Job market signaling, information acquisition, and competition

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dc.catalogadorpva
dc.contributor.advisorFigueroa González, Nicolás Andrés
dc.contributor.advisorHeumann, Tibor
dc.contributor.authorSchmitz Condeza, Lucas Sebastián
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-27T12:36:01Z
dc.date.available2023-01-27T12:36:01Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.date.updated2023-01-26T18:49:34Z
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2022
dc.description.abstractA worker, privately informed about his different and general skills sends a costly signal. Two firms, after observing the signal, decide to invest in information acquisition and then bid in a second-price auction. We assume that firms acquire information about different skills. In equilibrium, firms bid as if they had acquired two pieces of information despite that they acquire only one. Information differentiation allows firms to sidestep the Bertrand paradox and have positive utilities. We also discuss why information differentiation makes sense from the firms’ point of view. We discuss extensions where we test the robustness of our results.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2023-01-26
dc.format.extent35 páginas
dc.fuente.origenAutoarchivo
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/66437
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés ; S/I ; 1010172
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Heumann, Tibor ; 0000-0002-6963-199X ; 1156037
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Schmitz Condeza, Lucas Sebastián ; S/I ; 1045725
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.titleJob market signaling, information acquisition, and competitiones_ES
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados1010172
sipa.codpersvinculados1156037
sipa.codpersvinculados1045725
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3.13 Tesis magíster