, the information revelation principles, and incentive compatibility issues are described. We propose a model composed of three elements: valuation of a transmission project based on a linear contract, a principal-agent model to determine the optimal effort of an agent developing the transmission project, and the optimal bilateral negotiation of right-of-way costs. We define a method to evaluate the offers to build a transmission line project as a function of the number of agents bidding for it. The value of the project is a function of both the incentives and the valuation of the right-of-way costs. In part two of this series, we present two case studies: the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC) in Chile, where we apply the methodology to a real network.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2201179
dc.identifier.eissn1558-0679
dc.identifier.issn0885-8950
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6231709
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2201179
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64115
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Molina Castro, Juan David ; S/I ; 181795
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Rudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh ; S/I ; 99168
dc.issue.numero1
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.pagina.final263
dc.pagina.inicio253
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.revistaIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectGames
dc.subjectContracts
dc.subjectCost accounting
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectPlanning
dc.subjectResource management
dc.subjectInvestments
dc.titleA Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part I: Regulatory Frameworkes_ES
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen28
sipa.codpersvinculados181795
sipa.codpersvinculados99167
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