



Enforcement, Empowerment and Entitlement (3E):
Subnational Determinants of Armed Post-conflict Stability

By
Didiher Mauricio Rojas Usma

Thesis submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies in fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor in Political Science

Ph.D. Dissertation Committee:
Prof. Julieta Suárez Cao (Advisor)
Prof. Julián Andrés Muñoz
Prof. Valeria Palanza

Instituto de Ciencia Política
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

January, 2022

©Didiher Mauricio Rojas Usma

*No part of this thesis may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means or process, without the written permission of the author.*

*Ninguna parte de esta tesis puede reproducirse o transmitirse bajo ninguna forma o por
ningún medio o procedimiento, sin permiso por escrito del autor.*

*To my beloved wife Andrea B., Juanita and Luna
(My multispecies family)*

Acknowledgments

This work is the result of multiple vital efforts. The most important is that of my wife, Andrea Buitrago. She safeguarded our love despite the distance and knew how to face personal and collective challenges to keep our family together. All my love and infinite thanks to her. Likewise to Juanita, one of my canine accomplices, pampered and pampering forever. In days and nights of writing, her love and companion were the secret ingredients for ending my final dissertation manuscript.

Lunita (*Ojitos Locos*) also deserves my gratefulness. Her sudden arrival and the many unknowns about her past filled our multispecies family with fortune and new horizons. Thank you, Luni! For all your courage, energy, and joy. I also thank my mother and father, my sister Astrid, and my niece Guadalupe for their love, company, and unconditional support. Also to Juan Pablo Moreno, Luis Mario Marín, and “*unos pocos buenos amigos*” (the expression is from Andrés Caicedo).

To Julieta Suarez Cao. Thanks, J! for being the advisor of my Ph.D. dissertation. Without your brilliant ideas, comments, and unwavering support, this work would not have been a reality. Since my arrival at the ICP doctorate, I was sure you directed my work. I deeply admire your ideas, academic contributions to academia, and contemporary citizenship. I hope to continue counting on you. For you all my *cariño* and admiration.

Thanks to the members of my Ph.D. thesis committee. To Professor Valeria Palanza for her generous support in difficult moments of my doctorate. Thanks, Valeria, for being so supportive. Also, for learning, reading, and comments on my dissertation. To Professor Julián Muñoz for completing my Ph.D. committee. His comments and suggestions to my findings made it possible to unveil issues of my research implicit or hidden for a long time.

I would also like to thank my professors and colleagues from the Political Science doctorate program at the ICP. My Ph.D. is entirely the product of learnings taken from each one of them. Also, my gratitude to scholars, professors, students, and UC community members with whom I shared my ideas and my research project in multiple academic discussion spaces.

On the other hand, all my acknowledgments to the participants, interviewees, testimonies, and collaborators (face-to-face and virtual) of my fieldwork. The selfless help of each of them was crucial to carry out and finish my research despite the Covid-19 global pandemic scenario. I particularly appreciate the civilians, social leaders, victims of the conflict, and former rebels who participated with their testimony on the armed post-conflict dynamics in Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian regions of exception.

Likewise, I am grateful for the local public servers, peace and post-conflict managers, local policy-makers, national and subnational post-conflict institutions that participated in different stages of my research. Their objectives of designing and implementing post-conflict programs and institutions are decisive for stabilization despite the legacies of violence that continue negatively impacting the Latin American territories of internal war.

Finally, my deep gratitude to scholars, colleagues, and Latin American academic institutions that I visited, interviewed, and met during my Ph.D. research. Mainly, scholars from FLACSO-Sede Ecuador and IAEN in Quito; University of Antioquia, EAFIT and National University in Colombia; IDEHPUCP and Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP) in Lima. Their ideas and academic support substantially enriched my work's theoretical arguments and comparative empirical evidence. Thank you all.

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	Page iii
<i>List of Figures</i>	vii
<i>List of Graphics</i>	viii
<i>List of Maps</i>	ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	x
 <i>Abstract</i>	 xi

Introduction	1
<i>Subnational Determinants of the internal Armed Post-conflict</i>	

Part I Theory and Method

1. Chapter 1. From 3R to 3E: Subnational politics in the Armed post-conflict	12
1.1 The theoretical Background	13
<i>1.1.1 Galtung and 3R Model as Theory of Reconciliation</i>	13
<i>1.1.2 The 3E Armed Post-conflict Stabilization Theory</i>	17
<i>1.1.3 Contentious and Armed Politics approach to Post-conflict studies</i>	18
<i>1.1.4 Subnational Politics approach to Armed Post-conflict Stability</i>	21
1.2 Armed Post-conflict Approaches and Models: From State-oriented variables to Subnational Legacies of Armed Conflict (SLAC)	24
<i>1.2.1 Armed Post-conflict Approaches</i>	24
<i>1.2.2 Explanatory models: Economy, Security and Democratic governance</i>	28
1.3 Subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict (SLAC) on Insurgent Regions of Exception	31
<i>1.3.1 SLAC theoretical background</i>	31
<i>1.3.2 SLAC Concept Formation, Dimensions and Indicators Levels</i>	33
1.4 Armed Post-conflict Stabilization (APS): Concept formation, Dimensions and Indicators	36
<i>1.4.1 Armed Post-Conflict Stabilization: Theoretical Background & Concept Formation</i>	36
<i>1.4.2 APS as a contentious subnational process: Definition, Conditions and Indicators</i>	40
1.5 The Argument: The 3E Armed Post-conflict Stability Mechanism	47
 2. Chapter 2. Research Design	 53
2.1 The APS Mechanism	53
<i>2.1.1 General hypothesis</i>	54
<i>2.1.2 Hypothesizing the 3E sequential Mechanism</i>	54
<i>2.1.3 How 3E sequential mechanism works?</i>	55
2.2 Insurgent Regions of Exceptions (IRE) as Unit of Analysis	57
<i>2.2.1 IRE Typology</i>	59
2.3 Within and Between-Nation comparison strategy	60
<i>2.3.1 SLAC and APS variables Operationalization</i>	61
<i>2.3.2 Armed Conflict and Armed-postconflict Data</i>	63
2.3.3 Methodology	64
<i>2.3.3.1 Mix Methods Geo-nested analysis: Medium-n and Small-n Comparisons</i>	65
2.3.4 APS territorial dependency: Measuring Strategy and embeddedness levels	69
2.4 Medium-n Geo-nested Analysis: SLAC and APS in Latin American Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) 1958-2017.	72

Part II Comparative Evidence

3. Chapter 3. Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) in Colombian Regions of Exception	92
3.1. Colombia: A Recurrent Armed Post-conflict setting	96
<i>3.1.1 Colombian internal armed conflict</i>	96

3.1.2 Recurrent armed post-conflicts: Between Total war and Peace agreement processes	100
3.2 Colombian Insurgent regions of Exception (IRE): Same armed conflict, differentiated impacts	105
3.2.1 Colombian Eastern Antioquia and Southwest Regions: Why these cases?	109
3.2.3 Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region: IRE and SLAC	110
3.2.4 Colombian Southwest Region: IRE and SLAC	117
3.3 The 3E Causal Sequence and the negotiated “End” of Armed Conflict: How SLAC shapes APS In Colombia Insurgent Regions of exception	123
3.3.1 Colombian East Antioquia Region: Partial Armed Post-conflict Stability	124
3.3.2 Colombian Southwest Region: Weak Armed Post-conflict Stability	137
4. Chapter 4. Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) in Ecuadorian Regions of Exception: From National to Foreign Insurgencies Across Borders	149
4.1 Ecuador: From Small-wars to insurgent low-intensity insurgent conflicts	153
4.1.1 Ecuadorian insurgency Dynamics: Policial State, Anti-subversive intelligence and Security policies	153
4.1.2 M-19, FARC-EP, and ELN Colombian Foreign Insurgencies: Post-conflict instability on the northern border and the new risk of “contagion”	162
4.1.3 End of the internal armed insurgency and negotiating peace in neighboring armed conflicts	166
4.2 SLAC and Armed Hostility Dynamics: From center to the peripheral Insurgent Regions of Exception (Pichincha to Planning Zone 1)	170
4.2.1 Ecuadorian Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE)	171
4.2.2 Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1: Foreign Insurgency and Border Rebel Diplomacy	174
4.3 The 3E Sequence in the Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1: After National insurgent peace process... borders policies against the foreign insurgencies’ “contagious”	182
4.3.1 Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1: Strong Armed Post-conflict Stability	183
5. Chapter 5. Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) in Peruvian Regions of Exception: Legacies of armed violence and neoin insurgency risks	205
5.1 The Peruvian-Armed Conflict	208
5.1.1 From Ayacucho to Lima’s Insurgent Regions of Exception	210
5.1.2 End of the armed conflict and Politics after violence	220
5.2 SLAC Dynamics: From rural IRE to the Metropolitan Armed Fence	224
5.2.1 Peruvian Insurgent Regions of Exception	227
5.2.2 The VRAEM as a neo-insurgent Region of Exception	234
5.3 The 3E Sequence and the Armed postconflict outcome: Militarist State Enforcement ruled by decree armed post-conflict	238
5.3.1 Peruvian VRAEM Region: Fragile Armed Post-conflict Stability	239
Conclusion	255
<i>Insurgency, Legacies, and stabilization</i>	
Appendix	267
<i>Appendix 1 – Latin America Armed Conflict Data</i>	
<i>Appendix 2-3 - Colombian Data</i>	
<i>Appendix 4 – List of Interviews</i>	
<i>Appendix 5 - Ecuadorian Data</i>	
<i>Appendix 6 - Peruvian Data</i>	
References	268

List of Figures

Figure 1. Galtung's Theory of Reconciliation in Post-conflict	<i>Page 14</i>
Figure 2. 3E General Model	18
Figure 3. SLAC Dimensions, Indicators and Typology	33
Figure 4. APS Radial Concept Formation	43
Figure 5. APS Diminished Subtypes	43
Figure 6. APS Dependent Variable	44
Figure 7. APS Conditions and Measuring Levels	47
Figure 8. Enforcement Mechanism Step	49
Figure 9. Empowerment Mechanism Step	50
Figure 10. Entitlement Mechanism Step	51
Figure 11. APS Mechanism (3E Argument)	52
Figure 12. 3E mechanism Sequence with levels of APS	55
Figure 13. Geo-Nested Steps by IRE Case Selection	66
Figure 14. APS Conditions, Measuring & Territorial Dependency Levels	70
Figure 15. Colombia - East Antioquia Region APS Causal Mechanism	94
Figure 16. Colombia - Southwest Region APS Causal Mechanism	95
Figure 17. Colombia - Eastern Antioquia Region 3E Mechanism Causal Process	124
Figure 18. Colombia – Southwest Region 3E Mechanism Causal Process	137
Figure 19. Ecuador – Planification Zone 1 APS Causal Mechanism	152
Figure 20. Ecuador – Planification Zone 1 3E mechanism Causal Process	184
Figure 21. Peru - VRAEM Region APS Causal Mechanism	207
Figure 22. Peru – VRAEM Region 3E Mechanism Causal Process	240

List of Graphics

Graphic 1. Insurgent Armed Conflicts in LATAM 1958-2019	Page 73
Graphic 2. LATAM Insurgent Armed Conflicts Trajectory	74
Graphic 3. LATAM Insurgent Armed Groups by Type of Organization	75
Graphic 4. Number of Insurgency Armed Groups by IRE	76
Graphic 5. SLAC by Armed Conflict in Latin America (1958-2019)	77
Graphic 6. Type of Armed groups by IRE and SLAC	78
Graphic 7. End of the conflict by Type of SLAC and IRE	79
Graphic 8. Total of cases by Type of IRE and Type of SLAC	80
Graphic 9. Latin American IRE and SLAC types	81
Graphic 10. Social Agency and Strategic Territories SLAC Dimension	82
Graphic 11. Post-conflict Cases based on Armed Groups Type	83
Graphic 12. Types of SLAC and Post-Conflict Cases (Including Non Post-conflict active Hostility Cases)	83
Graphic 13. Type of SLAC and Post-Conflict Cases (Active Hostility Cases excluded)	84
Graphic 14. Type of SLAC aggregate conditions (Including Active Armed Conflicts)	85
Graphic 15. Type of SLAC aggregate conditions and Type of IRE (Excluding Active Armed Conflicts)	85
Graphic 16. Post-conflict Cases by Country and Type of SLAC	87
Graphic 17. LATAM Armed Post-conflict Stability Levels	88
Graphic 18. Medium-n LATAM APS Cases	89
Graphic 19. Violent events and people affected Department of Antioquia 1980-2017	114
Graphic 20. Violent events and people affected in Eastern of Antioquia Region 1980-2017	115
Graphic 21. Number of violent events by type in Eastern Antioquia	116
Graphic 22. Events of violence and affected people in Southwest region of Nariño between 1980-2017	122
Graphic 23. Type of violent events in the Southwest region of Nariño (1980-2017)	122
Graphic 24. Eastern of Antioquia Total Forced Displacement Victims by Municipalities	126
Graphic 25. Alleged perpetrator of armed violence in the Eastern of Antioquia (1981-2017)	127
Graphic 26. Eastern Antioquia - Distribution of Victims of the Armed Conflict by their Vulnerability	129
Graphic 27. Eastern Antioquia Total Forced Displacement Victims and SVV Data	132
Graphic 28. Alleged perpetrator of armed violence in the Colombian Southwest (1981-2017)	139
Graphic 29. Distribution of Armed Conflict Victims by Vulnerability	140
Graphic 30. Colombian southwest Total Forced Displacement Victims	143
Graphic 31. Colombian Southwest Region Total Forced Displacement Victims and SVV Data	145
Graphic 32. Ecuadorian National and Foreign Insurgencies SLAC by IRE	177
Graphic 33. Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from Colombia to Ecuador (1981-2020)	199
Graphic 34. Illegal Crops in Colombia vs. Eradication Strategies impacting Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1	201
Graphic 35. Peruvian Armed Post-conflict Death Cases by Department (2000-2019)	248
Graphic 36. Peruvian Armed Post-conflict Death Cases in the VRAEM (2000-2019)	248

List of Maps

Map 1. Geo-reference LATAM Post-conflict Cases and Type of SLAC	<i>Page 90</i>
Map 2. Geo-reference LATAM Post-conflict Cases and Types of IRE	90
Map 3. Colombian geo-referenced IRE	107
Map 4. Colombian geo-referenced Type of IREs and SLAC	108
Map 5. Colombian IRE by Insurgent armed orders (SLAC variation)	108
Map 6. Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region – Type of IRE and SLAC	112
Map 7. Events of violence georeferenced in Eastern of Antioquia Region	116
Map 8. Geospatial distribution of victimization focus in the Eastern of Antioquia	117
Map 9. Colombia Southwest Region – Type of IRE and SLAC	119
Map 10. Victimization Focus and Events of violence in the Southwest region of Nariño	123
Map 11. State Investment in Antioquia (Colombia)	134
Map 12. State Investment in Colombian Southwest (Nariño)	145
Map 13. Ecuadorian Regions/Planification Zones	171
Map 14. Ecuadorian National and Foreign Insurgencies Georeferenced	173
Map 15. Ecuadorian geo-referenced Type of IREs and SLAC	175
Map 16. Ecuadorian Geo-referenced Origin of Insurgencies and Type of SLAC	179
Map 17. Colombian Southwest Region and Ecuadorian PZ1 Geo-referenced IRE and Type of SLAC	179
Map 18. Peruvian Regions	225
Map 19. Peruvian VRAEM Region	225
Map 20. Peruvian geo-referenced IRE (1980-2000)	228
Map 21. Peruvian geo-referenced by IRE and SLAC (1980-2000)	229
Map 22. Peruvian geo-referenced IRE and Armed Groups (1980-2000)	229
Map 23. Peruvian geo-referenced SLAC types and Armed Groups (1980-2000)	230
Map 24. Peruvian IRE by Insurgent armed orders and their Paths	233
Map 25. VRAEM Region Armed post-conflict Dissident Groups (2000-2019)	236
Map 26. VRAEM Region Armed postconflict IRE (2000-2019)	236
Map 27. VRAEM Region Armed post-conflict Groups and SLAC (2000-2019)	237
Map 28. VRAEM Region Armed postconflict IRE and SLAC (2000-2019)	238

List of Tables

Table 1. Scope Conditions Matrix for Transnational Comparisons	<i>Page 24</i>
Table 2. Peace and Armed Post-conflict Explanatory Models	28
Table 3. SLAC Categories, Dimensions, Indicators, and Reference Cases	32
Table 4. Types of Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE)	59
Table 5. SLAC Independent Variable Classification (Operationalization)	61
Table 6. APS Dependent variable with Territorial Dependency	62
Table 7. Types of transnational comparative comparisons	68
Table 8. IRE Post-conflict Pathways	69
Table 9. LATAM Post-Conflict Cases based on SLAC Dimensions	86
Table 10. Subnational Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) Cases (Small-n step)	91
Table 11. Diverse Cases Selection Strategy (Small-n Step)	91
Table 12. Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region – 3E Mechanism process tracing	131
Table 13. APS Process tracing narrative in Eastern of Antioquia Subnational Unit (Activities & Entities)	136
Table 14. Colombian Southwest - 3E Mechanism Process Tracing (Uniqueness & Certainty)	141
Table 15. APS Process tracing narrative in Colombian Southwest Subnational Unit (Activities & Entities)	148
Table 16. Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 Region – 3E Mechanism Process Tracing	190
Table 17. APS Process tracing narrative in Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 (Activities & Entities)	204
Table 18. Peruvian VRAEM Region – 3E Mechanism Process Tracing (Uniqueness & Certainty)	243
Table 19. APS Process Tracing Narrative in Peruvian VRAEM Region (Activities & Entities)	254

Abstract

Latin American countries experienced a long and intense cycle of insurgent internal armed conflicts for State sovereignty in multiple exceptional war territories. I consider this long period of internal armed conflict as *the cycle of integrated armed insurgencies* (1985-2017) due to the type of armed insurgent actors and the political objectives contested by the rebels challenging the State. Despite the variation in the strategies and pathways for ending the armed conflict, the long-term cycle of the integrated Latin American internal armed conflicts is over.

Nevertheless, the legacies of violence over the States, the former rebels, and the civilian victims in the pre-existing subnational conflict zones still are alive. Likewise, the Latin American's State capacities for achieving armed post-conflict stabilization, implementing post-conflict policies, and controlling the new post-insurgent risks of armed violence are critical. As a result, a new set of contentious political subnational challenges for achieving a higher internal armed post-conflict stabilization have arrived.

Scholars, peace managers, and policymakers have concentrated on national peace and reconciliation processes under the classic Galtung 3R model: *Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution*. However, the internal armed conflict is an eminently subnational phenomenon. In this sense, I suggested a turn in the studies of armed post-conflict, from the national scale of Galtung's 3R (1998) to the 3E of subnational legacies of internal armed conflict on post-conflict stabilization. Namely, *Enforcement, Empowerment & Entitlement* (3E Model). I claim that the *Subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict* (SLAC) determines the variation in the *Armed Post-conflict Stability levels* (APS). Thus, my research attacks one underexplored issue of the armed post-conflict studies. At the same time, it suggests a theoretical and empirical framework for explaining the dynamics of the armed post-conflict stabilization and its causal mechanism.

My research employs a mixed-methods strategy combining geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) of a *medium-n* analysis data set (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) and a diverse cases comparison (Gerring, 2007) encompassing the Latin-American IRE from 1957 to 2019. Likewise, I use in-depth case studies (*small-n* analysis) for the empirical testing of the 3E mechanism, *causal process observations*, and *process tracing* techniques for APS levels variation. In that manner, I cover the entire spectrum of post-conflict stabilization (APS) variation as quasi-experimental complete matching techniques and control by design the potential selection bias errors.

My findings demonstrate the potential use of the *3E Model* as an explanatory mechanism for the variation of subnational post-conflict stability. My findings suggest that the more fulfilled the sequential chaining of the 3E mechanism, the higher the level of post-armed conflict achieved. The preceding was empirically evidenced by comparing diverse APS cases, including The *strong APS* level achieved by the Ecuadorian northern border Planning Zone 1, the *partial APS* identified in the Colombian Eastern of Antioquia region, the *fragile APS* level observed in the Peruvian VRAEM, and, last but not least, the *weak APS* level of the Colombian southwest region.

Introduction

Subnational Determinants of the internal armed post-conflict

Between 1958 and 2017, Latin America experienced a long and intense cycle of insurgent internal armed conflicts for State sovereignty in multiple exceptional war territories. I consider this long period of internal armed conflict as *the cycle of integrated armed insurgencies* in Latin America due to the type of armed insurgent actors and the political objectives contested by the rebels challenging the State.

Likewise, I call *Insurgent Regions of Exception* (IRE) to the subnational armed conflict spaces where the dynamics of the internal war take place. The armed actors exercise their rebel governance to achieve their political objectives from these enclaves. Starting with the events of the Cuban insurgent revolution in 1959 until the signing of the peace agreements between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP guerrilla in 2017, the Latin American insurgent regions of exception adopted differential pathways based on the armed groups' capacity, their sub-national anchorage levels, and the strategic importance of the territories for making the war.

Thus, regions of exception in territorial enclaves of Nicaragua, Cuba, or El Salvador experienced a dynamic of rebel governance for reaching the objectives of their State armed takeover. On the other hand, regions of exception in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, or Uruguay were crucial to the beginning of low-intensity insurgent conflicts relatively quickly dissolved. The latter, if we consider the long-intensity armed conflicts experienced by countries such as Peru and Colombia.

In the multiple Peruvian and Colombian regions of exception, the dynamics of the insurgent armed conflict led to implementing several strategies and scenarios for ending the war. The first opted for the armed strengthening of the State for the military victory against the insurgency; the second has installed recurrent negotiating scenarios for signing peace agreements. At the end of the day, despite the variation in the strategies and pathways for ending the armed conflict, the long-term cycle of the integrated Latin American internal armed conflicts is over.

Nevertheless, the legacies of violence over the States, the former rebels, and the civilian victims in the pre-existing subnational conflict zones still are alive. Likewise, the Latin American's State capacities for achieving armed post-conflict stabilization, implementing post-conflict policies, and controlling the new post-insurgent risks of armed violence are critical.

As a result, a new set of contentious political subnational challenges for achieving a higher internal armed post-conflict stabilization have arrived. Some critical issues point to the insurgent armed conflict peripheralization and the emergence of new enclaves of rebel governance (i.e., the Eastern Colombian border, The Paraguayan Northeastern; The Chilean Macro Zona Sur; the Venezuelan Andean border; the Peruvian VRAEM). Additionally, rebel dissidents and neo-insurgent factionalization are associated with new illegal State challengers and regional criminal governance networks.

Consequently, the end of this integrated armed insurgencies cycle asks for the armed strategies and policy responses implemented by Latin American governments for ending the internal armed conflicts and attacking their legacies of violence. Likewise, to stabilize their post-conflict settings after the insurgent violence. Two specific questions arise in this Latin American post-insurgency scenario. What determines the armed post-conflict stability?

Scholars, peace managers, and policymakers have concentrated on national peace and reconciliation processes under the classic Galtung 3R model: *Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution*. However, the internal armed conflict is an eminently subnational phenomenon. Except for the armed revolutions where the conflict consolidated until the seizure of national political power, armed conflicts are nested, developed, and ended in subnational enclaves of war. In this sense, after the end of the war, post-conflict management is also a subnational politics phenomenon that varies in its levels of stability.

In that vein, this research investigates the internal armed post-conflict stabilization determinants in the Latin American Insurgent Regions of Exception. I claim that the *Subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict* (SLAC) determines the variation in the *Armed Post-conflict Stability levels* (APS). Thus, my research attacks one underexplored issue of the armed post-conflict studies. At the same time, it suggests a theoretical and empirical framework for explaining the dynamics of the armed post-conflict stabilization and its causal mechanism.

The idea of exploring legacies of war comes from Soifer & Vergara (2019) when considering after-violence contexts, defined the legacies of violence as conditions that persist into the post-conflict period and have affected state capacity in lasting and negative ways (Page 121). In that sense, my research affiliates to legacies of conflict approach to emphasize the processual nature of post-conflict determinants such as SLAC and formulate an alternative explanation on the long and medium-term effects of armed conflict over post-conflict stability.

Using empirical and unique data on Latin American internal armed conflicts (1958-2019) and focusing on comparing Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian post-conflict settings, my research shows why subnational regions of exception inherited legacies of war adopt differentiated post-conflict pathways. The latter is crucial for explaining why the internal armed post-conflict stabilization levels vary depending on its sequential causal mechanism dynamics.

In this sense, my research orients the post-conflict studies based on the national-oriented 3R stability model to the subnational 3E determinants of the armed post-conflict stability: *Enforcement, Empowerment & Entitlement*. Thus, my research explores institutional, political, and social factors configuring an alternative mechanism for post-conflict stabilization. That is a mechanism to: First, investigate the factors affecting the institutional order captured by the armed insurgency in sub-national contexts; and, second, identify the effect of the legacies of violence on political institutions, social agency, and the inhabitants and territories of the war.

Call it post-conflict, post-war, or post-agreement scenarios, the objective of the after-violence policy is to guarantee the stability of the conditions allowed when the internal war diminishes or ends. Thus, the victims and sub-national territories affected by the conflict become the focus of stabilization and favor increasing the levels of post-conflict stability. The above makes sense if we think of the weak and fragile stability levels majorly achieved by Latin American governments after national-scale post-conflict management based on militaristic, securitarian, and authoritative strategies.

My research deals with conventional national-level recipes about post-conflict stabilization through economic development strategies, securitarian militarization, and exogenous third-parties intervention. At the same time, I confront approaches defining stabilization as an exclusive national-executive power outcome in the Latin American regimes. My findings show, for example, how the Ecuadorian strong subnational strategies for the post-conflict management may challenge the classical vision about the political instability of Ecuador due to its recurrent processes of presidential impeachment. In the same vein, the weak and partial levels of armed post-conflict stability in the Colombian subnational regions of exception could overturn the political wisdom about the solid political stability of its national governments.

By the same token, I propose a new definition of armed Post-Conflict Stability focused on the intervention of contentious and territorialized unstable processes inherited from the war. In this sense, my definition majorly differentiates from most definitions that postulate a peaceful post-conflict nature and reduce its meaning to episodes composed exclusively of peacebuilding actions. From this perspective, the post-conflict is a new process of contentious politics experienced in the Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE). Thus, during post-conflict, the armed actors, the victims, and the State deal with the new governance conditions of war territories.

Two primary theoretical references guide the conceptual framework of my post-conflict research from a subnational perspective: First, the contentious policy literature on armed politics (Close & Prevost, 2007; Balcells, 2017), armed orders (Kalyvas, 2010); Staniland, 2014; 2017), rebel governance (Arjona, 2016) and the social processes of war (Wood, 2008). Second, the subnational politics approach applied to the post-conflict determinants, the units of analysis in contexts of informal power, and the Armed Post-Conflict (APS) levels.

Additionally, my research follows Pepinsky (2017) and Sellers (2019) theoretical innovations for designing research strategies for transnational comparisons. Particularly those that cover -as in my small-n diverse cases strategy (Gerring,2007)- the whole spectrum of variation of subnational units within a country (Colombia). Likewise, those techniques for analyzing the between sub-national variation on units of different countries (Peru and Ecuador). In that manner, my research improves its strategy for selecting subnational units and looks for higher causal leverage explaining the APS outcome.

In short, my research suggests a new theoretical and methodological frame for studying the explanatory factors of post-conflict stability. Still, it does not exclude the background references and empirical models about peace and post-conflict from a national-level perspective: Peacebuilding (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; UN, 2008), Stable Peace (Caplan

& Hoeffler, 2017), Enduring Peace (Hoddie & Hartzell 2005), Post-conflict success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), post-conflict risk (Collier et al. 2008) and Post-conflict Recovery (UNDP, 2008).

Limits of APS existing Explanations

Peacebuilding research and post-conflict studies focus on structural and national-state determinants of post-conflict stability. In that sense, economic recovery, national security, and war-to-peace transformation are the most important explanatory factors of stabilization. All of them explore the potential causes of stabilization from a State-oriented perspective. Consequently, the subnational determinants of the post-conflict have been less explored.

One of the critical limits coming from these national-state-oriented explanations is the premise that internal armed conflict impacts the whole structure of the State; hence its social and political legacies of violence are homogenous at the full national scale. I attack this centric-state *bias* of armed post-conflict based on subnational and contentious legacies of violence approaches (Giraudy et al., 2019; Soifer & Vergara, 2019), considering that internal armed conflict varies with other subnational processes over time. I suggest the pre-existing armed order conditions, social agency impacts, and strategic territorial conditions as a new set of aggregated subnational conditions for explaining how the APS level varies.

The post-conflict and economic recovery approach may be the most radical when estimating the successful post-conflict based on macrostructural variables such as the private sector development and the national economic normalization. Besides economic development matters, consider it as the central axis of post-conflict leave behind core elements of positive peace approaches related to social justice, truth, and binding political conditions for internal war victims. Additionally, national economic normalization regularly implies unilateral privilege elites and govern strategies not appropriately compromised with a social and pluralistic post-conflict agenda.

Similarly, the securitarian post-conflict approaches lack theoretical and empirical conditions for transcending the traditional meaning of post-conflict as the absence of war through militarization. My findings concerning Colombian and Peruvian militaristic enforcement rules evidence the limits of militarily managed post-conflict settings. Methodologically, security and public order studies lack severe limitations explaining the relation between causes of war and the militaristic measures justifying the unilateral State intervention on the post-conflict.

Surprisingly, human-scale securitarian approaches represent the other side of the coin. They promote positive peace-building conditions and criticize the traditional militaristic view of post-conflict securitization. For Alkire (2003), human security initiatives must be oriented towards an active and substantive notion of democracy from local to global scales of politics. My findings of how Ecuador achieved strong APS levels promoting a human-scale security policy for its northern border with Colombia are revealed concerning this issue.

The performative war-to-peace transformation approach is also considered a vital component of democratic governance and human security for dealing with the post-conflict. In that sense,

it proposes a progressive commitment of the State with the democratic participation of civilians in negotiating and implementing post-conflict policies. Despite this, it lacks theoretical and methodological gaps conceiving explanations about the post-conflict stability based on fulfilling a considerable series of unordered peace milestones (Brown et al., 2011). My research does not ignore the contributions of this performative peace approach. Still, I try to solve its limitations by suggesting a sequential APS mechanism that includes achieving crucial peace milestones at the subnational level.

