Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBesfamille, Martin
dc.contributor.authorFigueroa González, Nicolás Andrés
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán, León
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-03T20:49:07Z
dc.date.available2022-06-03T20:49:07Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.date.updated2022-06-03T17:07:11Z
dc.description.abstractWe consider the regulation of a monopoly facing consumers that may evade payments, an important issue in public utilities. To maximize total surplus, the regulator sets the price and socially costly transfers, ensuring that the monopoly breaks-even. With costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. Under unit demand and fixed quality, price is independent of marginal cost, but increasing in the marginal cost of public funds. When quality is endogenous, we find sufficient conditions that imply a non-monotonic relation between price and marginal cost of public funds. We extend the model to consider non-unit demand and moral hazard.
dc.fuente.origenSIPA
dc.identifier.issn2364-1428
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2022/working-paper/fare-evasion-and-monopoly-regulation
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64308
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Besfamille, Martin ; 0000-0002-4073-3466 ; 1013292
dc.information.autorucInstituto de economía ; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés ; S/I ; 1010172
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.revistaCESifo Working Papers
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.subjectRegulación
dc.subjectMonopolio natural
dc.subjectEvasión
dc.subjectCosto marginal de los fondos públicos
dc.titleFare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados1013292
sipa.codpersvinculados1010172
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
cesifo1_wp9592.pdf
Size:
993.97 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
Artículos de revistas