Browsing by Author "Alvarado Marambio, José Tomas"
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- ItemBy Way of Conclusion: (Neo) Platonism(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasThis last chapter offers an overview of what has been argued through the book. The ontology defended is one in which in the fundamental level there are only transcendent universals and their instantiations. Everything else is grounded on these basic categories of entities. Universals have priority over particular instantiations, though, because transcendent universals are independent of those instantiations. Following the characterization of ‘emergence’ by Barnes, particular objects are emergent from universals.
- ItemIdentity Conditions for Transcendent Universals(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasIt has been argued above that it is essential for a universal the nomological relations into which they enter. Even more, it has been argued that there is just a unique nomic network of necessary existence. Nevertheless, some have maintained that the conditions of identity for universals that result from these ideas are incoherent. It is explained here that this problem of incoherence can be dealt with, but assuming that the nomic structure is ontologically prior to the universals that enter in it. Universals are nodes in this unique necessary nomic structure.
- ItemSubstrata and Bundles(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasAfter the defense of Platonic universals it is necessary to consider how are particulars to be conceived, given that their characters are grounded in what universals those particulars instantiate. There have been traditionally two great alternatives for understanding the nature of particular objects. Under one alternative the ‘particularity’ of a particular is dependent on a substratum that is the subject of instantiation of different universals and its principle of unity. Under other alternative, particulars are ‘bundles’ or ‘collections’ of properties, either universals or tropes. This chapter examines the problems that these traditional conceptions face. On the one hand, it is argued that the difficulties leveled against substrata are not compelling. On the other hand, it is argued that the difficulties affecting the theories of particular objects as bundles of properties seem to demand structures of ontological dependence, like those postulated by Husserl in his idea of ‘pregnant wholes’.
- ItemThe Nuclear Theory of Trope Bundles(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasThe previous chapter has discussed the main alternatives for the conception of particular objects. The problems that affect theories of trope-bundles have led to the idea of ‘pregnant wholes’ originally proposed by Husserl. This chapter considers in more detail the ‘nuclear’ theory of pregnant wholes defended by Peter Simons in a series of works. The nuclear theory preserves the advantages of the ‘pregnant wholes’ and correct some of its problems. Nevertheless, the nuclear theory faces important additional complications. On the one hand, it has to face the problem of ‘substantial change’. On the other hand, nuclear bundles of tropes are built by connections of ontological dependence between tropes, but these connections violate basic requirements of irreflexivity, asymmetry and transitivity.
- ItemThe Reformed Nuclear Theory(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasThis chapter discusses the ‘reformed’ nuclear theory of trope bundles. The main difference of the reformed theory with the theory considered above is that the nucleus of a bundle is constituted by a unique nuclear trope. The reformed nuclear theory does not require a relation of ontological dependence with especial, non-standard characteristics. Even more, the unique nuclear trope is a substratum. The reformed nuclear theory is, then, a conception in which particular objects are, at the same time, a bundle of tropes, and have a substratum. Finally, structural nuclear bundles are considered in connection to the requirements that have motivated forms of ‘ontic structural realism’ in philosophy of physics.
- ItemThe Superiority of Universals Over Classes of Tropes(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasThe second alternative to universals that is considered in this work is the ontology of classes of tropes. Defenders of these ontologies have sustained that classes of tropes are free from the problems that affect resemblance nominalism while still evading universal entities. It is argued here that these supposed advantages are illusory. Resemblance classes of tropes have the same difficulties of resemblance classes of objects, because the relation of resemblance relevant is also in this case ‘external’ to tropes. Besides, an ontology of tropes without universals is inadequate for an actualist modal metaphysics. If resemblance classes of tropes are substituted with ‘natural’ classes, the situation does not improve.
- ItemThe Superiority of Universals over Theological Nominalism(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasThe third alternative to universals discussed in this work is theological nominalism. This form of nominalism postulates concepts in the mind of God to replace universals. There are many advantages of this position over regular concept nominalism. Nevertheless, it is argued here that the conception seems unfeasible if one supposes divine simplicity. It is also affected by a problem of regress specific to this form of nominalism. The chapter finally considers if Platonic universals are incompatible with divine aseity. They are not.
- ItemTheoretical Roles for Universals(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasUniversals have been traditionally postulated because they can satisfy certain theoretical functions. Universals supposedly explain why different objects have the ‘same’ nature (the one over many problem), why the same object has different natures (the many over one problem), why different objects are objectively similar, why objects have the causal powers they have, what are natural laws, and why our epistemic practices of induction seem reliable. This chapter presents these theoretical roles for universals. Of course, those who reject universals argue that other entities can satisfy the same functions. If those alternatives are acceptable, though, depends on their aptitude to play the explanatory role of universals.
- ItemTranscendent Universals and Modal Metaphysics(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasThis chapter is the first of the Part Two of the book in which Platonic universals are defended. Here it is argued that only transcendent universals are adequate for an actualist modal metaphysics. This argumentation requires a detailed examination of how transcendent universals work in comparison to immanent universals in each of the main actualist conceptions of possible worlds: possible worlds as maximal structural universals, possible worlds as set-theoretic ‘combinations’ of objects and universals, and possible worlds as ‘complete’ maximally consistent novels. In all cases it results that the supposition that only instantiated universals exist is unable to explain the metaphysical possibilities concerning ‘alien’ properties.
- ItemTranscendent Universals and Natural Laws(2020) Alvarado Marambio, José TomasOne of the theoretical functions attributed to universals is to work as natural laws – or, at least, to be something on which natural laws are dependent. It is argued in this chapter that only transcendent universals can satisfy this theoretical function. Transcendent universals have been postulated as constituents of natural laws since 1977 by Michael Tooley. The cases presented by Tooley are discussed and generalized. Functional laws are not of use for Aristotelians to explain those cases. On the contrary, functional laws are an additional reason to postulate Platonic universals. Finally, it is considered whether there is a unique nomic structure invariant through all possible worlds.