In a nutshell, theoretical and empirical explanations about armed post-conflict from a national scale lack prominent criticisms focused on ambiguity and conceptual consistency issues (i.e., Hoddie and Hartzell Model); normative bias (i.e., DDR Model); exogenous intervention (i.e., Doyle-Sambanis Model), and scope conditions (i.e., Collier and Hoeffler Model). All of them are crucial to understanding the post-conflict dynamics. However, down the scale in the study of subnational post-conflict determinants may improve its main findings.

Concerning the limits of Galtung's 3R post-conflict model, I confronted some theoretical and methodological flaws that negatively affect the causal explanatory leverage of APS determinants. Galtung (1998; 2012) gives the State a crucial role as a transforming agent of violent conflicts and disputes; however, the State is not regularly a neutral actor in armed conflict environments. Latin American armed conflicts in Colombia, Perú, or Ecuador evidenced the role of the State as an agent of violence responsible for severe human rights violations during the war. Thus, the States and national governments are not only agents but subjects of transformative post-conflict measures for achieving stability.

In this vein, the 3R Model proposes a one-sided approach to the post-conflict reconstruction, considering the State as a neutral agent of war. This lack of bidirectionality of the internal armed conflict neglects the State's responsibility in war events. Moreover, it promotes a normative-state *bias* as the unilateral agent for the transformation of disputes. The Peruvian authoritarian national-oriented policies for the post-conflict management in the VRAEM traced in my research are crucial for understanding this unilateral post-conflict setting ruled by decree.

On the other hand, although the 3R model considers a multilevel scenario for the transformation of conflicts, it prioritizes international and inter-state wars conditions from a State-level scale. Galtung's (1998) model has been crucial for explaining the war in International Relations affairs; nevertheless, its unit of analysis is domestic conflicts that arose from the 20th-century post-war scenario. In this line, Galtung's reconciliation approach lacks scope conditions that may be solved downing the scale to the within-nation context of war.

Empirical models based on the 3R normative assumptions reveal additional limitations of Galtung's theory for the transformation of conflicts. I identified that the 3R model takes into account the temporal dimension of the conflict and its effects on the post-conflict settings. Still, theoretical lacks concerning the dynamics of the 3R past-present-future sequence limits the empirical testing of the transformation of conflicts approach. For example, what if reconstruction of past violent events is prolonged and overlaps with the Resolution process? In the same line, do changes in the temporary 3R stages affect the variation in the post-

conflict setting? As far as I am concerned, there is insufficient empirical evidence supporting the 3R steps argument to identify conflicts.

Consequently, without ignoring its vital contributions to resolving conflicts in the contemporary post-war scenario, the 3R model has a primary moral and normative motivation that limits exploring the empirical determinants of internal armed post-conflict. As I recognized in my theoretical framework, the 3R model offers indicators and observable conditions for armed conflict resolution. However, recent studies (Walter, 2014; Kreutz, 2018) exploring post-conflict environments recognize the model's limits and inform about spurious and non-significant results after testing Galtung's explanatory variables.

In the same line, Hoeffler (2019) states that the theoretical and large-n peacebuilding models based on the negative peace approach of the 3R model exclude crucial dimensions and variables of alternative peace perspectives. Therefore, variables such as justice processes improving and civilian participation in politics after violence are absent in the 3R conditions for transcending the meaning of post-conflict as a mere scenario of the absence of war. In a nutshell, there are problems of empirical validity and explanatory efficacy that seriously limit the scope conditions and causal leverage of the 3R model.

The Argument

As seen below, previous research on peacebuilding and post-conflict stabilization (Felstiner et al., 1980; Mather & Yngvesson, 1981; Galtung, 1998) proposes that the 3R Model is the key mechanism to build a stable post-conflict environment. According to the former idea, the 3R let the State intervene in armed conflict's visible and invisible effects. However, the 3R model suffers from limitations respecting the long timing of deciphering the structural causes of the armed conflict and its negative peace approach that disregard the emergence of new contentious scenarios or recurrence of armed violence between the actors of war.

Opposite to this, the central argument of my research states that subnational legacies of the internal armed conflict determine the armed post-conflict stability levels. Thus, I claim that the APS causal mechanism consists of the 3E subnational political processes: *Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement*. Implementing the 3E sequential mechanism allows achieving the necessary conditions to intervene in the legacies inherited by the armed conflict.

The 3E Model proposes a new mechanism for a stable post-conflict setting beginning with three subnational politics processes (steps) linking a causal sequence: First, the Enforcement allows the application of formal rules by the State in the pre-existed armed orders (Knight, 1992; Holland, 2016); Second, an Empowerment process to "Rebuild communities' social cohesion and political participation (Cliffe et al. 2003); and, finally, the victims and territories' Entitlement focused on transformative post-conflict policies (Chilkin & Kaldon, 2017: 354). All of them are necessary for the accountability, justice, and reconciliation of political institutions, former rebels, and civilians involved in the internal armed war.

Following Falletti & Mahoney (2015), my argument is based on a sequential mechanism causally ordered to explain how the linkages between the 3E steps trigger stabilization's transmission vectors for achieving higher APS levels. Thus, the dynamics of my 3E mechanism consider factors excluded in the APS existing explanations: First, the subnational dimensions inherited from legacies of the armed conflict; second, the effect of implementing transformative and holistic post-conflict initiatives; and last but not least, the post-conflict pathways for achieving stability. In a nutshell, my argument suggests that the better the 3E sequential causal mechanism works, the more APS level is achieved.

In this respect, my argument distinguishes between sequential and non-sequential post-conflict settings. When implementing the 3E mechanism is sequential, the result is a higher level of stability. On the contrary, the APS outcome trend decreases when implementation is non-sequential (i.e., incomplete or selective). My findings in the APS process tracing of the Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 show how the sequential accomplishment of the 3E mechanism drives to a strong APS level. In contrast, the non-sequential 3E mechanism implementation in the Colombian Eastern of Antioquia and Southwestern regions resulted in partial and weak APS levels. I identified a similar outcome in the Peruvian VRAEM region of exception due to a non-sequential (selective and incomplete) 3E mechanism implementation.

Research Design

My research employs a mixed-methods strategy combining geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) of a *medium-n* analysis data set (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) and a diverse cases comparison (Gerring, 2007) encompassing the Latin-American IRE from 1957 to 2019. Likewise, I use in-depth case studies (*small-n* analysis) for the empirical testing of the 3E mechanism, *causal process observations*, and *process tracing* techniques for APS levels variation. In that manner, I cover the entire spectrum of post-conflict stabilization (APS) variation as quasi-experimental complete matching techniques and control by design the potential selection bias errors.

My research design was carried out using a subnational comparison framework within a country (Colombia) and a transnational one (Ecuador and Peru). In that manner, I collected pieces of evidence for the empirical tests of my armed post-conflict stability argument. Having delimited the study of the internal armed post-conflict in my geo-nested *medium-n* step, I compare the subnational variation of the stability levels based on the empirical tests of the SLAC and APS variables. At the same time, I identify and compare the Latin American Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) for selecting diverse post-conflict cases in my geo-nested *small-n* step.

In this vein, my research considers methodological innovations for the causal inference suggested by Sellers (2019) and Pepinsky (2017), replacing a *large-n* analysis econometrically oriented by a *medium-n* analysis territorially nested. Thus, my research covers the universe of Latin American armed conflicts over my periodization (1958-2019), and it is sensitive to the particularities of the IRE based on within and between subnational comparisons.

Likewise, I implement a diverse cases strategy (Gerring, 2007) in my geo-nested *small-n* step for selecting and comparing the IRE cases that emerged from my *medium-n* analysis. In that manner, I traced the dynamics of post-conflict pathways in the cases selected for the empirical testing of my armed post-conflict stability theory. Finally, my research design incorporates my 3E sequential mechanism proposal explaining its origin, steps, and linkages for achieving a higher APS level.

For the geo-nested *medium-n* analysis, I used georeferenced conflict event data (GED) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for Latin America and the UCDP / PRIO armed conflict data set (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). With them, I identified and codified the SLAC dimensions in the universe of Latin American armed conflicts (61 cases in the period 1958-2019). For my APS process tracing in the comparative evidence chapters, I collected primary and secondary information from reports, files, databases, and data series on armed conflict in Latin America. Additionally, I used my own data derived from my fieldwork, face-to-face and virtually interviews, between 2019 and 2020 in conflict spaces of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

The comparative *small-n* diverse cases analysis includes interviews with former rebels, armed conflict victims, and post-conflict state institutions managers. I also used historical data and documentary sources on the internal insurgent conflicts within and between sub-national units selected in the *medium-n* geo-nested analysis: Official and unofficial documents, academic studies, and research, Reports from local institutions, victim's organizations on the conflict, and places of memory [ex. CARE, *Jardín de la Memoria* and *Salón del Nunca Más* (Antioquia-COL); *Lugar de la Memoria* (Lima-Peru); *Comisión de la Verdad* (Ecuador)].

Additionally, I consulted legal texts of the agreements, amnesty processes, communications from groups in negotiation, reports from truth commissions, Historical Memory, and documents related to the post-conflict initiatives and policies implementation in Latin America. I explored local databases such as the *Centro de Documentación de Los Movimientos Armados* (CEDEMA), *Centros Nacionales de Memoria Histórica* of the selected countries, and the *Centros locales de Memoria Histórica*, among others. At the same time, I use local and national press archives on the history of the conflict and the processes of negotiation, dissolution, or termination of the armed conflict. Unique data on armed conflict and post-conflict processes also include post-conflict constitutional texts, policy programs, and post-conflict state decrees.

The fieldwork included contact, face-to-face and virtual, with local researchers and former armed-conflict actors in the sub-national units of Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. In addition, I conducted interviews with crucial actors of the post-armed conflict in the countries mentioned. The interviewed people included in the first group, victims of the armed conflict, social organizations, and Victims' rights defenders. In the second, former rebels demobilized and reincorporated ex-combatants from the armed insurgent organizations. Third, national and sub-national institutional managers (public workers, post-conflict policymakers, among others). Finally, I interviewed local researchers and scholars on Latin American armed conflict and post-conflict.

Chapters Overview

This research is composed of two main parts: Theory and comparative evidence. The first part includes the theoretical framework and methodology for explaining why the subnational legacies of violence determine the armed post-conflict stability levels and how its mechanism works. The second part presents comparative evidence on Latin American armed post-conflict stabilization settings. My comparative evidence shows the dynamics of the SLAC in the whole universe of the Latin American insurgent regions of exception (1958-2019). Then, I focus on tracing the dynamics of the 3E mechanism in the diverse IRE cases that emerged from my mixed methods geo-nested empirical strategy. In this manner, I compare the APS post-conflict pathways of subnational units within (Colombia) and between (Ecuador and Peru) nations.

Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework of my research. I confront the conventional Galtung's 3R model to show the normative bias and empirical limitations of its national-scale oriented reconciliation theory. At the same time, I describe the pre-existing large-n explanatory models of post-conflict, focusing on their core argument and explanatory limitations. Thus, I introduce my subnational politics stability approach and suggest its contributions to explaining the legacies of war shaping the internal armed post-conflict settings.

To do that, I describe the formation process of Legacies of the Armed Conflict (SLAC) and Armed Post-conflict Stabilization (APS) concepts. Using an aggregation strategy that includes pre-existing armed orders, civilian agency, and territorial dependency dimensions, I operationalize the SLAC variable by combining variables with high logical and theoretical correlation (Quinn et al., 2007). In the same line, I offer a new definition of the APS based on empirical attributes framed by the extensive literature on peacebuilding, post-war stability, and processual peace.

Nevertheless, the logic of concept formation and measurement of my APS variable is different from that used by large-n and national-scale empirical models. In this case, I used a radial concept formation technique to accomplish a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in a Bayesian logic style. The result is a diminished subtypes typology that differentiates between weak, fragile, partial, and strong APS levels. I conclude Chapter 1 by describing the measuring strategies for my SLAC and APS variables. Likewise, I present the core argument of my research concerning the 3E sequential mechanism and unpack the process theoretically through Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement steps that trigger stability vectors of transmission. At the end of Chapter 1, the pieces of the 3E puzzle are introduced and explained.

Chapter 2 deals with my mixed-methods research design and the empirical strategy for testing my 3E armed post-conflict stability argument. In that line, my research claims for the existence of an alternative APS causal mechanism including subnational State institutions, local civil society, and transformative post-conflict policies. In contrast to the *large-n* empirical models following Galtung's 3R, I design a subnational unit of analysis for the empirical testing of my APS theory based on the formal and informal characteristics of

subnational regions of exception (Pepinsky, 2017). In that vein, I defined and operationalized in Chapter 2 my unit of analysis as Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE).

In Chapter 2, I also unveiled the dynamics of the 3E sequential mechanism and hypothesized how it works. My research design differentiates between two types of hypotheses: First, the general hypothesis concerns the effect of subnational legacies of violence on armed post-conflict stability. Thus, the effective intervention on the subnational legacies of armed conflict increases the armed post-conflict stability levels. Second, the mechanism hypothesis disaggregates the dynamics of the 3E steps following a sequential causal linkage (Falleti & Mahoney, 2015) between Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement.

As seen above, my research design is based on a subnational (within-nation) and transnational (between-nations) comparison framework that allows collecting comparative evidence for my APS general and mechanistic hypothesis. In that sense, I describe in Chapter 2 my mixed-methods geo-nested empirical strategy by scaling down the study of internal armed post-conflict. Following Harbers & Ingram (2017), my geo-nested analysis considers three nuclear steps: The *medium-n*, the *small-n*, and the *mechanisms of diffusion* analysis (APS process tracing).

The *medium-n* step presents the SLAC general hypothesis testing based on own and secondary data on Latin American IRE territorially nested (1958-2019). I describe in Chapter 2 the process of codifying and georeferencing the universe of insurgent regions of exception identified. The *small-n* step orients the selection of diverse cases for an in-depth comparison of the variation on APS levels. The move from the medium-n to *small-n* analysis step represents a change from data set observations to thicker and more heterogeneous causal-process observations using qualitative techniques as process tracing. In that line, I conclude Chapter 2 selecting diverse cases of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru for the APS mechanisms of diffusion hypothesis testing in my comparative evidence chapters.

The Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian IRE cases selected for my in-depth post-conflict pathways comparison emerged from the *medium-n* geo-nested analysis of my research design. In that manner, I present in Chapters 3 to 5 the comparative evidence on the dynamics of the 3E mechanism using the within and between nations comparison already mentioned. Chapter 3 compares the Colombian Eastern of Antioquia and Pacific Southwest insurgent regions of exception. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on my transnational IRE comparison between the Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 (Chapter 4) and *Peruvian's Valle de los Rios Apurimac, Ene y Mantaro – VRAEM* regions (Chapter 5).

The Colombian within-nation comparison presents empirical evidence for explaining the variation on *weak* and *partial* APS levels achieved by the *Eastern Antioquia* and *pacific southwest* regions. After a general overview of the Colombian internal armed conflict, Chapter 3 describes the last long cycle of agreements and peace negotiation processes between armed insurgent groups and national governments (1981-2017). Then, I compare the SLAC variation on the Colombian insurgent regions selected and show why the mixed-type legacies of violence inherited during war determined the recurrent Colombian post-conflict scenarios. Using a process-tracing technique, Chapter 3 ends by unpackaging the

dynamics of the 3E mechanism and comparing its effects on the conditions for achieving the APS levels observed in the Colombian within-subnational units compared.

Chapter 4 opens the between-nation comparative section of my research. In this chapter, I empirically traced the 3E causal mechanism under the *strong* post-conflict stability level achieved by Ecuador after its low-intensity internal armed conflict and the risk of foreign insurgencies “contagious”. To that end, I present a brief overview of the Ecuadorian national armed insurgency experiences from Pichincha to the northern border *Planification Zone 1 (Esmeralda, Carchi, and Sucumbios)* regions (1956-1991). At the same time, I explore the role of foreign insurgencies in building networks of rebellion and rebel governance sanctuaries in the Ecuadorian part (1991-2017).

Thus, Chapter 4 delves into the subnational dynamics of internal and foreign insurgencies in the northern Ecuadorian border for showing how the bottom-up strategy designed by the State and civil society around the 3E mechanism favored its early armed post-conflict stabilization. After describing the processes of national insurgencies dissolution and peace agreements, I georeferenced and compared the type of national and foreign insurgent regions of exception and its legacies of violence. I end chapter 4 with the Ecuadorian APS process tracing for evidence of why stability vectors of transmission triggered from Enforcement to Empowerment and Entitlement explain the strong post-conflict setting of the Ecuadorian “island of peace” enclave.

Chapter 5 closes the between-nations strategy for comparing the whole APS specter of variation hypothesized in my research design. This chapter deals with the armed post-conflict setting inherited by the national government and armed insurgency legacies of violence during the Peruvian internal war (1980-200). After comparing within and between subnational regions in Colombia and Ecuador, I enter the Peruvian rebel enclaves to explain why the selective and incomplete 3E mechanism implementation became at a *Fragile* APS level.

I mainly focus on the Ayacucho provinces, where the PCP-Sendero Luminoso armed group promotes its rural-to-urban armed revolution. Likewise, I explore the dynamics of *neo-senderistas* regions of exception in the VRAEM that emerged during the post-conflict period. Thus, Chapter 5 shows the impacts of legacies of violence on civilians, territories, and subnational state institutions shaping its fragile post-conflict setting. As in the Colombian and Ecuadorian cases, Chapter 5 traces the 3E mechanism process and collects crucial pieces of evidence for explaining the contemporary Peruvian post-conflict pathway.

Finally, my conclusions summarize the main findings of my research concerning subnational legacies of violence and stabilization in contemporary Latin American post-conflict settings. I also discuss my research’s theoretical and methodological contributions on insurgency, legacies, and post-conflict studies. Additionally, I underline some contributions of my theoretical framework and empirical findings for political science and social science scholars following my APS subnational approach. I end with an evaluation of the scope conditions of my research as well as a potential contribution to policymakers designing post-conflict policy responses

Chapter 1

From 3R to 3E: Subnational politics in the Armed post-conflict

1.1 The theoretical frame

For more than 30 years, Ireland faced what would be one of the longest war events in its recent history: The internal armed conflict between Catholics and Protestants over the Irish State separation from the United Kingdom. This conflict included armed insurgent groups confronted against the Irish State in a type of prolonged war whose political objectives would end up giving it a different hue from the resto of European wars of religion.

It was only until 1998 that the Irish would find a negotiated way out of the conflict through the Belfast Peace Agreements. In these, three processes were key to the post-conflict: *Remember, Renew and Reconcile*. Behind this recipe for the post-conflict there were a series of previous reflections that referred to the work of philosophers, thinkers and researchers on peacebuilding, including the outstanding peace theorist Johan Galtung and his later called 3R Model: *Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution* (Galtung, 2009).

In cases such as that of Ireland, and in general the set of cases of internal armed conflict mediated or intervened by the United Nations, Galtung's model became the standard for peacebuilding processes and the study of its effects at the state level. At the same time, the studies on peacebuilding and peace consolidation adopted the Galtung model to face the empirical study of the so-called negative peace, which, in short, defined the post-conflict as a scenario where peace was understood as the total absence of war.

In short, for Galtung (1998) at the heart of his model dwells the mechanism of post-conflict understood as the transformation of conflicts through peace. In Galtung's words (1998): “Transform the root conflict so that the parties can handle it, the thesis being that ‘it is the failure to transform conflict that leads to violence’” (Galtung, 2009: 3).

However, the 3R model contributions suffer from at least two fundamental issues: First, the long timing of deciphering the structural causes of the armed conflict as a previous condition of post-conflict stabilization; second, the limits of its negative peace approach that disregard the emergence of new contentious scenarios or recurrence of armed violence between the actors of war. In that vein, one possible reason for the limits of the 3R Model may depend on its structural and State-level scale that shapes its explanatory factors of post-conflict. Additionally, the 3R Model focuses on legal, cultural, and moral issues of negative peace empirically not tested.

The foregoing issues could then imply that, despite the legal, cultural and moral importance of 3R processes, there are material, institutional and political factors that may configure a different explanatory mechanism for post-conflict stabilization. For this reason, the purpose of this section is to explain the components of the 3R model, their antecedents and basis for its construction, in order to identify potential gaps regarding cases of armed insurgency that seem not to respond to the effects of 3R recipe. Having identified the problems and

limitations of the 3R Model, I proceed with the 3E Model and the theoretical frame about the causal mechanism of post-conflict stabilization in contexts of armed insurgency.

1.1.1 Galtung and 3R Model as Theory of Reconciliation

Galtung (1998) states that the question about *afterwar paths to peace* implies the identification of the strategies used by the National states to face the new post-conflict scenarios after violence. Based on this statement, the author proposes that 3Rs Model: *Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution*, as the key mechanism to build a stable post-conflict environment. According to this idea, 3Rs let to the State intervenes the visible and invisible effects of armed conflict dealing with the strategies of the so-called ABC-triangle.

The so-called ABC-triangle postulates the existence of three interrelated aspects in the causal chain of armed conflicts: Attitudes (A), Behaviors (B), and Contradictions (C). In general, Galtung (2007) states that the 3R Model is based on the analysis of Attitudes (A) that underlie the conflict between the actors, the identification of their Contradictions (C), and the type of Behaviors (B) that trigger the incompatibility of internal war.

However, the contribution made by the ABC model leaves aside at least two fundamental issues: First, the problem of conditioning the construction of the post-conflict to deciphering the causes of the armed conflict and, second, avoiding the armed post-conflict as a new scenario of contradiction.

Faced with these problems, Mather & Yngvesson (1981) propose a transformation of disputes legal approach made up of three processes: *Rephrasing, Narrowing, and Expansion* (From Now on RNE Model). For the authors, the usefulness of this model lies in at least three issues: a. Improving the understanding of how people process their disputes or contradictions; b. Showing normative frameworks and laws created by people negotiation of social order; and c. Comparing cases of disputes and conflict processes in diverse institutional settings and across different cultures. According to the authors:

This framework will suggest how the processing of disputes is linked to larger considerations of social and political order. Specifically, we are interested in the relation between the definition and transformation of disputes, on the one hand, and the maintenance and change of legal and other normative systems, on the other (Mather & Yngvesson, 1981: 776).


A second model in the line of transforming the disputes is that proposed by Felstiner et al. (1981) around three new formal processes: *Naming, Blaming and Claiming* (Hereinafter NBC Model) From a theoretical perspective, the NBC Model starts from the assumption that social disputes rather than "things" are social constructs, which shape the behavior and attitudes of the actors involved in a conflict. Thus, studying the process of transformation of disputes implies the adoption of a sociological point of view, rather than strictly legal or institutional; that is: "the way in which experiences become grievances, grievances become disputes, and disputes take various shapes, follow particular dispute processing paths, and lead to new forms of understanding" (Felstiner, et al.; 1981: 632)

In the Felstiner et al. (1981) process of transformation of conflicts, *Naming* is the recognition of the grievances that triggered a particular type of dispute. In terms of the model: The transition from an *Unperceived Injurious Experience (unPIE)* to a *Perceived Injurious Experience (PIE)*. In the same line, the identification of a PIE would lead to its transformation into grievances that allow the attribution of a particular lack or violation of rights for a subsequent repair process. This stage of the process corresponds to *Blaming*. Once the *Naming* and *Blaming* stages are established, the NBC conflict transformation model closes with the *Claming* process that involves identifying those responsible for the grievances and adopting measures of reparation and restitution to those affected by the conflict.

In this way, the NBC model allows designing dispute processing institutions that provide stability to post-conflict processes after violence. At the same time, it identifies the social structure of dispute, that is, the differences in the social perception of the damage generated by the war. Likewise, improving the conditions of access to justice for the parties involved and balancing the scenario of attribution of responsibilities for stabilization after violence.

Due to the appearance of previous models, Galtung (2012) proposes a new version of 3R Model starting from the identification of the dimensions in which the controversies generated by the conflict could be transformed. Each of these dimension associates with a specific moment in time that includes the Past, Present and Future. In sum, the “before and after” of the conflict (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Galtung Theory of Reconciliation in Post-conflict



Source: Own elaboration based on Perlman, Santa Bárbara y Galtung (2012)

Figure 1. summarizes the central components of Galtung's 3R model (1998; 2012), starting with a time axis of the conflict that makes visible its transformations over time. In this sense, the 3R Model not only serves as an articulating axis of his *Reconciliation* theory but also serves as an explanatory mechanism for post-conflict in a diachronic axis that goes from the past of violence to the present and future of the transformation of disputes. Likewise, from a Micro level, the *Reconciliation* process includes damages and interpersonal traumas necessary to the establishment of a new culture of peace at the Metasocial level. In this way, Galtung's 3R Model inserts into conflict transformation narratives in the line of Yngvesson's

(1980); Felstiner et al. (1981) and Culbertson, et. all (2007). However, it is crucial to mention some of the 3R Model lacks as a causal explanatory resource for armed post-conflict processes:

a. *The model proposes a one-sidedness of the post-conflict construction process when considering the State as a neutral agent for conflict resolution.*

As in the case of Felstiner et al. (1981) and Mather & Yngvesson (1981) models, Galtung gives the State the role of transforming agent of violent conflicts and disputes. However, in the context of armed conflict and state-building disputes, the latter is usually not a neutral actor. Likewise, social actors and non-state institutions participate in the processes of ending the conflict and post-conflict construction under the slogan of multilateral implementation of the actions necessary for stabilization.

Nevertheless, what happens to the process of *Reconciliation* when the transforming agent is a State that also generates violence during war? Who exercises the role of a neutral third party under these conditions?

In short, Model 3R not only concentrates on a one-sided, state-based version of the post-conflict, but it also promotes a normative *bias* according to which the State, being a neutral agent in the face of conflict, is the unilateral agent for the transformation of disputes. Thus, the participation of legitimate actors such as victims, political organizations, and local institutions in the initial and subsequent stages of the process is questioned.

b. *Although the 3R model contemplates a multilevel scenario for the transformation of conflicts (Micro to Meta levels), it focuses only on problems on the Inter-States and State-Level scale.*

Galtung's (1998) model is in line with the field of International Relations, and in that sense, its emphasis is on the area of Inter-States politics. However, its unit of analysis is domestic conflicts in the 20th-century post-war scenario, which implies, in my opinion, the need for an explicit problematization of the within-nation scenario of war. For this reason, Galtung's (2012) reconciliation approach, as well as the set of disputes transformation approaches, are carriers of a state-oriented *bias* focused on the formulation of "State-based peacebuilding strategies," thus ignoring the heterogeneity of the post-conflict scenarios, actors and processes at other levels and scales of politics.

As an example, Pepinsky (2017) introduces the *Regions of exception* category referring to zones, scenarios, or spaces within the States where the dynamics of the conflict adopt a significantly higher magnitude compared with the rest of sub-national units. Consequently, an approach about the transformation of disputes and post-conflict should include a differential perspective about the effects of the conflict, not only in time but in the different sub-national peacebuilding contexts. In summary, the Micro and Meta levels of the 3R model become normative dimensions of Galtung's post-conflict theory (from the intrapersonal to the collective-social) rather than spatial or political scale categories for the implementation of the transformation processes of disputes.

c. The 3R model contemplates the temporal dimension of the conflict and its transformation; however, it does not unveil the effects and changes in the causal sequence of reconciliation.

As in the case of the ABC Triangle (Galtung, 1998), the 3R model comprises steps in the peace-building process that seem to constitute a causal mechanism for the transformation of disputes. Proof of this is the relationship between each R of the 3R model and the time frame of its Past-Present-Future conflict. However, the sequence between the processes and their distribution over time is inaccurate.

Thus, what if the *Reconstruction* of past violence events is prolonged or overlaps with *Resolution* processes? Do changes in the rhythm or stages of the 3R sequence have differential effects on the post-conflict scenario? In the case of the ABC Model, Galtung states that there is no specific order of the steps that lead to the identification of conflicts. The same seems to be true of the 3R model, even though the distribution of the 3R over time looks like a sequence causal process.

d. The 3R model has a primary moral and normative motivation that limits the study of the empirical determinants of post-conflict.

The 3R model theoretically guides most empirical studies on peacebuilding: *Hoddie and Hartzell* (HH model) *Doyle – Sambanis* (DS model); *Collier and Hoeffler* (CH Model) (See Table 2 in Section 1.2). Still, its normative weight of their peacebuilding processes and objectives limits the explanatory capacity, scope conditions, and causal leverage of its assumptions.

Additionally, the model offers indicators and observable implications for the operationalization of the 3R, but researchers recognize the empirical limitations of the model and inform about spurious results after testing of variables: “It appears to be very difficult to provide support for a number of the hypotheses discussed above because previous analyzes have found most variables to be statistically insignificant (Walter, 2014; Kreutz, 2018, p. 229). In sum, these problems of empirical validity question the explanatory efficacy of the model, and evidence the gaps of the 3R Model when it comes to empirical testing.

e. The negative peace approach of the 3R model leaves out critical empirical dimensions for the study of post-conflict.

Finally, as Hoeffler (2019) states, the theoretical and large-n peacebuilding models for the study of post-conflict stabilization bases on the negative peace approach of the 3R Model. In consequence, design and measurement arguments justify why these models exclude for the analysis of peace variables such as justice processes and participation politics during post-conflict. At this point, it is necessary to turn to research approaches and strategies that cover variables and dimensions of positive peace directly related to the sub-national scale and the post-conflict human scale.

1.1.2 The 3E Armed Post-conflict Stabilization Theory

Although the process from *Reconstruction* to *Reconciliation* for the conflict transformation (Galtung, 2012) may be considered as a typical mechanism of stabilization, my research postulates an alternative stabilization mechanism containing the potential effects of restructuring war on different levels and scenarios subnationally oriented. This alternative mechanism implies:

First, analyze the factors that affect the institutional order captured by the armed insurgency in sub-national State contexts. Second, identify the effect of the impacts on the social agency and the strategic importance of the conflict spaces on the stability of the post-conflict. In my research, the above implies a shift from Galtung's 3R (1998) to a 3E mechanism built from an armed, contentious, and subnational approach. The 3E means in its order: *Enforcement, Empowerment & Entitlement*. (See Figure 2).

By and large, *Enforcement* defines the application of formal State rules (Knight, 1992; Arjona, 2016) on armed orders inherited from the conflict between the State and Insurgency groups. *Empowerment* is a mechanism that involves the actors and social processes of the war (Wood, 2008) after the end of the conflict. Finally, *Entitlement* refers to the recognition of the effective rights of armed conflict victims and the binding force of the processes of justice (i.e., constitutional change), and the design of policies in the armed post-conflict environments.

