THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUSSERL’S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS FOR REALIST PHENOMENOLOGY AND A CRITIQUE OF SEVERAL ‘HUSSERLIAN’ THESSES ON PHENOMENOLOGY.

In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Publication of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900/01-2000/01)

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I. FOREWORD WHAT IS “REALIST PHENOMENOLOGY” AND WHERE DID IT ORIGINATE?

With as least as much right as Dostoyevski could say of the Russian “realist” novelists of the 19th century, “We all come out of the same cloak” (by Nikolai Gogol), we phenomenologists, and, in particular as well, we realist phenomenologists, for whom this work is the most important of Husserl, state: “We all come out of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations” (1900/01).

In the following paper, I will use the expressions “realist phenomenology” and “phenomenological realism” without any difference in meaning. One could, of course, make such a distinction and mean, for instance, with realist phenomenology a form of phenomenology that has

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realist foundations or even non-evident realist, basic convictions or presuppositions – in contradistinction perhaps to a “transcendental phenomenology” that would be considered more critical and presuppositionless¹. This is in no way meant, in any case with regard to the assumption of unfounded realist presuppositions, since we are starting from the conviction that the foundations of philosophical realism and of every philosophy have to show themselves from the things themselves. With “phenomenological realism” we mean even less a philosophy which maintains the reality of “phenomenological entities” or of phenomenology itself (such as “mathematical realism” which asserts the reality of mathematical objects), which in our case would hardly make any sense. What is meant rather is such a phenomenology of essence and being, the object of which does not result from being posited or constructed, but which shows and reveals itself of itself in its own objective nature or real existence, which may be, in the case of manifold appearances, aspects and perspectives, constituted by the subject but in many other cases is entirely independent of the subject and yet shows itself to the subject in its transcendent intrinsic necessity or real existence.

The expression “realist phenomenology” refers further to the philosophy of a large group of thinkers who do not agree with each other on all points, who also do not necessarily all start from the Logical Investigations, but whose “movement” in its earlier and present day forms finds its most prominent starting point, or at least a classical expression, in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, above all in the Prolegomena.

One must, of course, not fail to recognize also the pre-Husserlian roots of this movement in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and in the great philosopher from Prague who was highly esteemed by Husserl, Bernard Bolzano², whose logical objectivism and Platonism of the “propositions in themselves” had a deep influence on the Logical Investigations that Husserl himself emphasized expressly; and, above all, in Franz Brentano. Especially Franz Brentano’s discoveries of objective, undeniable evidence and certainty of knowledge; his rediscovery of the intentionality of consciousness, which had in principle been recognized already by Scholasticism; and his fight against every reductionism regarding the concepts of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, as well as his fundamentally

intense and positive relation to Aristotle, and in general to the *philosophia perennis*. exercised great influence on the development of phenomenology in general, and, in particular, on that of realist phenomenology³.

This influence of Brentano on realist phenomenology must be emphasized although one cannot fail to note that, even concerning the achievements of his philosophy that were just mentioned, there are essential differences between Brentano’s philosophy and that of realist phenomenologists (not only in its form of the “Göttingen” or “Munich school of Phenomenology”⁴, but also in the form in which Husserl defended an objectivist phenomenology in *Logical Investigations*). For instance, intentionality in the Munich school of phenomenology is no longer claimed as a universal characteristic of the psychic as it is in Brentano’s thesis of a perfect congruence of the psychic and the intentional. Husserl already critically modifies this thesis in the *Logical Investigations* by allowing for non-intentional, conscious experiences⁵.

The Munich school of phenomenology also distinguishes itself from other phenomenological trains of thought as well as from Edmund Husserl in that it holds the relation to an *I* interpreted as real subject and real center of acting (Scheler) to be a decisive characteristic of the psychic. Precisely the area of problems connected with such distinctions within different phenomenological philosophies is presently being investigated in Russia and Liechtenstein⁶.

When one emphasizes the fundamental significance of the *Logical Investigations* for the origin of phenomenological realism, one should

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³ Mainly the following works of Brentano exerted great influence on realist phenomenology: *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, introd. and ed. by Oskar Kraus, unchanged Reprint of 4th Ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1955); *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Vol. 1-2, ed. O. Kraus, unchanged reprint of the edition of 1924 (first edition 1874). (Hamburg, 1955); *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg i.B., 1862; reprinted Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960). The last work also had a great impact on Martin Heidegger, as he emphasizes in various passages, for example in his *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, ¹967).

⁴ For this school names such as Moritz Geiger, Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfländer, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein and Dietrich von Hildebrand stand.


⁶ Cf. For example the Masters thesis of Mr. Vitalij Kurennoj, “Die Münchener Phänomenologie”. 
further not leave out of consideration the fact that Max Scheler already developed very similar thoughts at the same time as Edmund Husserl, even two years prior to the Logical Investigations, so that a dispute arose between Husserl and Scheler as to who had been the founder of the phenomenological movement: a dispute which it may never be possible to settle entirely, but which, based purely on the dates of their respective works, turns out in Max Scheler's favor, and based on the objective force of analysis and influence is in Husserl's favor. Alexander Pfänder also comes into consideration with his Phänomenologie des Wollens (Phenomenology of Willing) as a simultaneous co-founder of phenomenology\(^7\). One could also want to discover still older foundations of a realist phenomenology in Vladimir Solov'ev and other Russian thinkers. (Scheler refers to interesting examples of phenomenology in Russian philosophy)\(^8\).

Added to this is the fact that, as most members of the Göttingen Circle already stressed, it was actually, although he was the pupil of Husserl, more Adolf Reinach through his irresistible clarity and his pedagogical talent than Edmund Husserl who should be seen as the actual teacher and founder of the absolute phenomenological objectivism, and who fundamentally restructured the philosophy of his master and interpreted it in a Platonic-Augustinian sense\(^9\).

A still more significant help in the attempt to understand the essence and roots of realist phenomenology is the recognition that realist phenomenology, which does not aim at being a narrow, new

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\(^8\) Max Scheler, "Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie", Die Weißen Blätter, 1, 8, 1914, pp. 860-861; and in: Max Scheler, Politisch-Pädagogische Schriften, Gesammelte Werke Vol. 4 (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1982), pp. 611-612. This work is an interesting book-review of a big comprehensive work by Th. G. Masaryk (of 900 pp.).

\(^9\) Edith Stein and many others emphasized this. Breda attributed al a congress in Munich in 1971 entitled "The Munich School of Phenomenology", on the occasion of the 100\(^{th}\) birthday of Alexander Pfänder, the Platonic and Augustinian influences within phenomenology chiefly to Reinach and denied that they are found already in Husserl's Logical Investigations. While this appears to be a strong exaggeration, certainly it is true that Reinach was more consistently Platonic than Husserl.
philosophical school, but rather a comprehensive *philosophia perennis*, is in no way exclusively indebted to Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler or other thinkers of our century and the previous one (for instance also to Bernard Bolzano); but is rather built on the philosophical insights which were won in the spirit of such a realist phenomenology by earlier classical and medieval philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, René Descartes, and so on. Realist phenomenology strives for nothing other than to be simple, good, objective and methodologically well thought out philosophy which fulfills the eternal task of philosophy: to return to “things themselves” and to investigate them without any trace of reductionism and violation of what is given. Every thinker who has done this, and to the degree that he has done this, belongs to this “school”, which actually only represents a newly formulated ideal of “eternal philosophy”, that at the same time can be regarded as an ideal picture of realist phenomenology. Balduin Schwarz, the most comprehensive historian among the realist phenomenologists, formulates this ideal, the far-reaching realization of which he ascribes to Thomas Aquinas, in the following way:

It is the incomparable contribution of St. Thomas that he approached the intellectual situation of his time with no other question than the question of truth. In the mere defense of a tradition, with reference to its greatness, to the authorities that stand behind it, such an elementary occurrence as the becoming apparent of new aspects of reality is not to be captured. Thomas...loved truth absolutely and was convinced of its unity; and so he began the colossal task of scrutinizing of his opponent, ... the clarification, reshaping, and restructuring of Aristotle; at the same time, however, also a penetrating analysis of the Augustinian teaching, in order to finally fit everything into the unity of one single, great *corpus veritatis*. Not relinquishing anything of the truth, never thinking of parties and schools of thought, ready to learn from someone else, not forgetting any detail over the whole, and seeing everything in its connection with incomparable perception, proceeding with care and magnanimity of spirit, sensitive to every nuance, his gaze directed unwaveringly towards the *totum*, progressing steadily, never hesitating or getting caught up in pa-

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10 For Plato, Reinach pointed this out repeatedly, and I tried to show this in the following works: Josef Seifert, *Ritornare a Platone. Im Anhang eine unveröffentlichte Schrift Adolf Reinachs*, ed., introd. and trans. by Giuseppe Girgenti. Collana Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi, vol.
tial aspects, the genius of the Summa came to be, a peak of human existence..."}


11 The German text continues here:

Nun aber war wieder ein umfassendes Bild gegeben, in dem alles bisher Erkannte an seinem richtigen Ort stand, sein Gewicht besaß, so wie es ihm zukommt, und in dem es in seiner Verbindung und seinem Anderssein gegenüber allem übrigen deutlich war. ... Thomas... repräsentiert in der Geistesgeschichte die guten, wahrhaft lebendigen Kräfte, die ein Mensch in sich erweckt, wenn er etwas hineinnimmt in sein Leben,
This ideal of fitting all insights into one *corpus veritatis*—nothing more, nothing less—is the ideal of the movement that is characterized here as realist phenomenology. This movement believes, however, that it has one decisive advantage at its disposal in the accomplishment of this task: a rigorous and deeply worked out method of phenomenological research in the service of the knowledge of "things themselves".

I have introduced the term "Realist Phenomenology" in place of the earlier and rather purely historical descriptions such as the "Göttingen School of Phenomenology" or "Göttingen Circle", "Munich School of Phenomenology", "Munich-Göttingen-School", "Early Phenomenology", etc., expressions which are misleading because this school exists in many countries until today and because the geographic origins of the school are not only many, but also insignificant for the nature of this movement and for its own self-understanding. These descriptions impose geographical or temporal restrictions, which do not touch upon the essence of this movement that has existed from 1900 till today and extends over the *Logical Investigations* from Adolf Reinach.

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12 The Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists might have called themselves objectivists or realists, or could have easily called themselves this way, but did not see themselves as bound to some geographic location or to some early phase of phenomenology. It seems to me that the term "Munich Phenomenology" does not only assign to the city of Munich (instead of Göttingen, Crakow and others) too dominant a role, which is historically speaking incorrect, but that there is also the danger to identify certain accidental features of Alexander Pfänder's or Moritz Geiger's method with the essence of this philosophy, as this was done for example in H. Spiegelberg's lecture 1971 during the Congress "The Munich Phenomenology" and also in his well-known work, *The Phenomenological Movement*. Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 2 vol, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

Alexander Pfänder\textsuperscript{14}, Johannes Daubert\textsuperscript{15}, Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Roman Ingarden till the present time.

For different reasons, other descriptions of this movement are misleading because some of them, such as objectivist philosophy, are too broad, others are only fitting for part of this realist phenomenological movement and sound too esoteric, such as the description proposed by Fritz Wenisch in two excellent works: “Chreontology”, a methodologically well-founded analysis of necessary essences, as distinct from “Chreontic Philosophy” as a philosophy which actually analyses necessary essences regardless of whether or not it is based on a clearly worked out methodology\textsuperscript{16}. It seems to me, with regards to the last description\textsuperscript{17}, that realist phenomenology cannot be sufficiently characterized as the philosophy of the objectively necessary (\textit{tò chréon}), since this does not take into consideration the different existential dimensions of the same, or, at least (if the expression is understood in the sense of a mere “pars pro toto”), the central importance of existential analysis.

Moreover, I regard the expression “realist phenomenology” in what is to follow as the description of a philosophical ideal that was only realized in part in its historical appearances. And the following exposition pertains more to this ideal than to its historical realization.

Despite diverse critical remarks we are going to make concerning the significance of Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations} and the works of other thinkers in relation to the origin of the ideal, comprehensive form of realist phenomenology, the importance of Edmund Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations}, as emphasized at the outset, remains immense. This importance should, of course, not be exaggerated and not at all be

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. especially Alexander Pfänder, \textit{Logik}, cit..


