TAKEOVERS IN THE WORLD AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL UNDER THE VARIOUS REGULATIONS IN FORCE
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Date
2015
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
FONDO CULTURA ECONOMICA
Abstract
We review the corporate takeover regulation in place in the world and find evidence that it is converging from the Market Rule (MR) towards the Equal Opportunity Rule (EOR). The literature on the economic rationale of these rules shows that the Private Benefits of Control (PBC) affect control changes; in particular, the EOR has the potential to preclude inefficient transfers but also to slow down the overall activity of the corporate control market. Jurfest, Paredes and Riutort (2015) proposes a model to estimate the PBC under the different regulations, nesting as a special case the well-known model of Block Premium Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004). In this paper we illustrate the applicability and consistency of this model to estimate the PBC under the different regulatory regimes in place and under alternative distributions of the bargaining power of the seller of control.
Description
Keywords
SHARE-ONE VOTE, CORPORATE-CONTROL, VOTING-RIGHTS, MARKET, GOVERNANCE, SHAREHOLDERS, EFFICIENT, SALES, RULE