Monopoly regulation with non-paying consumers

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dc.contributor.advisorBesfamille, Martin
dc.contributor.advisorSilva, Francisco Andre Alves da
dc.contributor.advisorSilva M., Hugo
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán Lizardo, León Felipe
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-30T15:17:53Z
dc.date.available2018-01-30T15:17:53Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2017
dc.description.abstractThis article studies the effects of delegation in a monopoly regulation context. A regulator, with welfare maximization objectives, fixes the price level and makes transfers to a monopolist who faces non-paying consumers. In a Full Information scenario, the regulator not only chooses the price and the transfers so as to maximize the social welfare, but is also able to decide the optimal investment in a costly anti-evasion technology. This situation, however, is unrealistic since usually the firm's know-how is required in order to undertake a successful investment. Therefore, under this context the best the regulator can do is to delegate the investment decision to the firm and try to induce high investment. It is shown that under certain conditions, delegation not only implies a lower level of anti-evasion technology, but also a lower price level than what is socially optimal. We show that this is true for different specifications of the firm's utility. Comparative statics exercises are done in the main exogenous parameters of the model.
dc.format.extent34 páginas
dc.identifier.doi10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/21496
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/21496
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/21496
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Besfamille, Martin ; 0000-0002-4073-3466 ; 1013292
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Silva, Francisco Andre Alves da ; S/I ; 1039370
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Silva M., Hugo ; S/I ; 1020528
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Guzmán Lizardo, León Felipe ; S/I ; 250097
dc.language.isoes
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.subject.otherTransporte - Modelos matemáticoses_ES
dc.titleMonopoly regulation with non-paying consumerses_ES
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados1013292
sipa.codpersvinculados1039370
sipa.codpersvinculados1020528
sipa.codpersvinculados250097
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