Consistent with the above, two main theoretical approaches guide my framework for studying the mechanism of post-conflict stability from a sub-national perspective: First, the contentious politics literature on armed politics (Close & Prevost, 2007; Balcells, 2017), armed orders (Kalyvas, 2010; Staniland, 2014; 2017) and wartime institutions (Arjona, 2016); and, second, the sub-national policy approach applied to the study of sub-national determinants of post-conflict, the post-conflict units of analysis in contexts of informal power and the levels of stability after the internal war.

In this way, my research analyses the explanatory factors of post-conflict stabilization in a different way of Galtung's 3R but without ignoring the background of the literature on stabilization at the Nation-State level: Peacebuilding (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; UN, 2008), Stable Peace (Caplan & Hoeffler, 2017), Enduring Peace (Hoddie & Hartzell 2005), Post-conflict success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), Post-conflict risk (Collier, et.al.2008) and Post-conflict Recovery (UNDP, 2008).


At the same time, my theoretical framework focuses on the effect of subnational determinants on post-conflict stability, recalling that internal armed conflict is, above all, a within-nation politics phenomenon. In short, the purpose of scaling down (Snyder, 2001) in the study of post-conflict stability implies the adoption of a theoretical framework that allows:

First, identifying the characteristics of the insurgent armed orders and their sub-national anchorages (Arjona, 2016; Staniland, 2017); second, incorporate dimensions of positive

peace related to the dynamics of the social processes of war (Wood, 2008) and its differentiated impact on the post-conflict stabilization mechanism; third, build an analysis unit that allows observing the characteristics of the sub-national conflict space in the line of regimes of exception (Pepinsky, 2017); and last but not least, design an empirical strategy for the theory-building of Armed Post-Conflict Stability (APS) using comparisons of subnational units within and between nations (Sellers, 2019) that provide a higher level of causal leverage to the 3E mechanism.

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between my *Subnational Legacies of Armed Conflict* (Hereinafter SLAC) independent variable and the *Armed Post-conflict Stabilization* (Hereinafter APS) dependent variable. Likewise, figure 2 describe a mechanism level mediating the variables and defining the sequential order of the *3E mechanism* (See Section 1.5).

Figure 2. 3E General Model



Source: Own Elaboration

1.1.3 Contentious and Armed Politics approach to Post-conflict Studies

Concerning the contentious and armed politics approaches, this research starts from authors exploring pre-existing armed order and subnational dimension of my SLAC independent variable (Staniland, 2014; Wood, 2008; Arjona, 2016; Balcells, 2017; Mampilly, 2011). Some of these potential determinants include the institutions in times of war, the armed orders’ building, the social processes of the war, and the subsequent dynamics of the conflict after violence.

Wartime Institutions

My theoretical framework articulates the contentious and armed politics approaches in legacies of the armed conflict dimensions such as the subnational *wartime institutions* (Arjona, 2014;2016; Arjona, et.al., 2017). Despite these approaches do not directly explore

stability in the post-conflict period, they consider the pre-existing local institutions and the civil resistance as core factors for explaining the variation in the type of social order inherited by armed actors (guerrillas and paramilitaries). In this sense, my research considers the wartime institutions and their rebel governance strategies as crucial dimensions for the analysis of violence legacies, policies institutions, and post-conflict levels of stability.

The central claim of the wartime institutions approaches is identifying the explanatory factors and the underlying mechanisms of the armed orders established by the insurgency. In that line, I adopt the two types of wartime institutions defined by Arjona (2016) for my subnational legacies concept formation: *Rebelocracies* explained as armed orders where actors take control and have long-term objectives (long-term horizons); and, *Aliocracies* understand as war zones with strong pre-existing institutions and civilians with a higher capacity for resisting the war (Arjona, 2016).

From this perspective, Arjona (2016) findings contribute to my aggregated concept formation rule exploring the not yet explained effects of armed institutions legacies on post-conflict setting. This gap underlies, among others, my research question about the type of political institutions required to build a stable post-conflict environment. In short, Arjona (2016); Quinn, et. al. (2007), Sambanis (2014), Balcells (2017) and Mampilly (2011) findings are crucial for my argument about the armed order dimension of the SLAC (See section 1.3) and the effect of *Enforcement* step on the primary conditions of APS (See Section 1.5).

Social war processes

My research also bases on relevant literature on mobilization and political participation in armed conflict contexts in line with the called by Wood (2001) as Social war process. This approach distinguishes social processes such as political mobilization, military socialization and the transformation of local governance, shaping long-term effects on post-conflict stability. Each one of them is essential for understanding the social dimension of my SLAC concept and its legacies on the subnational stabilization process. In this way, incorporating Wood's (2001) findings into my theoretical frame conducts to identify the effect of social processes of war as determinants of subnational politics in the post-conflict period and its relationship with the *Empowerment* step of 3E Mechanism (See Section 1.5).

Wood (2001) defines the *political mobilization* as how local elites, inserted in the interests of war, mobilize the civilian population to create networks of support for armed groups. Thus, the political mobilization of civil actors captured by the objectives of armed groups affects the social bond: “Thus the political mobilization of civilian networks into support networks for armed groups reshapes social networks” (Wood, 2008: 545). I used this social process for exploring the level of subnational anchorage and civilian compliance of armed groups on their rebel enclaves. Thus, the more civilian compliance and subnational anchorage of rebel enclaves, the more the legacies of war in subnational post-conflict settings.

On the other hand, the *military Socialization* refers to impacts of the war in the political socialization practices of the communities coexisting with the war. For Bourke (1999), the

effects of this socialization process between civilians and armed actors not only compromise citizens but the combatants themselves, who, in most cases, experience significant problems in terms of their re-socialization and reincorporation into civilian life.

In this sense, the former rebel's reincorporation and victim's restoration policies, theorized in my research, determine the creation of a new political culture that redirects the subnational political culture of war towards unarmed social processes: "Some of these processes may also support prosocial psychological transformations, such as altruistic solidarity with nonkin, as in the emergence of a new insurgent political culture of solidarity in contested areas" (Wood, 2008: 546).

The *transformation of local governance* refers to the displacement of institutional governance strategies by the influence of armed actors in scenarios of armed conflict (Wood, 2008; Staniland, 2014). The roots of this process extend to the social base, in terms of the political mobilization strategies of the armed actors, political loyalties, and the militarization of civil society. The previous, becoming factors of informal war institutions (Arjona, 2007) that displace the role of the administration and the local state: "The militarization of governance takes place in at least some areas of nearly all civil wars, as armed actors displace civil authorities or as hardline military, or paramilitary forces displace "softer" authorities such as policy when conflict intensifies (Wood: 2008: 550)

On my research, this process is related to the legacies on civilian and local public institutions by armed organizations interested in accessing State resources and infrastructure. Additionally, it refers to the way how war puts at risk the preservation of customs and cultural repertoires of the communities by changing the role of its inhabitants. In the same line, the impact of the war on the local economy, particularly the rural market, peasant production, and how the income and employment of the populations affected by the war are related to illicit crops, drug trafficking, and economic networks created by armed organizations.

In this way, the transformation of local governance claim for post-conflict policies oriented to stabilization measures such as crop substitution, land restitution, property formalization, among others. These post-conflict policies are the core of the *Entitlement* process of my 3E mechanism.

Networks of Rebellion and Subnational Linkages

Staniland (2014) inspires the conceptualization of subnational anchorages of my theoretical framework. At the same time, it orients the armed group's types of my SLAC's dimension concerning legacies of former rebels on the post-conflict stabilization traced in my geonested research design. Staniland (2014) states that the level of cohesion of the insurgent armed groups determines their strategies during the war, the maintenance or the end of the conflict, and the political results of insurgent rebellion.

In this sense, the social and political networks that pre-exist insurgent organizations (networks and social linkages) are crucial for understanding the characteristics and levels of cohesion of armed groups: "The origins of insurgent organizations lie in prewar politics. The

vertical and horizontal ties in which leaders are embedded and the political salience of these ties shape what kinds of organization emerge" (Staniland, 2014: 33).

In contrast to conventional and structural arguments on the rebellion of subordinate social class such as Skocpol's (1979), Staniland (2014) focuses on explanatory factors that highlight the level of the human scale of the conflict. In terms of my research, the civilian's autonomy and agency capacities impacted for the subnational legacies of war. Likewise, the rebels' organizational capacity to fight the State, their counterinsurgency strategies, and their strategies for achieving a high level of social support.

My research includes the four types of insurgent armed groups theorized by Staniland (2014;2017) in the concept formation of the SLAC (See Section 1.3) and the insurgent regions enclaves (See Section 2.2):

- *Integrated* insurgent groups (high internal-external control and minimal dissent or insurgent factionalization);
- *Vanguard* insurgent groups (high internal control and low external or territorial control);
- *Parochial* insurgent groups (under internal control, high territorial control, and internal dissent or factionalization due to personalistic-local leadership); and, finally,
- *Fragmented* insurgent groups (under internal-external control and dissent or high factionalization)

In sum, the theoretical background on war institutions (Arjona, 2016); social war processes (Wood, 2008), contentious and Armed politics (Staniland, 2017), and among others, provide substantive elements for the analysis of the subnational legacies of conflict and the social and legal impacts of the war in structuring the post-armed conflict contexts empirically compared in my research.

1.1.4 Subnational Politics approach to Armed Post-conflict Stability

My research designs a theoretical framework aligned with the empirical strategies for studying subnational politics in the field of armed post-conflict. Two contemporary references are essential for articulating the armed contentious, wartime institutions, and subnational politics approaches on my theoretical framework: First, Pepinsky (2017) and his argument about the existence of subnational exceptional regions - in my case, the *Insurgent Regions of Exception* (Hereinafter IRE). Second, Sellers's (2019) methodological innovations regarding the advantages of comparative analysis *within and between nations*. I applied these theoretical and methodological innovations to the comparison of subnational Latin American IRE as unit of analysis of my mixed geo-nested *Medium-n* and *small-n* diverse cases research design (See Chapter 2)

Pepinsky (2017) states that in crisis scenarios, armed conflict or secession, the State faces the emergence of *Regions of Exception* in which the dynamics of internal problems adopt a significantly different or exceptional magnitude compared to that of the rest of the territory. In this regard, my research adopts at least two attributes distinguishing the *Regions of Exception*: First, its definition as: "Sites of civil conflict, economic backwardness,

secessionist movements, opposition party support, and challenges to contemporary national projects” (Pepinsky, 2017: 1034); second, its methodological study as regions in which either unobservability or indeterminacy prevents causal inference using comparative methods. (Page 1036).

Faced with the question of what makes a sub-national unit a region of exception, Pepinsky (2017) argues that it is not only about differential attributes that vary atypically between sub-national units, i.e., Religion, colonial history, political culture. Beyond that, they refer to cases that have observable characteristics exceptional only with respect to specific causal questions (Pepinsky, 2017: 1027). In this sense, a region of exception is not necessarily an *outlier* or a *deviant case* in the empirical approach about zones of war. On the contrary, regions of exception are heterogeneous sub-national units with both, standard and exceptional features, regarding a specific issue or problem of interest.

In this sense, regions of exception are not usually selected based on linear regression methods or identification strategies such as matching or full matching (Maldonado, 2017). On my research design, I use a mixed-methods strategy combining quantitative and qualitative techniques for studying Latin American insurgent regions of exception regularly excluded of *large-n* and *State-oriented* research due to issues related to regional heterogeneity, unobservability, and indeterminacy (Pepinsky, 2017).

I follow Pepinsky (2017), Raustad (2019) and Sellers (2019) alternatives for studying this type of informal sub-national unit, as well as strategies for generalization and causal inference from the sub-national scale. Even though their characteristics are not limited to the conventional assumptions of statistical causal inference. Particularly, I propose mixing subnational comparative methods with some other inferential techniques such as process tracing to transcend the conventional logic of nomothetic inference and idiographic causal explanation applied to the Regions of Exception dynamics.

Consequently, I construct the *Insurgent Regions of Exception* (IRE) as a unit of analysis for studying the post-conflict stabilization different from those used by frequentist statistical approach. Beyond that, I used an identification strategy close to Bayesian inferential logic (Beach & Pedersen, 2013), based on necessary and sufficient conditions; as well as techniques such as process tracing and Causal Process Observations (CPOs) (Bennet, 2008) for comparing the subnational variation of Armed Post-conflict Stability levels.

In this regard, the comparative analysis of *Insurgent Regions of Exception* is relevant for theoretical and empirical reasons concerning to:

- a. The configuration of armed orders and wartime institutions (Arjona, 2016) responding to the logic of the Regions of Exception. In this order of ideas, the problematization of IRE as sub-national units of analysis allows the comparison of the effects of the armed order on post-conflict scenarios, both in its territorial and political dimensions.
- b. Given the informal and non-jurisdictional nature of the insurgent armed orders, the rebellion networks, and their sub-national anchors, IRE as units of analysis of 3E

stabilization mechanism allow the use of different case identification strategies (Gerring, 2007) in rural, urban, central or peripheral sub-national units where heterogeneity matters.

c. The study of armed orders and post-conflict societies is limited for reasons like those stated by Pepinsky regarding the Regions of exception in the sense of theorizing, generalization, and causal inference. Hence, the use of Pepinsky (2017) empirical strategies for the study of regions of exception is extensible to the case of the Armed conflict spaces (IRE) selected as the unit of analysis of my research.

d. Concerning its standard and exceptional characteristics, the IRE allows the implementation of *before-after* and *within-between* comparisons (Sellers, 2019), such as those used to study insurgents armed orders and post-conflict societies. In short, the identification of diverse IRE cases allows us to analyze the variation in the determinants of stability and its effects in post-conflict subnational scenarios.

On the other hand, Sellers (2019) is critical to addressing issues of my theoretical and methodological design referred to the number of within-nation subnational IRE available for comparison. The study of units with exceptional properties -both in their conceptualization and in their empirical approach- as well as those that account for a territorial dependency (Harbers & Ingram, 2017), implies the design of empirical strategies for increasing generalization based on the number of observations and comparisons within and between nations.

In this vein, using transnational comparisons (Sellers, 2019) in my *medium-n* and *small-n* mixed research design allow me to incorporate a wide range of strategies to increase causal leverage of my 3E armed post-conflict stability argument. Likewise, this strategy let me compare the variation of subnational units in different settings: Between countries, between subnational and national levels from the same country, or between subnational units of several countries. The above, especially when within case comparisons are insufficient or when a higher level of theoretical generalization is required.

Sellers (2019) offers different routes and empirical strategies according to research design criteria such as the characteristics of the units of analysis, the type of variables and categories of study, as well as the different stages of the agendas of sub-national research. Thus, my theoretical framework focusses on the comparison of *Centered* and *Border-oriented* cases as one of the most useful empirical strategies when it comes to exceeding the scope of the within-nation conflict spaces or war zones (Buhaug & Gates, 2002, Pepinsky, 2007).

In this way, incorporating different countries subnational units on my research broadens the field of comparison by identifying not only how subnational and national factors interact, but how national factors play out in similar subnational contexts and under different national conditions (Sellers, 2019: 90). Hence the importance of facing the functional equivalence problems of the transnational comparisons and, at the same time, the possibility of reaching more significant scope conditions in the results.

Finally, my research follows Sellers (2019) theoretical innovations for designing the strategies and techniques for transnational comparisons. Particularly those that cover -as in

my small-n diverse cases strategy (Gerring,2007)- the entire spectrum of variation of subnational units within a country. Likewise, those for analyzing the variation between subnational units of different countries. Table 1 summarizes the scope conditions of the transnational comparison: Subnational Scope and Cross-national Scope, focusing on the type of strategies that are useful for the study of IRE in small samples or Small-n studies.

Table 1 Scope Conditions Matrix for Transnational Comparisons

		Cross-national Scope		
		<i>Contiguous Borders</i>	<i>Similar</i>	<i>Most Different</i>
Subnational Scope	<i>Small n</i>	Matched, similar cases or crossborder.	Replicatory comparison of matched cases	Matched similar subnational cases in most different systems
	<i>Encompassing/national selection (or sample)</i>	Encompassing test by border proximity	Replicatory encompassing comparison	Encompassing subnational cases in most different systems
	<i>Type of testing</i>	Quasi-experimental; Geo-Nested Analysis	Hypothesis generation and development, small to intermediate sample	Varies

Source: Adapted from Sellers (2019)

1.2 Armed Post-conflict Approaches and Models: From State-oriented variables to Subnational Legacies of Armed Conflict (SLAC)

1.2.1 Armed Post-conflict Approaches

The theoretical background about armed postconflict and reconciliation (Galtung, 2010) shows, at least, three general approaches about stabilization: First, *the economic recovery approach*; second, *the security approach*; and third, *the war-to peace or democratic peace transformation*. All of them explore the potential causes of stabilization in a *State-oriented perspective*, focusing on structural factors and issues related to stabilization at a national level.

Consequently, these approaches consider that the social and political outcomes of armed conflict are the same and have homogenous impact at the national level. The preceding, in contrast with contentious and new political legacies frames (Soifer & Vergara, 2019) considering that impacts of internal armed postconflict vary with other variables and processes along time and subnational levels. In that sense, Soifer and Vergara (2019) say about the study of political legacies of armed conflict in concrete cases like Perú:

Our analysis diverges from diagnoses claiming that the IAC [Internal Armed Conflict] is the central factor shaping contemporary Peru, as well as from those that dismiss its impact. Instead, we argue that the IAC left important legacies, but that as time passes these coexist with, affect, and are affected by a variety of other variables and processes (Soifer & Vergara, 2019:2)

Additionally, national-scale approaches lack of limitations on operationalization and concept formation that limits the formation of an integrated concept of post-conflict stabilization. So that, post-conflict outcomes are studied unsystematically and depending on the type of variable of interest of the scholars: *Consolidation of peace* (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; UN, 2008); *Peace Endures* (Caplan & Hoeffler, 2017); *Duration of Peace* (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2005); *Post-conflict Success* (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), *Post-conflict Risks* (Collier, et. al. 2008); *Post-conflict Recovery* (UNDP, 2008).

This section presents a general description of these *State-oriented* approaches and their empirical models to the study of armed postconflict. The analysis of their principal limitations and gaps explaining the outcome of stabilization let us introduce the Subnational Legacies of Armed Conflict (SLAC) as a new independent variable for explaining the determinants and mechanism of Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) after violence.

Post-conflict and Economic recovery

The relation between armed post-conflict and State economic recovery considers different areas of analysis; specifically, those related to economic strategies to attack the legacies of war and intervene factors associated with national and international conditions of post-conflict stability. However, given the interest in the dynamics of domestic or internal armed conflicts, this section will focus on the most relevant issues for the analysis of economic development and recovery policies at the national level. Reflections about the subnational scale are absent in these kinds of approaches.

According to Ohiorhenuan & Kumar (2011), Barnett et.al., (2007), the relationship between post-conflict and economic recovery includes issues about policies and strategies analyzed from five fundamental axes: a. Financing and public policy projects, b. private sector development, c. Natural resources, d. The reintegration of States to the economic community, and e. Employment. In this way, economic recovery points to State development after violence not properly as economic growth (Lipset, 1959), but as a macro factor upon which all other areas of development are affected by the internal war.

In that sense, discussions about economic development in post-conflict societies must consider different perspectives distinguishing recovery, reconstruction, or economic stabilization as diverse paths going from negative or positive peace approaches to humanitarian assistance or State development strategies.

The first path, oriented by principles of negative peace, warns that the central axis of the post-conflict economy must be the economic recovery, understanding by this, the goal of closing the gap between assistance and development, restoring the capacity of government and communities to recover from the conflict (UNDG, 2004). The second, that is, the economic normalization approach states that the central axis of the post-conflict economy must be the overcoming of the obstacles imposed by the internal war.

In other words, its objective is to reestablish the necessary conditions for State development privileging govern strategies not compromised in the armed conflict negotiation or cease of fire agenda. Thus, its principles of defining the armed post-conflict from a negative peace

approach that discards the transformation of the State, imply nuances for the negotiation or cease-fire process that remains on the side of the primacy of the State actor.

Third, the economic reconstruction approach explicitly contemplates factors specific to the positive peace approach. Kim (2005) states that economic reconstruction approach establishes the need for a structural reform of post-conflict economies to build state institutions and capacities for sustaining the development of the State. In that sense, changes in the public budget for war, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants into the formal economy, and the reconstruction of social infrastructure; are evidence of a sustained process over time.

In sum, perspectives on the relationship between the economies and the post-conflict show the supremacy of the State-oriented and negative peace perspectives when it comes to economic affairs. However, the analysis of the relationship between post-conflict and economic development cannot ignore the multiple criticisms that warn about tensions between economy and conflict, not only as a factor to be considered in the framework of peace processes but as a cause itself of the conflict that merits analysis in the way of Suhrke et. al. (2007)

Post-conflict, Security and Public order

The issue of security and public order is usually a very questioned area in the case of approaches such as that of peacebuilding, as they are assumed to be areas directly related to the causes of war. Hence, in methodological terms, its causal relationship with the post-conflict is the object of abundant problems of reverse causality, or issues of ambiguity in its definition as cause and product, at the same time, of the negotiation of post-conflict conditions.

The traditional approach conceives security as the defense of the territory from a military point of view; that is, the State is the only one authorized to exercise violence legitimately. Two theoretical perspectives serve as general support for this traditional or militaristic approach to security: On the one hand, the conception of security established by Bellany (1981) according to which security is a relative freedom from war (Bellany, 1981: 102): on the other, the works of Walt (1991) about securitization as: “The study of the threat, use, and control of military forces, especially of the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.” (Walt, 1991: 212)

The human security approach promotes the positive approaches to peacebuilding and economic development (Thomas, 1995; King and Murray, 2000) as well as criticizes the traditional militaristic approach to security (Rothschild, 1995). For them:

Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met. Thus, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive notion of democracy, and is directly engaged with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global (Alkire, 2003: 13)

The holistic approach to security integrates elements of the traditional and human approaches, advocating for the strengthening of the State, and at the same time, for the importance of human well-being, equality, and participation in government public decisions. In this way, the holistic approach seeks to compensate for the problems of the militaristic approach towards peacebuilding and the risks incurred by the humanist perspective by diluting, in a certain way, the right to protection of political institutions. In this order of ideas, the holistic approach: “Reflects the complex and fragmented nature of security in post-conflict environments. This entails moving away from the current piecemeal, ad hoc approaches and taking into account concerns about the broad scope of the concept” (Jarstad, 2008).

Post-conflict, peacebuilding, and democratic governance

Finally, there is a vast bibliography linking peace and post-conflict processes with the stability of the democratic regime. Two perspectives are familiar: the former, consider the existence of a democratic government as a precondition for the beginning of a peace process or end of the war; the latter, states that the beginning of a peace process constitutes one of the pathways to democracy, particularly in those regimes that experienced an armed conflict due to democratization.

In the first case, the authors establish the existence of a "minimum" level of democracy as a necessary condition for peace negotiation processes such as the recognition of the conflict and the belligerent status of the non-state armed actor (i.e., Insurgency). An example of this is the so-called *deficitarian democracies* where peace negotiation represent an option to strengthen or "raise" their quality of democracy. In the second, democracy is seen, not properly as an outcome of the post-conflict, but instead as one of the main objectives on the democratic regime consolidation.

The *democratic governance* approach (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; UNDP, 2000) states that the main objective of a democratic government is to respond effectively to the demands and essential services of citizens to achieve a capacity to command, regulate and administer the State effectively. In this sense, the main objective of the post-conflict would be to stabilize and restore the function of democratic government.

In the case of Internal armed conflicts, where post-conflict is as a condition for increasing the level of democratic governance, the objectives of democratization depend on the characteristics of the peace-building context. About that says Paris (2004): "[After Violence] The most severe States often lack even the most rudimentary government institutions" (Paris, 2004: 46).

The *Performative or democracy's transformation* approach (*War-to-peace transformation*) emphasis is on the reconstruction of the State's relations with civil society due to omissions, hostility, or institutional weakness in the context of the war (Jarstad, 2008). This perspective contemplates a higher level of commitment to civil society and the State with the post-conflict and the strengthening of political institutions. In this sense, it shares with the *positive peace*, a vision on the end of the conflict that transcends the cessation of hostilities between the actors. To do this, it proposes a progressive vision of the democratic participation of

citizens both in the negotiation of the conflict and in the implementation of public policies derived from the agreements between the State, the armed groups and the victims.

1.2.2 Explanatory models: Economy, Security and Democratic governance

At the empirical level, my research identifies a diverse set of explanatory models on armed post-conflict, post-conflict stabilization and peace. These perspectives combine, as noted, different post-conflict definitions aimed at *Peacebuilding* (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; UN, 2008), *Stable peace* (Caplan & Hoeffler, 2017), *Lasting peace* (Hoddie & Hartzell 2005), *Post-conflict success* (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), *Post-conflict risks* (Collier, et. Al. 2008) *Post-conflict recovery* (UNDP, 2008). A summary of these models can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2 Peace and Armed Post-conflict Explanatory Models

Model	Argument or Hypotesis	Independent Variables	Cases
Hoddie and Hartzell (HH) Model	Negotiations that end with a peace agreement that solve territorial conflicts and include proper government accountability measures (participation, a written constitution, free press, the rule of law) increase the survival of peace	1. <i>Grievances</i> 2. <i>Opportunities</i> 3. <i>Negotiations and</i> 4. <i>Commitments</i>	Small n: 38 civil wars that ended in a negotiated solution in the period 1948-1998.
DDR Model: Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) contribute to political stability as they build trust so that the parties to a conflict can reject violence and transform their political and organizational structures.	1. <i>Disarmament,</i> 2. <i>Demobilization</i> 3. <i>Reintegration</i>	Large n: The implementation of the United Nations resolution in 1,325 situations of armed conflict and post-conflict environments.
Doyle–Sambanis (DS) Model	Peacekeeping and peace-building operations can make a significant contribution to post-conflict when levels of hostility and local capacities are at the extremes.	Post-conflict risk factors: 1. <i>Amount of natural resources</i> 2. <i>Economic opportunities</i> 3. <i>Ethnic dominance</i> 4. <i>Injustices (Grievances)</i>	Large n: 688 cases of internal armed conflict and civil war
UN peacekeeping Operation Model (UNPKO)	The presence of UNPKOs significantly improves the intervention of risks to the survival of peace	UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO) Variables: <i>Dummy, treatment, the total number of uniformed personnel, troops, type of mission.</i>	Small-n: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Collier and Hoeffler (CH) Model	Natural resources, lack of economic opportunities, and ethnic dominance are the causes of the initial conflict. Once the conflict has arisen, it generates claims that increase the risk of subsequent conflict. In turn, the extent to which conflict increases the risk of further conflict depends on two factors: time and diasporas.	1. <i>Time</i> 2. <i>Diasporas</i>	Large n: 7 9 internal armed conflicts that occurred between 1960 and 1990
Effective Post-conflict Peacebuilding (EPP) Model (Tschirgi, 2004)	E Effective Post-conflict Peacebuilding (EPP) is provided for systematic and structural issues: State, Financial Resources and Economy.	1. <i>The level and nature of support provided by member states</i> 2. <i>“De-linking” post-conflict reconstruction rom its regional environment</i> 3. <i>Availability of necessary financial resources for postconflict reconstruction.</i> 4. <i>The viability of country-based peacebuilding strategies de-linked from broader trends in a globalized world economy</i> 5. <i>Institutional architecture issues</i>	N/A

Source: Own Elaboration

As seen in Table 2, each peace and armed post-conflict model points to a set of factors (independent variables) for the restoration of structural conditions affected by the armed conflict: The economy, security, or the political regime after the war. This emphasis on

structural dimensions, separately, has the effect of divide explanatory models that prioritize one or another post-conflict variable and, at the same time distance themselves from an integrated or sequential view of the multiple dimensions of post-conflict.

Likewise, it leaves aside the question about non-structural stability factors (Soifer & Vergara, 2019) such as the citizen agency (human scale of the armed conflict), the role of private non-state institutions, and the necessary programs and policies in the sub-national level. The last ones, given the heterogeneity of the conditions and contexts under which the internal armed conflict takes place. In this sense, there are several criticisms and questions related to the design of the models, their empirical strategies, the validity of their results, or the consistency of their measurements.

In the case of the *Hoddie and Hartzell (HH) Model*, the most prominent criticisms are focused on the problems of ambiguity, conceptual precision and consistency (Caplan et al. 2005); product, among other things, of the concept of negative peace that serves to operationalize the model. That is, peace understood as the absence of armed conflict that excludes central dimensions of the post-conflict related to justice, political recognition, and the rights of victims.

The *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR Model)* is perhaps one of the most referenced and useful post-conflict models as it transcends the cease-fire sphere as a focus of stability to incorporate variables related to the political reincorporation of armed actors. However, DDR is a highly normative model that fails to empirically answer the question of how stability conditions are to be successful without a firm commitment from citizenships and political elites within and outside state structures (Brown et al. 2011). Therefore, an analysis of sub-national conditions would be necessary to validate or give empirical support to their normative reflections on stability as social reintegration and reparation.

A similar criticism, but oriented to the conditions of the international environment, is posed to the *Doyle – Sambanis (DS) Model*, whose criteria for the stability of peace depend heavily on the intervention of heteronomous external actors and international agencies. Although this intervention is effective in the case of post-conflict societies with vast problems of polarization and internal division, it does not recognize sovereignty and state autonomy issues from potential destabilization and risk of new conflicts.

Regarding the limitations of the *Peacekeeping Models (UNPKO)* and the *Collier and Hoeffler Model (CH)*; the main problems concern to the validity, significance and explanatory scope of the variables empirically supporting each of the models. In the former, the variables treatment, the total number of uniformed personnel, troops, type of mission, among others; are not significant (Caplan et al., 2005); in the latter, the explanatory variables: *time and diasporas*, present operationalization and consistency problems when interacting in the model.

Additionally, *Collier and Hoeffler Model* does not explain if the *time* variable varies less rapidly in the case of diasporas compared to the resident population. Some evidence from case studies suggests that diasporas harbor claims for much longer than resident people

(Caplan et al., 2005). Even without that effect, diasporas appear to be the main additional risk factors in post-conflict societies.

Finally, the *EPP model* (Tschirgi, 2004) is essential insofar as it incorporates structural and institutional variables for the construction of peace, articulating the post-conflict state, economy, and society. However, the articulation of these variables with the international normative environment creates a link of exogenous dependence for the effectiveness of the internal post-conflict. Therefore, it arouses criticism about the existence of a neocolonial *bias* in the international peacebuilding approaches.