\textsuperscript{17} Cf. also Fritz Wenisch, “Insight and Objective Necessity - A Demonstration of the Existence of Propositions Which Are Simultaneously Informative and Necessarily True?”, \textit{Aletheia} 4 (1988), pp. 107-197.
understood in a dogmatic fashion as if deviations from Edmund Husserl's own thoughts, even from those of his early period of the Logical Investigations, constitute an abandoning of phenomenology or a kind of disloyalty towards the master. For if the only ideal is the truth, then true faithfulness to Husserl, who likewise only sought the truth, also includes criticism wherever truth demands it.

Both the positive significance as well as the limitations of the Logical Investigations for a true philosophy in this sense can best be established through a short survey of some of the most essential elements of phenomenological realism (which I understand in the following in its ideal, complete form, which is, of course, not embodied entirely in any individual thinker of this group of philosophers, and incidentally is scarcely recognized, let alone taken into consideration and appreciated in its importance, even by the best known authorities on phenomenology)\textsuperscript{18}. In the framework of such a sketch of the core of "phenomenological realism", the most essential contributions of the Logical Investigations of Edmund Husserl must be taken into consideration.

II. ELEMENTS OF "REALIST PHENOMENOLOGY"

1. "Back to the Things!"

A first and most essential element of phenomenology had already been clearly formulated by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, from whom the expression Urphänomen (arch-phenomenon), which Husserl had probably adopted from him, stems, is the motto of Husserl: "Back to Things" or "Back to Things Themselves!" Goethe insists that when we encounter an ultimate Urphenomenon, we must not seek to explain it any further by other things but yet have an important work to do in clarifying such archphenomena and work at their elucidation. He complains that authors normally fail to do just that, and hence distort these phenomena by their futile attempts at reductionist explanations. Thus he writes:

\textsuperscript{18} See Herbert Spiegelberg, \textit{(The Phenomenological Movement,} cit.), who, though himself a member of the Pfänder-School and a faithful adherent of his master, reduced the significance of realist phenomenology more or less to a few and rather obscure methodological principles and contributions to ethics. See also Robert Sokolowski, \textit{Introduction to Phenomenology}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 211-212.
Even if one were to encounter such an *Urphenomenon*, there remains the evil that one does not want to acknowledge it as such, and that one is looking behind it and above it for some other thing, whereas we should confess here that we have reached the end-point of such looking\textsuperscript{19}.

And elsewhere he adds:

The highest thing at which man can arrive... is the sense of wonder, and when an *Urphenomenon* provokes wonder in him, he should be content; for it cannot accord him anything higher than that, and he should not look for anything higher behind it; for here is the limit. But to humans the sight of an *Urphenomenon* is normally not sufficient, they think, one has to go farther than that, and they resemble children, who, when they have looked into the mirror, turn it right away around, in order so see what is on the other side\textsuperscript{20}.

The formulation of the character of archphenomena (*Urphänomen*), which cannot be explained by anything outside themselves, which the scientist "should allow to stand there in their eternal tranquility and glory" and which the philosopher should let enter into his region\textsuperscript{21}, makes Goethe a forerunner of the phenomenological method of returning to things themselves\textsuperscript{22}. In writing the following things, he sets up for us a high ideal of a philosophy that is faithful to ultimate data, without attempting to reduce the irreducible phenomenon to anything else:

We believe to deserve the thankfulness of the philosopher for having attempted to pursue the phenomena up till their original sources (*Urque-
llen), up till the point where they do nothing but manifest themselves and are, and where it is impossible to explain anything beyond in them...\textsuperscript{23}

He [the philosopher] ought to form for himself a method which is adequate to intuition (\textit{eine Methode, die dem Anschauen gemäß ist}); he should avoid carefully to transform the intuition into concepts, and the concept into words, and then to operate with these words as if they were things...\textsuperscript{720} ... the philosopher accepts from the physicist's hands some last thing which with him now becomes a first thing\textsuperscript{24}.

Elsewhere in his \textit{Theory of Colors}\textsuperscript{25}, Goethe speaks of the \textit{Urphantomene}, saying that they reveal themselves only to an intuitive knowledge and that "nothing on the order of their [self-]appearing lies above them"\textsuperscript{26}. It becomes quickly clear, however, that—in spite of the magnificent things Goethe says about the archphenomena that lend themselves to philosophical analysis— for Goethe many phenomena in nature, such as the \textit{Granit} or the \textit{magnet}, are archphenomena which in the strict philosophical sense of necessary intelligible essences are not irreducible archphenomena\textsuperscript{27}. To use a felicitous expression in Heidegger's \textit{Being and Time} \textsection 7, we may say that they can only "show themselves from themselves".

But Goethe also insists on the same fundamental feature of the phenomenological method which Reinach insists upon: hardly anything is a harder labor than to elucidate these archphenomena, without reducing them to something else. And it is hard work to identify the essential marks of such irreducible phenomena\textsuperscript{28}.

The principle "back to things themselves", which intends primarily these \textit{urphenomena} and directs itself against all premature systematization, against all constructive tendencies of the human

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Farbenlehre}, ibid., Introduction, Vol. 37, p. 9 (my own translation).

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Farbenlehre}, ibid., V. Abtheilung, Nr. 716, 720, Vol. 37, pp. 232-233.

\textsuperscript{25} ibid., Nr. 175, Vol. 37, p. 67. There are many other texts where Goethe speaks of archphenomena.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Farbenlehre}, ibid., Nr. 175, Vol. 37, p. 67: "Wir nennen sie \textit{Urphantomene}, weil nichts in der Erscheinung über ihnen liegt..."

\textsuperscript{27} For example \textit{Farbenlehre}, ibid., Vol. 37, Nr. 247, p. 90, where he calls light and darkness archphenomena. See also this and other texts of Goethe from his \textit{Farbenlehre} and Leisegang's commentary on Goethe's concept of \textit{Urphantomen} and \textit{Grundphantomen} in Hans Leisegang, \textit{Goethes Denken} (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1932), pp. 157-159; 168 f.

\textsuperscript{28} See \textit{Farbenlehre}, ibid., Nr. 177, Vol. 37, p. 68.
intellect\textsuperscript{29}, but especially against the reductionist philosophical theories and, above all, the subjectivist reductionisms in face of the arch given data/urphenomenon of an objective nature, was developed by Edmund Husserl in a masterly and exemplary manner in the \textit{Prolegomena} of the \textit{Logical Investigations}, but also in most of the \textit{Logical Investigations} themselves.

Let us point out several examples of the realization of this ideal of "back to things!" Think, for instance, of the discovery of consciousness and the irreducibility of objects of intentional acts to these acts themselves and their immanent real constituent parts; or of the distinction between signs, linguistic "expression", and logical "meaning" in the first \textit{Logical Investigation}; as well as of Husserl's brilliant refutation of every form of tracing logical laws and principles, such as the principle of contradiction, back to psychological ones\textsuperscript{30}.

In a similar way, Reinach established that social acts, that is to say the claims and obligations arising out of the social act of making a promise or contract, cannot be traced back to subjective moments like feelings and their objects\textsuperscript{31}. Promises can also never be traced back to other acts such as declarations of the will or of intentions\textsuperscript{32}. Similarly, Roman Ingarden fought against every subjectivist and psychologistic reductionism in the interpretation of a work of art and of the values of the same, but also in the interpretation of being\textsuperscript{33}, in which area he was


\textsuperscript{33} Roman Ingarden, \textit{Das literarische Kunstwerk}. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft (Halle: Max Niemeyer,
followed by Hedwig Conrad-Martius\textsuperscript{34}. With regard to values and the moral sphere, but also the phenomenon of love, above all Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand demonstrated the absolute untenability of every such reductionism, as it is found in American emotivism and in diverse forms of value relativism, of love to sexual desires, as well as of values to emotions, etc.\textsuperscript{35} Also Scheler’s brilliant proof of the impossibility of tracing morality or justice, and especially love, and the specific Christian form of love, back to resentment, as Friedrich Nietzsche attempts, and similar intuitions of Siegfried Johannes Hamburger are to be emphasized here. In a remarkable way, Scheler, in his battle against Nietzsche’s false reductionism, simultaneously takes up Nietzsche’s insights into pseudo morals which are just disguised forms of resentment, and develops a valid form of reduction that is called for by phenomenology, a reduction of only apparently contradictory moral phenomena\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{34} Hedwig Conrad-Martius, \textit{Das Sein} (München: Kösel, 1957).


So there was carried out in realist phenomenology with special methodological stringency what great philosophers of all times, at least in their valid and deepest insights, have embodied: a genuine, rigorous penetrating into the logos of things themselves and a rejection of the “nothing but method”, that is to say, of all attempts to explain an $x$ through an $a$ or a $y$, ... which is precisely not $x$.

2. Strict Objectivism and the Absoluteness of Truth Presupposed by Every Deception and Every Relativism

A second factor of phenomenological realism is connected with the principle “Back to Things Themselves”: the strict objectivism of the same, which resists every Kantian tendency to subjectivize the truth, as Adolf Reinach pointed out with particular clarity. This is true, however, of most realist phenomenologists; indeed it constitutes perhaps the most important ground they have in common.

Husserl expresses the insight into the objectivity of truth in a magnificent passage in the Logical Investigations thus:

What is true, is absolute, is true “in itself”; the truth is identically one, whether it is grasped in a judgment by humans or non-humans, angels or gods. The logical laws and all of us speak of truth in this ideal unity, as opposed to the diversity of races, individuals, and experiences, if we are not confused, for instance, by relativism.  

Husserl begins his criticism of relativism with the insight into the essence of truth, from which the absurdity of someone speaking of truth follows:

...and, in fact, to speak of truth for this or that person is nonsensical. The possibility which leaves open that the same content of a judgment (we say in a dangerous equivocation: the same judgment) is both true and false according to who is making the judgment, is absurd.

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Husserl proves the absurdity of the thesis that a creature of another species would not be bound by the highest logical principles\textsuperscript{39}. "Truth for a species" is in principle just as nonsensical as "individual relativism", which strives to set a truth for one individual against that for another:

Individual relativism is such an obvious, and, I would almost like to say, brazen skepticism, that it, if ever at all, certainly has not been held seriously in more recent times ... The subjectivist ... cannot be convinced if he... is lacking in the disposition to recognize that propositions, such as the principle of contradiction, are grounded in the bare meaning of truth; and that, according to them, talk of a subjective truth which is one thing for one person and the opposite for another must be regarded as nonsensical\textsuperscript{40}.

Husserl demonstrates that relativism in every form, including also "specific relativism" which tries to relativize the truth to man as such, amounts to changing the meaning of the word "truth", yes, to reinterpreting its essence and to contradicting the absolute essence of truth.

Consequently, relativism comes down to totally changing the meaning of the word truth, but still makes the claim to speaking of truth in that sense which is established through the logical principles, and which we all exclusively mean when truth is spoken of\textsuperscript{41}.

Husserl recognizes most clearly in the \textit{Logical Investigations} that the truth of judgments cannot possibly have its source in the constitution of the human species or of any other species. If truth had its roots in the constitution of man, then it would not exist at all \textit{without} this constitution. Such an assertion is nonsensical, for the proposition (and here Husserl is completely Augustinian!) "There is no truth" is equivalent to the proposition "The truth exists that there is no truth". The absurdity of the thesis demands the absurdity of the hypothesis\textsuperscript{42}.

In all of this Husserl is also quite Augustinian and Bonaventurian. Augustine insists, like Husserl, on the contradiction and absurdity of the negation of the existence of truth. And so does Bonaventure, in many stunningly brilliant texts and defenses of his theses.

Cf. also Josef Seifert, “Bonaventuras Interpretation der augustinischen These vom notwendigen Sein der Wahrheit”, Franziskanische Studien 59 (1977), 38-52.

Augustine, Soliloquia II, II, 2:
Ergone interisse veritatem verum non erit? Si non erit verum, non ergo interit. Si verum erit, unde post occasum veritatis verum erit, cum jam veritas nulla est? A. Nihil habeo quid plus cogitem atque considerem.

