A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part II: Case Studies

dc.contributor.authorMolina Castro, Juan David
dc.contributor.authorContreras, J.
dc.contributor.authorRudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-18T14:04:50Z
dc.date.available2022-05-18T14:04:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractThis paper is the second of a two-paper series and presents a model to assess and promote investment projects defined in a plan of expansion of the transmission. We propose a model that consists of three main elements: valuation of a project based on the design of a linear contract, a principal-agent model to assess the optimal effort of an agent, and the right-of-way negotiating cost. We also define a model to evaluate bids by the agents. The value of the project depends on the number of competitors, the incentives to invest, and the right-of-way costs. The right-of-way cost is approached from the perspective of a bilateral bargaining problem.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2201180
dc.identifier.eissn1558-0679
dc.identifier.issn0885-8950
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6238338
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2201180
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64114
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Molina Castro, Juan David ; S/I ; 181795
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Rudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh ; S/I ; 99167
dc.issue.numero1
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.pagina.final271
dc.pagina.inicio264
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.revistaIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectCost accounting
dc.subjectContracts
dc.subjectIndexes
dc.subjectInvestments
dc.subjectProductivity
dc.subjectResource management
dc.subjectCost function
dc.titleA Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion-Part II: Case Studieses_ES
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen28
sipa.codpersvinculados181795
sipa.codpersvinculados99167
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