An example are the policies that post-conflict States must implement as a condition for access to international cooperation resources. At the same time, the ties of disconnection or State dependence (The internal-external disconnect) created during the implementation of post-conflict diffused policies may open new scenarios of internal conflict that external intervention can unleash. A specific case is Colombia and the State dependency with the United States after the implementation of the so-called *Plan Colombia*. On the other hand, the case of the Central American countries regarding international agencies operations. In the words of Tschirgi (2004): "The normative bias of external actors' intervention Role in Nation-Building (i.e., UN's)"

In summary, my research identifies at least five substantive problems or theoretical and empirical limitations related to the above approaches and models: *a.* The problematization of *issues* on the national and international scale of the conflict that prioritizes structural variables and limits the understanding of the sub-national level of the conflict and internal post-conflict; *b.* The formation of normative theories on peace conditions that lack theory testing for empirical support to their findings; *c.* The design of explanatory models derived from empirical strategies with design, measurement or implementation problems (Caplan et al. 2005); *d.* The absence of causal explanatory mechanisms on stability due to the scale, scope conditions, and the exclusion of data on other levels of the internal armed conflict; and, *e.* The proposed explanatory factors and the reported results prioritize descriptive inference over causal inference, in line with the absence of approximations that investigate the dynamics of the causal mechanisms of post-conflict stability.

For this reason, my research down the scale to the sub-national and contentious politics approaches to attack, on the one hand, a new set of conditions for explaining subnational factors shaping the internal armed post-conflict. In the other hand, designing a new post-conflict stability concept bases on a subnational political contention process involving State, armed groups and organized civil society.

In the first case, I include factors related to the type of armed order, the capacity of agency and citizen organization in conflict zones, and the strategic importance of territories in armed dispute. Taken together, each of these factors constitutes the concept of *Subnational Legacies of Armed Conflict (SLAC)* as the independent variable of my research. In the second, I built the *Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS)* as the dependent variable of my research. Thus, my research considers the definitions of post-conflict proposed in the Peacebuilding studies and the 3R theory but offering a new set of theoretical and methodological tools for studying the internal armed post-conflict from a sub-national scale.

1.3 Subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict (SLAC) in Insurgent Regions of Exception

1.3.1 SLAC theoretical background

Taking about the determinants of internal warfare, Fearon & Laitin (2003) states that internal armed conflicts are caused primarily by conditions that facilitate insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 79). In this section, I attack a similar question: What conditions trigger the armed post-conflict stability? My answer, hypothetically, points to the insurgent armed conflict legacies. That is, the *Sub-National Legacies of the Armed Conflict* (SLAC), defined as the conditions inherited by three specific subnational dimensions of war: First, pre-existing armed orders; second, the impact on the civilian's social agency; and third, the strategic importance of the disputed territories on war.

Designing this variable allows me to turn the focus of national-State scale to the subnational factors shaping the post-conflict: "While much research has focused on the attributes of a nation that make it susceptible to the initial onset of civil war, the more relevant question may be what characteristics of the post-civil war environment make a nation more or less likely to experience a recurrence of civil war" (Quinn, et. al. 2007: 168).

Likewise, SLAC is the result of operationalizing (aggregate) in a single concept the most relevant findings on armed politics determinants. Mainly those scattered in the literature on armed politics (Staniland, 2014; Balcells, 2017; Mampilly, 2011), insurgent governance (Arjona, 2016; Arjona, et. al., 2017), social processes of war (Wood, 2008) and post-conflict stabilization (Mani, 2005; Marshall, et. al., 2010). Also, using an aggregation rule for concept formation (Giraudy, 2012) allows me to establish theoretical and empirical connections of sub-national politics variables and to facilitate the empirical testing of my hypothesis about the existence of a causal link between the sub-national legacies of the armed conflict and the post-conflict stability.

The reason for prioritizing the literature mentioned above lies in the emphasis placed on the dynamics of internal armed conflicts and the contentious nature of post-conflict processes. However, the SLAC concept formation also includes contributions from the literature on armed conflict foreign military intervention (Wallenstein & Sollenberg, 1997; Suhrke, 2007; Paris, 2004; Marshall & Ishiyama, 2016); State war (Walt, 1991; Mani, 2005; Justino, 2013; Ghani, et al. 2005) and international armed conflict (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; Bellany, 1981).

This section focuses on: First, the characterization of subnational conditions of armed conflict (Arjona, 2016), agency (Wood, 2008) and territorial strategic importance (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) as central dimensions of the SLAC. Second, the definition of primary and secondary levels of the SLAC as a determinant of the conditions for stability in the armed post-conflict (Bigombe et. Al., 2000; Brown et al. 2011; Caplan, et al., 2015; Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom, 2008). Table 3 summarizes the theoretical background, dimensions, indicators, and reference cases that allow me designing the SLAC as an independent variable of post-conflict stabilization

Table 3. SLAC Categories, Dimensions, Indicators, and Reference Cases

Dimensions	Variables	Indicators	Reference Cases
Wartime Institutions and Armed Orders	Pre-existed armed orders (Arjona, 2016)	Rebelocracies (Strong insurgency conflict spaces) Aliocracies (Weak or civilian resisted insurgency conflict spaces)	Latam: Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua Perú Asia & Europa: Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Grecia and Asian Southeast
	Subnational Anchorages and Type of insurgent organizations (Staniland, 2014, Holland, 2016)	Integrated insurgent groups (High internal-external control) Parochial insurgent groups (Low internal control, high territorial control) Vanguard insurgent groups (High internal control and low external control) Fragmented insurgent groups (Low internal-external control)	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) - Colombia Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) - México Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (EPP) - Paraguya Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) - Chile
	Strategies for conflict termination (UCDP, 2016)	Agreement or Negotiation Armed Takeover Disarticulation Dissolution/Factionalization	El Salvador-Colombia-Sudáfrica Cuba-Nicaragua-Costa Rica Perú Chile Uruguay--Ecuador
Human Agency Conditions	Civilian agency & organization (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2003, 2008),	Intrapersonal Agency (Individual Level) Organizational Agency (Social Agregate level) Social Agency (social y communitary level)	Indigenous and Rondas campesinas (Peru), Non-violent social movements (El Salvador), Tamil civil population (Sri Lanka), y Sierra Leona. (Wood,2008)
	Power Access strategies and structure of political opportunities (Cruz, 2015).	Structural Opportunities (Full access to political power and National-International scope) Sectorial Opportunities (Targeted access to political power and Sub-national or Territorial scope) Short-term opportunities (Limited or transitory access to power)	
	Post-conflict community driven development (Barron, 2010; Christia, 2019)	Community Driven Post-conflict Development State oriented post-conflict Development	East Asia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Liberia, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Yemen (Barron, 2010; Christia, 2019)
Strategical Conflict Space	Territorial conflict spaces (UCDP, 2019, Pepinsky, 2017)	Strategic development zones (Center) Border areas (Borders) Urban and industrialized areas Circumscriptions and peasant reserve areas Released areas Protected areas	Uganda; Burundi, Rwanda and Cambodia (Brown, et.al. 2011); Mozambique, Sudan (Brück 2001), Colombia (Arjona, 2016; Ávila, 2019), Ecuador (Rivera, et.al., 2018); Perú (Ríos, 2016)
	Sites for decision-making on reconstruction initiatives (Saul, 2014)	Negotiation Scenarios: procesos constituyentes locales, Consultas populares, General political authority (State Dependency) Specific programm level: Prior Consultations, Territorial Sel-defense, Circunscripciones especiales de paz	Colombia (CNMH, 2016; CHCV, 2015), Ecuador (CODHES, 2007); Perú (CVR,2003); México (León, 2011; Gándara, 2016), Paraguay (Díaz, 2010)


Source: Own Elaboration

As seen in Section 1.1, talking about *legacies of war* comes from Soifer & Vergara (2019) and their work on politics after violence in cases of armed post-conflict such as Peru. For the authors, the legacies of violence are armed-conflict conditions that persist into the post-conflict period and that have affected state capacity in lasting and negative ways (Pag. 121).

In that sense, my research affiliates to legacies of conflict approach to emphasize on post-conflict determinants such as SLAC. Likewise, to formulate an alternative explanation on the long and medium-term effects of armed conflict over post-conflict stability. Thus, my concept distances itself from the theories assuming that the causal factors of armed conflict are usually the same as those of the post-conflict: i.e., Economic underdevelopment (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004) or “greeds and grievances” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

Moreover, the concept of SLAC differs from other explanatory variables of the post-conflict (See Section 1.4) by focusing on the identification of subnational factors triggering the APS causal sequence hypothesized in my research. Figure 3 shows the primary and dimensions levels for the SLAC concept formation, and the indicators level designed under substitutability criteria to: “The absence of any given characteristic to be compensated for by the presence of another” (Goertz, 2006: 39 -44). The selection of this type of aggregation and substitutability rule dues to, among other reasons, the need to propose functional equivalents of the indicators in my empirical strategy comparison.

Figure 3 SLAC Dimensions, Indicators and Typology



Source: Own Elaboration

1.3.2 SLAC Dimensions and Indicators Levels

The theoretical background on the factors determining the stability of the armed post-conflict refers to two general scenarios inherited from the war: “The stability of the postwar peace is fundamentally linked to how the initial civil war ended and the attributes of the post-conflict

environment” (Quinn, et. al, 2007: 171). Given my emphasis on the subnational factors shaping the post-conflict settings, I operationalized the general *legacy scenario* (Quinn et al., 2017) in three dimensions articulating the legacies of the armed orders on:

First, the type of pre-existing armed order (**D1**) -in contrast to studies that select the ending of the conflict (Collier, 2000) as the master variable of post-conflict stabilization-. Second, the agency conditions and organization of the unarmed civilian population (**D2**); Third, the strategic importance of the territory disputed by the route of armed insurgency (**D3**). The way these dimensions vary and interact in between allows me to identify theoretically two types of SLAC: *SLAC A* and *SLAC B* (See Figure 3).

Wartime Institutions and Pre-existed armed orders (D1):

following Arjona (2016), Quinn et al. (2007), the impact of the armed order legacies on the post-conflict should be measured from: a. A structural component comprising the pre-established type of armed order and the outcome of the conflict; and b. A performative component that accounts for the characteristics of former ex-combatants and their probability of returning to war or betting on peacekeeping:

The outcome of the prior civil war—i.e., whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory, or a negotiated settlement—affects the probability of civil war recurrence in that each of these three outcomes has different effects on the extent to which a condition of “dual sovereignty” (Tilly, 1978) persists after the civil war ends, making renewed civil war possible. With respect to agency, we identify a set of conditions in the post-conflict environment that affect former combatants’ estimates of the costs and benefits of resuming the conflict versus sustaining the peace (Quinn, et. al. 2007: 168)

In this sense, downing the scale of the post-conflict determinants leads us to a **D1** dimension that puts together the structural and performative Quinn et al. (2007) levels. First, the characteristics of pre-existing armed institutions: *Rebelocratic* and *Aliocratic* orders (Arjona, 2016); and, second, the type of armed insurgent actor that constitutes them (Staniland, 2017). According to figure 3: *Integrated* or *parochial* armed groups in the case of *Rebelocracies* (Strong IRE), and *Vanguard* or *fragmented* armed groups when it comes to Aliocracy (Weak IRE).

Thus, the existence of a *Strong IRE* is indicative of a pre-existing Rebelocratic-type armed order (Arjona, 2016), with properties such as low levels of civil resistance and the presence of integrated or parochial armed groups with a higher governance capacity (Staniland, 2017). Meanwhile, the *Weak IRE* results of an Aliocratic armed order, with higher levels of civil resistance and governance strategies typical of vanguard or fragmented organizations (Staniland, 2017).

Organizational and Human Agency Conditions (D2):

D2 Dimension refers to the impacts of the armed conflict on the social agency and the organization of the communities in insurgent disputed territories. Based on this, this dimension can take two forms: The first characterizes by an "Individually driven" (Christia,

2019) agency as a result of the strong impact of war on the dynamics of collective action and community leadership; the second, a "Community-driven" agency (Christia, 2019) capable of resisting, with greater force, the armed order and governance Insurgency strategies aimed at controlling the civilian population during the war.

Conditions and Strategic Importance of Territories (D3):

This **D3** dimension confers a high level of importance to the territories of war (Conflict Space) as an IRE stabilizing factor in the armed post-conflict. In this sense, the territory is geographically defined (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) based on attributes such as the location of conflict (distance from Capital), the effect of natural resources, and the existence of international borders, among others (Buhaug & Gates, 2002). Likewise, its definition includes political characteristics such as the level of municipal strategic importance or the type of territorial prioritization for the implementation of post-conflict social and legal initiatives (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017: 339).

Thus, Figure 3 distinguishes between two types of strategic territorial importance: a. The *strategic areas* characterized by a location of conflict, natural resources, and local economies that leverage the dynamics of armed conflict between the State and the insurgents; and, b. The *non-strategical peripheral areas* with properties such as the existence of internal national borders, the absence or fragility of State Institutions, and the support of social networks for financing the rebel groups.

1.3.3 SLAC Typology

The way to build (aggregate) these SLAC typology based on the strategy proposed by Quinn et al. (2007) about construct typologies combining variables with high levels of logical and theoretical correlation for then empirically testing them. As an example, the author states: "All secessionist wars are ethnically based" (Quinn et al. 2007: 183).

In this way, as seen in Figure 3 the logical and theoretical correlation between the exclusive values of D1, D2 & D3 conditions allow me to propose two types of SLAC: *SLAC A* and *SLAC B*. Those IRE cases where the accomplishment of these aggregate dimensions is absent will be considered as *non-SLAC* cases (See Table 6 in Section 2.3.1). That means IRE, where legacies of conflict do not exist (For empirical examples see Section 2.4)

SLAC A: Compose by **D1, D2 & D3** values that correlate logically with a *Weak IRE*. That is a collective social agency with a higher capacity to resist insurgent governance strategies and strategic territorial conditions that, theoretically, make it more challenging to consolidate the armed order during the conflict. At the same time, these strategic territorial conditions for the State increase its capacity for achieving its stabilization objectives during post-conflict.

SLAC B: Compose by **D1, D2 & D3** values with a high theoretical correlation with a *Strong IRE*. This type of legacy characterizes by an armed order with strong effects on the social agency of the civilian population and non-strategical territorial conditions, which incentives the insurgent domination during the conflict. The SLAC B impacts over the subnational units that inherit this type of legacy also justify the stabilization of State intervention providing

better conditions for civil protection and adequate legal security for increasing the strategic importance of the resources and territories of war.

In a nutshell, the theoretical and logical correlation postulated (See Section 1.3) between the same type of each dimension or the mixture of different types (values) allowed me to code SLAC types as: *SLAC A*, *SLAC B* and *Non-SLAC* (All other possible combinations). This theoretical and logical oriented correlation is described in Table 6 and empirically tested in Section 2.4.

1.4 Armed Post-conflict Stabilization (APS): Concept formation, Dimensions and Indicators

1.4.1 Armed Post-Conflict Stabilization: Theoretical Background & Concept Formation

This section presents the concept formation process of my research Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) dependent variable. This definition takes into account the criticisms made of the theoretical approaches and empirical models previously described (See sections 1.1 & 1.2), as well as the subnational policy factors identified. To do this, I start with two main types of definition of post-conflict stability available in the literature:

First, the definitions of the post-conflict guided by the principles of negative peace, according to the post-conflict, is an equivalent scenario of the absence of war (Caplan et al. 2015). This definition, widely used in post-conflict and peacebuilding studies, incorporates primarily a set of variables related to the role of the State (State-oriented approach). In this sense, it carries a normative State-bias that may be explicit for identifying the empirical conditions of post-conflict stabilization at different scales of internal politics.

Second, I identify comprehensive and processual post-conflict stability definitions built on necessary and sufficient conditions for stabilization after the armed conflict. For the preceding, the stability of the post-conflict supposes, more than the absence of war, fulfilling a set of peace milestones (Brown et. al., 2011) necessary for the positive transformation of the effects of war.

In this point, my research is in line with the later processual strategy for the APS concept formation in contrast to stability definitions derived from negative peace approaches. Nevertheless, my main difference with the peace milestones approach is the focus on a sequential APS mechanism and a subnational perspective that may solve some limitations of stabilization studies such as: a. The high number of explanatory variables proposed (Problem of many variables, few cases), b. The absence of relationships or causal links between them and, finally, c. The lack of dimensions or conditions belonging to the sub-national scale of the post-armed conflict. As follow, I present each one of these definitions for then introduce my APS concept.

The peacebuilding path: APS Between negative and positive definitions of peace

In the peacebuilding literature, post-conflict is a specific period established in the aftermath of violent conflict and whose main characteristic is the total absence of war (Caplan et al. 2015). This way of understanding post-conflict is considered “negative” insofar as its content corresponds to the opposite of the existence of war, but not to the set of own or specific conditions after the end of the war: “It is important to note that most quantitative studies of armed conflict employ a ‘negative’ conception of peace— i.e., the absence of armed conflict—with armed conflict being defined variably depending on which data set is adopted (Caplan et. al. 2015: 6).”

Based on this perspective, post-conflict is stable to the extent that, after the war, the absence of confrontation is constant over time (Caplan et al. 2015). In this way, although the negative peace approach does not make it so clear, post-conflict is a variable that focuses on those cases where there is only one previous experience of armed conflict. In this sense, this type of definition would not apply to all societies that experience an environment of stable peace, but to those that, having experienced war for the first time, do not repeat it.

One way to broaden this negative definition of post-conflict stability as the absence of war is exploring in Fortna's pioneering works (2004, 2008); Hartzell & Hoddie (2003); Caplan et al. (2015) and Hoeffler (2019); when they refer to the factors that contribute to the duration of the peace or increasing the risk of its fracture. According to Fortna (2004, 2008), the most determining factor for the stability of the armed post-conflict is *the intervention of peace operation programs (UNPKO's)*. They mediate or guarantee the conditions agreed to end the war.

Opposite to Fortna (2008), Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) proposes a set of factors for post-conflict stability centered on the power relations of the internal armed actors. In sum, their argument suggests that internal factors matter, being the objective of international military intervention the interstate dependence rather than the stability of the internal post-conflict. For the authors, the *power-sharing arrangements* between the actors in conflict -territorial or militarily oriented-, determine the stability of the armed post-conflict: “We define power-sharing institutions as those rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003: 320).

One more definition from the frame of negative peace is that of Caplan et al. (2015) when states that post-conflict stability means the *survival of peace*. According to this, stabilization depends on a set of factors, such as the outcome of the conflict, the duration of the conflict, and the number of battle deaths. For the authors, incorporating variables for the previous phase to the end of the conflict allows increasing the number of observations, and correct, by design, problems related to stability understood as a war-to-peace process.

Likewise, the use of a *survivor analysis technique* allows them to correct the results of previous research that resort to *logit* (multivariate) or *probit* regression designs (i.e., Toft 2010; Kreutz 2010). The preceding ignore the operationalization of the concept of stability like a transition process. Hence, for Caplan et al. (2015), post-conflict stability is understood

as a transition period that goes from the end of the war to peace. That is, when stability is the outcome, a scenario of peace would be consolidating, and, on the contrary, instability would mean a high risk of returning to war.

In this regard, Hoeffler (2019) is aware of the high number of problems facing post-conflict studies oriented by large n strategies. One of them, and perhaps the most complex, is the conceptual construction of post-conflict stability based on definitions of negative peace as the absence of war:

While this article uses quantitative methods, we should be mindful of the limitations of this approach. Defining peace is problematic and here it is simply defined as the absence of state-based armed conflict [...] Although the present quantitative study cannot examine positive peace, the analysis is carried out in this spirit. Development and security are mutually reinforcing and a more detailed understanding can be used in processes of peace stabilization (Hoeffler, 2019: 1253)

At the same time, the author recognizes the existence of studies using variables with little explanatory leverage. The latter as a result of the difficulties in accessing social and community data essential to conceptualizing stability from a positive peace approach including recognition and social justice dimensions: “It is very difficult to obtain good quality data in (post-) conflict societies and although more data on societal groups are now available, there is little information on changes over time, thus making it impossible to examine whether grievances intensified or not. (Hoeffler, 2019: 1240)

Finally, the author recognizes the lack of significant contributions of negative peace approaches in the formulation of post-conflict stability policies at the global level. He also invites a joint work between different research traditions on armed conflict:

Because of the conceptual problems future research should combine the methods from quantitative and qualitative approaches. This is also important because the different contexts can never be fully quantified (i.e., leadership, history) and case studies can provide analysis when the sample size is too small to provide reliable statistical evidence. A stronger collaboration between quantitative and qualitative research should enable the research community to provide more reliable evidence to provide policy advice on matters of global importance (Hoeffler, 2019: 1253)

In consequence, Hoeffler (2019) suggests an alternative way for post-conflict studies including mixed-methods research designs and small-n strategies. These settings offer a higher capacity to disaggregate and analyze information for in-depth armed conflict cases. It also suggests the use of qualitative tools for causal inference. Thus, my research aims to be part of this new set of studies.

Stabilization as a comprehensive peacebuilding process

The comprehensive or processual meaning of post-conflict refers to a transversal political process that covers all phases of the internal armed conflict. These phases include: a. Actions to prevent armed conflict when there is a threat of war; b. Peace actions when there is an

escalation of armed conflict; and, c. The implementation of peace efforts when the intention of the parties is ending the war.

In this order, Wittkowsky (2017) identifies three substantive criteria in which the comprehensive or procedural definitions of post-conflict stability converge:

- All refer to stabilization as a means of responding to intrastate conflict.
- All define stabilization as aiming to achieve an ultimate political outcome.
- All delimit stabilization very broadly as a comprehensive set of integrated or coordinated civilian and military activities to influence a wide range of conflict drivers. (Wittkowsky. Center for International Peace Operation 2017:2)

The third point, without a doubt, is the most substantive of all when considering not only the inclusion of the civilian population in decision-making but also incorporating dimensions of positive peace. Thus, issues such as recognition and social justice absent in the post-conflict stability negative peace approach are, at least, mentioned. My research identifies in the APS theoretical background three relatively recent and partially different definitions of post-conflict stability as a comprehensive process:

Securitarian definitions: Stabilization means securitization. The origin of this definition goes back to the United Nations (UN) policies that emerged within the framework of the so-called *Capstone Doctrine* that brings together approaches to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and post-conflict construction. All of them aim to strengthen state security in each of the stages of the armed confrontation: “There is inherent value in understanding stabilization as a comprehensive peacebuilding approach employed immediately, during or after a violent conflict (Wittkowsky. Center for International Peace Operation 2017: 2)

Comprehensive definitions assuming the United Nations (UN) intervention reference framework: According to Gorur (2016), the concept of stabilization has again caught the attention of academics and researchers after its extensive use in disciplines such as economics in The 1990s: “The concept has since expanded, positing that stability derives from a complex relationship between national security, economic development, and physical and human security, and that poverty and underdevelopment pose potential threats to international security”(Gorur, 2016: 13).

In this framework, stabilization is a comprehensive and multi-level process (Top-down) oriented: “From large-scale peacekeeping operations in areas affected by widespread insecurity to smaller-scale program [sic] with targeted security and development packages.” (Muggah, 2014). Muggah's definition matters because it adds a stabilization component related to the multi-level intervention of peace actions (mainly international and state) that cover the issue of post-conflict scale. However, its focus remains again on the questioned foreign intervention and its pacification effect on internal conflicts. Nevertheless, Muggah (2014) highlights an essential point of stabilization related to the importance of development and state-building capacities (Top-down enforcement) in post-conflict societies.

Similarly, Boutellis (2015) points towards stabilization as a process considering an active and multidimensional conflict intervention for tuning escalation of violence. Thus, it creates the necessary conditions for implementing negotiations and peace agreements between the parts. In this scenario, new critics emerged under the idea than early conflict intervention means, at the end of the day, a new twist promoting the unilateral use of force by the State: “Stabilization as Robust Use of Force” (Hunt, 2016: 4).

In summary, Gorur (2016) conceptualization results in a polarized political dispute between those who defend stabilization as a post-conflict outcome after violence and those who advocate its construction from earlier stages of the armed conflict: “This examination of stabilization as a concept shows a wide range of opinions. The academic literature offers several schools of thought, some of which are mutually incompatible (for example, one school of thought views stabilization as a post-conflict and pre-peacebuilding phase, while another views it as an intervention in active conflict)” (Gorur, 2016: 13-14).

Peace milestones Definitions: I identify a comprehensive definition of post-conflict seeking to resolve the incompatibility of visions described by Gorur (2016). This definition focuses on a procedural interpretation of post-conflict stabilization that comprises different actors (Wittkowsky, 2017), dimensions (Boutellis, 2015) and indicators gathered in *peace milestones* (Brown et al.,2011).

Brown et al. (2011) refers to post-conflict stability as a reconstructing set of peace milestones related to multiple dimensions and actors of the internal war. Consequently, post-conflict is a transition process from the cessation of armed hostility to the economic State recovery. In this way, the author's main contribution is the design of a multidimensional post-conflict processual approach that allows identifying the necessary conditions for achieving a post-conflict environment:

We propose rather than pick one or other condition to define the beginning and end of “post-conflict,” a more productive approach to conceptualizing the post-conflict scenario is to see it not as a period bounded by a single specific event, but as a process that involves the achievement of a range of peace milestones. Taking a process-oriented approach means that “post-conflict” countries should be seen as lying along a transition continuum (in which they sometimes move backwards), rather than placed in more or less arbitrary boxes, of being “in conflict” or “at peace.” (Brown et. al.2011: 4)

However, Brown et al. (2011) post-conflict processual vision suffers from gaps and problematic issues, including: a. The overwhelming number of proposed milestones and indicators for peace outcome; b. The absence of an argument about the sequential order of peace milestones achievement; and c. Lack of empirical testing to evaluate the causal leverage of peace milestones' main assumptions.

1.4.2 APS as a contentious subnational process: Definition, Conditions and Indicators

Having described the APS theoretical background, my research proposes a new definition of *Armed Post-Conflict Stability* (APS) focused on the intervention of contentious and territorialized unstable processes inherited from the war. In this sense, my definition majorly

differentiates from most definitions suggesting a peaceful nature for the post-conflict and reducing its meaning to episodes composed exclusively of peacebuilding actions.

From this perspective, the post-conflict is a new process of contentious politics experienced in the *Insurgent Regions of Exception* (IRE) impacted by legacies of violence. Thus, after violence the armed actors, the victims of the conflict, and the State dispute the new governance conditions of their territories. Hence, the unstable nature and vulnerability conditions of post-conflict against risk like the recurrence of war: "[Post-conflict] is the time when the nation is most vulnerable to a relapse into armed conflict" (Quinn et al. 2007: 189).

In short, *Armed Post-conflict Stability* (APS) means the set of conditions obtained after insurgent violence: a. The political process that strengthen subnational State institutions (C1), the demobilization and Incorporation of ex-combatants (C2), the protection of Civilians (C3) and, the effective and accountable policy responses (C4). My definition contains empirical attributes framed by the extensive literature on peacebuilding and post-war stability. However, it proposes substantive modifications in the conditions and indicators of stabilization by the analysis from a sub-national scale. The most significant conceptual inheritances include:

The inclusion of Formal State power (Wittkowsky, 2017) as a necessary condition for the beginning of post-conflict. Nevertheless, I include indicators on strengthening and State enforcement (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) that transcends conditions such as the exclusive use of military power or robust force. i.e., subnational State Capacity, municipality prioritization, and local economic budgets.

On the other hand, I added a demobilization and disarmament component of insurgent actors (Fortna 2004, 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Caplan et. Al., 2015; Hoeffler, 2019) as a necessary condition for the end of armed violence. The previous included a civilian reintegration strategies and political incorporation routes, essential to avoid the risk of militant dissent and war recurrence in the new post-conflict scenarios.

Moreover, my research adopts the security (Wittkowsky, 2017) and civil protection (Muggah, 2014) components of the comprehensive stabilization approaches, but extended to the human scale actions for recognition and social justice. Thus, I cover indicators absent into the post-conflict studies oriented by a negative peace approach. In short, my research considers variables of positive peace and transitive stabilization (war-to-peace transformation) as critical components for the achievement of highly stable post-conflict environments.

Finally, I take into account components and indicators of the processual peace approach (Brown et al., 2011) but proposing the hypothetical stabilization mechanism and its sequential causal linkage absent in the definitions of peace milestones for achieving post-conflict. The results are some APS conceptual innovations referred to:

a. The incorporation of sub-national State building conditions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2011; Carranza-Franco, 2014; Lister & Wilder, 2005) in armed post-conflict settings as an alternative to the strictly, security and militaristic definitions of state Enforcement. Likewise,

the main objective for including indicators from the sub-national scale is to trace the effect of conditions that transcend the central State capacity for intervening in the legacies of conflict.

b. The redefinition of the APS dimensions in terms of contentious processes related to the post-conflict outcome. Among them: a. The effect of wartime institutions (Arjona, 2016) and armed orders (Kalyvas, 2006); b. The protection and empowerment of civil society (Carranza-franco, 2014; Wood, 2010), and c. The conflicts derived from the processes of justice, criminal alternatives, and recognition of victims of the armed conflict (Uprimny, 2014).

c. The APS concept is sensitive to variation in the outcome of the armed conflict in contrast with research traditions focused exclusively on peace agreements. At the same time, the APS concept distinguishes from armed conflict outcomes such as revolutionary armed-takeover, organized crime, and post-dictatorship democratic transitions regularly undifferentiated in the literature on conflict.

d. The APS definition differs from others conceived as a quantitative variable measured in years or months. Although the accomplishment of APS conditions is framed in the time and space of each sub-national unit, it is not measured in terms of “time.” In this case, APS is an ordinal variable so that it would be more a matter of degree than of timing (the more conditions achieved, the greater of armed post-conflict stability)

The logic of concept formation and measurement of the APS dependent variable is different from those identified in the empirical studies on post-conflict and armed stabilization guided by large-n models. In this case, I used a Bayesian radial concept formation technique (Collier & Mahon, 1993) of APS diminished subtypes (Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Giraudy, 2012) that contrasts with definitions of stability based on risk and survival regression models (Fortna, 2004; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).

The main reason why I privilege this radial strategy was its focus on a qualitative conceptual technique from which: “Concepts are constructed through a semantic process, one in which the researcher specifies the meaning of a concept by identifying the attributes that constitute it” (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012: 213). In this way, this research presents an alternative typology (See Figures 4&5) for the study of armed post-conflict based on a set of conditions necessary for achieving post-conflict stability and the secondary categories for the identification of APS values.