Bonaventura, In Hexaëmeron (IV, 1), Bonaventura, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia, edita studio et cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, ad Claras Aquas (Quarracchi) ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventura, 10 volumina (1882-1902), V, 349:
Lux animae veritatem ponat; haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat: quia, si veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse: ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, ergo verum est, veritatem esse: ergo si veritas non est, veritas est.


“Veritas autem est incorruptibilis... cum sit talis naturae, quod ipsa negatio veritatis veritatem ponat”, Bonaventura, II Sententiarum (d. XIX a. Iql) II, 459 11. 12. Also Bonaventura, De Mysterio Trinitatis V, 48, 5, and Bonaventura, ibid., V 50 ad 5. 1

Ad illud quod obicitur contra rationem Augustini, quod contradictoria non infect suam contradictioriam; dicendum, quod verum est secundum quod contradictoria; sed intelligendum est, quod propositio affirmativa duplicem habet affirmationem: unam, qua asserit praedicatum de subjecto; aliam qua asserit, se esse veram. In prima distinguitur a propositione negativa, quae removet praedicatum a subjecto; in secunda vero communicat cum illa, quia tam propositio negativa quam affirmativa asserit, se esse veram. Quantum ad primam attenditur contradictio, non quantum ad secundum. Cum vero dicitur: nulla veritas est, haec propositio, in quantum negat praedicatum a subjecto, non infert suam oppositam, quae est, aliquam veritatem esse. In quantum autem asserit, se esse veram, infert aliquam veritatem esse. In quantum mirum, quia sic ut omne malum praesupponit bonum, sic falsum infert verum. Et ideo hoc falsum, quod est, nullam veritatem esse - cum propter remotionem praedicati a subjecto destruat omne verum, et propter assertionem (F affirmationem), qua asserit, se esse veram, ponat aliquam veritatem esse - includit utramque partem contradictionis; ideo utra que ex illa potest inferri, et ipsum in se esse falsum et unintelligibile ab intellectu recte apprehendente. Et hoc est quod vult dicere Augustinus.

Different logical questions such as to whether or not Bonaventure, as Pfänder objects to traditional logic as such, confuses in this passage the assertive function of the copula with the affirmative modality of the assertive proposition, or the question, whether in this passage we find already an anticipated critique of the applicability of Russell’s theory of types to the negation of truth, cannot be pursued in this context.
Husserl argues in a similar way: If truth were relative to the constitution of a species, it could ensue that the truth that is valid for it would consist in that there is no such constitution\(^{47}\). Thus there arises out of relativism "absurdities upon absurdities"\(^{48}\).

Husserl also recognizes: If truth were relative, then the world would be relative as well\(^{49}\). Being cannot remain absolute if truth is relative. Then, however, also the "I am" or "I experience" is possibly false\(^{50}\).

The thesis of relativism is in conflict as well with the inner evidence of the cogito and of inner perception\(^{51}\). Logical laws can also not be accidental like mere contingent facts. To assume this is absurd\(^{52}\) and contradicts apodictic evidence.

All of these quite foundational insights of Husserl are decisive for the development of phenomenological realism, indeed they can be regarded as its "Magna Charta" since they do justice to the arch-phenomenon and the primary value of all scientific research, truth in its objectivity, and defend it profoundly in its absoluteness.

3. The Evidence of Philosophical Insight as "Immediate Cognizance of Truth" and Criticism of Every Form of Skepticism

To this objectivism in the conception of truth as an arch given data in the realm of judgement, of every logical construction which by its essence makes a claim to objective truth, is also inseparably linked Husserl's teaching of the evidence and scientific character of philosophical knowledge as well as his criticism not only of the logical, but also epistemological side of every form of relativism, which does not just reinterpret the essence of truth, but also, as skepticism, disputes the evidence of the knowledge of truth. I see precisely in his establishing that there is evident knowledge one of the most important contributions of Husserl to the founding of a realist phenomenology: that he has not only refuted in the \textit{Logical Investigations} the logical absurdity of every form of relativism, but also the epistemological errors of every form of skepticism, and has shown the evidence of the knowledge of truth.

\(47\) Edmund Husserl, Prolegomeni, ibid., p. 127.
\(48\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 127-128.
\(49\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 128.
\(50\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 128, 15 f.: "Auch das 'Ich bin' und 'Ich erlebe dies und jenes' wäre eventuell falsch...".
\(51\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 128.
\(52\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 129.
What Husserl calls the "cardinal question of epistemology" (ibid., 3), namely, the question concerning the objectivity of knowledge, can be fully and entirely positively answered, on the foundation of the insight into the objectivity and evidence of truth.

We can first agree with Husserl that philosophy as a science aims at knowing and would also have to achieve this in order to be able to make a justified claim to knowledge: "Science, as the name indicates, has to do with knowledge (scire)"\(^{53}\).

It has especially to avoid "contravening" "the evident conditions for the possibility of a theory in general"\(^{54}\). One can only speak justifiably of truth or science, as Husserl again expresses in a different way, if the subject finds in the justification of his judgement the lucid certainty of having attained to truth itself. The evidence, furthermore, of being able to recognize the truth or to "possess" the truth itself, is the condition of being able to speak of a theory, or better said of a grounded theory:

> If the one judging, however, were at no place and time in the position to experience in himself that distinguishing characteristic which constitutes the justification of the judgement, and to grasp it as such, he would be lacking in all judgements the evidence which distinguishes them from blind prejudices, and which gives him the lucid certainty of not merely holding them to be true, but of possessing the truth itself; thus, for him, reasonably establishing and founding knowledge, theory and science, would be out of the question. A theory, therefore, violates the subjective conditions of its possibility as theory in general when, in accordance with this example, it denies every advantage of that which is evident as opposed to blind judgement; it dissolves in so doing that which distinguishes itself from an arbitrary, unfounded assertion\(^{55}\).

In a wonderful passage, Husserl describes evidence not as a merely subjective character, as some feeling of the subject, but as the "becoming aware of the truth" in evident knowledge, or also as a "possession of truth" in knowledge.

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The most perfect characteristic of the rightness is the evidence; we can regard it as an immediate becoming cognizant of the truth itself...⁵⁶.

"Possessing truth in knowledge" is spoken of elsewhere:

In knowing, however, we possess the truth. In actual knowing, to which we see ourselves led back in the end, we possess it as the object of a correct judgment. But this alone does not suffice...⁵⁷.

And Husserl adds:

To this belongs rather—if one is speaking of knowing in the narrowest and strictest sense—the evidence, the lucid certainty that that which we have acknowledged is, and that which we have rejected is not⁵⁸.

The powerful insights of Brentano into evidence as the ultimate criterion of truth, and his criticism of subjectivist and psychologistic theories of evidence undoubtedly form the basis here. Brentano in particular points to the objectivity of evidence and its radical difference from a mere subjective feeling or a mere necessity of thought in his criticism of the subjectivist interpretation of evidence as a mere compulsion of thinking:

The characteristic of insight, the clarity, the evidence of certain judgements from which their truth is inseparable, has little or nothing to do with a feeling of compulsion. It may be that at the moment I cannot help but make a particular judgement: the essence of that clarity does not consist in the feeling of being compelled; and no consciousness of a necessity to judge in a certain way could as such guarantee truth. Whoever, when making judgements, does not believe in indeterminism, holds all judgements to be necessary under the circumstances under which they are made, but—and with undeniable justification—for that reason, however, not all for true.

Sigwart, while wanting to find the consciousness of insight in a feeling of compulsion to think in a certain way, maintains that this consciousness of one’s own being compelled is at the same time a consciousness

⁵⁷ Cf. Edmund Husserl, ibid., p. 28, line 16-18.
⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 28, line 21-25.
of the necessity for all those who think, who have the same underlying
reasons... But why should...every other thinker...be subject to the same
compulsion?...
What insight one person has, is, of course, for him as for every other
person who has the insight in a similar way, certain. Likewise, general
validity always belongs to the judgement, the truth of which is grasped in
an insight; that is to say, one person cannot grasp the opposite of the
insight another has, and anyone errs who believes the contrary. In addi­
tion,... whoever grasps something as true, recognizes that he is justified
in regarding it as true for everyone. But it would mean being guilty of a
great confusion of concepts if one wanted to make out of such a con­
sciousness of the truth for everyone, the consciousness of a general compul­
sion of thought59.

On the basis of these insights, Oskar Kraus rightly emphasizes that
Husserl's criticism of the subjectivist theory of epistemology and
evidence in psychologism has its foundation precisely in Franz
Brentano's insights into the objective character of evidence.
(Underlining Brentano's powerful contributions to the clarification of
the objective character of evidence60, does not comprise any agreement
with Brentano's evidence theory of truth itself)61.

The opposite of evident knowledge is knowing based on
probability of varying degrees, and, above all, "blind conviction"62 and
"unfounded opinion"63. Evidence means, in contradistinction to such
forms of knowing, a having or possessing the truth and the facts
corresponding to it in the conscious experience of truth.

Therein lies the foundation of all knowledge, of all science, and of
any theory which distinguishes itself from arbitrary claims to truth of
blind judgements that are robbed of their justification, and which
therefore we can also discern as such.

59 Franz Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, introd. and ed. by Oskar
61 Cf. my critique of this theory in Josef Seifert, Filosofie, Pravda, Nesmrtlenost. Töi
praûská pöednáöky/Philosophie, Wahrheit, Unsterblichkeit. Drei Prager
Vorlesungen/ Philosophy, Truth, Immortality. Three Prague Lectures (chech-
German), pöeklad, ùvod a bibliografi Martin Cajthaml, (Prague: Vydala Kôestanská
akademie Óim, svacek, edice Studium, 1998).
62 Ibid., p. 28, line 26.

We can rightly ascribe to Husserl a full "prise de conscience" of intentionality as that which paved the way to the recognition of the transcendence in knowledge, the foundation of every phenomenological realism. He had likewise emphasized in the Logical Investigations the receptive structure of the acts of knowing and the genuine transcendence of man in knowledge which far surpasses mere intentionality; and his own insights will serve as a foundation of the rejection of the theory of the immanence of intentionality of the later Husserl and as a justification of the objectivist theory of evidence of the Logical Investigations.

Phenomenology, and within this movement especially phenomenological realism, turns against every attempt to make constructs in philosophy, and thereby not only against Kant’s interpretation of the antinomies as an indication that reason is inevitably the victim of contradictory thought constructions64, but also against every conception of knowledge as a construction or creation of objects. A genuine phenomenological philosophy attempts to track down the sources of knowledge and its evidence; and this is inseparable from the recognition that human consciousness is not a stream of consciousness that is locked within itself and faced only with its own 'contents', but rather goes beyond itself, in fact by seeing and discovering its objects, not by creating, positing or producing them. Without such an elucidation of the receptive transcendence of knowing, any talk of evidence remains untenable65.

Precisely in this area of a theory of epistemology adequate to this state of affairs, Husserl’s accomplishment was tremendous: first of all, because he shed light on the arch-phenomenon of the intentionality of


consciousness, which excludes every picture/image theory of consciousness and its interpretation as a kind of box in which contents of consciousness are found. For the real contents and the real unity of consciousness, the conscious experiences, distinguish themselves sharply from the objects that appear in them, which possess completely different characteristics and cannot be reduced to the former. Intentional consciousness (and not all consciousness is intentional, as Husserl remarked by way of clarification, Franz Brentano, on the other hand, wrongly assumed) goes essentially far beyond its own immanent contents—to the things themselves. Therein lies an amazing transcendence of consciousness! The picture/image theory of consciousness, which Husserl criticizes in a masterly way, in no way does justice to precisely this phenomenon. Through his critique, Husserl shows a certain arch form of transcendence appropriate to consciousness, which this theory fails to recognize, in intentional consciousness as such. Husserl elucidates the same arch phenomenon of intentionality further through his distinction of the different meanings of the terms “representation” (Vorstellung) and “content of consciousness” (Bewu?tseinsinhalt), from which proceeds the radical distinction between immanent real contents of the conscious life of the person and the objects which stand opposite to this experiencing as something transcendent. But Husserl also devotes himself to the essentially beholding and discovering structure of knowing, for instance when he writes:

He also knows that he does not make the objective validity of the thoughts and intellectual connections, of the concepts and truths, as if it were a matter of accidental factors of his mind or the human mind in general, but that he gains an insight into them, he discovers them. He knows that their ideal being does not have the meaning of a psychical “being in our mind”, since, with the genuine ideality of truth and of the ideal in general, all real being, including subjective being, would be dissolved as well.

