Information acquisition in an all-pay auction contest

Simple item page
dc.catalogadorpva
dc.contributor.advisorFigueroa González, Nicolás Andrés
dc.contributor.advisorHeumann, Tibor
dc.contributor.authorBarrientos Barrientos, Agustín Orlando
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-09T21:17:07Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.date.updated2023-08-09T20:52:27Z
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2023
dc.description.abstractWe develop a two-player all-pay auction model where an incumbent competes with an entrant. The incumbent’s valuation is publicly known, whereas the entrant’s valuation is unknown but has a publicly known prior distribution. However, before competing in the all-pay auction, the entrant can acquire additional information about his valuation through a learning experiment. This experiment enables him to learn his valuation perfectly, but we also allow for intermediate levels of information. We find that the entrant maximizes his expected payoff by perfectly learning his valuation. Furthermore, the entrant has a greater willingness to pay for information when competing against an incumbent with a similar ex-ante valuation, and a lesser willingness to pay for information when competing against a stronger or weaker incumbent. Nonetheless, the entrant is less willing to pay for information when he competes with a weaker incumbent than a stronger one. We then test the robustness of these results and find that the entrant’s perfect learning outcome is robust only for certain incumbent valuations.
dc.description.version2023-08-11
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2023-08-09
dc.format.extent49 páginas
dc.fuente.origenAutoarchivo
dc.identifier.doi10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/74380
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/74380
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/74380
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés ; S/I ; 1010172
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Heumann, Tibor ; 0000-0002-6963-199X ; 1156037
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Barrientos Barrientos, Agustín Orlando ; S/I ; 1045986
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subjectContestses_ES
dc.subjectAll-pay auctiones_ES
dc.subjectInformation acquisitiones_ES
dc.subjectCompetitiones_ES
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.titleInformation acquisition in an all-pay auction contestes_ES
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados1010172
sipa.codpersvinculados1156037
sipa.codpersvinculados1045986
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Tesis Final Agustín Barrientos.pdf
Size:
573.83 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
0 B
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download
Collections
3.13 Tesis magíster