Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation
link https://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64308account_box Besfamille, Martinaccount_box Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrésaccount_box Guzmán, León
Comparte este registro
We consider the regulation of a monopoly facing consumers that may evade payments, an important issue in public utilities. To maximize total surplus, the regulator sets the price and socially costly transfers, ensuring that the monopoly breaks-even. With costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. Under unit demand and fixed quality, price is independent of marginal cost, but increasing in the marginal cost of public funds. When quality is endogenous, we find sufficient conditions that imply a non-monotonic relation between price and marginal cost of public funds. We extend the model to consider non-unit demand and moral hazard.
Registro Sencillo
Registro Completo
| Autor | Besfamille, Martin Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés Guzmán, León |
| Título | Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation |
| Revista | CESifo Working Papers |
| ISSN | 2364-1428 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2022 |
| Resumen | We consider the regulation of a monopoly facing consumers that may evade payments, an important issue in public utilities. To maximize total surplus, the regulator sets the price and socially costly transfers, ensuring that the monopoly breaks-even. With costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. Under unit demand and fixed quality, price is independent of marginal cost, but increasing in the marginal cost of public funds. When quality is endogenous, we find sufficient conditions that imply a non-monotonic relation between price and marginal cost of public funds. We extend the model to consider non-unit demand and moral hazard. |
| Derechos | acceso abierto |
| Enlace | https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2022/working-paper/fare-evasion-and-monopoly-regulation |
| Palabra clave | Regulación Monopolio natural Evasión Costo marginal de los fondos públicos |
| Tipo de documento | artículo |