70 Husserl, ibid., LU 5, ch. 6, § 44, pp. 520-529.
Here, as also in his theory of the "categorial intuition" in the sixth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl seems not only to see clearly the receptivity and receptive transcendence of knowledge, in the sense of St. Augustine, who says that the human mind does not make such things, but discovers them\(^{72}\); but also to maintain the strict validity, which he radically puts into question in his later philosophy, of ideal essential laws for objects and states of affairs in the real world.

Knowledge is an arch given datum characterized through receptive transcendence, and every cognition is determined by the object and not by the subject. Only when this is acknowledged, is its arch given essence preserved. Edmund Husserl has also been an absolute pioneer precisely regarding this point in the *Logical Investigations*, as the above discussed critique of Husserl of relativism demonstrates. One only needs to think of his poignant refutation of every relativism that is to be found in psychologism, and of his exposition of its necessary contradictions\(^ {73}\).

The most weighty objection that one can raise against a theory, and especially against a theory of logic, consists in saying that it violates the evident conditions of the possibility of a theory in general. To put forward a theory which in its content, be it expressly or inclusively, is in conflict with the propositions which at all ground the meaning and claim to legitimacy of all theories in general - that is not merely false, but entirely wrong...\(^ {74}\)

In the concept of knowledge in the strict sense there lies a judgement that not merely raises the claim to touch the truth, but is also certain of the justification of this claim and really also possesses this justification. If the one judging, however, were at no time and place in the position to

\(^{72}\) "Non enim ratiocinatot talia facit, sed invenit. Ergo antequam inveniantur, in se manent, et cum inveniuntur, nos innovant". (Augustine, De Vera Religione, XXXIX, 73, 205-7).

\(^{73}\) Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, ch. 5-8, in particular *ibid.*, Prolegomena, chapter 7, "Der Psychologismus als skeptischer Relativimus", especially § 32, "Die idealen Bedingungen für die Möglichkeit einer Theorie überhaupt. Der strenge Begriff des Skeptizismus".

\(^{74}\) See also the continuation of the text:
experience in himself that distinguishing characteristic which constitutes the justification of the judgement, and grasp it as such, he would be lacking in all judgements the evidence of which distinguishes them from blind prejudices, and which gives him the lucid certainty of not merely holding them to be true, but of possessing the truth itself; thus, for him, reasonably establishing and founding knowledge, theory and science, would be out of the question.

A theory, therefore, violates the subjective conditions of its possibility as theory in general when, in accordance with this example, it denies every advantage of the evident judgement as opposed to the blind judgement; it dissolves in so doing that which distinguishes itself from an arbitrary, unfounded assertion...75

In an objective respect, talking about conditions of the possibility of every theory is not concerned with theory as a subjective unity of cognitions, but rather with theory as an objective unity of truths, that is to say propositions linked together through conditions of cause and effect. The conditions here are all the laws which ground purely in the concepts of theory—more specifically expressed, that ground purely in the concept of truth, proposition, object, constitution, relation, and the sort, in a word, in concepts which essentially constitute the concept of theoretical unity. The denial of these laws is, therefore, synonymous with (equivalent to) the assertion that all of the terms in question: theory, truth, object, constitution, etc., are devoid of a solid meaning. A theory dissolves itself in this objective-logical respect, when, in its content, it violates the laws without which 'theory' would not have any "reasonable" (solid) meaning at all.

The violation of the logical conditions is most acutely apparent when it is constituent of the meaning of the theoretical thesis to deny these laws, upon which the reasonable possibility of every thesis and of every foundation of a thesis is altogether dependent...We distinguish, therefore (naturally, not with any intention to classify): false, absurd, logical, and noetically absurd, and finally skeptical theories; referring with the last title to all theories whose theses either expressly imply or analytically include in themselves that the logical or noetic conditions of the possibility of a thesis are false in general.

...(to skepticism) correspond, for example, the antique forms of skepticism with theses of the kind such as: there is no truth, there is no

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75 The text adds:

... [Zur Unterscheidung] wollen wir von ihnen als von noetischen Bedingungen sprechen.
knowledge and foundation of knowledge, and the sort... That it belongs to the concept of the skeptical theory to be nonsensical is clear straight away from the definition.  

Or one regards the brilliant and accurate characterization of evidence as "experience of truth" in the Prolegomena, in which clearly a receptive transcendence of knowledge, a "possessing of truth" is formulated:

Evidence is, rather, nothing other than the "experience" of the truth. The truth is experienced, of course, in no other sense than in that in which something ideal can at all be an experience in a real act. In other words: Truth is an idea, the individual occurrence of which in the evident judgement is an actual experience. The evident judgement, however, is a consciousness of original data. The non-evident judgement is to the evident judgment analogous to what the arbitrary positing of an object is to its adequate perception. That which is adequately perceived is not merely something that is meant in some way, but rather is given originally in the act as what it is meant, that is to say, as itself present and grasped in its originality... The analogy, which binds together all experiences that are given in this immediate way, leads then to analogous formulations: one calls the evidence a seeing, recognizing, grasping of the ("true") state of affairs that is given itself, that is to say, in a natural equivocation, of the truth.  

Edmund Husserl underwent precisely in this point, however, a radical change, which is much more radical than the famous Heideggerian 'Kehre.' He abandoned this objectivism almost entirely and fell into a "transcendental relativism", in fact already in 1905. It

76 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, ch. 5-8, especially ibid., Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena, Chapter 7, "Der Psychologismus als skeptischer Relativismus", especially § 32, "Die idealen Bedingungen für die Möglichkeit einer Theorie überhaupt. Der strenge Begriff des Skeptizismus".


78 Cf. Walter Hoeres, Kritik der transzendentalphilosophischen Erkenntnistheorie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969); the same author, "Critique of the Transcendental Metaphysics of Knowing, Phenomenology and Neo-Scholastic Transcendental Philosophy". Aletheia (1978) I.1, 353-69.

is difficult to comprehend how the same thinker, who so clearly saw this arch form and condition of transcendence in consciousness in the cognizant going beyond oneself to the ideal and real world, and thereby became a pioneer in the breakthrough to an objectivist philosophy, could so drastically mistake the deeper transcendence of knowledge in his later work.

There are different reasons for this surprising turn in Husserl. To begin with, a serious mistake, which is decisive for the later Husserl, as for every form of idealism, needs to be eliminated at this point: the evident truth that no act of cognition is possible and conceivable in which the subject of knowing does not recognize exclusively through his own acts whatever he comes to know, has to be sharply delineated from the contradictory and false opinion that the subject cannot know of anything that it is more than merely a purely intentional object of consciousness! The starting points of such a confusion, which also goes back to Kant, Fichte, and other representatives of German idealism, can already be found in the Logical Investigations; they give to the intentionality of consciousness, which is expounded in the Fifth Logical Investigation and is decisive for all phenomenology, an immanentistic interpretation. Instead of perceiving in intentionality an initial, but by no means sufficient step of transcendence, Husserl commits the mistake of confusing things in the concept of immanence; and, as we saw above, denies, already beginning in 1905, every genuine transcendence of man in knowledge.

This view of Husserl extends itself in the Cartesian Meditations to a comprehensive, radical immanentism which goes far beyond that of Kant:

Transcendence in every form is an immanent character of being constituting itself within the ego. Every conceivable meaning, every conceivable being, whether it is called immanent or transcendent, falls in the realm of transcendental subjectivity as that which constitutes meaning and being.


Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ed. and introd. by S. Strasser, in: Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke E. Husserls, auf Grund des
In part, the root of this conception lies in the already mentioned view of Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* that all real acts (consequently, also knowing and the acts of judgement) must be causally determined; only the contents of the judgements are not. In part, however, the basis of this conception of Husserl lies in his view that already the transcendence of consciousness that is found in intentionality, and relates to a *Noema* that is not identifiable with the conscious act, suffices to found genuine knowledge, and is enough to refute the immanentistic picture/image theory of knowing. Both of these theses are serious errors of Husserl, which are already found in the *Logical Investigations* and which blocked Husserl’s rigorous path to an actual phenomenological realism.

Sokolowski appears in his very brief treatment of realism in phenomenology\(^{81}\), which he himself appears to defend, neither to take seriously the path of Husserl into radical transcendental idealism, nor to grasp that the mere indication of the (at best proto-realist) reference of the intentional act to objects beyond itself *by no means* suffices for a foundation of phenomenological realism. For the recognition of intentionality in this sense is compatible with a radical idealism or even relativism which reduces all objects of consciousness to purely immanent noemata of conscious noesis. This was also clearly seen by Hartmann\(^{82}\).

This decisive point of criticism and the essential limitations of Husserl’s foundation of a phenomenological objectivism need to be treated here in greater detail. It is clear, after all, that the intentional subject-object-relation can also be found in a dream or in the imagination, the objects of which do not possess autonomous existence. If, therefore, the transcendence of knowing were to consist in nothing

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more than a trait found in all intentionality, then deception and knowledge would in the end be the same. Or which distinction could we then still make between a deception, an hallucination, and knowledge? Even the things and persons which habitually appear in weird associations before going to sleep and of which we have consciousness, process before our mind’s eye and would then be transcendent objects of knowledge. Above all, no distinction between deception and knowledge, and error and knowledge could be made because also the acts of erring and beliefs based on deceptions are intentional acts.

In his main epistemological work \(^{83}\), Nicolai Hartmann, the phenomenologist who came from the Neo-Kantian tradition, crosses swords polemically with phenomenology and maintains that “intentional objects” are indeed not “conditions of the I”, and, therefore, not real parts of consciousness; but that they still are immanent “pictures” in an epistemological-metaphysical sense \(^{84}\). For, as the case of deception clearly teaches us, the intentional object is distinct from the real object. In fact, Hartmann concludes, the intentional object is not only in the case of deception, but rather never identical with the object as it is in itself; it is instead always in one sense “immanent to consciousness”. This Hartmann declares to be the “principle of consciousness”: “It belongs to the essence of consciousness that it is never able to apprehend anything other than its own contents, that it can never step outside of its own sphere” \(^{85}\). This “immanence of positing”\(^{86}\), on the one hand, which is strongly reminiscent of the later Husserl of the Cartesian Meditations, and according to which all “intentional objects” remain dependent on consciousness and consciousness can never grasp the object itself; and, on the other hand, the “intention of knowledge to attain transcendence”, according to which we still always aim through the “picture” (the intentional object) at a transcendent, autonomous, and really existing object \(^{87}\), constitute, according to Hartmann, the “antinomy of

\(^{83}\) Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik des Erkennens*, 1st Part, 3rd Section, ch. 10, pp. 106 ff.

\(^{84}\) Cf. *ibid.*, p. 47, b7.


\(^{87}\) One sees here how Hartmann sought to move away from the Kantianism and Neokantianism of the Marburg School, to which he himself belonged. He saw with special clarity – in contradistinction to the later Husserl – that moment of the transcendence of knowledge that is directed to a “thing in itself” (at least as an element in the ‘phenomenon of knowing’ even though he does not recognize this transcendence as an evident datum):
consciousness”. This antinomy simply presents itself in its contradictoriness and cannot really be rationally solved. According to Hartmann, Husserl was guilty, therefore, of a “simplification of the picture problem”\textsuperscript{88}. The fact that the “intentional object” is not a “condition of the I” makes it by no means into something “transcendent”, says Nicolai Hartmann\textsuperscript{89}, but rather precisely into that which is meant with “picture”, through which we aim in knowledge at the object that is distinct from the picture, as the case of deception proves.

