Learning from lazy liars.
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Date
2019
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Abstract
This article studies a persuasion problem where biased experts acquires costly information in order to convince a decision maker (DM) to take their preferred action. The information acquired can not be falsified but it can always be concealed. This setting has been studied for preferences that are linear on the DM’s belief, Kartik et al. (2017) showed that adding experts is not necessary good for the DM because of strategic components, the DM might prefer to hire only one highly informed expert than two poorly informed. On this article I study if the timing of the hiring influences the effort decision and show that at least for the first expert, efforts remain as strategic substitutes when hired sequentially. However, I show that if experts are short lived and there is a long term DM, efforts become independent and full learning might be achieved when experts are hired sequentially. Finally I extend the analysis for other preferences.
Description
Tesis (Magíster en Economía)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2019