Team-based incentives in transportation firms: An experiment

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dc.catalogadorgrr
dc.contributor.authorRamírez Garat, Vicente Nicolás
dc.contributor.authorGalilea, Patricia
dc.contributor.authorPoblete Lavanchy, Joaquin Jose
dc.contributor.authorSilva M., Hugo
dc.contributor.otherCEDEUS (Chile)
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-25T14:19:41Z
dc.date.available2024-09-25T14:19:41Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractProviding the right incentives to bus drivers has become an issue in many cities worldwide. Liberalization experiences and research have shown that high-powered incentives lead to safety hazards, lack of service in low-demand areas, and poor service quality. Fixed-wage schemes, common in tendered systems, are among the leading causes of increased fare evasion, as drivers do not control payment adequately. In a controlled experimental setting, we show that team-based incentives induce levels of effort similar to those provided by an individual pay-for -performance scheme but without undesirable operational decisions. We find that team contracts eliminate the conflict of interest between drivers, causing drivers to control the passengers' payment while maintaining more regular speeds. Consequently, reducing safety hazards and rushing through low-demand stops, avoiding excessive waiting times, and keeping a uniform distribution in the passenger load. These characteristics are absent in the individual contract and are a crucial part of the quality of service.
dc.format.extent12 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.tra.2022.07.012
dc.identifier.eissn1879-2375
dc.identifier.issn0965-8564
dc.identifier.urihttp://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2022.07.012
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/87947
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000861648600001
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Ramírez Garat, Vicente Nicolás; S/I; 223005
dc.information.autorucFacultad de Economía y Administración; Poblete Lavanchy, Joaquin Jose; S/I; 4355
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía; Silva M., Hugo ; 0000-0003-0307-2686; 1020528
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.revistaTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectIncentives
dc.subjectContracts schemes
dc.subjectTeams
dc.subjectPublic transport
dc.subject.ddc380
dc.subject.deweyComunicación y transportees_ES
dc.titleTeam-based incentives in transportation firms: An experiment
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen164
sipa.codpersvinculados223005
sipa.codpersvinculados4355
sipa.codpersvinculados1020528
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2022-10-11
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