Symmetrical punishments, price wars and collusion in durable goods with imperfect public monitoring

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dc.contributor.advisorSanchez, José Miguel
dc.contributor.advisorMontero Ayala, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.advisorBobenrieth H., Eugenio S.
dc.contributor.authorIde Carvallo, Enrique Eduardo
dc.contributor.otherPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-13T19:29:44Z
dc.date.available2016-05-13T19:29:44Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.descriptionTesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012
dc.description.abstractIt is well-known that consumers' intertemporal incentives may play a key role on the potential of rms to sustain collusion. All previous e orts studying the topic however, assumed perfect observability of actions. I consider a stylized model of collusion in durable goods with imperfect public monitoring, and document a series of new insights. In particular, results indicate that \price wars" may be an ine ciently costly discipline mechanism even when compared to other strongly symmetrical punishments, as they induce consumers to delay purchases. This could have important implication on the election of punishment procedures by cartels, and in the characterization of optimal collusion schemes. JEL Classi cation Codes: L12, L13, D43.
dc.format.extent12 hojas
dc.identifier.doi10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/14986
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.7764/tesisUC/ECO/14986
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/14986
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Sanchez, José Miguel ; S/I ; 60564
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Montero Ayala, Juan Pablo ; 0000-0002-6815-0158 ; 87534
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Bobenrieth H., Eugenio S. ; 0000-0001-9899-4186 ; 1010081
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía ; Ide Carvallo, Enrique Eduardo ; S/I ; 170914
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.subject.otherCompetencia económicaes_ES
dc.subject.otherEmpresas - Aspectos económicoses_ES
dc.titleSymmetrical punishments, price wars and collusion in durable goods with imperfect public monitoringes_ES
dc.typetesis de maestría
sipa.codpersvinculados60564
sipa.codpersvinculados87534
sipa.codpersvinculados1010081
sipa.codpersvinculados170914
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