In sum, the APS definition adds new theoretical and empirical properties to correct the limitations of pre-existing explanatory theories. In turn, I identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the stabilization causal process from a subnational approach. Additionally, the APS definition includes a multilevel component (Top-down/ Bottom-up) necessary for the analysis of IRE nested and territorial dependency conditions (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) emerged on the subnational level (See Figures 4&5 and Table 7 in Chapter 2)

Figure 4 APS Radial Concept Formation
Concept: Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS)

Basic Core	Concept	Components			
	Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS)	C1	C2	C3	C4
Secondary Categories (Values)	Strong APS (High Stability)	C1	C2	C3	C4
	Recurrent APS (Low Stability)	C1	C2	C3	
	Fragile APS (Low Instability)	C1	C2		
	Weak APS (High Instability)	C1			

Note: Differentiating characteristics of secondary categories are contained within the primary category (Basic Core).

C1= Political Process that Strengthen Subnational State Institutions (Quick Impact Projects)


C2= Demobilization and Incorporation of Ex-combatants

C3= Protection of Civilians (Safe Environment)

C4= Effective and Accountable Policy Responses (Rule of Law/ Policy Implementation)

Source: Own elaboration based on Collier & Mahon (1993)


Figure 5 APS Diminished Subtypes



Source: Own elaboration based on Collier and Levitsky,1997; Giraudy, 2012

Figure 6 describes, in a general way, the set of conditions and indicators of my armed post-conflict stability concept. As follows, I disaggregate each one of them and trace the relation between the accomplishment of conditions and the variation on APS levels.

Figure 6. APS Dependent Variable



Source: Own Elaboration

APS Basic level

Figure 6 describes each of the APS concept levels. The basic level includes the general definition of the concept as the set of conditions obtained after the end of the armed insurgency violence.

At the secondary level, each of the APS components (conditions) are unpacked according to the aggregation rule (Giraudy, 2012) that determines the different values of the dependent variable. The concept establishes, in turn, a set of APS indicators and distinguishes the levels of substitutability required for the comparative analysis of sub-national units within and between nations (Sellers, 2019).

APS Secondary level

Subnational State Institutions (C1): This component of the stabilization includes actions to strengthen and build subnational state capacities after the end of insurgent violence. For Christia (2019): “To build capable and locally accountable subnational governments” (Christia, 2019: 209). The C1 main objective for stabilization is to return governance to the State (Chinkin & Caldor, 2017) and the legitimacy of *prewar power structures* (Christia, 2019). disputed by *wartime institutions* (Arjona, 2016) and *substitute informal actors* (Helmke & Levitsky, 2011) in the territories of the armed conflict.

For Chinkin & Caldor (2017) the best way to define this first post-conflict condition is that of a “pivotal moment” after the armed cessation or the end of the conflict that allows: “Determining the future constitutional and legal framework for a post-conflict zone”(Page 339). In this way, the accomplishment of this condition allows us to speak of post-conflict

but at its lowest and most unstable level. The later, due to the intensity and proximity in time of the legacies of the armed conflict impacts.

Defining **C1** as a “pivotal moment” allows the construction of indicators that account for the initial stages of the post-conflict in contrast to the securitization peace approaches (Hunt, 2016; Wittkowsky, 2017) that define state strengthening as the post-conflict arrival point. At the same time, the **C1** definition traces a direct relationship with stages or later APS conditions necessary for increasing the levels of stability after violence.

C1 post-conflict indicators are substitutable and operationalized as the existence of *Subnational Budgets and Institutions* or the *Municipalities Prioritization and Territorial Development Plans* in post-conflict territories. In terms of the stabilization narrative: The accomplishment of this condition (**C1**) indicates that after the end of the war, the post-conflict is managed nationally to take control of Insurgent Exception Regions (IRE) and to strengthen the construction of sub-national State capacities.

Demobilization and Incorporation of Ex-combatants (C2): This component of stabilization orients the actions of disarmament and integration of insurgent actors in civil society organizations and political institutions of the State. Its main objective is to prevent a return to arms, the creation of dissent that reactivates the armed conflict, and the emergence of new enclaves of insurgent violence. Thus, the accomplishment of this condition (**C2**), as well as (**C1**), comes from the State Enforcement Power strategies implemented not only to regain control of the territories but also the governance exercised by the substitute insurgent actors (Helmke & Levitsky, 2011).

C2 indicators are also substitutable and include the implementation of *Disarm and Demobilization Programs (DDR)* in areas of post-insurgent conflict (Brown et al. 2011) or the formulation of *Reintegration and Reparation Routes (RR)* created to establish civilian incorporation routes for ex-combatants. The first indicator includes, mainly, the Reintegration programs through the delivery of arms and submission to justice. The second, contemplate ways of reintegration through negotiation and alternative justice mechanisms.

Consequently, accomplishment with **C2** allows us to speak of a post-conflict with higher levels of stability but still nationally managed and subnationally weak (Weak APS). The latter, given the risk of rearmament by the insurgent actors and the reactivation of the internal war. In terms of the stabilization narrative: Armed actors surrender, demobilize or join civil organizations (i.e., Cooperatives, Social Organizations) or State Institutions (i.e., political parties). Thus the risk of reactivation of internal conflict is reduced.

Protection of civilians (C3): The civil protection component points to actions to intervene in the social dimension (civilian-non-armed) of the insurgent legacies of the conflict. In contrast to Brown et al. (2011), civil protection not only includes defense and public security actions in insurgent territories but the intervention of the social processes of war (Wood, 2010). In this line, the main objective of **C3** is to restore social agency and the civilian capacity for the appropriation of territories previously captured by armed actors.

Following Barron (2010) C3 means: “Incentivizing forms of collective action that can work across conflict divides; by contributing to local institution building; and by strengthening vertical society-state linkages” (Barron 2010: 1). Consequently, the indicators established for the measurement of this component are two, equally replaceable: The existence of *Social Investment Programs* (Different to Economical Budgets for subnational State institutions), or the presence of *Return process and Social Leadership initiatives* related to collective civil leadership in the territories of war.

In the first case, the axis of civil protection is economic resources (i.e., Productive projects). In the second, the core is the guarantees of political participation and representation of the victims in the territories affected by the war (i.e., Special representation seats, differential constituencies, prior consultations). After increasing sub-national state capacity and diminishing the risk of insurgent armed dissent, the accomplishment of **C3** allows us to speak of a post-conflict with a higher capacity for social agency and where post-conflict stability exists but at a low level given the risk of war recurrence.

In terms of the stabilization narrative: Civilian actors empower their territory, and post-conflict management is primarily subnationally oriented. Likewise, post-conflict territorial implementation achieves higher levels of local autonomy, but the risk of instability persists if Community-Driven Development (CDD) is not entitled (Christia, 2019).

Effective and Accountable Policy Responses (C4): It includes implementing the social, economic, and political plans and initiatives of victims and civilians previously affected by the war (Saul 2014). Likewise, it promotes the possibility of contestation and citizen oversight of the local political power by guaranteeing that the actors and institutions are accountable: “This is particularly important in societies emerging from conflict, as conflicts can often be traced to non-transparent and corrupt governance, and if accountability is left unaddressed, abuses of authority and consequent violence can re-start” (Saul, 2014: 19)


According to Saul (2014) and Sriram (2011) findings in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan armed conflicts, typical actions of this component are the creation of judiciary and oversight commissions, the updating and promulgation of new laws (p. 20), and implementing robust legal pluralism approach for the rule-of-law enterprise (Grenfell, 2013). My research proposes as **C4** indicators: The design of *public policies oriented to the post-conflict and Transitional Justice* or the changes at the level of the *Military Doctrine and Type of Security Approaches* for the new post-conflict setting.

In the former, the fundamental axis is the recognition policies for the legal and political security of the population; in the second, it is the changes in security approaches that guide policies towards the humane and comprehensive management of the new post-war order (i.e., Militarist security vs. human security). The accomplishment of **C4** guarantees the State and social order necessary for the stability of the post-armed conflict (Strong APS). In turn, it formalizes the processes of reintegration, reparation, and recognition of the territories (IRE) according to their strategic importance.

In terms of the stabilization narrative: The post-conflict is managed and implemented subnationally, and the post-conflict territorial initiatives come for C1, C2, and C3 to

formalize (Recognition, Rights, and justice). Figure 7 summarizes the APS conditions described above and link them with the APS typological levels proposed in my research (For the measuring strategy of APS as a dependent variable see Section 2.3)

Figure 7. APS Conditions and Measuring Levels



Source: Own Elaboration

1.5 The Argument: The 3E Armed Post-conflict Stability Mechanism

In line with the theoretical framework and mechanistic hypothesis, this section deals with my Argument about the mechanism of stability absent in the theoretical background and research models on armed post-conflict (See Section 1.2). In this way, my Argument explicit the relationships between the subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict (SLAC) and the Levels of Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS).

In this regard, the section covers the central argument of this research about the 3E mechanism that intervenes in the legacies of internal armed conflict. Likewise, the section unpacks theoretically the processes that constitute the 3E mechanism and explores the dimensions of the SLAC that trigger them on the necessary conditions for stabilization (See Figure 11). The hypotheses on the sequential causal linkage of the 3E mechanism and its effects on APS is explored methodologically in Section 2.3.

Argument and 3E Mechanism definition

The central argument of this research considers that, from a sub-national perspective, the APS mechanism is made up of three processes: *Enforcement* (Knight, 1992; Holland, 2016), *Empowerment* (UNDP, 2012; Christia, 2019) and *Entitlement* (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; UNDP, 2000). Implementing the 3E sequential mechanism allow achieving the necessary conditions to intervene in the legacies inherited by the armed conflict.

As seen in Section 1.1, my 3E mechanism is closely related to the 3R framework (Galtung, 1998; 2007); however, the emphasis is on filling the gaps left by the Nation-state oriented

approach focusing on the question of the sub-national determinants of post-conflict stabilization. Consequently, *Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement (3E)* constitute the mechanism through which, after experiencing internal armed conflict, the sub-national conditions necessary to achieve a stable post-conflict society move on.

For a better understanding of APS stabilization mechanism, this section covers each of the 3E steps beginning with: First, the mechanism definition; second, the SLAC dimension that trigger the mechanism; and, finally, the APS condition generated by each one of the 3E. At the end of the section (See Figure 11), the pieces of the 3E puzzle will be integrated. Additionally, the sequential mechanistic hypothesis is theoretically described.

Enforcement consists of the application of formal state rules (Knight, 1992; Holland, 2016) to the armed order and insurgent actors in the territories of conflict: "The act of applying or enforcing a law, norm or obligation" (Knight, 1992: 3). As the primary step of the stabilization mechanism, the objective of the Enforcement (E1) is to recover the territorial sovereignty of the State in zones war and to guarantee the social and political incorporation of ex-combatants.

This step reduces the risks of experiencing episodes of civil war recurrence (Mason, et. Al., 2011) or summarizing armed conflict (Quinn et al. 2007) that are common in early post-conflict stages:


“Sustaining the peace is enhanced by the establishment of political institutions that dismantle the conditions of dual sovereignty and reintegrate former enemies into a single polity, one that affords former combatants a fair opportunity to pursue their interests and redress their grievances through peaceful means” (Quinn, et. al 2007: 181).

The *Enforcement* conceptualization comes from Knight (1992) when he states that consolidation of the State is the locus of the legitimate monopoly of force. Thus, the emergence of rules and their common acceptance by the people become the center of the State institution: “First, an institution is a set of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways [...] Second, for a set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of these rules must be shared by the members of the relevant community or society (Knight, 1992:3).

However, according to Knight (1992), the existence of a formal State organization for commanding the relationships of the society members is not sufficient in contexts where the State Power is disputed. That is where State substitute actors have the capacity for challenging the territorial and population control initially concern to the State (i.e., movements, groups, legal or illegal associations).

In this way, the *Enforcement* includes both the strategies of legal institutions understood as State's Enforcement Power (Knight, 1992: 3) as well as the power of organizations such as insurgent groups and their Self-enforcing Institutions (Knight, 1992). In the internal armed conflict, both institutions battle to enforce their actions and objectives in the territories of the military operation, hence the connection of this primary mechanism with the armed order and the wartime institutions of SLAC (See Figure 8).

Figure 8 Enforcement Mechanism Step



Source: Own Elaboration

Figure 8 describes the relationship between the armed order dimension of the SLAC and the Enforcement mechanism step necessary for achieving conditions C1 and C2 of post-conflict stabilization. Based on Beach and Pedersen (2013), the figure combines the theoretical and empirical levels of SLAC with the first stabilization mechanism step by considering: a. The existence of a primary mechanism formulated deductively from the framework of contentious politics (See Section 1.1); and, b. A set of observable APS conditions whose presence or absence must be empirically tested.

In this case, the *Enforcement* step is triggered by the legacies of pre-existing armed orders (D1), and its effects focus on strategies for strengthening subnational political institutions (C1) and the demobilization and political incorporation of ex-combatants (C2). Hence, the *Enforcement* mechanism has a double strategic target: the territory and the armed actors.

This double strategic objective becomes, in turn, the reason why my research postulates the Enforcement mechanism as the process that initiates the causal sequence of stabilization (See Figure 8). In short, the recovery of territorial control by the State and the effective incorporation of the demobilized are the primary condition for the stabilization of the post-armed conflict. Likewise, given its importance for reducing the risks of violence and armed control over the civilian population, the *Enforcement* step is necessary for beginning with the sequential causal linkage of the 3E general mechanism that produces stabilization.

Empowerment step defines ex-ante the process for promoting the social and political leadership of civil organizations and non-armed sub-national actors in the territories occupied by the armed actors during the violence. According to Cliffe et al. (2003), the central objective of this mechanism may summarize as: "Rebuild communities' social cohesion as well as their economic well-being"(Page 17).


The concept of *Empowerment* comes from the general idea of Community-Driven Development (CDD) raised in the works of Christia (2019) about the social dimension of post-conflict understood as a new form of civilian governance. Consequently, the Empowerment mechanism may point to: "Power and resources [that] increase a

government’s proximity to its citizens by enhancing participation in community affairs and by rendering decision making more inclusive” (Christia, 2019: 208).

Additionally, the mechanism highlights the importance of local power and "people-centered" policies (Langer & Brown, 2016). The previous, to promote community-driven strategies and the strengthening of the citizen agency affected by the SLAC's military and social legacies: “The high level of civic engagement [that is part of CDD] is considered more likely to enhance social capital, effectively meet local needs, and limit aid theft” (Christia, 2019: 209).

As in the case of Enforcement, Figure 9 graphically describes the relationship between the SLAC agential dimension affected by war and the Empowerment step as the generator of the C3 condition of APS.

Figure 9. Empowerment Mechanism Step



Source: Own Elaboration

Figure 9 describes the relationship between *Empowerment* and the protection of the civilian population after the end of the conflict, as conceived in the contentious and armed politics approaches. At the empirical level, the figure illustrates the effects on the organizational and social agency of victims (D2) as the factor that triggers the *Empowerment*. Similarly, the implementation of strategies for the protection, leadership, and social entrepreneurship of civilians in territories affected by war (C3) appears as the effect of this mechanism for increasing the levels of APS.

In this way, it is crucial to understand that if *Enforcement* is the mechanism step achieving the primary conditions for the post-conflict in its initial stages, *Empowerment* is a step for increasing the APS levels during post-conflict. The latter, by producing not only an effect on sub-national political institutions and armed actors (C1 and C2) but in the civilian population and social processes in the conflict zones (C3).

For this reason, my research postulates *Empowerment* as the second chain of the causal sequence of post-conflict stability (See Figure 9). The above, after implementing formal strategies by strengthening the State subnational institutions. In this way, this step is crucial


for promoting negotiation and political contests scenarios that empower social actors such as victims, minorities, and vulnerable populations at different levels of the State.

Entitlement step refers to the binding force achieved by constitutional reforms, enactment of new laws, and public policies in the communities and territories affected by the armed conflict. In short, the Entitlement is a crucial mechanism for restoring rights and guarantees of non-repetition of war (UN, 2016; PI, 2019). Their objectives include observable implications related to the effective recognition of decision-making processes, prior consultation, autonomous economic development, territorial sovereignty, among other political expressions that are managed at the sub-national level. The above is a result of the processes of State Enforcement and citizen empowerment that precede the Entitlement in the causal sequence of the APS.

According to Chilkin & Kaldon (2017), the central axis of the *Entitlement* are the transformative post-conflict policies (p. 354). On the other hand, Saul (2014) and multilateral organizations such as the UN (2016) focus on justice initiatives as the core of restitution rights proper of this mechanism: “The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (Saul, 2014: 18).

Examples of observable implications of the *Entitlement* are the truth commissions (Hayner, 2001); the amnesty laws enacted in the post-conflict (Osorio, 2017); the Justice and Peace Policies in cases such as Germany, Argentina, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia; the Reparation Policies and Special Representation Mechanisms for victims in cases such as those of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2004; Yugoslavia during 2000–2002; South Africa 2000/2001 (UN, 2009) and Colombia between 1981-2017.

Figure 10. Entitlement Mechanism Step



Source: Own Elaboration


Figure 10 describes the relationship between the territorial dimension of the SLAC (D3) and the effect of the *Entitlement* on condition C4 of the post-conflict stabilization for achieving the highest level of APS (High Stability). In terms of the mechanism proposed ex-ante, the

strategic conditions of the territories recovered by the State after the war trigger the Entitlement mechanism. Thus, the higher levels of subnational strategic importance in the post-conflict areas, the higher the possibility for achieving effective and accountable security and implementing transformative post-conflict policies.

In terms of the sequential causal linkage of the 3E Mechanism, the *Entitlement* step is at the end of the APS sequence after implementing the *Enforcement* and *Empowerment* preconditions. Thus, the binding force granted by this mechanism step has effects on decision-makers and policymakers managing post-conflict at the national and sub-national levels. Moreover, the Entitlement mechanism, as stated above, is necessary to achieve the maximum level of APS after the accomplishment of the two previous processes in the causal sequence of the stabilization mechanism. That is the recovery of territorial and military sovereignty as well as civilian protection.

Figure 11 describes, in a general way, the relationship between the SLAC dimensions that trigger each of the 3E sequential mechanism steps and its relationship with the outcome of post-conflict stabilization (APS). This figure also refers to the general hypotheses of the 3E mechanism, and its sequential causal linkage presented, in greater detail, in section 2.3.

Figure 11. APS Mechanism (3E Argument)



Source: Own Elaboration

Chapter 2

Research Design

2.1 *The Dynamics of the APS Mechanism*

Large-n Regular Association vs Causal mechanism in the study of APS

There are two predominant ontological positions about causal relations in social sciences (Beach and Pedersen 2016). First, the regular empirical association to understand causality in terms of patterns of regularity between X: Y. Second, the mechanistic position which explains the relation X: Y starting from the existence of a hypothetical mechanism linking causes with effects. The latter, in terms of the authors, is a theoretical process that explains: “The transmission of what can be termed causal forces from X to Y” (Beach and Pedersen, 2016: 25).

In the case of post-conflict studies, those two ontological positions are clearly identifiable. Nevertheless, the former is proportionally more developed than latter. In the first case, there are *large-n* studies about peace stabilization (Fortna, 2004; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003) or post-conflict success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006) centered on patterns of the regularity of survival of peace. In the second, there are some rebel governance and armed politics studies exploring the process linking violence and its legacies (Soifer & Vergara, 2019) or violence and post-conflict based on case-centered comparisons (Staniland, 2017). Nevertheless, as seen in Chapter 1, research exploring post-conflict in a kind of mechanistic fashion is almost absent.

There are at least three substantive reasons for this research asymmetry in the case of post-conflict studies: The *scope conditions* offered by the *large-n* studies oriented to general explanations of a concrete variable (i.e., peace, development, economic recovery); second, the *availability of micro or subnational level* data that limits the study of post-conflict mechanisms; and finally, *the predominance of negative peace approaches* avoiding questions about the social process or civilian legal recognition directly related with the stabilization mechanism.

In that line, my research claims for the existence of an APS causal mechanism based on the sequential dynamics of 3E processes: *Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement*. At the same time, its effects on the conditions necessary for post-conflict stabilization. In contrast to Galtung’s 3R State-oriented model, my causal mechanism focuses on subnational factors and hypothesize a sequential causal linkage (Falleti, 2015) between 3E processes shaping pathways of post-conflict stabilization.

Thus, the dynamics of the 3E mechanism adopt three basic premises that guide this section: First, the subnational conditions inherited from the armed conflict (SLAC) determine the way of implementation of the 3E mechanism and its effect on APS Levels (General Hypothesis). Second, the Armed Post-conflict Stabilization (APS) is the result of the implementation of the processes leading to the end of the armed conflict: *Enforcement, Empowerment, Entitlement* (3E Mechanistic hypotheses). Finally, the application of the 3E mechanism may

adopt two general pathways (Falleti & Mahoney, 2015; Weller & Barnes, 2014): *Sequential* or *Non-sequential* (incomplete/selective). When the implementation of the 3E mechanism is sequential, the result is a higher level of stabilization. When its application is non-sequential (incomplete or selective) the result is a higher level of instability (See Table 9 in Section 2.3.3)

2.1.1 General hypothesis

In line with its central argument, the general research hypothesis states that the effective intervention of the 3E sequential APS mechanism on the subnational Legacies triggered by the Armed Conflict (SLAC): Armed order, citizen agency, and territorial strategic importance; lead to the existence of Post-conflict Stability (APS). According to Falleti & Mahoney (2015), a sequence is a temporally or causally ordered set of events that occur in a particular context or space. When these events or facts adopt the form of a process, we can talk about a type of sequence in which: “Ordered events belong to a single coherent mode of activity” (Falleti & Mahoney, 2015: 213).

Thus, given the formulation of my *ex-ante* general hypothesis, my research also considers a mechanistic hypothesis about a type of sequential causal linkage of the 3E processes (Beach & Pedersen, 2013) encompassing the conditions for achieving the APS. Hypothesizing this 3E sequential mechanism will allow me to assess the empirical testing of post-conflict pathways (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) considered in Section 2.3. Likewise, designing an empirical strategy for the APS process tracing mechanism in the comparative evidence section of this research.

2.1.2 Hypothesizing the 3E sequential Mechanism


Figure 12 graphically describes the hypothesized causal relationship between the 3E sequential mechanism and the levels of stability that result from the accomplishment of APS conditions:

First, the *Enforcement Hypothesis (Step 1)* consider that increasing the State intervention in the Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) is the primary condition to lead to stabilization in the earlier stages of the armed post-conflict pathway (C1 & C2: Strength subnational State capacities and ex-combatants’ reincorporation).

Second, *Empowerment Hypothesis (Step 2)* states that having achieved the conditions triggered by the *Enforcement* mechanism, *empowering* subnational non-armed actors increase the levels of stability in the post-conflict pathway (C3: Civilian protection and Safe environment); finally

Third, once the *Enforcement* and *Empowerment* process were implemented, *the Entitlement Hypothesis (Step 3)*, maintains that increasing the binding force of subnational political autonomy through the *Entitlement* process increases the stability level in the final stages of the armed post-conflict pathway (C4 Effective and Accountable Policy responses to the post-conflict)

Figure 12. 3E mechanism Sequence with levels of APS



Source: Own Elaboration

2.1.3 How 3E sequential mechanism works?

Figure 12 also disaggregates the dynamics of the 3E sequence at the mechanism level. The 3E mechanism follows a type of sequential argument designed according to the causal linkage (Falleti & Mahoney, 2015) between Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement mechanism steps: “The researcher can establish whether the temporal succession of events tends to reproduce the initial conditions and early characteristics of the unit of analysis or whether the events trigger reaction/counterreaction dynamics that considerably change the unit of analysis” (Falleti & Mahoney, 2015: 214).


3E mechanism general narrative

First, the intervention of sub-national conditions through Enforcement allows the stabilization of the post-conflict pathway in its initial stages since the State recovers the rebel governance enclaves control. Under these conditions, the State applies the institutional rules and regulations previously disputed by the subnational State challengers. It intervenes on the armed orders (Arjona, 2016) previously controlled by the insurgency substitute institutions of the State (Knight, 1992). On the other hand, demobilization and political incorporation of ex-combatants reduce the risks of armed dissent and return to violence (Caplan and Hoeffler, 2017) in the IRE. Post-conflict exists, but it is unstable given the proximity of armed conflict events and the absence of conditions necessary by increasing the APS level.

Second, given the takeover from rebel enclaves self-enforcing to State Enforcement power (Knight, 1991), the next step in the APS pathway points to the civilian Empowerment (Christia, 2019). That is, the civilian population, social organizations, and, in general, the non-armed subnational political actors and institutions, become local protagonists of the post-conflict stabilization from below (Wood, 2008). Finally, while State Enforcement and social Empowerment are necessary but not sufficient conditions for post-conflict stabilization, the final pathway to APS requires the conditions generated by the Entitlement process.

This process includes the emission of new laws, transformative post-conflict policies, special justice measures, and constitutional reforms (Chilkin and Kaldon, 2017; Saul, 2014) capable of formalizing (binding force) the new dynamics of State subnational governance. Likewise, the Entitlement offers guarantees of rights and non-repetition of war necessary for achieving a higher level of stability in the route to the armed post-conflict.

Following Falleti & Mahoney's (2015), I classify the 3E sequential mechanism as a *causal* one in which processes are causally linked to one another. Hence, my 3E sequential mechanism works as a *continuous self-reproducing process* (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015: 216), where:



As follows, I describe the sequential narrative (pathway explanation) of the 3E sequences and its effect on the APS necessary conditions. As seen above, my causal chain starts with the independent variable SLAC (X) and, through the series of causally connected processes (E1, E2, E3). It concluded with the outcome of APS Variable (Y).

Step 1 (E1 → C1*C2): “*SLAC D1 triggers the Enforcement (E1) step to drives the result of C1 and C2 as a primary condition of the APS.*”

Step 1 narrative: The first part of the 3E sequence drives to the control of the armed orders (IRE) and the insurgent actors for ending with the logic of dual sovereignty (Tilly, 1978) and substitute State power (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) established by the armed rebels. Focusing on the State Enforcement Power (E1), this step is the primary structural precondition (Quinn et al., 2007) in the pathway post-conflict stabilization. Its compliance allows stability vectors of transmission to transit from a higher to a lower level of post-conflict instability. At the same time, it is causally connected with stabilization step 2 determined by the implementation of the Empowerment mechanism step (E2).

Step 2 (E1*E2→ C3): “*SLAC D2 triggers the Empowerment (E2) that intervenes in C3 as a condition by increasing the APS level*”.

Step 2 Narrative: The second step includes events for empowering (E2) the non-armed civilian actors after the demobilization of former rebels and the State's control over the enclaves of war (E1). Achieving the Step 2 allows increasing the APS levels through vector of transmission coming from C1 and C2 conditions. Nevertheless, the risk of recurrence of war still demands the Entitlement (E3) step. For this reason, (E2) step is also causally connected with (E3).

Step 3 (E1*E2*E3 → C4): “*SLAC D3 triggers the Entitlement (E3) to intervenes in C4 as a necessary condition for achieving the highest APS level*”.

Step 3 Narrative: The final part of the 3E mechanism consolidates the processes of justice, recognition, and territorial autonomy necessary for the non-recurrence of violence. The

outcome of Step 3 closes the whole sequence of the 3E mechanism dynamics after triggered stability vectors of transmission from C1 to C4. Hence, achieving this step led the pre-existing armed order to conditions for the highest APS level (Strong APS).

2.2 Insurgent Regions of Exceptions as Unit of Analysis

This research designs a subnational unit of analysis (Soifer, 2019) for the empirical study of APS based on formal and informal characteristics of the calls by Pepinsky (2017) *Regions of Exception*. That means any subnational unit whose political, social, economic and historical processes are exceptional compared to other subnational regions (Pag.1035). In my research, given the emphasis on internal armed conflict, I call these units *Insurgency Regions of Exception* (IRE). This one contrast with *large-n* studies claiming post-conflict duration or survival as a unit of analysis. At the same time, it distances from case studies assuming the type or number of armed actors as the primary determinant of the armed post-conflict success.

Once a comparative design within and between nations is adopted (Sellers, 2019; Pepinsky, 2017), my unit of analysis proposes an alternative category to deal with theoretical and methodological limitations such as conceptual equivalence, territorial delimitation, and formality-informality of subnational unit. Likewise, because the study of armed post-conflict from a sub-national approach implies identifying an observable unit accounting for the territorial dependency, variation, and informality of the conflict dynamics.

In that order of ideas, the IRE is an *insurgent governance enclave* made up of formal (Jurisdictional) and informal (Non-Jurisdictional, Giraudy, et al. 2019) attributes coming from the armed conflict between rebels and the State. In this way, the IRE includes the armed groups, the territory, and the development of the armed conflict events. Additionally, it includes the of rebel control and legitimacy strategies as well as the war institutions civilian compliance. Thus, IRE's main characteristics include:

a. The presence of insurgent armed group: An insurgent group is a rebel organization of individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself. It is made up of formal structures of command and control and intends to seize political power using violence (Staniland, 2007: 5). However, this definition avoids the relationship between armed groups and the territorial conflict space that is crucial building orders and wartime institutions (Arjona, 2016; Mampilly, 2011).

In this sense, the existence of an armed group with strategic interests in the war territory becomes a characteristic attribute of the IRE at the sub-national level. As seen in Section 1.1, I adopt the Staniland (2014) typology of armed groups for identifying how the territorial conflict space covariates with the type of armed order as well as the type of conflict space (IRE). Thus, my research suggests that the *Integrated* armed groups (Staniland, 2014) with high levels of armed coordination and civilian compliance build IRE with favorable insurgent characteristics such as powerful armed orders. The same apply for the *Parochial* groups with lower levels of central coordination but strong subnational anchorages because its IRE account for higher capacities for controlling conflict spaces and population under its governance.

On the other hand, *Vanguard* armed groups despite its high levels of coordination (i.e., insurgent urban elites and bourgeois guerrillas) conquer lower IRE capacities because the weak local and civilian compliance in their rebel governance territories. In the same lime, Fragmented groups with less armed coordination and civilian control (Staniland, 2014) correlate with weak IRE because its scarce building wartime institutions and subnational anchorages.

