Playing Whac-A-Mole: Effects of Intervening the Supply Side of Fraudulent Sick Leaves Market in Chile
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Date
2024
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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of an intervention on the Chilean market of sick leaves issuance, which sanctioned doctors having a high pattern of licence issuance. Using regression discontinuity in time and difference–in–differences, I find that the sanctioned reduced their issuance, in the most conservative estimation, by 23.23%, with externalities on non–sanctioned doctors who showed a higherissuance pattern, stronger for doctors who share workplace with sanctioned ones. On the demand side, I find that the patients entirely exposed to sanctioned physicians, in the most conservative estimate, reduce their received sick leaves by 5.22%. Despite this, the described patients partially replace the sanctioned doctors with other doctors, who in turn change their behaviour to fill a market opportunity coming from the sanction.
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Tesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2024