Consequences of theoretically modelling the mind as a computer
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2017
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Abstract
The computational theory of mind holds that the mind is a computer. It does not restrict how the computer is to be programmed, but provides a metatheoretical framework for particular theories to propose different ways in which computer systems can support mentalprocesses. It also functions as a claim about the nature of the mind. Its main goal is to explain mental phenomena based on computational processes.This work argues that well known limitations of computers require more attention in order to understand the possibilities and limitations of the computational theory of mind itself. To that end, a revision of the Turing halting problem and Gödel’s incomplenteness theorems is included as a foundation for arguments about what computational models of the mind could and could not achieve.Contrary to traditional images,computational procedures can be diverse,flexible,adaptable, and deal with the uncertain in successful ways. Therefore, naive criticism of the computational theory of mind could be misplaced. We argue that the main limitations that computational modeling imposes on psychology are: that some important questions have no general answer; that theories are underdetermined by evidence in important ways; and that theories cannot answer specific questions about the nature of their object of study. We also show that the same limitations apply to any theory that restricts itself to making systematic predictions based on finite observations.
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Tesis (Doctor en Psicología)--Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2017