Additionally, I claim that internal armed conflicts between the State and Integrated or Parochial armed groups in strong IRE increase the probability of inheriting a type of SLAC B (See section 1.3) in the conflict space of war. In contrast, the armed conflicts disputed by Vanguard and Fragmented groups produce a SLAC A type or non-SLAC legacy in the post-conflict. I empirically test these theoretical assumptions on my geo-nested medium-n analysis (See Section 2.4). In addition, on my APS process tracing of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru comparative evidence (See Chapters 3 to 5).

b. Coercion and rebel governance: IRE are territories where armed groups create wartime institutions and governance strategies as a result of the mixture of violence (coercion) and persuasion (Kalyvas 2006: 101-104). That is, strategies for controlling the territory and its population from military and symbolic practices such as socio-spatial extortion, population expulsion, and forced conscription (Terpstraa and Frerksa, 2017: 280). In the words of Kasfir (2002): “Guerrilla governance refers to the range of possibilities for organization, authority, and responsiveness created from the daily interactions between guerrillas and civilians’ (Kasfir, 2002: 4).

In this way, the rebel coercion and governance in the IRE is not reduced exclusively to the sympathy or armed actors support, but to the real capacity for controlling the civilian population and their potential resistance strategies:

According to Kasfir, a number of scope conditions must apply before we are able to observe the phenomenon of ‘rebel governance’ (2015, p. 25). First, rebels must control territory – even if that control is contested. Second, civilians have to reside in that area. Third, the rebel groups must have acted violently and continue their hostility or at least threaten to do so in the territory they govern. Kasfir (2015, p. 25) elaborates that if these conditions are met, at least some elementary form of governance usually emerges” (Staniland, 2017: 284)

c. Legitimacy and Civilian compliance: Behind coercion and governance strategies of armed groups, legitimacy and civilian compliance are vital to consolidate IRE as armed enclaves. In this regard, Terpstraa and Frerksa (2017) states that legitimation comprehends a two-way process: First, a top-down strategy related to service provision derived from rebel governance capacity and, second, a bottom-up strategy where symbolic repertoire and identities such as speech, writing, and local rituals play a significant role. Both processes are crucial for consolidationg IRE in the absence of a jurisdictional legal frame that conducts the civilian democratic practices in zones of war (Frerksa, 2017).

2.2.1 IRE Typology

Based on the above, Table 4 presents a typology of IRE that serves for the conceptualization (coding) of the units of analysis of my research in the *Medium-n* and *Small-n* empirical sections.

Table 4 Types of Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE)

Type of IRE	Type of organization	Rebel governance	Legitimacy and Civilian Compliance	IRE Cases
Strong IRE	Integrated	High	High	Insurgency enclaves in: Cuba (M 26-7), Nicaragua (FSLN), Colombia (FARC regions), Perú (Shining Path regions)
	Parochial	Low	High	Insurgency enclaves in: Colombia (ELN, EPL, Guatemala (ORPA, EGP) or México (Caracoles EZLN),
Weak IRE	Vanguard	High	Low	Insurgency enclaves in: Uruguay (Tupamaros Regions); Ecuador (AVC regions), Chile (MIR regions); Colombia (M-19); Panamá (MLN 29)
	Fragmented	Low	Low	Insurgency enclaves in: Colombia (PRT, MAQL); Argentina (EGP, FAR, ENR); Peru (ELN)

Source: Own Elaboration based on Staniland (2017)

Strong IRE includes sub-national units with higher levels of rebel governance and, therefore, with more exceptional capabilities for creating rebellious-type armed orders (Arjona, 2016). In turn, this type of IRE comprehends two subtypes of armed organization: Integrated and parochial (Staniland, 2014), which vary, mainly, in the level of legitimacy and civilian compliance that they achieve in the armed orders established by them.

In the case of IRE made up of integrated armed groups, the high level of rebel governance and civilian compliance allow them to extend the characteristics of the armed order to large portions of the territory. Additionally, population legitimacy increases the possibilities of coming to power or achieving an armed victory against the State. Emblematic examples are the IREs that gave rise to armed revolutions in internal armed conflicts in Cuba (M 26-7) or Nicaragua (FSLN).

The Strong IRE, oriented by the sub-type of a parochial armed organization, shares with the former their high level of legitimacy and civilian despite their lower capacity for rebel governance. The latter means that IRE's objectives of expansion and armed victory are severely limited. In the same line, its sub-national anchors allowing the growth and armed order consolidation are not sufficient as the IRE led by integrated armed groups. An example of Strong IRE are cases coming from post-conflict negotiations or peace agreements caused by the impossibility of an unilateral armed victory by one of the parties: Colombia (FARC-EP regions), Peru (PCP-Sendero Luminoso regions), Guatemala (ORPA, EGP) or Mexico (Caracoles EZLN).

Weak IRE considers sub-national units with variable levels of rebel governance and low levels of legitimacy and civilian compliance due to the vanguard or fragmented (Staniland, 2014) armed organization guide them. Accordingly, the Fragile IRE type led by avant-garde armed groups appeals to the highest level of urban areas governance. However, they lack of low levels of civilian compliance and legitimacy in rural areas and strategic sub-national anchorage.

An example of weak IRE are cases of low-intensity internal armed conflicts in Ecuador (AVC regions), Chile (MIR regions), Colombia (M-19), and Panama (MLN 29). At the same time, it includes armed conflicts led by minority political factions such as Uruguay (Tupamaros). The latter armed capacities were not sufficient to achieve an armed-take over or forced a negotiation scenario with the State. The same apply to dissolved insurgencies (Unilateral end of the conflict) where the insufficient civilian and social support accelerated the guerrillas's disappearance or their State military defeat.

Weak IRE made up of armed organizations with a low level of rebel governance. Thus, low levels of legitimacy represent in these cases fewest capacities for the extension or consolidation of their political objectives. For example, cases led by fragmented-type armed groups (Staniland, 2014) with a high risk of dissolution or disappearance in low intensity armed conflicts in Colombia (PRT, MAQL); Argentina (EGP, FAR, ENR) or Peru (ELN)

As follows, Section 2.3 contains the APS typology based on the effect produced by the SLAC and from which the mentioned post-conflict pathways. Hypothetically, post-conflict stabilization is higher in Strong APS and Partial APS cases where the post-conflict pathway is oriented by a type of SLAC A. In the Weak and Fragile APS pathways, the conditions for stability are lower due to the rebelocratic legacy of the SLAC and the more substantial effects on the citizen agency in areas of violence and insurgent armed conflict.

Additionally, I claim that overlap different types of SLAC on the same territory (IRE) increases the risk of instability and recurrence of violence. Thus, SLAC types mixing hinders the effective implementation of the post-conflict stabilization mechanism. A typical example of this case is Colombia. Around forty years (1981-2019), Colombia has experimented at least ten post-conflict experiences with insurgent actors inheriting SLAC A and SLAC B legacies on war zones. and configured armed orders with sub-national legacies unstable variation. Thence, my claim about the Colombian partial and recurrent post-conflict stabilization setting (See Chapter 3)

2.3 Within and Between-Nation comparison strategy

My research design is conducted by a subnational and transnational comparison framework (Sellers, 2019; Pepinsky, 2017) allowed me to collect comparative evidence for my APS empirical testing. By scaling down the study of internal armed post-conflict I compare the subnational variation of APS levels based on the empirical testing of SLAC and APS conditions (See Section 2.4).

At the same time, I identify and compare the Latin American scenario of the Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) by making subnational and transnational comparisons (Within-Between) in the line suggested by Sellers (2019). I Implemented a selection strategy for diverse cases based on Gerring (2007) for the empirical testing of my 3E post-conflict stabilization theory. Likewise, my research design incorporates a proposal of a sequential 3E mechanism with a higher level of causal explanation to contribute to the post-conflict stability theory-building.

2.3.1 SLAC and APS variables Operationalization

Independent Variable (SLAC): My research defines SLAC as a categorical dichotomous variable. For its operationalization, I used an aggregation rule that defined three dimensions for identifying the type of SLAC in the IRE unit of analysis (See Section 1.3). Primary and secondary data were collected for coding SLAC dimensions based on the indicators proposed in my theoretical framework.

As seen in Section 1.3, I these data let me identify the type of SLAC dimensions in Latin American IRE. In the case of SLAC Dimension One **D1**, the presence of weak-armed orders on IRE is coded as *Weak*, whereas the strong-armed orders are coded as *Strong*. In the case of Dimension two **D2**, the presence of Low Social Agency Impacts is coded as (*Low*), whereas the High Social Agency Impacts is coded as (*High*). The same applies to SLAC **D3** when the IRE corresponds to a strategic conflict zone for the State coded as *Strategic* or, contrarily, non-strategic or Peripheral (See Table 5).

Table 5. SLAC Independent Variable Classification (Operationalization)

D1	D2	D3	Type of SLAC
Weak	Low	Strategic	SLAC A
Strong	High	Peripheral	SLAC B
<i>Strong</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Strategic</i>	<i>Non-SLAC</i>
<i>Strong</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Peripheral</i>	<i>Non-SLAC</i>
<i>Weak</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Strategic</i>	<i>Non-SLAC</i>
<i>Weak</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Peripheral</i>	<i>Non-SLAC</i>

Source: Own Elaboration

In Section 2.4, I used the UCDP datasets in the MNA Step to identify and to code the SLAC dimensions in the universe of IRE cases of Latin America armed conflicts (61 cases in the period 1957-2018). At the same time, I collected primary and secondary information prevenient from reports, archives, and unique data fieldwork collected between 2019 and 2020. Likewise, this operationalization process allows me to identify the post-conflict cases necessary for the empirical testing of the levels of APS. Likewise, to selecting cases for the diverse case strategy of my geo-nested *small-n* stage based on the variation of the SLAC in the whole universe of Latin American post-conflict cases.

Dependent Variable (APS) In line with the APS concept formation designed in Chapter 1, the APS is operationalized as an ordinal variable using a diminished subtypes strategy where the accomplishment of conditions increases the level of stability (See Section 1.4). As seen

above, I began with the UCDP dataset for Latin American armed conflicts (1957-2018) to identify post-conflict cases based on the type of SLAC (Medium-n step). Then I codify the accomplishment of post-conflict conditions in the cases based on secondary and primary information derived from fieldwork.

The identification of post-conflict cases in this universe of armed conflicts allowed me, in turn, to select cases for the small-n stage using a geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) and a diverse case strategy (Gerring, 2007). That is, a selection strategy that covers the entire spectrum of variation of APS considering all the possible values of the dependent variable: *Weak, Fragile, partial, and Strong APS*.

I code the presence or absence of APS conditions in the post-conflict cases identified in the geo-nested medium-n step. According to this, the presence of *Political Processes that strengthen Subnational State Institutions C1* is coded as (1), and its absence (0). The presence of *Demobilization and Incorporation of Ex-combatants C2* corresponds to (1), whereas its absence corresponds to (0). The same applies in the case of the presence or absence of *Protection of civilians C3*, and *Effective and Accountable Security conditions C4*.

Additionally, in the line of Muggah (2014), my APS variable is sensible to the territorial dependency (nesting) of APS levels and distinguishing between national (Top-Down) and subnational (Bottom-up) post-conflict conditions. According to this, **C1** and **C2** are nationally managed conditions due to the primary State enforcement purposes after the end of the conflict, and **C3** and **C4** are subnationally negotiated conditions on account of its focus on the civilian population and local territories (See Table 6).

Table 6. APS Dependent variable with Territorial Dependency

	Concept	Components				
Basic Core	Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS)	C1	C2	C3	C4	Territorial Dependency
Secondary Categories (Values)	Weak APS (High Instability)	C1				Top-Down (Non-Territorial)
	Fragile APS (Low Instability)	C1	C2			Bottom-Up (Non-Territorial)
	Recurrent APS (Low Stability)	C1	C2	C3		Top-Down (Territorial)
	Strong APS (High Stability)	C1	C2	C3	C4	Bottom-Up (Territorial)

Source: Own Elaboration

In line with my theoretical framework, the APS measuring strategy allowed me to identify cases with different levels of post-conflict stability based on the accomplishment of APS conditions (See Section 2.3.4). Thus, the more the achievement of APS conditions, the more the APS level.

2.3.2 *Armed conflict and Armed post-conflict Data*

My *Medium-n analysis data* comes from UCDP Dataset Download Center (See Appendix 1), particularly the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Likewise, I used historical data, archives, and Institutional and Non-Institutional Reports from Latin American armed conflicts, insurgent groups, and post-conflict processes. On the other hand, I collected unique primary data from fieldwork, presential and on-line interviews, and ethnographic work in conflict and post-conflict zones of countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Perú between 2019 and 2021.

The *Small-n data, Unique data and Fieldwork for the Small-n analysis* step included historical data and documentary sources on the internal insurgent conflict in the countries and subnational units selected: Official and Unofficial Documents, studies and academic research, reports of local institutions, and organizations on the conflict and Places of memory [i.e., *CARE* and *Salón del Nunca Más* (Antioquia-Colombia); *Lugar de la Memoria* (Lima-Perú); *Comisión de la Verdad para Ecuador* (CEV)].

I also explored local Databases such as Documentation Center for Armed Movements (CEDEMA), Historical Memory Center of the selected countries, Local Historical Memory Centers, Among others. At the same time, I used local and national press archives on the history of the conflict and the processes of negotiation, dissolution, or termination of the armed conflict. Additionally, I consulted legal texts of the agreements, amnesty processes, communications from groups under negotiation, reports of truth commissions, Historical memory, and documents related to the implementation the post-conflict Initiatives and policies.

Unique data about armed conflict and post-conflict processes also includes post-agreement or cessation of the armed conflict constitutional texts, policy programs, laws and state decrees related to the post-conflict. My fieldwork included face-to face and virtual contact with local researchers, former rebels and social actors in the countries and its subnational units. Besides, I conducted presential and on-line interviews with crucial conflict and armed post-conflict actors. (See Appendix 4 - Interviews List).

The Interviewed actors included: In the first group, victims of the armed conflict, social organizations, and Victim's Rights Groups. In the second, demobilized and reincorporated ex-combatants of the armed insurgent organizations. Third, national and subnational Institutional actors (Public workers, post-conflict policymakers, among others). Finally, I interviewed conflict and post-conflict local researchers and Scholars in armed post-conflict territories. Moreover, my research includes interviews with post-conflict academic experts, local researchers, and scholars related to the processes of negotiation, demobilization, or disarmament and subsequent processes for the enactment of laws and programs for post-conflict implementation in the cases I selected.

2.3.3 Methodology

As seen in Section 1.2, most of the empirical strategies for measuring post-conflict stabilization privileges *large-n* quantitative analysis and statistical models. All of them based on typical indicators such as the intensity of the conflict, the duration of armed hostility, the level of governmental control, or the total quantity of deaths. Nevertheless, the national-State level of this data conduces to serious omissions about the characteristics of rebellion, insurgency, and citizenship responses after insurgency at the subnational level (Hoeffler, 2019).

Some examples include research designs about stabilization as the duration of peace using regression analysis to the study of armed conflict and sporadic violence (Call 2012; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008; Fortna 2008, 2015; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003; Hoddie & Hartzell 2005; Walter 2014). At the same time, survival analysis techniques use household-level data for measuring peace at the national level. (Caplan et al. 2015; Forau and Chand, 2016). Moreover, most of the measuring strategies implemented such as a regression analysis present lack of significance and explicative leverage limiting to understand stabilization in armed politics scenarios (Hoeffler, 2019). At the same time, there are problems of precision and availability of data in the universe of cases that conducts to concept stretching as well as spurious correlations about APS.

Consequently, my research employs a mixed-methods strategy combining geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) of a *medium-n* analysis data set (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) and a diverse cases comparison (Gerring, 2007) encompassing the Latin-American IRE from 1957 to 2019. Likewise, I use in-depth case studies (*small-n* analysis) for the empirical testing of the 3E mechanism, *causal process observations* and *process tracing* techniques for APS levels variation. In that manner, I cover the entire spectrum of post-conflict stabilization (APS) variation as quasi-experimental complete matching techniques and control by design the potential selection bias errors.

In line with Sellers (2019), these *Medium-n and Small-n* strategies complement each other and help with each other's limitations. The geo-nested analysis establishes the universe of Latin-American IRE cases for testing where and how types of SLAC and APS levels work. At the same time, the small-n analysis informs about the dynamics of the 3E mechanism and its sequential causal linkage. Additionally, fieldwork and interviews conducted for the diverse case strategy allowed me to trace the causal processes of APS from a subnational perspective. In short, the *medium-n geo-nested analysis* provides breadth, while the *small-n* diverse case strategies offer depth.

Medium-n and Small-n Analysis in the study of APS

In contrast to the observable implications of large-n projects such as Correlates of War - CoW (Small & Singer, 1982), designing my *medium-n* strategy required the use IRE sub-national unit of analysis for implementing the methodological and empirical criteria suggested by geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017).

In this sense, my research suggests at least two substantive modifications to the empirical study of post-conflict stabilization coming from the contentious and subnational politics approach: First, replacing the independent variable *number of deaths per year* (regularly used in large-*n* studies for identifying cases of armed conflict), for the SLAC independent variable. Second, modifying the use of *the type of armed actor* or *the way of ending the conflict* (Harbom, Högladh and Wallensteen, 2006; Cox, 2019) as a unit of analysis for stabilization by a sub-national unit (IRE) with formal and informal characteristics inherited by internal war.

In this way, my research design considers the large-*n* stabilization theoretical background. Still, it proposes an alternative methodological setting focuses on the territorial dimension of the conflict, the differential effects of the SLAC, and the legacies of violence (Soifer & Vergara, 2019) on armed conflict sub-national units. Thus, the general observable implications (Small and Singer 1982) adapted to the subnational policy approach for identifying armed post-conflict cases included:


1. The armed conflict was supported by subnational linkages and wartime institutions (SLAC).
2. The government was one of the parties to the conflict.
3. There was effective resistance on the part of both the national and subnational government and its adversaries during the conflict.
4. The conflict does not necessarily occur within a defined political unit. Thus, Insurgency Regions of Exception (IRE), borders, and informal political units are included.

2.3.1 Mixed Methods Geo-nested analysis

Given the importance of IRE's characteristics such as regional exceptionality (Pepinsky, 2007) and territorial dependency, one of the strategies used for my subnational approach is geo-nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005; Harbers and Ingram, 2017). That is a spatially dependent data framework where insights gleaned at each step of the research process set the agenda for the next phase. Thus, the case selection for a *small-n* analysis is based on the diagnostics of medium-*n* spatial-analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017).

For Harbers & Ingram (2017) this framework for exploring territorially located units has an explicit connection with the nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005). The previous since the cases selected for qualitative analysis (Small-*n* analysis step) are nested (embedded) within the same sample firstly analyzed in the Medium-*n* step. Thus, in my research design, the sub-national units selected for the small-*n* diverse cases stage are nested in the medium-*n* universe of cases of internal Latin American armed conflicts (1958-2019). Implementing this empirical strategy comprises three central steps that I illustrated in Figure 13 and described below.

Figure 13 Geo-Nested Steps by IRE Case Selection



Source: Adapted from Harbers, I., & Ingram, M. (2017)

Three Steps to Geo-nested Analysis (IRE as Unit of Analysis)

Step 1 Medium-n analysis: According to Harbers & Ingram (2017), the first step in the geo-nested analysis is beginning with a preliminary Large-n or Medium-n analysis with theoretically relevant variables. In my research, the SLAC and APS variables are empirically tested using Latin-American IRE as a unit of analysis. As seen in Figure 13, this first stage of my analysis includes the identification of the universe of cases of armed conflict in the period and region selected. It considers as a prerequisite the georeferencing of armed orders (IRE) where insurgent conflicts express territorially. In my case, the total of georeferenced armed conflicts with the UCDP database for Latin America reaches a total of 61 between 1958-2019 (See section 2.4).

For Harbers and Ingram (2017), this step is essential because it allows the selection of the spatial scale for the analysis, as well as ensures that variables selected for the researcher reflect the theoretical "state of the art" (Harbers and Ingram, 2017: 6-7). As seen in Chapter 1, my research's explanatory variable (SLAC) and dependent variable (APS) come from the subnational and contentious armed politics theoretical frame. Thus, my ex-ante hypothesis claim that the SLAC determines the APS Level (See section 2.1)

Additionally, this medium-n analysis step allowed me to use multiple methods for the estimation and design of medium-n studies based on diagnoses of spatial dependence and territorial embeddedness. The above is essential for the selection of cases in the subsequent stages of the analysis. Thus, my research opted for a medium-n strategy based on georeferenced Latin- American armed conflict data conducted by UCDP.

On the other hand, I disaggregated the SLAC variable dimensions codifying its presence or absence according to the data as mentioned above. In this way, the medium-n stage involved not only the identification of the IRE conflict space in the universe of Latin-American armed conflicts but also the dimensions of the SLAC determining the post-conflict cases for the geo-nested small-n analysis step (See sections 2.4 and 2.5).

Likewise, I incorporated the methodological advances for the causal inference suggested by Sellers (2019) and Pepinsky (2017), replacing a large-n analysis econometrically oriented by a medium-n analysis territorially nested. Thus, my research not only covers the universe of Latin American armed conflicts along with my periodization, but it is sensitive to the particularities of the IRE based on within-between subnational comparisons.

Step 2 Small-n analysis: As seen in Figure 13, step 2 of the geo-nested analysis seeks to specify the spatial variance of the explanatory factors and check for the type of territorial dependency or embeddedness of the units of analysis (IRE). Thus, the core of my Step 2 consists of two main objectives: First, analyze the variation of the SLAC in the Latin-American IRE based on the typology built in the theoretical frame (See section 1.3); and second, identifying the armed post-conflict cases for the diverse case strategy (Gerring, 2007) of this small-n step.

In this sense, after identifying the type of embeddedness or territorial dependency of the SLAC in the medium-n step, the small-n analysis provides the opportunity to uncover the mechanisms of diffusion of the outcome variable (Harbers and Ingram, 2017: 10). That means, in my research, the dynamics of the 3E mechanism and its effects on IRE Post-conflict pathways to APS (See Table 6).

In line with Lieberman (2005) and Harbers and Ingram (2017), the move from the medium-n to the small-n analysis phase represents a change from dataset observations to thicker and more heterogeneous "causal-process observations" (Collier et al., 2004). Additionally, a "case" for the Small-n analysis is better conceptualized as a set of units, that is: "A focal unit (e.g., county, city, neighborhood or other unit depending on the research question and theory) and the neighboring units with which it is connected (Harbers and Ingram, 2017: 6).

Hence, the small-n step may be a potential strategy to attack some of the issues exposed by Caplan et al., (2015) referring to the study of stabilization in large-n and small-n settings:

The case studies provide important additional insights and identify a number of factors that were important for the consolidation of peace. However, many of these variables are difficult if not impossible to measure using statistical methods either because the data are not available/reliable or because the variables elude measurement (Caplan, et al, 2015:2)

Finally, in the *small-n* step my research combines diverse cases (Gerring, 2007) with a nested sub-national cases strategy from different countries (Rubin, 1973). I show, in the way of Sellers (2019), how a comparison of cases matched for these transnational strategies can approximate the controls of an experimental design (Sellers, 2017: 90). Table 7 summarizes the types of transitional comparative comparisons (Sellers, 2019) for the IRE analysis.

Table 7. Types of transnational comparative comparisons for Insurgents Regions of Exception (IRE)

Types of Comparison	Cross-border	Most different national systems	Encompassing comparison	Common transnational object
Country variation	Most similar	Most different systems	Aggregate subnational effects, national differences	Selected by relationship to transnational process or object
Subnational variation	Most similar cases, or similar variations	Similar cases, with variation-finding	Aggregated patterns, national influences	Matched by subnational context and relationship to transnational process or object
Type of testing	Quasi-experimental; Geo-Nested Analysis	Hypothesis generation and development, small to intermediate sample	<i>Varies</i>	<i>Varies</i>

Source: Adapted from Sellers (2019)

Based on Table 7, Sellers’s (2019) strategy for transnational comparisons consists of identifying two possible scenarios: One, of a quasi-experimental type, assuming that the border delimitation conditions are exogenous to the phenomenon studied since: “Holding the conditions of regions on both sides of a border constant, a contiguous cross-border comparison can focus analysis on national differences and their consequences ”(Sellers, 2019: 51) Second, in the absence of randomization, allows controlling variables that enable comparative analysis of cultural, political, and institutional differences that vary due to national influences on either side of the border units compared.

An example of this type of quasi-experimental conditions, in the absence of randomization, is identified in the historical analysis of Maclean (2010) regarding the differences between border institutions in countries such as Ghana and Ivory Coast and their incidence on nation-building colonial experiences. In those cases, although the history of border delimitation is not exogenous to the national identification process, it becomes a master variable for the analysis of subnational differences between nations.

Thus, the transnational comparison may recreate, in most cases, a quasi-experimental scenario designed by the conditions of territorial dependency and subnational nested units such as borders (Sellers, 2019). The above, without ignoring the long-standing legacies of the State building and border delimitation processes. Applied to my *Insurgency Regions of Exception* (IRE), I implemented a type of transnational comparison cases derived from the medium-n analysis step, and then selected diverse cases (Gerring, 2007) using the Geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) similar to quasi-experimental full matching techniques.

Step 3 Mechanisms of diffusion (Vectors of transmission): Steps 3a and 3b (See Figure 13) conduct to the identification of IRE post-conflicts pathways based on the variation of SLAC described in step 2. Harbers & Ingram (2017) conceive this step as identifying “Vectors of transmission” that entails the use of fieldwork such as interviews, and qualitative techniques like Causal-Process Observations (CPO’s) (Collier et al. 2004) and process tracing (Bennett and Checkel, 2015):

More contemporary research questions can make use of qualitative techniques including interviews, focus groups, and participatory observation. Qualitative work can take place at a distance (e.g., examining secondary literature or journalistic accounts online) or can be fieldwork consisting of personal interviews, observation, and visits to local archives. Crucially, the SNA focuses on linkages and interactions between units to better understand the spatial pattern. (Harbers, I., and Ingram, M. 2017: 15)

In my research, this step conducts to the analysis of the 3E mechanism and APS vectors of transmission. Moreover, it oriented the empirical testing of my 3E causal sequency hypothesis about the APS dynamics at the subnational level. Based on this hypothesis, the existence of a sequential 3E mechanism to intervene in the SLAC improves the accomplishment of the necessary conditions for higher levels of APS.

Table 8 summarizes the relation between SLAC, and APS levels based on my theoretical frame and the empirical outcome of 3a and 3b steps. Likewise, Table 8 describes the whole specter of APS variation and the dynamics of its sequential mechanism for the in-depth comparison of Latin American insurgent armed post-conflict settings. Table 8 is described in the following Section 2.3.4 about measuring APS and diverse cases selected for IRE pathways CPO’s (Weller and Barnes, 2014) and process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2018).

Table 8 IRE Post-conflict Pathways

		APS	
		Stable High (Sequential: E1*E2*E3 Mechanism Bottom-Up)	Stable Low (Sequential: E1*E2→E3 Mechanism Bottom-Up)
SLAC	A	Strong APS (C1*C2*C3*C4)	Recurrent APS (C1*C2*C3)
	B	Weak APS C1	Fragile APS (C1*C2)
		Unstable High (Non-Sequential: E1 Mechanism Top Down)	Unstable Low (Non-Sequential E1 Mechanism Top Down)

Source: Own Elaboration


2.3.4 APS territorial dependency: Measuring Strategy and embeddedness levels

APS concept incorporates Goertz and Mahoney (2012) suggestions about deepening the level of indicators and measurement during the qualitative process of concept formation: “Qualitative scholars need to think more about measurement and aggregation. They should not be content with default aggregation and dichotomous measurement” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012: 209).

In that sense, my APS concept considers not only levels of stability based on the type of SLAC, but levels of embeddedness or territorial dependency of post-conflict conditions (See Table 6). The latter obey to theoretical and methodological arguments mentioned by Goertz

and Mahoney (2012) but also to the way in Latin American post-conflict setting are managed from the national and sub-national scales (Saul, 2014). Figure 14 summarizes the relation between APS Conditions, Territorial dependency, and stability levels considering the previous methodological setting.

Figure 14 APS Conditions, Measuring & Territorial Dependency Levels



Source: Own Elaboration

Consequently, my research understands the post-conflict embeddedness or territorial dependency as an active component of territorial management conditions. It is not a mere backdrop for the decision-making process (Saul, 2014). In that sense, it includes the national and subnational-oriented management of post-conflict initiatives based on two specific factors:

The first one refers to the origin of the decisions guiding the armed post-conflict setting (Christia, 2019). That is, the direction of the activities, policies, and programs that guide stabilization. In short: “Sites of authority at which decision-making on reconstruction takes place” (Saul, 2014: 15). In this case, the location or origin may adopt two directions: *Top-Down*, when post-conflict is managed by the central government, or *Bottom-Up* when its management comes from sub-national political and social institutions.

The second includes the scope conditions of the post-conflict decisions. In my case post-conflict decisions also may follow two types: *Territorial* when stabilization’s initiatives implement successfully in the territories of former rebels’ governance; and *non-territorial* when conflict management fails to be implemented territorially. In this sense, the scope conditions of post-conflict implementation are closely related to the national and sub-national State capacities (decision-makers): “A clearer idea of the best practice for the identification of general political authority and the involvement of the population in decision making can be gained from thinking about the issue in relation to first the legitimacy and then the effectiveness of a reconstruction process” (Saul, 2014: 31)

Territorial Dependency Level

Based on the above, achieving the stability conditions shows a type of dependency or territorial embeddedness that, theoretically, corresponds with each of the APS dependent variable levels (See Figure 14).

- a. *Top-Down (Non-Territorial/Centralized)*: The post-conflict manages nationally: "Level of general political Authority" (Saul, 2014). Still, it has not yet developed or implemented territorially: "Authority at the specific program or territorial level" (Saul, 2014).
- b. *Bottom-Up (Non-Territorial/Centralized)*: Post-conflict is managed nationally, but territorial implementation is partial. The focus is still return the governance to the State and the ex-combatant's demobilization.
- c. *Top-Down (Territorial-Decentralized)*: Post-conflict is managed at the subnational level thanks to the Empowerment mechanism, but its implementation still depends on the national level: "Incentives for violent remobilization can therefore increase as the share of public resources and the balance of power between subnational units and the center moves increasingly in favor of the former" (Christia, 2019: 208).
- d. *Bottom-Up (Territorial-Decentralized)*: The post-conflict is managed subnationally. It is implemented in the territories with the highest level of social Empowerment and territorial autonomy Entitlement (Besley and Coate 2003; Oates 1972). In sum: "To the extent that decentralization increases local institutions' accountability and enables public expenditure to match citizens' preferences more closely, it is expected to improve service delivery, increase aggregate welfare, and mitigate conflict" (Christia, 2019: 208).

