Endogenous group reputation - A formal model

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dc.contributor.authorRodriguez Sickert, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorValenzuela Carvallo, Eduardo
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:38:42Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:38:42Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractWhen investment in individual reputation cannot solve contract incompleteness, group reputation becomes crucial to achieve social cooperation. In this article we develop a formal model in which the link between social pressure, group reputation formation and between groups trust is studied. Specifically, we model a transaction which involves trust as an asymmetric game. Additionally, we consider the operation of community-enforced sanctions within the group whose trustworthiness is required. We show that for a proportion high enough of honourable agents willing to sanction non-honourable peers, the optimal strategy of a selfish rational agent is to honour trust when placed in him and, therefore, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is one in which inter-group trust emerges. The required proportion of sanctioning agents depends negatively on the efficacy of the sanctioning technology and positively on the size of the opportunistic incentives faced by the agents whose trustworthiness is required. Even if the deterrence effect of social pressure is not strong enough, trust can emerge if the potential benefits from cooperation compensate the eventual harm associated with abused trust.
dc.format.extent13 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.eissn1988-429X
dc.identifier.issn0034-9712
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/77087
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000255719900010
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Administración;Rodríguez C;S/I;96511
dc.information.autorucSociología;Valenzuela E;S/I;58271
dc.issue.numero46
dc.language.isoes
dc.nota.accesoSin adjunto
dc.pagina.final217
dc.pagina.inicio205
dc.publisherCONSEJO SUPERIOR INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS-CSIC
dc.revistaREVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIA
dc.rightsregistro bibliográfico
dc.subjectgame theory
dc.subjecttrust
dc.subjectsocial norms
dc.subjectTRUST
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleEndogenous group reputation - A formal model
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen65
sipa.codpersvinculados96511
sipa.codpersvinculados58271
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.indexScopus
sipa.trazabilidadCarga SIPA;09-01-2024
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