Equilibrium Dynamics in Market Games with Exchangeable and Divisible Resources

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dc.catalogadorjlo
dc.contributor.authorCorrea, José
dc.contributor.authorHarks, Tobias
dc.contributor.authorSchedel, Anja
dc.contributor.authorVerschae Tannenbaum Jose Claudio
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-23T17:08:39Z
dc.date.available2024-05-23T17:08:39Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractWe study a market game with n ≥ 2 players competing over m ≥ 1 divisible resources of different finite capacities. Resources are traded via the proportional sharing mechanism, where players are price-anticipating, meaning that they can influence the prices with their bids. Additionally, each player has an initial endowment of the resources which are sold at market prices. Although the players’ total profit functions may be discontinuous in the bids, we prove existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibria of the resulting market game. Then, we study a discrete dynamic arising from repeatedly taking the (unique) equilibrium resource allocation as initial endowments for the next market game. We prove that the total utility value of the dynamic converges to either an optimal allocation value (maximizing total utility over the allocation space) or to a restricted optimal allocation value, where the restriction is defined by fixing some tight resources which are exclusively allocated to a single player. As a corollary, it follows that for strictly concave utility functions, the aggregated allocation vector of the dynamic converges to the unique (possibly restricted) optimal aggregated allocation, and for linear utility functions, we even get convergence of the dynamic to a (possibly restricted) optimal solution in the (non-aggregated) original allocation space.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2024-09-05
dc.format.extent22 páginas
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1137/1.9781611977912.20
dc.identifier.isbn978-1611977912
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/85761
dc.information.autorucFacultad de Matemáticas; Verschae Tannenbaum Jose Claudio; 0000-0002-2049-6467; 243006
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.pagina.final568
dc.pagina.inicio547
dc.relation.ispartofACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ddc510
dc.subject.deweyMatemática física y químicaes_ES
dc.titleEquilibrium Dynamics in Market Games with Exchangeable and Divisible Resources
dc.typecomunicación de congreso
sipa.codpersvinculados243006
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2024-05-20
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