In response to this, it can be said, first of all, that the autonomous reality of the object is decisive for any knowledge. This autonomous “reality” is different, however, according to the essence of each being that is known. Thus, other persons, for example, presuppose on the basis of their essence a reality that is independent of my knowledge and any consciousness of mine, while colors do not do this. The plans that an optimist has conceived and told me about allege, again on the basis of their essence, that peculiar “degree of reality” which is typical of such a design. If this “reality-in-itself” of things which corresponds to each of their essences did not really belong to them, and they would rather only be given to us as if they had this reality or as if reality even “consisted” only of “intentional objects” for a (transcendental) ego, then all “intentional objects” would, consequently, only be “constituted” in the corresponding “intentional acts” of this ego, as the late Husserl assumes. But then we would be locked into that radical immanentism which has been refuted in other works\textsuperscript{90} and which Hartmann so aptly characterizes:

It is an error to understand everything that is immanent as a “condition of the I”. Thoughts, fantasies, ideas are not conditions of the I. They have the character of being an object;...
But because of that they are not yet objects of knowledge. They are lacking in the being in itself, the independence from the intention; they live from the grace of the act...Transcendent in the gnoseological sense

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{90} Cf. Josef Seifert, \textit{Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit}, cit., in particular Part II.
is only that which is independent of the act... Thus, intentional objects are, insofar at least as they are merely "intentional", "gnoseologically immanent"\(^{91}\).

As correct as this certainly is in the sense just indicated, there are still some objections that need, on the other hand, to be made to Hartmann's theses.

First, it remains misleading to conceive of the object of a deception in its merely apparent existence as the "mere immanent image" of an object\(^{92}\).

Second, as has been treated elsewhere in detail\(^{93}\), it is a false dogma that we can never immediately know an object in itself in its autonomous reality and with the exclusion of every possibility of deception. We will still come back to the fact that there are many cases in which the "thing in itself" in our knowledge is an "intentional object". It will also become clear that we can know some things which cannot possibly be an aspect of reality that constitutes itself only for human beings. This we can already recognize on the background of the third and most important objection which must be raised against Nicolai Hartmann:

Third, even for such aspects which only constitute themselves for human beings (for instance, the humane aspect of the outside world), which, however, are objective in another sense and can therefore be known\(^{94}\), yes even for deception, it is true that there can be no apparent being without a being that is absolute and rests in itself, just as no relation is possible without absolute being. But not just that:

Fourthly, being in itself that is presupposed already for every deception has to be recognized immediately as such and thereby be itself

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\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 115.

\(^{92}\) Edmund Husserl shows in Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, 1, in ch. V, §11, and particularly in his rejection of the "image theory" of knowledge, pp. 421 ff., that already for the recognition of an image as image an intentional consciousness of that object itself is presupposed whose "image" we recognize the image to be; otherwise we would end up in an infinite regress. Moreover, terms such as "image", "immanent object", etc. suggest that one overlooks the unique nature of the intentional relation.


\(^{94}\) Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, 3rd edn, with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 5: "Objectivity and Independence".
“intentional object” of my knowledge; otherwise, no deception could come about. In order to be able to deceive myself, for instance, about the stick in the water I perceive being broken, I must not deceive myself precisely in grasping the state of affairs that I see, that it appears broken to me, and so on. I have to grasp this and countless states of affairs in their being-in-themselves in order to be able to deceive myself at all. The very case of deception, therefore, which Nicolai Hartmann cites as proof for his thesis, refutes his thesis and “principle of immanence”95. Immanence of consciousness is shut through with transcendence, and necessarily entails cognitive transcendence of evident knowledge. For even if in many cases the object, about which I deceive myself, is not itself (in its being in itself) the immediate “intentional object” of my knowledge, as Hartmann rightly points out against Husserl, every deception presupposes, nonetheless, certain realities, which are both “in themselves” and intentional objects of my knowledge. Without the immediate, deception-free knowledge of them, I could not deceive myself at all. Let us once more emphasize the most important objects of this knowledge that is presupposed by every deception: First, the absolute existence of the one being deceived is presupposed for every deception. Second, it is true in itself that something merely appears to him to be while not being in itself. Third, it is in itself such that the person, for instance, that I dream about, appears on the basis of her essence to possess a kind of autonomous existence, that she “professes” a kind of existence that she does not possess as a mere figure of a dream. If all of this and much besides were not “in itself” and were not true, there would not be any deception at all. Further, in recognizing all of this, the person dreaming does not by any means deceive herself; and this leads us to a distinction that must be made now and that is decisive for every epistemology96.

The decisive element in knowing, in contradistinction to every deception, to all that is merely believed erroneously, is, namely, that the “claim to being” of the object rightly exists and that I grasp precisely this datum. As much as the intentionality and receptivity of knowing are present in a deception through a dream or a Fata Morgana, the real transcendence and the knowing of the object does not actually lie in the

deception as such because the object only "gives the impression" of being to a mere meaning or perceiving, but does not really exist. Hence, also the real knowing coming into contact with reality cannot take place in the deception or error as such.

Only the knowledge of those things and states of affairs that are objectively presupposed for any deception and dream to take place, and that have to be known to the subject as a condition for his being deceived, is truly knowledge and possesses the mentioned transcendence.

It belongs essentially to knowing that the object is autonomous in its being and does not only appear to a subject to be, and still discloses itself to the subject. Only where this is present, do we find the transcendence that is characteristic of all knowing — but only in knowledge in the strict and narrower sense of evident knowledge, not in knowledge in a wider sense (that is mixed with beliefs of all kinds) do we find evidence of the cognitive self-transcendence of the subject.

Knowing in the strictest sense is, thereby, to be sharply distinguished from knowing in the broader sense that is connected to believing or interpretation. According to the results achieved till now, one could perhaps be still inclined to assume with Nicolai Hartmann that the autonomy of being of the object of each act of knowledge only supervenes from outside, and that error and knowledge in their inner aspect are acts of a completely similar nature. The question whether this is so, is an epistemological question of greatest importance. Nicolai Hartmann’s attempt at a solution seems to be a serious error.

It was shown just before that there could be no deception at all if certain things did not exist absolutely in themselves and were not truly recognized by the person deceiving herself. The person must recognize that an object really appears to her to be in such and such way. That has to be in itself, and she must recognize it as such; and in this, her knowledge, there can precisely be no deception and no error; otherwise, no deception at all would come about. If the person deceived then later sees that she has deceived herself, she will speak thus: "I never knew that the (dreamed) object really existed; I rather only ‘believed’ it on the basis of the suggestive appearance and with good reasons. Because the object really passed itself off so much as being, it convinced me entirely that it truly was. But when I look more closely, I see that I only recognized this claim to being in the full sense of the word; that it rightly exists, I assumed in a (perhaps scarcely noticeable element of)
It will be confirmed, therefore, that knowledge itself never errs as Plato says in the *Gorgias*\(^98\). And when, on the basis of this modest remark, one takes a look at all of our knowledge, one finds largely the same situation. Do we not also speak of "knowledge" where being has disclosed itself to us on the basis of the knowledge of others in our science, where we "know" something because we have "believed" trustworthy people? Most scientists have acquired practically all scientific knowledge through such —barely noticeable— "belief"? How else could a person study chemistry, geography, or history; how could someone "know" something of the past, if not through "belief"? Edmund Husserl proved already in the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, moreover, that in every sense perception, along with that which is immediately given, a background of knowledge and elements of interpretation, expectation, and completion are contained which go far beyond that which is really grasped in the strict sense, and through which the object actually first discloses itself to us. It is impossible to go into the interesting question here of which different forms there are of such a going-beyond-that-which-is-given-and-known, and how much in being discloses itself to man only through such elements of "belief" and interpretation. No one should and could only hold that to be true and existing which he has grasped in the strict sense of the word!

But one must nevertheless see that "knowledge itself" is distinct from these elements of belief, that it never lies in knowledge itself for "something to disclose itself to us which is not", but rather these elements of belief, assumption, and interpretation as well as other elements which go beyond knowing and are difficult to separate from it are responsible for deception and error; and which understandably, in the case of an insufficient foundation in knowledge, can lead astray.

It must be very clearly stressed, however, that often the concept of knowledge is applied to all kinds of "self disclosure of a being" — and in this case it only belongs to the *concept* of knowing that its object is

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\[^97\] In Josef Seifert, *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit*, cit., Part 2, many instances have been adduced in which we recognize this claim to objective (intrinsic) being without any rest of faith.

\[^98\] If someone asked you, 'Isn't there a false belief and a true one?' You would, I think, answer 'Yes'?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOKRATES: How then? Also a false knowledge and a true one?
GORGIAS: No way.
Platon, *Gorgias* 454.
autonomous. Then *deceptions* (which have a foundation in what is known) and the *corresponding erroneous beliefs* are not different with respect to their inner structure, but are only recognizable from the outside as distinct. When, on the other hand, knowledge is understood in the narrower sense, then one means with it that arch given act in which a being discloses itself to us in its autonomous reality and we grasp it itself. Without such knowledge in the narrower sense, that is to say without the grasping of states of affairs which actually are *so in themselves* and are given to us in this being in itself, no deception at all would be possible, as has already been shown.

In the case of this knowing in the narrower sense, it by no means belongs merely to the concept, but rather to the necessary essence of this act, that in it a being discloses itself to us as it is.99 This deeper transcendence of the act of knowledge was indeed recognized by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*, but was never seen deeply enough and was more and more rejected in the course of his later development.100

That the faithfulness to the full data of the transcendent, necessary essences does not at all constitute a forfeiting of the central phenomenological return to what is given, but leads rather to a better phenomenology, has been shown by different thinkers.101

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99 Cf. B. Schwarz, *Der Irrtum*, p. 53: "The highest level of givenness ... can therefore not err". ("Die höchste Stufe des Gegebenen... kann also nicht irren".) Plato designated this distinction between knowledge in the strict sense and belief as the distinction between ἰδία and ἐπιστήμη or also between πίσις (belief, opinion) and ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), though Plato conceives of ἐπιστήμη in a different way inasmuch as he includes in its content also that its object is an immovable and necessary idea (essence) and further elements. At any rate, Plato makes clearly a distinction between knowledge in the authentic (strict) sense and knowledge in a wider sense - mixed with moments of belief when he, especially in the *Theaetetus* (187b-210d) contrasts the (de facto) "correct doxa" (*orthé dóxa*) with knowledge. I owe to the Platonic analyses of knowledge more than the space of this footnote permits to express. In another way, however, the distinction intended here comes closer to what Aristotle, in contradistinction to Plato, who rejects sense knowledge itself as deceitful, says on the freedom from error of pure receptive sense perception. (Cf. Aristotle, *De an.* 427b, 12). See also J. Hirschberger, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, p. 179.

These hints have to suffice here.


5. The Impossibility of Deriving Knowledge, in Particular Knowledge of Essences, from Empirical Facts of a Causally Determined World – Husserl’s Serious and Gravely Consequential Error in Asserting an Efficient Causal Determination of All Real Beings as the Reason for His Abandonment of Phenomenological Realism

Husserl shows clearly: the constitution of a species is an empirical fact. From empirical facts, only facts can be deduced. It is nonsensical to give truth the character of a fact in this sense. A fact is individual and temporarily determined. Truth, on the other hand, is at most temporarily determined with regards to some of its objects. Causal determination holds for the act of judging, not for the content of the judgment.

We can only fully and completely agree with Husserl that efficient causal determination, above all, by material and psychical causes, does not pertain to the contents of judgements; and that such an efficient causal determination would destroy the entire objectivity of logic and the laws of logic. Therein lies a fundamental pillar of the foundation of every phenomenological objectivism and realism.

We must, nevertheless, adduce a crucial and sharp criticism of part of this last-mentioned view of Husserl, a critique upon which, in my opinion, the justifiability of a phenomenological realism depends. The thesis of causal (efficient causal) determination, namely, does not only not hold for the content of the judgement, for instance, logical judgements and their logical truth-relations –Husserl demonstrates very strikingly the inexplicability of these through efficient causality–; rather, it does not hold anymore so for real knowing and for the rational act of judgement. Knowing, at least in the narrower sense of the word, as well as acts of judgement based on knowledge, presuppose rather a completely different kind of cause. Intentional and rational acts of the mind such as knowing, judging, freely wanting, etc., are not produced by some efficient cause in the subject or even determined as regards their content by an efficient cause that would be as such the blind result of other physical, mindless causes or (in the case that not mindless natural causes but a supremely intelligent God would cause knowledge and

104 Cf. Josef Seifert, Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit, cit., Part 1, ch. 3; and the same author, Essere e persona, cit., ch. 9.
ideas *in* our minds that would objectively *correspond* to things, as Leibniz and other rationalists thought), still any extrinsic efficient cause of acts of knowledge would produce our acts and their contents completely from *outside our conscious relation to an object*, in which case any foundation of evident knowledge in the real nature of the object and any true cognitive contact with the *object* that itself in its own nature is the cause of our cognitive contact with it, and of the content of our knowledge, would be impossible. Hence, Husserl’s later idealism would inevitably follow from such a position if one wants to save the objectivity of knowledge.

