Audit threats and year-end spending by government agencies: experimental evidence from Chile

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dc.catalogadoraba
dc.contributor.authorEngel, Eduardo
dc.contributor.authorJordán Colzani, Felipe
dc.contributor.authorRau Binder, Tomás Andrés
dc.contributor.authorRepetto, Andrea
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-26T15:10:09Z
dc.date.available2024-09-26T15:10:09Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractPurpose: The paper aims to estimate the capacity of supreme audit institutions’ (SAIs) audits to deter potentially wasteful year-end procurement spending. It also studies heterogeneous responses to SAIs’ audits depending on whether agencies’ top managers are appointed through a competitive procedure or not. Design/methodology/approach: A letter signed by the head of Chile’s SAI was sent to a hundred randomly chosen agencies two weeks before the end of the fiscal year, with instructions on year-end spending accounting and an audit threat. In addition, a hundred agencies that did not receive the letter were used as a control group. Findings: Agencies that received the letter reduced year-end aggregate procurement spending by 33% relative to controls. Purchases of office supplies, safety equipment, personal care products and paper products experienced the most considerable reductions. The decrease in year-end spending was smaller for agencies with at least one top manager appointed through a competitive procedure. Research limitations/implications: A SAI’s audit threat significantly reduced year-end procurement spending. Larger reductions in agencies headed by political appointees and across categories of goods that have been flagged as likely to be purchased to exhaust the budget suggest the avoided expenditures would have been wasteful. Further research is needed to determine if the net social value of year-end procurement spending deterred by SAIs audits is negative as suggested. Social implications: This paper has implications for the institutional support of SAIs audits and civil service. Originality/value: This paper provides novel experimental evidence of SAIs’ audits’ deterrence power on public agencies’ year-end procurement spending.
dc.description.funderMIT Sloan
dc.description.funderUniversidad Adolfo Ibáñez
dc.description.funderUniversidad Diego Portales
dc.description.funderUniversidad de Chile
dc.format.extent24 páginas
dc.fuente.origenSIPA
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/JOPP-07-2022-0032
dc.identifier.eissn2150-6930
dc.identifier.issn1535-0118
dc.identifier.scopusidSCOPUS_ID:85147104248
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-07-2022-0032
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/87974
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000919736700001
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía; Jordán Colzani, Felipe; 0000-0002-8187-3860; 1271130
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía; Rau Binder, Tomás Andrés; 0000-0002-0964-0165; 1008831
dc.issue.numero1
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.pagina.final124
dc.pagina.inicio100
dc.publisherEmerald Publishing
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Procurement
dc.revistaJournal of Public Procurement
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectEfficiency
dc.subjectGovernance
dc.subjectPublic finance
dc.subjectRandomized control trials
dc.subjectRegulatory compliance
dc.subjectSocial value procurement
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.deweyEconomíaes_ES
dc.subject.ods16 Peace and Justice Strong Institutions
dc.subject.ods12 Responsible consumption and production
dc.subject.odspa16 Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
dc.subject.odspa12 Producción y consumo responsable
dc.titleAudit threats and year-end spending by government agencies: experimental evidence from Chile
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen23
sipa.codpersvinculados1271130
sipa.codpersvinculados1008831
sipa.trazabilidadSCOPUS;02-03-2023
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