Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorRodriguez Sickert, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorGuzman, Ricardo Andres
dc.contributor.authorCardenas, Juan Camilo
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:06:06Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:06:06Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractWe model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting Our model to experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital27-03-2024
dc.format.extent13 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004
dc.identifier.eissn1879-1751
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/76114
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000257589900016
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía;Guzmán R;S/I;9735
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Administración;Rodríguez-Sickert C;S/I;96511
dc.issue.numero1
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.pagina.final227
dc.pagina.inicio215
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
dc.revistaJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectexperimental economics
dc.subjectsocial norms
dc.subjectinternalization of preferences
dc.subjectlearning
dc.subjectcommon pool resource games
dc.subjectPUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS
dc.subjectCOOPERATION
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleInstitutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen67
sipa.codpersvinculados9735
sipa.codpersvinculados96511
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.indexScopus
sipa.trazabilidadCarga SIPA;09-01-2024
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
2024-03-27. Institutions influence preferences - Evidence from a common pool resource experiment.pdf
Size:
2.52 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
Artículos de revistas