For how would we ever *know* that the efficient cause that produces directly ‘knowledge’ in us, produces these immanent acts and ideas *in accordance with the real nature of the object*? This would be entirely unknowable by us. How would we know that the contents produced by efficient causes in our minds resemble the object of knowledge? Even if the object of knowledge (like this tree in front of me) were the efficient cause of my knowledge, I could in no way *know* its resemblance with its effect in my mind.

No, acts of knowledge are rather produced by a specifically spiritual-intentional “causality” of a totally different form, which is of a kind that engenders and motivates the acts from the side of the object and *through* the meaningful intentional contact with itself. What is in question here is an “intentional-spiritual causality” arising from the object which Husserl mysteriously, despite his discovery of intentionality, completely overlooked by allowing all temporal being to be causally determined, saying: “My judging that 2 X 2 = 4 is certainly causally determined...”\(^{105}\). Every objectivist and realist epistemology which assumes a being determined of real acts of knowledge by their object, through being itself, through the things themselves, presupposes a form of spiritual causality which is radically distinct from efficient causality. Only in this way can the objectivity and rationality of real acts of knowledge be founded.

Otherwise, one has with Husserl to presuppose a transcendental I that is not actually real or even a constitution of all objects of knowledge through such a pure ego in order to save the evidence and objectivity of knowledge. But, in the last analysis, from such a ‘redemption’ there

follows as well a destruction of the transcendence of real knowing and a "triumph of subjectivity", as Lauer characterizes the development of Husserl. Many interpreters of Husserl either fail to grasp the radicalness of his transcendental turn, which is a historical error on their part, or think with him that phenomenology, in order to be strictly scientific, must follow in the direction of such a radical turn to subjectivity. This overlooks, however, the essence of the necessarily real, individual act of knowledge as well as the real and individual form of being of the knowing subject, which will be made clearer in the following segment of this paper. Husserl and the transcendental phenomenology that was inspired by him also completely neglect the insights of a realist phenomenology which blossomed especially in Russia, and was elaborated by other realist phenomenologists. Realist

106 In the light of the profound things Husserl says in the Prolegomena on evident knowledge as an experience of truth, things are reversed, when Boehm claims that Husserl teaches there a pure "immanence of evident knowledge", and that he comes only later, especially in Ideas, to acknowledge a certain transcendence of knowledge. Cf. Rudolf Boehm, "Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction", International Philosophical Quarterly, (1965), 5; 183-202.


110 On the critique of Husserl's immanentism, see also Josef Seifert, Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit, cit.; the same author, "Kritik am Relativismus und Immanentismus in E. Husserls Cartesianischen Meditationen. Die Aequivokationen im Ausdruck 'transzendentes Ego' an der Basis jedes transzendentalen Idealismus". Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie XIV, 1970. For a critique of Husserl's claim of a complete causal determination of all acts of knowing and judging cf. also Josef Seifert, Essere e persona, ibid., ch. 9.

111 Cf. Steven Cassedy, "Gustav Shpet and Phenomenology in an Orthodox Key", Studies in East-European Thought", 1997; 49 (2), 81-108. The very title connects Russian phenomenology and the Orthodox Church, which might suggest that realism would be a consequence of religious faith, which Husserl in his radical search for rational philosophical foundations would have had to exclude. While any Christian, Jewish, or Muslim faith is essentially realist, one must not overlook, however, the purely rational grounds for a phenomenological objectivism and realism and the inner contradictoriness and absurdity of any subjectivism and relativism, including that of transcendental phenomenology. Without a recognition of a purely rational
phenomenologists, in particular Roman Ingarden, have critically examined and overcome the turn to transcendentalism in Husserl.\textsuperscript{112}

As little as Husserl grasps these characteristics of the real acts of knowledge and judgement, which are necessary for every phenomenological objectivism and realism, and their sovereign independence from causes that determine them which is given through the transcendence of knowing, so clearly does he see the untenability of every assertion of a causal (efficient causal) determination of the contents of judgements through human nature or psychical laws.

6. \textit{Away from Psychologism! -Discovery of the Objective A priori of Essential Necessity and “Ideal Objects”- Critique of Empiricism as well as of the Impossibility to Deduce Logical and Other Essential Laws from Empirical Laws of the Real World or from the Psychological Structure of the Human Person – Critique of a Wrong Conclusion that Husserl Draws from This Insight: that There Are No Necessary, Essential Laws for the Real World}

Husserl saw clearly in the \textit{Logical Investigations} that the necessity of logical laws is not the mere necessity of thinking, but rather a necessity that is completely and utterly objective, which grounds in the essence of judgements and their truth. He understood it surely as that which his friend and assistant Adolf Reinach characterizes as a “having-to-be-so” and “not-being-able-to-be-otherwise”. What he is concerned with, therefore, are objective, essential necessities which constitute the a

\textit{philosophical cognition of necessary essences and the existing world, however, a realist opposition to transcendental phenomenology would not be what we take it to be: a more critical philosophy that entirely rests on rational evidence. Instead, realism would only be found in religious faith, which would amount to a philosophical position of pure fideism or to a purely theological objection to idealism. In this paper I defend the critical and purely rational character of phenomenological objectivism and realism. Cf. also my Russian article, “ФИЛОСОФИЯ КАК СТРОГАЯ НАУКА” (Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. Towards the Foundations of a Realist Phenomenological Method –in Critical Dialogue with Edmund Husserl’s Ideas about Philosophy as a Rigorous Science), (Russian), Logos 9 (1997), 54-76.}

priori. The acknowledgement of these does not by any means lead to an absurd concept of ideal objects such as Locke's triangle, which unites the contradictory characteristics of different kinds of triangles in one single conceptional object. No, the eide are objects sui generis.\(^{113}\)

While Husserl, however, brilliantly refutes the thesis, which was disproved already in Plato's *Parmenides* and in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, of a nonsensical hypostatizing of ideas that are contradictory in themselves, and thereby demonstrates the radical distinction between ideal and real essences, he is lacking in a real ontological understanding of the existence of ideal essences and meanings which are independent of all human acts of thought. Because of this, Husserl is increasingly driven into his later subjective, transcendental idealism\(^{114}\), even though he also marvelously expresses the timeless existence of ideal objects and principles in some passages, especially in the *Second Logical Investigation*:

Ideal objects, on the other hand, exist really. It evidently does not simply make good sense to speak of such objects (for example, of the number 2, of the quality of redness, of the principle of contradiction, and the sort) and to introduce them as having predicates connected with them; we rather grasp also by way of insight certain categories of truth which relate to such ideal objectivities. If these truths are valid, so must everything be which their objective validity presupposes. If I intuit that 4 is an even number, that the stated predicate really befits the ideal object, then this object cannot as well be a mere fiction, purely \*façon de parler*, in truth a nothing. This does not exclude that the meaning of this being, and with it the meaning of predication, is here not entirely, not

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specifically the same as in the cases in which a real predicate, its characteristic, is attributed to or denied a real subject. Expressed differently: We do not deny it, but rather stress that...a fundamental categorical distinction exists which we make allowance for precisely by differentiating between ideal and real being...\textsuperscript{115}

Such texts stand in contrast to others in which Husserl calls logical forms “nothing more” than “forms of intended meaning which have been objectivized to ideal species” and thus makes them relative to man\textsuperscript{116}. Also the lack of recognition of real and autonomous being given in the objects of sense perception and also in the objects of categorial intuition, as well as further ideas of Husserl in the \textit{Vth Logical Investigation}, could be characterized as starting points for his subjective, transcendental turn\textsuperscript{117}. Not only the necessary, ideal essences which must not—as in the \textit{Logical Investigations}—be reduced to mere “ideal units of meaning”, but also real beings are real in themselves and are not constituted by any real or transcendental subject as mere objects of consciousness.

If one takes into consideration here the important investigations of the \textit{Second Logical Investigation}, one can, of course, conclude that Husserl is also speaking of “ideal species”, and with them of ideal essences; and hence does not reduce the sphere of the “ideal” to logical units of meaning, but recognizes rather other necessary essences as well, indeed even such which are also valid for the real world. Husserl appears, though, to reduce even the “ideal species” repeatedly to ideal meanings; and, in defense against the reproach of Platonism leveled against him, to doubt also their hypostatization, and consequently their actual independence from the subject, and more and more their validity for the real world as well\textsuperscript{118}.

Still much more untenable than a reduction of necessary essences to necessary conceptual connections or even to the objectively necessary logical essences of units of meaning (judging – contents of judgements, concepts, and so on) would, of course, be their reduction to mere linguistic factors, as can be elucidated by a pure linguistic analysis. An


\textsuperscript{116} Edmund Husserl, \textit{ibid.}, LU 2, ch. 3, §17, p. 154.


\textsuperscript{118} Cf. especially \textit{ibid.}, Vol. II. 1, LU 2, ch. 2, § 8 ff., pp. 128 ff.
attempt to interpret Husserl in this direction is made by Downes\textsuperscript{119}, who holds Husserl's view to be similar to that of Quine, but thinks at the same time that linguistic analysis as the method of analytical philosophical is inferior to that of the "categorial intuition" of essences. How can he justify this claim, however? Should, for instance, the necessities that are completely independent of all linguistic laws and meanings, as, for example, that movement presupposes time, color extension, or moral values freedom, follow from mere linguistic laws? In this case they would, after all, cease to apply in other languages or on the basis of other definitions of linguistically expressed meanings, which is absurd. An attempt to reduce necessary essences and essential laws to linguistic factors constitutes a worse form of reductionism with regards to essential necessities than the reduction of \textit{all necessary essences} to a limited \textsuperscript{1}—namely, the purely logical—partial sphere of the same. It is superfluous here to offer a more detailed criticism of this view, especially since such a critique does not belong to the relevant topic of this paper; besides, such a criticism follows logically from the proof that a reduction of all essential necessities (for instance, of those grounding in the essence of movement, color, morality) to meaning-connections and even to purely logical essential necessities is also untenable. Indeed, a reduction of the necessities grounding in the objective essence of things to linguistic factors, regardless of what kind, would contradict their characteristic nature more deeply than their reduction to psychological laws of thought, which does not deny the phenomenon of synthetic necessity in general, but "only" its existence as independent of the subject.

But every subjectivist, psychologistic, or even transcendental-philosophical reduction of essential necessity to subjective necessities of thought must fail as well. For \textit{every constitution necessarily presupposes the thing in itself and its knowledge}, an insight which Husserl, on the one hand, brilliantly formulates in the \textit{Prolegomena}; on the other hand, appears to reject more and more in his later work\textsuperscript{120}.

If, however, the logical laws do not have their roots in empirical laws of human thinking, do they at all have their roots then in psychological laws, in a subjective sphere of necessity of thought? Reinach already puts the \textit{having-to-be-so} and \textit{not-being-able-to-be-}


\textsuperscript{120} Cf. See on this Josef Seifert, \textit{Back to Things in Themselves}, ch. 4, 5-6.
otherwise of essential necessity in contrast to every mere subjective necessity of not being able to think any other way.\(^{121}\)

The way back to things, and the careful examination of the kind of necessity which confronts us in an exemplary way in logic, lead to a further insight: The necessary states of affairs and essentially necessary connections, which the philosopher intuits directly or grounds deductively, are by virtue of the inner absoluteness of their necessity also absolutely independent of the subject, and cannot be created or made by it.\(^{122}\) They also ground in the nature of the propositions, that is to say in the judgements expressed in them and can therefore impossibly be explained as subjective, psychological necessities of thought.

Further, they can just as little be reduced to analytical or tautological propositions, but are rather synthetic a priori. In fact, they do not originate in a subjective positing or necessity of thought, but rather in the essence of the relevant things themselves, in this case of the logical relation between truth and falsity of judgments (propositions).

And their rootedness in the essences of things is valid not only for logical laws, but also for all essential necessities in all areas.\(^{123}\) They are


grasped in their objectivity and absoluteness as grounded in the essences themselves. Of these it is shown, precisely through a serious phenomenological analysis, that their inner and absolute necessity prohibits every constitution through the conscious subject: every subjectivism is shattered by the datum of essential necessity.


