Auctioning adequacy in south america through long-term contracts and options: From classic pay-as-bid to multi-item dynamic auctions

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dc.contributor.authorMoreno Vieyra, Rodrigo Andrés
dc.contributor.authorBezerra, Bernardo
dc.contributor.authorBarroso, Luis A.
dc.contributor.authorMocarquer, S.
dc.contributor.authorRudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-17T15:57:22Z
dc.date.available2022-05-17T15:57:22Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractThe adequacy problem in electricity market is becoming a very important issue as there is neither theoretical proof nor practical evidence of correct delivering of sufficient and timely generation capacity when it is needed in a real (imperfect) environment. In contrast, classical market design seems to fail when facing high demand growth and/or large hydro share as seen in several Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Peru among others. Currently, various mechanisms have arisen across this region with the intention of stimulating energy procurement and new investment. These are mainly based on long-term contract and options obligations, which are allocated through auctions. Auction theory then becomes very important to ensure optimal allocation and efficient prices for both the new generation and the end user. However, difficulties arise when applying pure auction theory because basic hypotheses are not met by most electricity markets. The objective of this paper is to address and discuss the Latin American experience with auction design for long-term contracts focusing on practical design and theory. The different mechanisms and auctions for ensuring supply adequacy are listed along with theoretical justification as part of the potential solution for the adequacy problem that different economies have proposed.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/PES.2009.5275658
dc.identifier.isbn978-1424442416
dc.identifier.issn1932-5517
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/PES.2009.5275658
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5275658
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64082
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Moreno Vieyra, Rodrigo Andrés ; S/I ; 6689
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Mocarquer, S. ; S/I ; 4036
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Rudnick van de Wyngard, Hugh ; S/I ; 99167
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (2009 : Calgary, AB, Canadá)
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectSouth America
dc.subjectContracts
dc.subjectProcurement
dc.subjectElectricity supply industry
dc.subjectInvestments
dc.subjectCosts
dc.subjectPower generation
dc.subjectPower system economics
dc.subjectPower system planning
dc.subjectCapacity planning
dc.titleAuctioning adequacy in south america through long-term contracts and options: From classic pay-as-bid to multi-item dynamic auctionses_ES
dc.typecomunicación de congreso
sipa.codpersvinculados6689
sipa.codpersvinculados4036
sipa.codpersvinculados99167
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