APS Levels

Weak APS - High Instability (Easily broken or destroyed): It is product of accomplishing the Condition C1. This APS level results from the State Enforcement on the IRE and increasing the State military control managed by the national armed forces. At this stage, the post-conflict is controlled from the national level to regain its presence in the territories. Post-conflict is not yet territorial.

Fragile APS -Low Instability (lacking in force, usually strength): It results of fulfilling conditions C1 and C2. That means, the State Enforcement power on the territory (C1) and the demobilization or negotiation with IRE's armed groups (C2). The post-conflict is brought to the territories to ensure the non-return to arms of former rebels. In this way, sub-national decision-makers are incorporated, but post-conflict stability continues to depend on national management. Post-conflict continues in a primary military sense.

Partial APS - Low Stability (withstand or socially recovered with difficult conditions): This APS level is the result of compliance with conditions C1, C2, and C3. The former condition arises after the Empowerment mechanism intervenes on civilians and former rebels' political

incorporation. Post-conflict is managed with pluralistic social agents and decision-makers from sub-national territories. In this sense, empowerment comes "from below". It is territorialized but still depends on the mechanism of recognition and titling of rights that the Entitlement confers.

Strong APS - High Stability (well and powerful): It results from achieving the full set of C1, C2, C3, and C4 necessary conditions from a higher level of post-conflict stability. Although the Entitlement mechanism requires the central government support, it is managed and implemented in the subnational level. The previous is possible thanks to social empowerment and the higher levels of civilian and territorial autonomy conferred by the Entitlement step.

2.4 Medium-n Geo-nested Analysis: SLAC and APS in Latin American Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) 1958-2017.

As mentioned in Section 2.3, my geo-nested analysis begins with a medium-n analysis including the universe of Latin American insurgent armed conflicts between 1958 and 2019. This periodization responds to significant events in the Latin American history of the armed conflicts. First, the events of the Cuban revolution that in 1959 installed a revolutionary socialist State by way of an insurgent armed takeover. Second, the peace agreement between the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP)* and the government of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, that ended with the longest internal armed conflict of the Latin American region.

The data for my *medium-n* analysis primarily comes from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 20.1 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Pettersson and Öberg, 2020) and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 20.1 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). At the same time, I focus mainly on data observations from Latin American internal armed conflicts given my interest in selecting cases for a subnational comparison of the dynamics of APS in diverse cases of this geopolitical region.


My theoretically relevant variables (Harbers and Ingram, 2017) points to the SLAC as the independent variable of insurgent post-conflict stabilization (See section 1.3), and the APS dependent variable for measuring stabilization (See section 1.4). In this section, I show how types of SLAC determine several levels of APS. Likewise, the presence or absence of the variable SLAC allows me to identify the Latin American armed post-conflict cases necessary for the *small-n* geo-nested step.

Finally, this section offers a general overview of Latin-American IRE during armed conflict events and the diverse pathways to post-conflict. I, particularly, emphasize on characteristics such as the trajectory of armed conflicts and the types of insurgent armed groups. Likewise, I trace a set of conditions directly related to my subnational theoretical approach. As an example, the type SLAC, the civilian compliance to rebels, and the strategical importance of the territories of war.

Graphic 1 describes the number and trajectory (number or years active) of insurgent armed conflicts in the Latin American region between 1958 and 2019 as a preliminary step for the *medium-n* analysis. In this case, I updated the UCDP data using unique fieldwork data and

information from Newspapers, Institutional Reports, and other databases like CEDEMA, concerning Latin America active armed conflicts and recurrence of war after 2017 post-conflict events.

Graphic 1 Insurgent Armed Conflicts in LATAM 1958-2019



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002)

Graphic 1 shows the universe of Latin American internal armed conflicts (62 total cases). It also shows the number of years active by country and armed actor between 1958 and 2019. In line with UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the graph distinguishes the Side A and Side B of the armed conflict by countries. Side A corresponds to the formal Government of the country in incompatibility with a Side B Insurgent armed organization.

Among Latin American countries with the most significant number of armed groups Colombia and Argentina coincide in a total of 11 armed groups. However, the difference in the number of years active varies after comparing their trajectory of armed activity. The second set of countries, including Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and El Salvador, share an average of 4 armed organizations with similar behavior in terms of their armed trajectory (not more than 20 years) except in Central American cases (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador).

On the other hand, I identified a set of countries with a smaller number of armed groups (less than five) and significant differences in the number of years of armed trajectory. In this case, three subgroups express significant variation: First, the countries with a single armed actor and a short-armed history (Haiti, Costa Rica, Panama); second, states with a low number of armed organizations and a medium trajectory (Cuba, Nicaragua); and third, countries with a small number of armed organizations but with a longer trajectory -20 years or more- (Uruguay, Venezuela and El Salvador).

In general terms, figure 1 shows a significant difference between the armed conflicts in the Latin American region after comparing the number of armed organizations and their differential trajectories by country. The cases of Colombia and Argentina are illustrative in this regard since, although they have the same number of armed organizations, their differences in the type of armed actor (See Graphic 3) and the years of activity in a conflict place them at opposite poles.

I identified the same situation in the case of medium-duration armed conflicts (no more than 20 years), especially in those of Cuba and Paraguay. In these cases, the differences between the type of armed actor and the outcome of the conflict are significant. In the former, the trajectory of internal armed conflict was short, but the existence of a type of integrated insurgent organization drives a strong-armed takeover. In the later, the trajectory of armed organizations such as EPP is short too, but the outcome of the conflict is still the armed hostility

Graphic 2 complements the description of the trajectory of armed conflicts by drawing a timeline that allows comparing the year of start and end of insurgent armed actions. The graph also highlights the difference in the number of years of insurgent armed activity, as well as the variation in the capacity of armed groups for staying overtime.


Graphic 2 LATAM Insurgent Armed Conflicts Trajectory



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002)

In line with my general hypothesis, the armed groups with better conditions to maintain themselves over time are those of an integrated and parochial type (Staniland, 2017). Opposite to the Fragmented and Vanguard insurgent groups, the former have a higher capacity for building armed orders due to their internal and military coordination and their capacities to build Strong IRE in strategic conflict zones (See Graphics 3 & 4).

Graphic 3. LATAM Insurgent Armed Groups by Type of Organization



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Graphic 3 shows the type of Latin American armed groups leading the internal armed conflicts. The number of Fragmented groups (32 total) corresponds to the 52 percent of the total cases, followed by the Vanguard (11 total) with 18 percent. Likewise, the parochial (9 total) represents 16 percent; and finally, the integrated (9 total) with 14 percent. This considerably high number of Fragmented armed organizations (32 total) majorly results from cases such as Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Colombia.


In these countries, the trajectory of war was shorter, and the type of IRE was weak. The latter except in Colombia where coexisted several types of armed groups and trajectories of the armed conflict. At the same time, the Integrated and Parochial types exist in a low proportion, but they are in line with more prolonged and intense armed conflicts in cases such as Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Perú, and Colombia.

In sum, Graphic 3 evidence that the Fragmented and Vanguard armed groups are the predominant insurgent type from Latin American armed conflicts. At the same time, Integrated and Parochial insurgent armed groups are lower. This result may explain, on the one hand, the relative early breakdown of insurgent conflicts led by Fragmented and Vanguard groups in most of Latin American cases. On the other hand, the low proportion but, in turn, the long trajectory of armed conflicts disputed by Integrated and Parochial groups.

An additional reason, in line with my theoretical priors about the IRE, points to the correlation between the long-term internal armed conflicts and the presence of insurgent armed groups with higher capacities for war (Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua or Peru). In

that line, the stronger the IRE built for Integrated and Parochial armed organizations, the more intense the armed conflict and its SLAC on the post-conflict period (See Graphic 4).

Graphic 4. Number of Insurgent Armed Groups by IRE




Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Concerning the type of IRE, my research evidences the existence of Weak IRE (sub-national units with lower levels of rebel governance and legitimacy and civilian compliance) as a common condition in armed orders with Fragmented and Vanguard insurgencies in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, or Ecuador. In contrast, the cases of Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru; are included among armed conflicts with a more significant number of Strong IRE (Sub-national units with higher levels of rebel governance).

Graphic 4 shows significant variance in the IRE unit of analysis across countries. It differences between Strong and Weak IRE. Approximately 70 percent corresponds to the Weak type and 30 percent to Strong types. Cases such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile stand out by the existence of a homogeneous type of Weak IRE. Opposite to Colombia, Mexico, Peru or Paraguay, they evidence the coexistence of both types of rebel governance enclaves.

These results correspond with the findings about the number of Fragmented and Vanguard insurgent armed groups in most of the Latin American armed conflicts. It also emphasizes why the presence of strong IRE in the armed conflict may correlate with the long-term trajectory of the conflict.

Graphic 5. SLAC cases by Armed Conflict in Latin America (1958-2019)



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

As seen in Section 2.3, The variable SLAC is an aggregate variable composed of the type of IRE, civilian impacts level, and strategic territorial dimensions of war. Achieving with these armed conflict dimensions generates SLAC. Likewise, the SLAC indicates the kind of legacies inherited by armed orders on IRE, as well as the effects of armed legacies on the variation of APS. Hence, the SLAC captures the existence of legacies with differentiated impacts of APS levels. Graphic 6 shows clustering the three different types of SLAC inherited by Latin American armed conflicts.


The Non-SLAC cluster brings together the armed conflicts not reaching the total dimensions making the SLAC. Because of this, this group is made up of cases where, although the existence of multiple armed organizations (i.e., Argentina, Chile), they have not established subnational linkages necessary for achieving armed order consolidation. At the same time, this group includes cases of insurgencies with greater civilian compliance but low levels of armed coordination (i.e., Bolivia, Mexico). Likewise, armed groups with armed order capacities and civilian support, but lack of a strategic territorial position. (i.e., Haiti, and some cases of insurgencies in Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador). The Non-SLAC represents 40 percent (25 cases) of total cases.

The *SLAC A cluster* represents 37 percent of total armed conflicts (24 cases). It gathers armed orders that comply with the overall dimensions of SLAC: Weak IRE, Low, civilian compliance, and strategic armed conflict spaces. Nevertheless, SLAC A is inherited on IRE when weak-armed insurgencies coexist with more durable armed orders (i.e., Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru) that leverage its rebel governance strategies. Likewise, SLAC A may be identified in cases with the hegemony (predominance) of a single armed actor (i.e., Ecuador, Uruguay, Nicaragua) and a long-term trajectory that inherits legacies on post-conflict despite its lower capacities compared with strong IRE’s rebels.

The *SLAC B cluster*, include armed conflicts (16 cases) led by insurgencies with higher conditions for challenging the State formal power. SLAC B represents 24 percent of the total cases. It is composed of a Strong IRE with high levels of civilian agency impact and a peripheral position for making war. According to this, the cases of Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, or Peru evidences the existence of integrated and parochial armed groups capable of producing SLAC B during the war. Additionally, this type of subnational armed conflict legacy may explain the reason why SLAC B correlates with higher levels of instability in the pos-conflict. I empirically test this correlation in below data observations.

In my *medium-n* data observations, the absence of SLAC (Non-SLAC) on Latin American IRE may explain the earlier breakdown of the armed conflicts led by vanguard or fragmented insurgencies. Moreover, it explains the reason why the absence of pathways to post-conflict in Latin American countries with armed insurgent experiences but low-intensity armed legacies. The cases of Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, or Haiti, although its particularities, may are some examples. On the other hand, SLAC A and SLAC B may lead to positive cases of armed post-conflict, considering that its variation could be the explanatory factor for the variance on APS levels (See Graphic 17).

Graphic 6 Type of Armed groups by IRE and SLAC



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

In order to provide a more confidence test of the SLAC variable, the *medium-n* analysis test the relation between SLAC, and two regular variables measured in post-conflict studies: The type of armed group and the way of ending the conflict. Graphic 6 shows the relationship between SLAC and the type of insurgent actor (Staniland, 2014) evidencing how to increase the insurgent group military power correlates to the higher types of SLAC.


Graphic 6, shows the positive correlation between the existence of Fragmented insurgent groups and the non-SLAC cases. At least 19 of the total cases of non-SLAC include Fragmented armed groups characterized by low military coordination and civilian support. At the same time, Fragmented armed groups are present in cases of SLAC A but in a smaller proportion (12 of total cases) compared the predominance of Integrated and parochial armed groups in SLAC A and SLAC B types.

On the contrary, Parochial and Integrated armed groups are almost absent in the non-SLAC cases: There are only two of twenty-five total armed groups in the non-SLAC cluster. A similar condition applies to Parochial and Integrated groups in SLAC A, where the former only represents the twenty percent (5 cases) and the later four percent (1 case) of total armed groups in SLAC A cluster.

The right figure in Graphic 6 shows, by the opposite, the strong positive correlation between the existence of Integrated and, in a lower proportion, Parochial armed groups and SLAC B in Strong IRE. More than fifty percent (7 Integrated and 4 Parochial groups) of armed groups in Strong IRE belongs to the more durable type of insurgency. The Fragmented and Vanguard groups are highly concentrated on Weak IRE compared to the dominance of Integrated and Parochial groups on the Strong ones. Thence, their higher military conditions by producing SLAC B. In sum, increasing the military power of insurgencies may increase the inherits of SLAC on Latin-American IRE cases.

Graphic 7 shows the effect of SLAC in the outcome (end) of the armed conflict considering the distribution of Armed groups along Weak and Strong Latin American IRE. For coding types of ends of the conflict, I used the UCDP/PRIO classification composed of five types of strategies: Military Victory (by the State), Peace agreements, Dissolution, Low Activity, and Hostility (Dissidence of recurrence of war).

Graphic 7 End of the conflict by Type of SLAC and IRE



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).


Previous research (Caplan et al., 2015; Fortna, 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hoefler, 2019) states that ending the armed conflict by a state military victory, or the dissolving (low

activity) of insurgencies led to more stable post-conflict environments. In contrast, peace agreements and factionalization (recurrence hostility) increase the risk of instability in the post-conflict.

In that line, Graphic 7 describes how the end of the conflict by a Military victory of the State highly correlates with the absence of SLAC (Non-SLAC type) or someone SLAC A cases on weak IRE. A possible reason for this outcome may lie in the high number of fragmented and Vanguard armed insurgencies in non-SLAC armed conflicts. Likewise, it could be explained by the non-SLAC or SLAC A cases where the government's military victory on the fragmented and Vanguard insurgencies builds a more favorable scenario for ending the armed conflict.

In short, the results of this *medium-n* analysis are well in line with previous research regarding the strategies for ending the conflict. Nevertheless, my findings do not confirm this variable as an explanatory factor of APS levels variation. The SLAC A may exist in cases where the end of the conflict bases on military victories and dissolved insurgencies. In contrast, SLAC B may be inherited in peace agreement and recurrence of hostility settings. Thus, as in the case of peace agreements and recurrence of war, SLAC B may promote instability, whereas SLAC A would be prone to more stable post-conflict settings (after Military victories or low activity and dissolved armed orders).

Graphic 8 Total of cases by Type of IRE and Type of SLAC




Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

Similarly, correlations between Type of IRE and Type of SLAC are significant too in Latin American armed conflicts. As mentioned above, the IRE captures the level of intensity of the armed order based on the type of insurgent organization and the insurgent's civilian support. In this sense, the absence of SLAC is highly presented in Weak IRE cases (25 cases total). The above may also explain the reason why non-SLAC armed groups in weak IREs have a meager capacity for building post-conflict settings (i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Haiti, Chile)

Nevertheless, some weak IRE cases may produce a type of SLAC A when the total of aggregated dimensions composing SLAC is present. The left figure in Graphic 8 shows the difference between the number of insurgencies with non-SLAC (25 cases) compared with those producing SLAC A (19 cases). In the case of Strong IRE, the correlation with SLAC exclusively points to the presence of Armed groups building rebelocratic IREs (See Section 1.3). In that sense, SLAC B is majorly inherited by armed groups in Strong IRE (16 cases). The right figure in Graphic 8 compares armed groups and their SLAC types on Weak and Strong IRE clusters.

In the same way, Graphic 9 shows that consistent with the distribution of armed groups on Latin American IRE. There is a negative correlation between armed groups capable of producing SLAC and building weak IRE in conflict zones. Data observations in Graphic 9 evidence how a high number of armed conflicts nested on Weak IRE did not provides SLAC (25 cases). Thus, the non-SLAC armed conflicts represent approximately 40 percent of total cases of internal armed conflict compared with 29 percent (19 cases) of SLAC A cases in Weak IRE.


Graphic 9. Latin American IRE and SLAC types



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

In contrast, the *medium-n* analysis evidences a positive correlation between increasing the armed group military conditions for producing a type of SLAC B and the existence of Strong IRE. The number of armed groups providing SLAC B in strong IRE corresponds to twenty five percent (16 cases) compared to the SLAC A in the same type of IRE. According to the UCDP Data (See Graphic 9), building Strong IRE not only produces variation in the type of SLAC, but it increases the necessary conditions to provide subnational legacies during the armed conflict. This finding is confirmed below when I identify the effect of SLAC comparing non-postconflict and post-conflict cases in Latin America (See graphic 13).

Graphic 10. Social Agency and Strategic Territories SLAC Dimensions




Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

My research also accounts for the Social Agency impacts and Strategic IRE territories. Both dimensions, impact the effect of SLAC in the armed post-conflict levels achieved by a country. As the left figure in Graphic 10 shows, armed conflicts with low social agency impacts correlates in a higher proportion with non-SLAC (25 cases) and SLAC A (23 cases). On the other hand, although high social agency impacts are lower, the *medium-n* analysis identifies a strong correspondence between them and SLAC B type (16 cases).

The above could explain why the high social agency impacts presented in SLAC B would represent an extra factor for instability in the post-conflict compared to the low social impacts of SLAC A armed conflicts. The same may apply for the strategic territorial importance dimension of SLAC on Latin America armed conflict spaces. Figure on the right in Graphic 10 shows the number of strategic and non-strategic areas impacted by different types of SLAC.

In a higher proportion, armed conflicts took place in strategic subnational territories representing almost seventy percent (48 cases) compared to armed conflicts in non-strategic (peripheral) enclaves (16 cases). Likewise, approximately forty percent of armed conflicts in strategic regions did not inherit SLAC on rebel governance enclaves. For that reason, only armed conflicts that inherit SLAC are included in the post-conflict case selection that emerged from the medium-n step. Graphic 10 shows that social agency impacts, and strategic IRE territories follow the pattern of SLAC.


Graphic 11. Post-conflict Cases based on Armed Groups Type



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

As additional evidence for testing the effect of SLAC on the post-conflict cases, I look back on the correlation of SLAC and the type of insurgency on Latin American IRE. My data observations are consistent with previous research regarding how post-conflict cases with fragmented and vanguard insurgencies tend to be higher compared to post-conflict cases with integrated and parochial ones. Additionally, Fragmented and vanguard armed groups tend to be more present in SLAC A cases (i.e., Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua) compared to Integrated and parochial groups in SLAC B post-conflict cases (See Graphic 11).

Graphic 12. SLAC and Post-Conflict Cases (Including Non Post-conflict active Hostility Cases)




Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

In consequence, this *medium-n* data observations allowed me to test the use of SLAC independent variable for identifying post-conflict cases. The effect of the SLAC on post-conflict is substantial. Graphic 12, shows how non-SLAC armed conflicts do not constitute pathways to post-conflict. Cases such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, or Haiti, although account

with several insurgent organizations, are examples of why armed conflicts in Weak IRE are more prone to dissolve or ending with a Military victory for the State. As said above, Weak IRE constitutes cases of early breakdown of the conflict and minimal legacies in the post-conflict period.

On the contrary, armed groups producing SLAC A in Weak IRE (Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay) and those providing SLAC B in the Strong IRE (Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba), represents the higher number of Latin American armed conflicts. These armed orders were capable of inherit subnational legacies in the post-conflict period. I confirm these post-conflict outcomes through the left figure on the Graphic 12 clustering the non-post-conflict cases. Whereas the right figure clustering post-conflict cases distinguishes SLAC A and SLAC B cases in the post-conflict pathways. Additionally, Graphic 13 shows the same distribution but excluding active armed conflicts [i.e., Brazil, Paraguay (EPP) and Colombia (ELN, FARC dissidents)] non specified in UCDP/PRIO Data sets.

Graphic 13 Type of SLAC and Post-Conflict Cases (Active Hostility Cases excluded)



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

A determinant test for the SLAC in this *medium-n* step implies testing the logical and theoretical correlation between dimensions composing the SLAC mentioned in the methodological section of this research (See Section 2.3). Although each armed conflict in the Latin American region is different, I clustered them based on the aggregate dimensions producing the SLAC Type A or Type B. According to this, Graphic 14 gathers the SLAC A and SLAC B in different clusters, also accounting for the type of subnational IRE of Latin American internal armed conflicts. Graphic 15 shows the same distribution but excluding - as in the previous figure- active armed conflicts non specified in UCDP/PRIO Data sets.

Graphic 14. Type of SLAC aggregate conditions (Including Active Armed Conflicts)



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

Graphic 15 Type of SLAC aggregate conditions and Type of IRE (Excluding Active Armed Conflicts)



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

Graphics 14 and 15 shows the number of armed conflicts inherits SLAC A on post-conflict compared to those inherits SLAC B. After excluding active armed conflicts, both, SLAC A and SLAC B represents each one 50 percent of total cases (16 cases respectively). SLAC A cluster includes armed conflicts of Colombia (7 cases), Peru (2 cases) and El Salvador, Nicaragua, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay. All of them with one case of armed conflict. On the other hand, the SLAC B cluster comprehends cases of Colombia (4 cases), Guatemala (4 cases), Perú and El Salvador (2 cases respectively), and Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Mexico (1 case respectively).

Likewise, I considered the type of IRE corresponding to types of SLAC (See Graphic 15). Approximately seventy-five percent of armed conflicts (12 cases) in Weak IRE compliance the aggregate dimensions necessary by inherits SLAC A in the post-conflict period. Only 25 percent (4 cases) of armed conflicts in Weak IRE inherits SLAC B. A possible reason for this, as mentioned above, is the probable coexistence (overlap) of SLAC A armed conflicts with SLAC B cases within the same country (i.e., armed conflicts of Colombia, Peru, El Salvador)

At the same time, the total cases of armed conflict inherit SLAC B correspond to Strong IRE (16 cases). The results are consistent with my theoretical priors and previous findings (See Graphic 9). Particularly, the robust correlation between strong-armed groups (higher military coordination and civilian support) and high impact subnational legacies (rebelocratic armed orders, high social agency impacts and strategical positions in conflicts zone).

In sum, it is possible that variation on SLAC not only conducts to the presence or absence of post-conflict settings based on in IRE properties like the type of armed organization (Staniland, 2017) or the way for ending the conflict (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; UN, 2008; Caplan & Hoeffler, 2017; Hoddie & Hartzell 2005). The SLAC may also determine APS levels based on their subnational constitutive dimensions. In that line, Table 11 disaggregate each of SLAC's dimensions, as a result of the geo-nested *medium-n* analysis. It shows crucial data for testing at least two of my theoretical priors about the effect of SLAC in the pathways to post-conflict

First, the empirical correlation mentioned in Section 2.3, between lower values of SLAC dimensions on Weak IRE and the type of SLAC A. At the same time, higher values of SLAC dimensions on Strong IRE and the presence of SLAC B (See Table 6 in Section 2.3). Second, the empirical data observations for showing how the coexistence (overlap) of several types of SLAC on different within-nation IRE may explain the more destabilizing effects of SLAC on post-conflict at the subnational level (See Table 9).

Table 9. LATAM Post-Conflict Cases based on SLAC Dimensions

Side A	Side B	Type Of Ire	Type Social ..	Territory Impor..	Type Of Slac	Type Of Slac	
Government of Colombia	CRS	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	ELN	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	ELN, EPL - Megateo, FARC	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	ELN, FARC dissidents	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	EPL	Strong	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	ERG_Colombia	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	ERP_Colombia	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	FARC	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	M-19	Strong	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	MAQL	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	PRT	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	Government of Ecuador	AVC	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*
	Government of El Salvador	ERP_El Salvador	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*
FMLN		Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
FPL		Strong	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
Government of Guatemala	EGP_Guatemala	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	FAR_Guatemala	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	ORPA	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	URNG	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
Government of Mexico	EPR	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	ERPI	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	EZLN	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	FARP_Mexico	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
Government of Nicaragua	FSLN	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
Government of Peru	ELN	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	MIR_Peru	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	
	MRTA	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
	Sendero Luminoso	Strong	High Impact	Non-strategic	SLAC B	*	
Government of Uruguay	MLN/Tupamaros	Weak	Low Impact	Strategic	SLAC A	*	

Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Dyads Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).


Table 9 shows the post-conflict cases emerging from the geo-nested *medium-n* analysis based on the effect of SLAC on Latin American IRE. Fifty-two percent (15 cases) corresponds to internal armed post-conflicts with SLAC A type, whereas forty-eight percent (14 cases) belong to armed conflicts inherits SLAC B on Latin American IRE.

Colombia is the country with the highest number of armed post-conflicts (11 cases) compared to the total cases of Latin America between 1958 and 2020¹. The total Colombian post-conflict cases (including active and war recurrence conflicts in their multiples post-conflict periods) corresponds to 37 percent of the universe of Latin American cases. Additionally, Colombia is also the case with the highest subnational variation on SLAC. Around 63 percent of Colombian’s IRE (7 cases) produced SLAC A during the armed conflict period. On the other hand, Colombian’s IRE inherits SLAC B corresponds to the thirty-seven percent (4 cases). In the same line, Peruvian, Mexican, and Salvadorian’s IRE shows a subnational variation in the type of SLAC but in a lower proportion compared to Colombia.

In contrast, Ecuador, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Guatemala do not show subnational variation on SLAC type. All of them experienced armed conflicts on IRE inheriting exclusively SLAC A or SLACB on subnational IRE. Nevertheless, differences in the type of armed order, the trajectory of armed groups, and civilian support could be significant, particularly in the cases of Guatemala and Nicaragua. In the later, the outcome of the conflict implied high instability levels during post-conflict due to the radical structural changes in the political and economic regime.

On the contrary, SLAC A in Ecuadorian and Uruguayan armed post-conflict favor the achievement of strong APS conditions after military victories of the State and dissolution (low progressive activity) of insurgencies. Graphic 16 unpack the distribution of internal armed post-conflicts clustering for SLAC A and SLAC B types of post-conflict Dyads. Side A corresponds to the governing party and Side B to the armed insurgent group.

Graphic 16 Post-conflict Cases by Country and Type of SLAC




Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Dyads Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander,2013).

¹ For coding the SLAC dimensions I updated UCDP/PRIO and Geo-nested UCDP Data sets including active conflicts and Recurrence of war post-conflicts. My medium-n analysis take into account this additional cases for selecting final post-conflict cases for the SNA step.

Graph 16 shows the variation across within and between subnational armed orders of Latin America in the total post-conflict cases. SLAC A post-conflict cases include majorly armed groups with fragmented and vanguard characteristics, as seen in Graphic 6. Insurgent armed groups such as AVC (Ecuador) CRS, M-19, and ELN (Colombia); share similar properties to inherits SLAC A on Latin American IRE. Likewise, ERG and ERP (Colombia), ERPI, and FARP (Mexico), as well as MIR (Peru), are similar armed groups belonging to SLAC A in different countries. On the contrary, EGP (Guatemala), FSLN (Nicaragua), FARC-EP (Colombia), and PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Peru), among others, belong to the Integrated and Parochial insurgencies with the similar condition to provide SLAC B. The above clustering strategy offers additional criteria for selecting the most similar and most different cases within and between subnational units in the *small-n* step.

Graphic 17. LATAM Armed Post-conflict Stability Levels



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Dyads Data (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Sundberg & Melander

Having empirically tested my SLAC priors, Graphic 17 shows the APS levels triggered by the SLAC on Latin American IRE cases of the medium-n step. As mentioned in Section 2.3, I designed a dependent variable for stabilization base on an aggregation rule that distinguishes levels of stability in the post-conflict: Weak, Fragile, Recurrent, and Strong APS. I coded the type of APS according to the presence or absence of necessary conditions for increasing APS levels.


The results are consistent with the previous test on SLAC and its correlation with the types of Latin American IRE (See Graphics 4 & 6), type of armed groups (See graphics 3 & 11), and end of the conflict strategies (See Graphic 7). The columns one and two in Graphic 17 shows the Side A (State’s government) and Side B (Insurgent armed group) post-conflict parties. The third and fourth columns indicate the type of SLAC and the type of armed order IRE. Finally, the last column shows the APS level corresponding to each armed post-conflict case based on the APS conditions achieved

Excluding active armed conflicts in the post-conflict period, the *medium-n* analysis identifies variation in the APS level based on the effect of SLAC. Weak APS cluster represents thirty-

five percent of total cases (8 cases), followed by Fragile APS (11 cases) with forty-seven percent. Recurrent APS (2 cases) and Strong APS (2 cases) represents each one the nine percent of total cases.

According to this, after insurgency violence, the Latin America post-conflict IRE achieved stabilization; that is the conditions necessary to intervene in the subnational legacies of armed conflict. Nevertheless, in a high proportion, stabilization after the armed conflict is weak or fragile. Hence, my interest in exploring the variation in the dynamics of the stabilization’s mechanism. Tracing the pathways to post-conflict in the *small-n* step may offer insights about the in-depth reason for the variation in subnational APS levels.

Graphic 18. Medium-n LATAM APS Cases




Source: Own elaboration

Finally, Graphic 18 shows the diverse post-conflict cases that emerged from the *medium-n* step of my research design. In the *small-n* analysis step, as I have mentioned, I deliberate selected cases to capture the full specter of variation of APS dependent variable as suggested by the geo-nested analysis (See figure 17 on Section 2.3).

Using geo-references techniques in my *small-n* step, I can show the territorial distribution of IRE inside and across the armed post-conflict cases of Latin America. Maps 1 to 3 show a general overview of post-conflict cases that emerged from the *medium-n* step. At the same time, the geo-reference technique allowed me to select the post-conflict subnational units for the *small-n* step. Thus, well in line with Harbers and Ingram (2017), post-conflict cases chosen for the *small-n* analysis are embedded in the Latin America Armed conflicts included in the geo-nested *medium-n* step.


Map 1. Geo-reference LATAM Post-conflict Cases and Type of SLAC




Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Sundberg & Melander, 2013)

Map 2. Geo-referenced LATAM Post-conflict Cases and Types of IRE

Post-conflict Cases by Type of IRE and SLAC



Post-conflict Cases by Type of IRE



Source: Own elaboration based on UCDP Data (Sundberg & Melander, 2013)

Tables 10 and 11 summarize the subnational cases selected for the *small-n step* implemented in my comparative evidence chapters (See also Table 7 in Section 2.3).