The overcoming of every subjectivist explanation of the a priori and the discovery of an objective a priori only become fully understandable and possible to ground, however, through distinctions which are lacking in part in Edmund Husserl and almost completely in Adolf Reinach; even if it is Husserl to whom we owe many hints and some extremely clear formulations in this direction of distinguishing between those essences in which states of affairs ground a priori from those which can only be investigated with the help of empirical methods – a distinction which is extremely important for the foundation of realist phenomenology. Thus, we find in the Third Logical Investigation that dependent and independent parts are distinguished, a differentiation which refers in Edmund Husserl to entirely different phenomena which he does not delimit. This differentiation, however, anticipates in one of its possible interpretations the later distinctions, for example where Husserl writes:

We can imagine a man with two heads, the upper body part of a man combined with the lower body part of a horse, or also individual parts such as a head, a nose, an ear of itself. In contrast, it is impossible... for example, to separate the “idea” of motion from that of a moved body. Only such parts of an imagined whole, which indeed are in fact united with other parts, but can also really exist without them, can be abstracted in the sense of Locke’s separation...

In looking at certain contents, we have the evidence that the change or removal of one of the contents that are given together with them (but are not included in them) would have to change or abolish them in themselves. In the case of other contents, we do not have this evidence...: No dependence on other contents grounds in the “nature” of the content itself, in its ideal essence;
it is in its essence, through the fact that it is, what it is, unconcerned about all others...in its ideal graspable essence, the content is independent; this essence demands through itself, hence a priori, no other essence woven together with it\textsuperscript{124}.

Husserl considers objective essential necessity still more clearly, however, when he refers, not to a "subjective necessity, that is to say, the subjective inability-of-being-able-to-imagineanything-differently", but to "an objective-ideal necessity of not-being-able-to-be-otherwise", which "in accordance with its essence" "becomes...a given" "in the consciousness of apodictic evidence"\textsuperscript{125}.

Husserl can be credited with a real discovery of the phenomenon of necessary essences and states of affairs, and their distinction from contingent, non-necessary ones; still his discovery of their distinction suffers because of its confusion with the lack of independence of moments of meaning in analytical judgements and with the lack of independence of the accidents that inhere in a thing (a substance). Consequently, the immense significance of the Husserlian discovery cited only reached full fruition through later explanations of the distinctions between different kinds of essences\textsuperscript{126}.

In the Ideas of Husserl, the lack of this fully conscious objective foundation of the a priori is also clearly revealed through Husserl's attempt to make only one procedure and one method on the side of the subject(i.e., of science): namely epoché or the lack of it, responsible for the distinction between sciences about the real world (Realwissenschaften) and a priori sciences. That is why René Descartes,

\textsuperscript{124} Edmund Husserl, \textit{Logische Untersuchungen}, Vol. II, 1, LU 3, § 2-3, pp. 232-233; § 5, p. 239. Husserl refers in this context as well to the important analysis of the essences of color as such and of different color-species in C. Stumpf (ibid., § 4, pp. 234 ff., especially p. 236). In Josef Seifert, \textit{Back to Things in Themselves}, Chapter 2, 2, (iii), I have tried to distinguish three entirely different meanings of Husserl's term "dependent parts", thereby helping to elucidate the full importance of the Husserlian distinction between independent and dependent parts and its helpfulness in the attempt to solve the puzzle of a priori knowledge. Cf. on the third \textit{Logical Investigation}, also Barry Smith, (ed.), \textit{Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology}, cit.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., Vol. II, 1, LU 3, § 7, pp. 242-243. The whole paragraph 7 is in this context of extreme importance. On an analysis of the role played by the \textit{Third Logical Investigation} and the teaching on dependent and independent parts it contains, see Robert Sokolowski, "The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Investigations", \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, (1968), 28; 537-553.

\textsuperscript{126} Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, \textit{What is Philosophy?}, ch. 4.
who delimits different kinds of essences from one another, is much more clearly than Husserl to be called the precursor of the distinction that is crucial for realist phenomenology between contingent (morphic) natures, the characteristics of which are not necessarily linked to each other, and the necessary essences\textsuperscript{127}.

However, it is only the distinction made clearly by Dietrich von Hildebrand between objective essential necessity, that is to say \textit{between necessary essences and two other kinds of essences}, the merely accidental and the morphic-contingent, which makes the method of perceiving essences mentioned programmatically in the Husserlian yearbook, that is to say of the rational intuiting of necessary and objective connections, explainable in the end. Without this distinction, the mere teaching of the \textit{epoché} as the basic method of philosophy leads almost inevitably either to pure empiricism and the skepticism that follows from it, or to idealism and subjectivism\textsuperscript{128}.

8. **Husserl's Discovery of the Given Character in Experience of A priori Connections in the Categorial Intuition of Things (Insight into Essences and the Broadening of Immediate Knowledge) – the Return of Husserl which Was Begun, but Later Abandoned, to the Thing Itself as Noumenon, to Real and Essential Being as Being in Itself and at the Same Time Being that Is Intuitively Given and Intelligible**

Connected with this is again the realist interpretation of the return to things as a return to things in themselves that since Kant had been believed to be lost. This step was introduced by Husserl in a certain sense in the \textit{First Edition} of the \textit{Logical Investigations} in his theory of the “categorial intuition”, that is to say, of an intellectual and yet even more immediate form of knowledge than sensory perception (in the \textit{Sixth Investigation}). He himself regarded this \textit{Sixth Investigation} as “the most comprehensive, practically speaking most developed, and perhaps most successful of the entire book”\textsuperscript{129}. Husserl had made essential steps,
above all, in the *Prolegomena*, to recovering the "thing in itself" for knowledge and its being immediately given, but soon gave them up again. Let us recall here only the most fundamental thoughts of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*:

It is true of every perception that it *grasps* its object *itself* or *directly*. But this direct grasping has a different meaning and character according to whether we are dealing with a perception in the more narrow sense or such a one in the extended sense; that is to say, depending on whether the "directly" grasped objectivity is a *sensory* or *categorical* object; expressed differently, on whether it is a *real* or *ideal* object. We can characterize the sensory or *real* objects, namely, as objects of the lowest degree of possible intuition, the *categorical* or ideal objects as the objects of the higher degrees\(^{130}\).

In his theory of the categorial intuition, Husserl develops the very principle and foundation of an objectivist and realist philosophy by expounding a direct intuition, which is not obscured by the mere use of images or other intermediaries, of that which is universal as such.

The consciousness of the universal is built equally on the grounds of perception and the imagination that conforms with it; and if it is grounded at all, then the universal, the idea *red*, the idea *triangle*, is grasped *itself*, is intuited in the one and only way which does not allow for any distinction between an image and the original... if the universal opinion fulfills itself in an adequate perception, that is to say, in a new consciousness of universality, ...The universal object is then not merely imagined and posited, but rather given itself\(^{131}\).

Husserl emphasizes that something is grasped here intellectually, as it is, and that it is not distorted. And he applies to this insight his theory of the meaning-intentions and the meaning-fulfillment by pointing out that here as well the meanings which are directed at universal essences are either fulfilled in corresponding categorial intuitions or can remained unfulfilled. The latter is the case precisely when the object of such meanings is only purely abstractly meant in thought but not intuited, but above all, when it is a conceptual construction which *can not at all be given intuitively*. Indeed, the most authentic acts of thinking are "intuitions into states of affairs" and


intuitions in general\textsuperscript{132}. This authentic intuitive intellectual knowing or "intuitive 'thinking' of the intellect" reaches then its climax in the adequate intuition:

in the adequate intuition we grasp the state of affairs itself and intuit it first in its full selfhood\textsuperscript{133}.

Husserl is very well aware of the fundamental critique that lies therein of Kant's entire philosophy, which is built upon the rejection of every such insight into the universal. This is shown by the additional passage in which Husserl criticizes the central point in Kant's uncritical "critical philosophy" by showing that "the genuine phenomenological concept of the a priori" was missing in Kant; and that Kant "had appropriated" neither the ideation and intuition of the essence, nor the goal of investigating the pure essential laws which govern acts according to all their modes as intentional experiences ... of the fulfilling constitution of 'true being'\textsuperscript{134}.

By virtue of the investigations in the Third Logical Investigation, and of later differentiations made by other authors within the bounds of philosophy, of necessary essences in contradistinction to morphic-contingent and non-necessary forms of being, we see that this immediate self-givenness, which is not mediated by any image, only holds for necessary essences; and, what is more, not for each instance of their individual existence in real contingent beings, but rather exclusively for them in their ideal, eidetic form. Husserl contributed fundamentally to defining them through his brilliant critique of empiricist and


\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., § 66, p. 731. First edition: "schaun sie selbst erst an".

nominalistic philosophy as well as through his criticism of that kind of "absurd concept of ideas" as found in "Locke's universal triangle".135

9. **Away from the Confusions of Purely Linguistic and Syntactic Interpretations of Logic! – Towards the Ideal Meanings and Essential Laws as the Sphere of Objects of Strict Logical Laws!** Husserl's Distinctions of the Ideality of "Units of Meaning" from Their Linguistic Expression and the Fluctuating Meanings of Words, as well as His Discovery of "Pure Grammar" as the Foundation of an Objectivist Logic and Phenomenology

One of the most significant contributions of Husserl to logic and a philosophy of language lies in the sharp distinction between concepts and the linguistic expression of the same. Only through this distinction in the *First Logical Investigation* is it possible for Husserl to differentiate clearly between the sphere of the object of "pure logic" and that of empirical linguistics.136

Only on the basis of this does Husserl also discover those spheres of objects to which alone those necessary logical laws can relate with which the pure science of logic deals, and which concern an essential foundation of all thinking and all truth; since every objective thought, every judgement as well as its truth, as well as every deductive conclusion to necessary laws which logic studies, rest on necessary laws.137 And this sphere of the objects of the laws of logic precisely does not depend on the acts of the subject, and, above all, is not subject to psychic empirical laws, but rather to timeless, ideal laws which alone as a foundation can ground the dignity of logic:

What he uniformly thinks and connects, however, are the concepts and propositions with their objective relations. To the subjective thought associations there corresponds at the same time an objective unity of meaning (that is to say, one which adequately measures itself in the objectivity which is "given" in the evidence) which is as it is, whether someone actualizes it or not in an act of thinking.138

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Only this discovery allows Husserl to grasp the "limitlessness of objective reason" and the knowability *quoad se* ("in itself") of all being.\(^{139}\)

We also have to mention here that Husserl's investigations, which build on the distinction between dependent and independent parts, of the difference between dependent and independent logical meanings, and his discovery of a pure or purely logical grammar, is likewise of fundamental significance for laying the foundation of a realist phenomenology in the area of logic and linguistics. Because the scope of this paper was defined by pre-established limits, we cannot go into this here in more detail.\(^ {140}\)

### 10. The Foundation of an Objectivist and Realist Epistemology
Demands the Radical Surmounting of the Identification of Husserl and Heidegger of Reality with Temporality and the Realm of Empirical Sciences, as well as an Overcoming of the False Opinion of Husserl that All Temporal Being Is Causally Determined, which Would Represent the Deathblow of Every Form of Realism

Added to the root of the Husserlian immanentism and subjectivism in his immanent interpretation of "intentionality," is Husserl's unfortunate identification of reality with the sphere of temporal being, which decisively influences Heidegger and eventually leads him to atheism. This would have shown to be completely unnecessary with a clear distinction between real being and temporality. For who could fail to see that also irreal and purely intentional objects in dreams or in a drama are temporal and that on the other hand the flux of temporality is an immense restriction of the reality of a (temporal) being that constantly emerges from and sinks back into non-being, from which it is evident that temporality, while it characterizes all real beings in the world, in no way is of the essence of real being.\(^ {141}\)

A further and equally significant root of relativism and transcendental idealism is Husserl's thesis in the *Logical Investigations*
that every real happening such as knowing is to be thought of (deterministically) as brought about by preceding causes. As already mentioned, the variety of causes is not taken into account in this thesis.\(^{142}\) Therein lies as well a compelling reason for Husserl’s later idealism in his *Logical Investigations*, since, as the logical consequence of this view of Husserl, every achievement of knowledge and evidence becomes impossible in the *real world of temporal subjects*. For in the case of its causal determination through temporally preceding (for instance, material) causes, knowledge as regards its content would neither be determined by a real object nor by a real subject, nor by essential laws which exist in themselves, but rather, as it were, “from the back side of things”, through causal chains supposedly belonging to the material world or to a real personal mind extrinsic to human acts. The act of knowing would then, however, be causally determined from the outside of its rational contact to its objects and therefore in a way that would completely exclude it from the essence of cognition; and, consequently, a criterion of evident knowledge would never be possible, since efficient causes which are completely independent of the known object would decide over the content of knowing.

