Delegating environmental enforcement to private agents: The case of smog checks

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dc.catalogadorvdr
dc.contributor.advisorMontero Ayala, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.advisorGallego Yáñez, Francisco
dc.contributor.authorSkorin Uranga, Pedro Pablo
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2024-12-26T19:34:57Z
dc.date.available2024-12-26T19:34:57Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.date.updated2024-12-20T03:17:19Z
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2024
dc.description.abstractDelegating the enforcement of environmental norms to private agents has costs and benefits. Even if private agents do not compete, they may exercise lower than socially optimal enforcement efforts. This problem is exacerbated when they compete. We explore these questions using data from Chile’s smog (and safety) checks on passenger vehicles. We find strong reduced-form evidence that competition has prompted smog-check providers to relax their enforcement standards, approving cars that did not comply with the norms. This has increased pollution. On the other hand, competition has also shown to improve service quality, reducing inspection times. By looking at government-made changes to the level of competition in different locations, we also show that firms learn how to distort their pass rates and carry this learning across unrelated markets.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2024-12-20
dc.format.extent42 páginas
dc.fuente.origenAutoarchivo
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/89258
dc.information.autorucFacultad de Economía y Administración; Skorin Uranga, Pedro Pablo; 0000-0002-4508-6368; 1267949
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Montero Ayala, Juan Pablo; 0000-0002-6815-0158; 87534
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía; Gallego Yáñez, Francisco; 0000-0002-2252-891X; 94445
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.rights.licenseAtribución 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.subject.ods08 Decent work and economic growth
dc.subject.odspa08 Trabajo decente y crecimiento económico
dc.titleDelegating environmental enforcement to private agents: The case of smog checks
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados1267949
sipa.codpersvinculados87534
sipa.codpersvinculados94445
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