Husserl’s later immanentism, subjectivism, and in the end also atheism\(^{143}\) is connected with a weighty thesis in the *Logical Investigations*: namely, with Husserl’s idea that essentially necessary states of affairs not only themselves have to be *originally* ideal and timeless (even though they are also embodied in contingent real beings, we must add), wherein I wholly agree with him –although only with respect to the contingent world and therefore with one mighty exception of a necessary essence that is *originally both real and necessary* (!)\(^{144}\) and wherein (with the aforementioned exception) lies a true Platonism of

\(^{142}\) Cf. On this Josef Seifert, *Essere e persona*, ibid., ch. 9; Cf. also Dietrich von Hildebrand’s unpublished studies on causality in Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Nachlaß*, Munich State Library and (in copy) at the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at PUC.


\(^{144}\) For precisely in the case of the necessary divine essence we must abandon the idea that essential necessity, at least in its origin, excludes real existence and has its source in a purely ideal sphere. Cf. Josef Seifert, *Gott als Gottesbeweis*, especially ch. 2; 10 f.
Husserl\textsuperscript{145}, but rather that all essential laws can only refer to ideal meanings as the sphere of their application. According to this view, that which is real, psychical as well as physical real beings, could not at all be determined by essentially necessary states of affairs. Precisely for that reason we would have to perform an epoché with respect to the entire world of that which really exists and reduce it, as it were, to the level of a "possible world" in order to make philosophical assertions about it. Connected with this, furthermore, is Husserl's thesis that everything that is real can only be temporal and, therefore, the object of the empirical sciences. This thesis as such would indeed only lead to an objectivist Platonic idealism. But when the essence of knowing as well as of intentionality is not recognized as something necessary, this thesis leads either to transcendental idealism or to a philosophical empiricism which excludes all real being and all reality in principle from the realm of the objects of philosophy; yes, it leads to the idea that every real knowing would necessarily have to be understood immanentistically. In the end, this view leads to the conclusion that, in a realistically conceived cosmos, man is not at all capable of attaining objective knowledge. Therefore, according to Husserl, an epistemological realism would have to lead to relativism. If knowing were a temporal happening that is purely determined by efficient causality, as Husserl presents reality, then, in fact, every realism would lead to relativism or skepticism! For this reason, all that remains for Husserl—in my opinion based on these false premises—is the escape into idealism, in which he wants to salvage the realm of strict a priori science.

This complete, and phenomenologically unfounded, banishing of the real m of the real into the realm of the empirical, temporal, and deterministically caused, is not the last of the factors that lead to Husserl's opinion that that which is real can only be investigated by empirical sciences.

11. The Rediscovery of Real Existence as Object of Philosophy – A Contrast to Husserl

Connected with the identification of reality with temporality that was mentioned is an epoché that is prefigured in the Logical Investigations in the sense of a radical prescinding from every transcendent real existence. This epoché was carried even further by

realist phenomenologists such as Adolf Reinach. For Adolf Reinach too, philosophy is "pure science" and one only arrives at it when one leaves real existence out of consideration and concentrates on pure essence\textsuperscript{146}. Through a series of decisive developments, realist phenomenology has overcome this "pure essentialism". In reality, namely, one needs to grasp the central ontological significance of real existence, of being and its independence from the subject, and, at the same time, its greatest fulfillment in the real, living, spiritual subject\textsuperscript{147}.

The crucial steps made in realist phenomenology in the direction of a phenomenology of real existence are the following:

a) The recognition of the applicability of all essential laws and the results of "purely essential knowledge" of absolute, necessary essences to every possible world, but also to the real world - therefore, not only to possible worlds.

b) An ontological reflection on the meaning of being as real existence as such, on the actus essendi as a phenomenon which is absolutely not reducible to essence\textsuperscript{148}.

c) The knowledge of the concrete existence of the indubitably given real I and with that of a real being in the world. With this, an explicit rediscovery and further development of the Augustinian-Cartesian cogito is given as the experience of an indubitable "little piece of the real world"; yes, as a crucial and exceedingly real experience of the reality of not just a small piece of the real world, which Husserl expressly denies, but rather of the focal point of the

\textsuperscript{146} Adolf Reinach, "Über Phänomenologie".


world, the person, who exists in a more objective and sublime way than all non-personal things.\textsuperscript{149}

d) The knowledge of the real outside world and the justification of the relation of sense perception to reality.\textsuperscript{150}

e) The analysis of empathy and other forms of grasping other persons as insights into the you, as the foundation of community and as the genuine overcoming of the solipsism that Husserl’s \textit{Cartesian Meditations} did not really surmount.\textsuperscript{151}

f) The knowledge of the real soul, of the person and her immortality.\textsuperscript{152}

g) The knowledge of the absolutely real and infinitely perfect being. (New justification of the knowledge of God, in particular of the ontological argument)\textsuperscript{153}

The last two points are of such fundamental significance that we wish to treat them briefly in a section of their own.

\textsuperscript{149} Cf. Edmund Husserl, \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge}, cit., §.

Also \textit{ibid.}, § 7 Husserl sees the being of the world no longer as an obvious fact but only as a “phenomenon of claiming ...”, as a “Geltungsphänomen”. (Cf. Edmund Husserl, \textit{ibid.}, § 10 ff.)


12. Personalism

All of this is connected to the distinct personalism of realist phenomenology, a personalism which Husserl in some points even co-founded, which, however, is decidedly neglected by him in many ways: For one thing, he questions the fundamental datum of a subject that stands in itself, of a unique personal self. Furthermore, he is originally completely influenced, in the *First Edition* of the *Logical Investigations*, by Hume’s dissolving of the personal self and his reducing it to a series of perceptions and states of consciousness\(^{154}\); in the *Second Edition*, however, he interprets the “I that he had found in the meantime” in the sense of a transcendental I which cannot be called a person because it is lacking in the clear character of the unique individual self\(^{155}\). Thirdly, Husserl does not achieve the personalism of realist phenomenology because he fails to recognize the absolute superiority of the person in contradistinction to all purely ideal units of meaning, and with that the fundamental superiority of living and real being and of the real world, above all, of the values of the person, over ideal meaning units. Therein lies as well a certain “false Platonism” of Husserl. Within the tradition of realist personalism, phenomenological realism is much closer to Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianz and Clemens of Alexandria, but also to Polish personalism, which shows close connections to Scheler, Edith Stein and phenomenology, than it is to Husserl\(^{156}\). This personalism also was the basis of Dietrich von

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Hildebrand's fight against National Socialism\textsuperscript{157}, in sharp contrast to Heidegger's failure in this direction.

13. Phenomenological Realism and the Rehabilitation of a Philosophy of God

Linked to this personalistic approach to philosophy is also a revolutionary new introduction of a real and living God who embodies all pure perfections as a valid object of phenomenological philosophy. This is likewise excluded by the Edmund Husserl of the \textit{Logical Investigations} and his equivocation of real with temporal being, and logically leads to the atheism and agnosticism of later phenomenologists.

Only, therefore, when all the false presuppositions of Husserl that have been pointed out in the \textit{Logical Investigations}, and even more so those made in his later works, have been overcome, are all conditions given for establishing phenomenological realism as classical philosophy, also in the sense of a metaphysics which defends anew not only the proofs of God's existence based on contingency, but the ontological argument as well, and which can also develop an objective philosophy of religion. The steps which Max Scheler, Edith Stein, and other authors in later works undertook to found such a philosophy cannot be expounded here\textsuperscript{158}.

14. A New Concept of Philosophy as a Strict Science

A totally different understanding of the scientific nature of philosophy is also interrelated with this. Already in the \textit{Logical


Investigations, Edmund Husserl speaks of the bellum omnium contra omnes (referring as well to the contents of the teachings of these philosophers) and thinks that he can perceive in this intellectual war waged by philosophers against each other a definite proof of the lack of the scientific nature of philosophy, a thesis to which I have attempted to give a critical response. In general, Husserl is of the opinion that he can only ground the rigorous scientific nature of philosophy by renouncing realism and the claim to knowledge of a being that is transcendent with respect to the subject. In the face of this, it is clear, if the above mentioned foundations of realist phenomenology are correct, that the realm of philosophy as strict science is not something that can be won back only with the help of Husserl, but is rather much deeper and more extensive than Husserl assumed.

III. CONCLUSION: REALIST PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE CONTINUATION AND REHABILITATION OF THE GREAT INSIGHTS OF THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

All of the great insights of Husserl, which were only sketched in this paper in a few points, should not only be retained in the framework of realist phenomenology, but must be carried on, developed further, and applied to concrete problem areas. We can thereby fully and wholly...
embrace the valuable remarks of Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* where he states that the formal object and the conditions of a science are totally independent of the scientist. Furthermore, what belongs to the science and what doesn’t, is not a question of arbitrariness. The unity of philosophical science “urges itself upon us”, as Husserl expresses himself; and hence there are correct and incorrect determinations and limitations of a science. Husserl’s own objectively incorrect restriction of the phenomenological philosophical science to mere analyses of consciousness and investigations of purely intentional objects has to be avoided in particular.

Nevertheless, we can retain thereby the magnificent insight of Husserl that the science of philosophy and of logic suffers immense harm when it confuses in psychologism the genuine realm of objects of the philosophical sciences with those of merely immanent psychical laws. Indeed, in the framework of a realist phenomenology, we can develop especially these great, immortal achievements of Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* still more radically and precisely; defending them primarily, however, in their full significance, while this became impossible for Husserl himself through his “transcendental psychologism” and relativism. In this sense, I regard phenomenological realism, as much as it includes the critique of the elements mentioned in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and, above all, of Husserl’s later development, at the same time as the redemption of the innermost issues that concerned Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*: All spheres of purely subjective psychological necessities of thought have to be radically distinguished from the objective a priori essential laws in all areas, as they govern logic for example. And, in order to thus rediscover the whole objectivity of being and of truth, with which the *Logical Investigations* deal, the things themselves, also the existing ones, have to be separated from all subjective acts in which they are given.

At the same time, however, such an objectivism does not at all prevent us from analyzing all real forms and dimensions of subjectivity as well, the genuine personal dimensions, but also the false and negatively subjective ones; and contrasting appearances, deceptions, forms of blindness and value deception of all kinds with the true and deep meanings of human subjectivity.

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In this sense, I regard the task of phenomenological realism as that of a comprehensive and classical philosophy which, on the grounds established by Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, approaches again fully and with still greater clarity than in Husserl its occidental origins, especially in Plato and Aristotle; but leads, at the same time, through its methodology and personalism to a living, new beginning of philosophy which aims anew at capturing the eternal truth; which leads to a *Seventh Voyage* of philosophy, as it was wonderfully initiated by Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, but unfortunately soon forgotten and in no way continued.\(^{161}\)

The task of such a phenomenological philosophy is none other than the old “Back to Things Themselves”, the principle of principles:

But enough of wrong theories. *No imaginable theory can confuse us* with regards to the principle of all principles: that every originally given intuition is a justifiable source of knowledge, *that everything that presents itself to us* originally in ‘intuition’ (so to speak, *in its incarnate reality*), is simply to be taken as that which it gives itself to be, *but also only* within the limits in which it presents itself. *Let us grasp, after all, that every theory could only draw its truth from originally given data*\(^{162}\).

The principle that guides us in following and criticizing Husserl is none other than *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*, the same principle which the motto of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein also expresses. This great, originally Platonic and also Husserlian principle compels us to reverently preserve the treasures of insight in the *Logical Investigations* and to appropriate them ourselves; but, at the same time, to contradict the master everywhere where he has distanced himself from his own principle and from the truth. Then the wise old saying will hold for him as well: *amicus Husserl – magis amica veritas!*

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