Table 10. Subnational Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) Cases (Small-n step)

Basic Core	Dependent Variable	Components				Territorial Dependency	Subnational units (IRE)
	Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS)	C1	C2	C3	C4		
Secondary Categories (Values)	Weak APS (High Instability)	C1				Top-Down (Non-Territorial)	COLOMBIA SouthWest Region (Nariño-Putumayo)
	Fragile APS (Low Instability)	C1	C2			Top-Down (Non-Territorial)	PERU VRAEM Region (Apurimac, Huancavelica, Ayacucho)
	Recurrent APS (Low Stability)	C1	C2	C3		Bottom-Up (Territorial)	COLOMBIA East Antioquia Region
	Strong APS (High Stability)	C1	C2	C3	C4	Bottom-Up (Territorial)	ECUADOR Planification Zone 1 (Esmeraldas-Carchi-Sucumbios)

Source: Own elaboration based on Collier & Mahon (1993)

Table 11. Diverse Cases Selection Strategy (Small-n Step)

ARMED POST-CONFLICT		
	STABLE HIGH (Sequential Bottom-Up) <i>TD: Border</i>	STABLE LOW (Sequential Bottom Up) <i>TD: Center</i>
SLAC A	ECUADOR Planning Zone 1 (Esmeraldas-Carchi-Sucumbios)	COLOMBIA East Antioquia Region
SLAC B	COLOMBIA SouthWest Region (Nariño)	PERU VRAEM Region (Apurimac, Huancavelica, Ayacucho)
	UNSTABLE HIGH (Non-Sequential Top Down) Top Down)	UNSTABLE LOW (Non-Sequential Top Down) Top Down)
ARMED POST-CONFLICT		

Source: Own Elaboration based on Gerring (2007)

*TD= Territorial Dependency

ECUADOR

Planning Zone 1

(Esmeraldas-Carchi-Sucumbios)

Outcome: Stable High (Sequential Bottom-Up 3E Vector of Transmission)

Subnational Units selected:

- a. IRE *Border areas*: Origin of the Insurgent armed groups-Relationship with Colombian guerrillas and subsequent post-conflict political activity: Cantón Esmeraldas (Province of Esmeraldas).
- b. IRE *Center Areas*: Social mobilization and post-Alfarista non-armed activity: Cantón Quito (Quito Metropolitan District).

COLOMBIA

East Antioquia Region

Outcome: Stable Low (Sequential Bottom-Up 3E Vectors of Transmission)

Subnational Units selected:

- a. IRE *Center Area*: Strategic development areas with higher levels of civilian resistance and social leadership: East Antioquia Region (Department of Antioquia)

PERU

VRAEM Region

Outcome: Unstable Low (Non-Sequential Top-Down 3E Vector of Transmission)

Subnational Units selected:

- a. IRE *Area*: Rural area of high activity and guerrilla concentration: Provinces of Ayacucho
- b. IRE *Area*: War recurrence areas, Civilian post-conflict social mobilization: Apurimac and Huancavelica provinces

COLOMBIA

Southwest Region (Nariño-Putumayo)

Outcome: Unstable High (Non-Sequential Top-Down 3E Vector of Transmission)

Subnational Units selected:

- a. IRE *Border areas*: Conflict Zones with lower levels of strategic importance and high impact on social leadership: Nariño-Putumayo (South-West Colombian Region)

Chapter 3

Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) in Colombian Regions of Exception

On June 14, 1964, the so-called *Republic of Marquetalia*² was bombed by the Colombian army to put an end to what would be the longest-lived armed insurgent group in the history of the insurgency: the FARC-EP (Aguilera, 2010; 2014; Pécaut, 2008). *Marquetalia* represents the founding myth of the Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) in Colombia. At the same time, it was the first insurgent governance enclave in the Colombian armed conflict history.

Marquetalia is also the emblematic case of an IRE with strategic rearguard functions (Pizarro, 2021) during the beginning of the Colombian armed conflict. As of the founding of this insurgent governance enclave, the Colombian armed conflict experienced a vertiginous escalation that led to the rapid expansion of the guerrillas throughout most Colombian territory. With it, the IRE also proliferated within the nation in a clear sample of the territorial dispute over the population's armed, political, and economic control (Villamizar, 2017; CHCV, 2017).

In response, Colombian governments fluctuated between the alternatives of making peace or making war. This bipolarity in the way of facing the armed conflict, in turn, created a climate of polarization in public opinion in which civil mandates for peace coexisted with massive demonstrations in favor of a total war against the insurgency. On this path, then, the long cycles of negotiations with the insurgency (1981 to 2017) and military operations alternated between ending the war unilaterally.

After the signing of the *Teatro Colón* peace agreement in 2017 between the State and the FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas, the conclusions point to a recurrent peace scenario where the weak and partial post-conflict coexists. This conclusion is obtained after analyzing the subnational variation of post-conflict stabilization in most Colombian territory but, particularly, in two emblematic regions of the center and the Colombian periphery with opposite strategic values: *The Eastern of Antioquia* and the *Colombian Southwest*.

These two territories of Colombia represent the contrast of the legacies of violence in the post-armed conflict. On the one hand, the border territory of Nariño (Colombian southwest) illustrates the weight of the military action of the State to restore State Enforcement power, but, at the same time, its partial effects when the state presence is focused on the military presence and not on social Empowerment. In terms of the 3E mechanism, when the military intervention of violence's legacies limits the transmission of stability going from Empowerment to citizens' Entitlement, their territories, and their local political institutions.

On the other hand, the Eastern Antioquia territory represents how the State enforcement power can operate in the face of the transmission of post-conflict stability for local citizens' Empowerment. In this region, the post-conflict stabilization mechanism set in motion

² Insurgent territory located in the town of Gaitanía (department of Tolima, Central-west Colombia)

through the State's armed control found in the inheritance of civic movements and the resistance of citizens against armed actors a key vector for stabilization. However, the conditions for the APS's consolidation are at risk when the Entitlement actions are weakly supported or are carried out in a scenario lacking State prioritization. Likewise, when the risks of war regression in neighboring territories represent a menace in the emergence of new IRE.


In 2017, the southern border of Colombia with Ecuador saw how the dissident front of the FARC-EP Oliver Sinisterra was born, led by the guerrilla of Ecuadorian origin Walter Patricio Arízala Vernaza, Alias "Guacho." Meanwhile, from an unknown Colombian peripheral territory, a new dissident faction of the same ex-guerrilla led by peace negotiators Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich, and Hernán Velásquez ("El Paisa"), announced the renewal of the war against the Colombian State through the "Second Marquetalia - FARC-EP" guerrilla. Fifty years later, the Insurgent Region of Exception of Marquetalia intends to be reborn inside that I call a new *Colombian recurrent post-conflict scenario*.

In this chapter, I present the empirical evidence for the hypothesis testing of the 3E mechanism and APS levels in Colombia's subnational cases. Section 3.1 presents a general overview of Colombia's internal armed conflict focused on its origins, causes, and actors. At the same time, it describes the last long-cycle of peace agreements and negotiation (1981-2017) between the Colombian State and the insurgencies for achieving the Armed Post-conflict Stability.

Section 3.2 focuses on the subnational units selected for the 3E mechanism testing and APS process tracing. I selected the cases of Eastern of Antioquia and Southwest of Nariño based on the variation of the SLAC variable and the outcome of my *small-n* geo-nested analysis research design (Harbers & Ingram, 2017). This section aims to compare the variation in the SLAC dynamic in the subnational units selected for the within-comparison (Sellers, 2019) of Colombian IRE.


Section 3.3 unpacks the dynamic of the sequential 3E mechanism and its effect on the conditions for achieving the APS levels observed in the Colombia subnational units of my within-nation comparison. Figures 15 and 16 summarize the APS outcome of the Colombian East Antioquia and the Southwest regions traced in the Section 3.3.

Figure 15. Colombia - East Antioquia Region APS Causal Mechanism



Source: Own Elaboration based on Beach and Pedersen (2013).

Figure 16. Colombia - Southwest Region APS Causal Mechanism



Source: Own Elaboration based on Beach and Pedersen (2013)

3.1. Colombia: A Recurrent Armed Post-conflict setting

3.1.1 Colombian internal armed conflict

Concerning the Colombian armed conflict there are several approaches to the timing and historical phases of internal war. On the one hand, González, et al. (2001) and Berry (2002) locates the origins of civil conflict in the agrarian development issues of 1946. On the other hand, scholars such as Giraldo (2015), Gutierrez Sanín (2015), and Torrijos (2015) consider that the origin of internal armed conflict lies in the partisan conflict between *Liberales* and *Conservadores* during the *Frente Nacional* experience³. Thus, the origin of the internal war according to the latter approach was around 1964.

Nevertheless, to conciliate the different approaches about the history of insurgent war, the *Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas - CHCV* (2015)⁴ establishes two historical moments of violence in the case of Colombian internal armed conflict: The earlier violence (1946-1964) and the contemporary violence period (1964-65 until today).

The early violence (1946-1964) was a stage of the armed conflict characterized by a type of “social war” between factions of opposed state development projects. At the core of this stage, there is a big ideological and political antagonism between big and small property agrarian development models for the country. The contemporary violence period includes the agrarian problems inherited from the era of *La Violencia*, as well as the political conflict between liberal and conservative party elites and social sectors excluded from power. In this sense, internal events such as the formation of the *Frente Nacional* pact elites and external events such as the emergence of the Latin American guerrillas, after the Cuban revolution, became the germ of the contemporary Colombian armed conflict (Giraldo, 2015).

Thus, the origin of the insurgent armed groups in Colombia precedes the beginning of the contemporary integrated guerrilla cycle in Latin America and the Caribbean (Villamizar, 2017). The assassination of the liberal caudillo Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in 1948 became the main cause of the emergence of armed factions of liberal origin and, later, of communist ideology that confronted the State for taking power through an armed revolution (Pécaut, 2006; Palacios, 2003)

With the armed triumph of the Castro guerrilla in Cuba, the communist-inspired Colombian guerrillas such as the FARC-EP, the ELN, and the EPL would strengthen their warfare by launching their founding manifestos and applying guerrilla warfare tactics sporadically given their limited military capacity (Reyes, 2013; Villamizar, 2017). At the beginning of the 70s of the twentieth century, the rural war initiated by the peasant insurgency was complemented

³ The Frente Nacional (1958-1974) was a national pact of liberal and conservative elites for ending the partisan war experienced during La Violencia period. The agreement consisted of alternating the executive power for periods of four years between the two hegemonic Colombian political parties.

⁴ The Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas (CHCV) was created by la Mesa de Paz in the frame of “Acuerdo general para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera”, subscribed by the Colombian National Government and the FARC Insurgency on August 26th of 2012. The main objective of CHCV was to prepare an official report to contribute to the understanding of the Colombian armed conflict

by the formation of urban and avant-garde guerrillas such as the M-19. The latter was very similar to the National Liberation Alliance, Los Tupamaros, the ERP, or Alfaro Vive, Carajo! insurgencies in countries like Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, or Ecuador.

Beyond the differences with the urban anti-dictatorial guerrillas of the Latin American region or the rural ethnic insurgencies of Africa or Southeast Asia (Slater, 2010), the first cycle of insurgencies in Colombia showed a fast-armed rural and urban expansion throughout the Colombian territory. The mix of rural and urban armed insurgency since the beginning of the Colombian conflict is a critical factor in understanding the intensity of the war and the type of inheritances and legacies of violence (SLAC) from the origins of the armed conflict to the most recent post-conflict events.

In 1979, a second cycle of armed insurgency began in Colombia (Villamizar, 2017, Calderón Rojas, 2016). A new victory for the Central American armed insurgency, this time in Nicaragua, and the guerrilla consolidation in El Salvador and Guatemala fueled the Colombian FARC-EP, ELN, EPL, and M-19 strategic objectives. At the same time, it motivated the emergence of new insurgent expressions such as the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL), the PRT, and the FRF. In Appendix 2, I summarized the most recent list of guerrilla organizations in Colombia, as well as the main paramilitary groups that have been part of the Colombian armed conflict (Villamizar, 2017; Observatorio de Paz y Conflicto, 2016; Cedema, 2021; MOE-CERAC, 2016; Arjona, 2017).

For Villamizar (2017), the gradual outbreak and insurgent expansion of the second Colombian guerrilla cycle is crucial for understanding the subnational insurgency's political and military positions and its unequal and differentiated armed political demands. The latter characteristic would identify, among others, the Colombian armed conflict concerning the rest of the armed struggles of the American continent (Franco, 2012; Villamizar, 2017: 27). Additionally, this differential factor signed the guerrillas' war against the Colombian State and the so-called conflict among rebels (Pischedda, 2020); that is, armed dissidents, insurgent factions and paramilitaries confrontations (See sections 3.2 and 3.3).

For the 80s of the twentieth century, the common objective of the Colombian insurgencies fluctuated between, on the one hand, the search for guerrilla unity in rural and urban national spaces (CNMH, 2017) such as the *Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera* (CNG) and an international one as the so-called *Batallón América* where converged insurgents from cross-border countries such as Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia (Aguilera, 2013); on the other hand, the negotiation with the Colombian State as an agreed solution to the internal armed conflict (Villamizar, 2017).

However, the attempts at insurgent unity were “relatively unsuccessful” (Int.13). Even when the purpose of the guerrillas was to organize to negotiate peace (Valencia, 2019) with the governments of Belisario Betancur (1982-1996) and Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) the trend towards insurgent fragmentation became stronger. In the first years of the 90s. the beginning of a period of successive peace negotiation processes led to the demobilization of several so-called second-generation guerrillas (M-19, MAQL, among others).

Consequently, the guerrillas of an integrated nature such as the FARC-EP and the ELN, will oversee the objectives of armed revolution by increasing their armed actions against the State,

the military recruitment and the incorporation of factions and armed dissidents of the demobilized guerrillas (Palacios, 2003; Pécaut, 2008). Simultaneously, the Colombian State was strengthening and modernizing its national army to combat insurgencies (Pizarro, 2021) despite previously established peace agreements and late or partial compliance with the agreement (Villamizar, 2017).

Likewise, in the case of Colombia, the State's role in the face of the war was not only reduced to the legitimate monopoly of force and the defense of the nation. Since the origins of bipartisan violence, elite national and subnational politics linked to State institutions have been identified as direct and indirect actors in the war by financing private armies for defense, expansion, and consolidation of your property (Zelik, 2015; López, 2017)

In the same line, the complaints imposed by national and international organizations (Otero, 2010) regarding the links between the Colombian State institutions with paramilitary and illegal groups led to the progressive dismantling of intelligence organizations (i.e., F2, DAS). The latter became strategic allies of counterinsurgent groups and warlords identified as generators of violence and committing multiple human rights violations during the internal war (Grajales, 2017; Zelik, 2016).

By the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 21st century, Colombia was already facing one of its historical periods of greatest escalation of insurgent violence. During this period, the number of militias and urban guerrilla fronts increased as well as related phenomena of criminal violence such as drug trafficking and paramilitarism (CNMH, 2017). Similarly, the strongest Colombian guerrillas (FARC-EP, ELN) carried out important anchoring and territorial consolidation actions (Ávila, 2019; Villamizar, 2017) that allowed them to expand their social bases despite the constant military persecution by the State and the counterinsurgency strategy including paramilitary groups such as the *Autodefensas Unidas Campesinas* (Ávila, 2019).

In turn, the guerrilla offensive would begin to be confronted with the implementation of foreign military intervention, particularly by the United States in the general framework of war against drug trafficking and terrorism (Otero, 2010). In that sense, the strategy of guerrillas such as the FARC-EP would be oriented again towards the negotiation of peace, being the scene of the Caguán dialogues (1999-2002)⁵ a critical juncture to create a liberated zone where: “They materialized new political and military structures and make a qualitative leap towards international scenarios” (Villamizar, 2017: 27).

In short, for the first years of the 20th century, the Colombian armed conflict was based on a strategy where negotiating peace was “the best way” to sustain the war. Thus, the Colombian political history and the history of the internal armed conflict converge in a long and complex process of state-building in which ideologies (Gutierrez & Wood, 2014), economic models, and local national projects (Soifer, 2015) constitute the scene of a political contest with

⁵ The Caguán dialogues were the episode of peace negotiation from 1999 to 2002 between the FARC-EP and President Andrés Pastrana's government. This negotiation's main characteristic was the creation of a military demilitarized zone in the Caguán region (Colombia) where the peace negotiations with this insurgent group would take place. The military clearing of this area ended in 2002 when the President of the Republic publicly announced the peace talks' ending with the FARC-EP.

differentiated legacies and impacts inside the territory. Hence, my claim about how the reissue of violence and the insurgents' rearmament is one of its most significant shortcomings the Colombian recurrent post-conflict scenario.

After the failed Caguán negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, the armed regression towards a new period of insurgent violence would be strongly responded to by the security policies created by the Colombian government of Álvaro Uribe Velez in a strong articulation with the United States government (Otero, 2010). Decreasing the peace processes with the insurgencies and increasing the combatants' voluntary demobilization and bombardment *Insurgent Regions of Exception* (IRE) enclaves bears witness to this.

For this new period of insurgency fighting, the complaints about State government's participation in crimes against humanity, State crimes, displacement, and forced disappearance of the population in war zones increased the dynamics of violence (GMH, 2013). Simultaneously, the government's security policies aimed to increase military combat and bombardment of the zones of guerrilla presence and rebel governance closing the door to new scenarios of dialogue and peace negotiation (Valencia, 2019).

For the years 2016/17, the Colombian insurgencies' cycle seems to end with signing the Teatro Colón peace agreement between the FARC-EP and the Colombian Government. In the case of the FARC-EP guerrilla, Villamizar (2017) states:

The date of June 23, 2016 will remain as the day on which the most solid and oldest group agreed with the Government the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and hostilities and the laying down of their weapons and began the process of reincorporation to life civic and transformation into a political party or movement. There was no other guerrilla that lasted such a long time, nor that achieved sustained growth and such a high number of combatants; Nor an organization that would achieve the rural and urban operations of the FARC-EP [...] We Colombians came from that war and that conflict, but towards what peace are we going? (Villamizar, 2017: 28)

Regarding that issue, the advances in the transitional justice processes by post-conflict institutions such as the *Justicia Especial Para la Paz* (JEP) opened paths for judicializing members of military forces, leaders and middle managers of the demobilized guerrillas accused of crimes against civilians. At the same time, this court's actions for transitional justice have been fundamental to clarify the Colombian State' and its links with illegal groups to combat the insurgency throughout the internal armed conflict.

The specific case of extrajudicial executions of the civilian population (in Spanish “Falsos Positivos”) by members of the Colombian army, in association with paramilitaries and local actors in the war zones (JEP, False Positive Report February 2021) constitutes one of the emblematic cases for identifying the responsibilities of the Colombian State as an agent that also promotes violence in the internal armed conflict.

However, the panorama of insurgent and paramilitary violence after the 2016 (Havana) and 2017 (Teatro Colón peace agreement) negotiations has varied. At least two factors are crucial for this variance in the post-conflict outcome: The level of the subnational peace accords implementation (Kroc Institute, 2020) and the emergence of new armed dissident factions

and focalized armed conflicts (FIP, 2018a; Indepaz, 2018; Salas, et.al. 2018) in areas where the Colombian State is precarious after the guerrillas abandoned their IRE.

3.1.2 Recurrent armed post-conflicts: Between Total war and Peace agreement processes

As mentioned above, the rapid expansion and consolidation of the Colombian guerrillas during the most intense years of the conflict had an additional objective pointing to seeking dialogues with the Colombian State to negotiate a solution to the armed conflict. In that order of ideas, the period analyzed here (1981-2019) became the one with the highest armed confrontation between the State, the insurgencies, and related extra-systemic actors (Echandía, 2006). Additionally, it has the highest number of negotiations and dialogues between armed actors and the State to sign peace agreements (García-Durán, 2004; Echandía, 2013; Valencia, 2019).

This bipolarity between *making war* and *negotiating peace* is the background, maybe the most remarkable singularity, of the Colombian armed conflict since its beginning. Hence, my claim about a recurrent APS level in Colombia bases on this mixture of stable and unstable subnational scenarios of armed post-conflict that limits achieving strong stability. In the same line, Giraldo (2015) states: “[Since the Amnesty Law] in the country, both war and peace have been waged” (Page 37).

Valencia (2019) argues that Colombia has a long record of peace processes since its constitution as a republic (Page 45). The last and the more intensive cycle of peace process started in 1980 when the president of the Republic proposed to the National Congress to create an Amnesty law (Law 37 of 1981) and the first peace commission in charge of negotiating the ceasefire with the internal insurgent actors (Valencia, 2019:45).

As a result, the most recent peace negotiation cycle in Colombia (See Appendix 3) comprehends a total of fifty-four historical transactions to achieve the end of the conflict (Valencia, 2019). Of these, thirty-three are formally established negotiations to reach the signing of a peace agreement. Simultaneously, twenty-one transactions classify as "Upcoming Meetings" led to the beginning of a negotiation process or failed in their attempt to reach a peace agreement.

Additionally, the last cycle of peace can be divided into several transaction periods based on the actors and the internal armed conflict dynamics. Valencia (2019) considers at least four periods of transaction of peace between 1980 and 2017, called by the author “periods of political uncertainty” (Page 50). In what follows, I identify the main initiatives for the subnational implementation of the agreements reached in the peace negotiations and the failed or successful upcoming meetings.

Period no. 1: Amnesty law and “Mano tendida y Pulso firme” Policies (1980-1987)

Between 1980 and 1987 the president Julio César Turbay promoted an Amnesty law (Law 37 of 1981) oriented to reduce the internal armed conflict intensity. Additionally, the government of Turbay created the first peace commission (Decree 2761 of October 8, 1981) composed of civilians and militaries to propose legal alternatives for the demobilization and reintegration of illegal armed actors (Valencia, 2019; Villamizar, 1997)

The success of these strategies for the end of the conflict was minimal. However, the first peace commission's most remarkable goal was to put the issue of peace on the country's public agenda and mobilize citizenship around the importance of a negotiated peace path (Valencia, 2019). Likewise, the main objective for achieving the post-conflict was to attack the called by the government “objective and subjective” causes of the war through new policies and social programs.

The Betancur’s Amnesty Law also included economic benefits and social programs for the economic recovery of the territories affected by the violence and the social reintegration of the insurgents benefited by the amnesty (Villarraga, 2015). Despite this, the efforts for making peace in the subnational territories of war failed. In November 1985, the M-19 attacked The Palace of Justice -The highest symbol of Colombian justice institutions-creating a new inflection point in the armed conflict dynamic and evidencing the need for a new moment of peace policies with the insurgencies.

The government of President Virgilio Barco assumed the challenges of this new period of peace transactions. His administration divided the efforts for peace into two powerful strategies: A social dialogue in the first years of his government (1986-1988) and a dialogue with the insurgencies (since 1990). For Barco, social policies were essential for making peace. Still, his critics of the State's levels of governance and presence in the previous governments oriented his new strategy based on a mix of dialogue and enforcement. This new strategy was called “*Mano tendida y pulso firme*” (Arenas, 1990; Villarraga, 2015; Valencia 2019)

Thus, the government intensified its efforts to enforce the state rule in rebel governance territories. At the same time, it diminishes the role of the direct negotiation with the insurgency (Nieto & Robledo, 2001) and promotes the community's confidence in the State's capacities. In short, the grand conclusion for this first period of peace transactions was the government's strategy for increasing the economic, political, and civilian support to the State (García, 1992) as well as delegitimizing the substitutive power of the insurgency (López, 2016).

Period no. 2: “Iniciativas para la Paz” and Negotiated Peace for a new Political Constitution (1988-1993)

The armed fortification of the insurgencies and the emergence of new illegal and contra insurgent actors as the paramilitaries increased violence in the territories of internal war. The political triumph of left parties in rural and urban zones, together with the communities' compliance in their political programs, was assumed by the paramilitaries as a nuclear reason for increasing the massacres, forced displacement, and population punishment in strong and weak IRE. For this period, the internal armed conflict dynamic also involved increasing crimes against humanity related to the kidnapping, murder of political leaders and presidential candidates (GMH, 2013).

Consequently, President Barco launched in 1988 a new initiative for peace based on the dialogue with the insurgencies and the diminish of practices as kidnapping and crimes of war.

This new strategy was called *Iniciativa para la Paz* (García-Durán, 2004; Valencia, 2019) and was oriented by the *Comisión para la Reconciliación, Normalización y Rehabilitación* (CRNR). In contrast with the previous efforts for peace negotiation, the *Iniciativa para la Paz* allowed the Barco and, subsequently, the Cesar Gaviria's governments to achieve peace with vanguard and fragmented armed insurgencies such as M-19, EPL, PRT, MAQL, and CRS. In this way, the second period of the peace negotiations constitutes the historical context for the first armed post-conflict scenario in Colombia.

Despite the achievements in the peace negotiation promoted by Virgilio Barco and César Gaviria's governments, the beginning of the 90s was characterized by a new escalation of multiple insurgents, paramilitary, and mafia violence types (Int.12). The assassination of presidential political candidates such as Jaime Pardo in 1987, Luis Carlos Galán in 1989, Bernardo Jaramillo, and Carlos Pizarro in 1990 (demobilized from the M-19 insurgency) was a significant sign of a new failure in the process of making peace in Colombia.

This political crisis scenario brought with it the creation of a National Constituent Assembly. The 1991 constitutional framework would bring new tools for political decentralization and territorial autonomy to strengthen peace agreements with a subnational focus in the upcoming peace negotiations. By 1994, the government of César Gaviria reoriented the *Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación* (PNR), expanding the number and selection strategy of municipalities that made up the peace policy of his administration. However, the government's political decisions, as well as the implementation of economic reforms of "more market and less state" (Int.10) weakened the PNR and left on paper their promises of peace in the territories of the war (Valencia, 2019; López, 2016).

In this sense, more than the Gaviria government, the new constitutional framework of 1991 was the most significant factor concerning the peace agreements signed between 1990 and 1994 and the "upcoming meetings" with the CGSB in 1989 and 1991 (See Appendix 3). In conclusion, even though the transactions carried out by the Barco and Gaviria governments included a component for the construction of territorial peace, these ones concentrated more than anything on national strategies to make peace. Strategies directed by the executive power and its delegated national institutions reduced the participation of subnational leaders, social actors, and political leaders who experienced the armed conflict in insurgent governance territories.

Period no. 3: From "Diálogo Útil" to Plan Colombia (1994-2002)

This new peace negotiation period in Colombia occurs at a moment of intensification of the armed conflict characterized by the increase in kidnappings, attacks against public infrastructure, and combats between the guerrillas and the army (Valencia, 2019). Similarly, it coincides with the election in 1994 of Ernesto Samper as President of the Republic. His negotiation strategy with the insurgencies called "*Diálogo Útil*" (Int.13), once again prioritized the objectives of a nationally negotiated peace, with international oversight and support, and open to the participation of multiple civil society sectors different to those social sectors most affected in the territories of insurgent governance.

To the changes in the internal policy of negotiation with the insurgency and intervention of the victims throughout the Colombian territory, the government added the so-called *Plan*

Colombia that sought the United States of North America's support for the eradication of illicit crops (Otero, 2010). However, this mixture of the fight against the insurgency and the narco-terrorism over time became: “One more ingredient in the internal war with the insurgencies that saw in the United States support an additional reason to strengthen their interests in taking power by way of an armed revolution” (Int.10).

The Samper's government culminated with creating a new Peace Exploration Commission and the launch of the so-called *Mandato Civil por la Paz* (García-Peña, 2009). The latter was a plebiscitary process that mobilized most of the Colombian population to the polls to demand a State's policy for the negotiated solution to the armed conflict (Valencia, 2019; García-Peña, 2009).

In the hands of the new President of the Republic Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), the second part of this period of peace negotiations could not be more discouraging. Although the Pastrana administration managed to negotiate with the FARC-EP guerrillas in 1999, the result would be nothing other than a resounding failure. Pastrana's government changed the subnational focus of peace negotiation with rebels and victims for a nationally oriented antiterrorism policy called *El Plan Colombia*.

At the subnational level, this Plan Colombia represented an additional ingredient for the conflict's intensification rather than an alternative for territorial peace. For López (2016), *Plan Colombia* took up previous governments' ideas about the importance of focused attention in armed conflict areas. However, López (2016) states: “The approach would not be made in areas with an insurgent presence, but in areas with high interference from illicit crops” (p. 236). In this way, *Plan Colombia* transformed the objectives of higher State's capacities and social attention in the war's sub-national territories into a policy of armed defense of the State against narco-terrorism. In sum, the State's peace policies became new policies for making war.

Period no. 4: From anti-terrorist Security Policies to Territorial Peace efforts (2003-2017)

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe Velez was elected as president of the republic after an intense electoral campaign under the slogan of a firm hand and total war against the guerrillas, whom he blamed for the problems related to terrorism and drug trafficking in Colombia (Valencia, 2019). With Álvaro Uribe's arrival to the presidency, the national government's peace policies became national security policies. Likewise, operations and military actions were replaced by the peace processes aimed at reestablishing the State Enforcement Power weakened by the insurgency in its insurgent governance enclaves.

The main policy for fighting the guerrillas in the Uribe government was its democratic security policy (Ints. 10, 13). The national government managed to increase the national force for armed combat against the guerrillas with the US support in territories and insurgent hegemony areas (Otero, 2010). However, the social and political effects of the intensification of the war in the subnational context: “Greatly affected the civilian population victim of armed violence on both sides” (Int.12).

The increase in forced displacement, the expansion of paramilitary groups, the failures in the process of voluntary demobilization of the insurgents, the increase in the number of

massacres of the civilian population, the planting of antipersonnel mines, the complaints of forced disappearances, and State crimes; among many additional factors, they made this partial victory of the State against the insurgency a true *war against society* (Pecaut, 2001) in the territories, municipalities and zones of armed conflict.

The guerrillas' response to this attack by the State was to change their strategy of armed struggle and subnational anchoring. This strategy implied them retreating to the border areas where their strategic corridors served as a rearguard in the face of intensifying the bombing of their camps (Pizarro, 2021; Ávila, 2019). Likewise, their armed actions focused on stronger insurgent control territories and alternated with attacks on the Colombian army's contingents and troops as a pressure mechanism for negotiation. Even so, the democratic security policy continued to be based on the State's military defense and the conviction that the internal war was the solution to decades of insurgent threat.

In 2006, and after a constitutional reform promoted by the government itself that allowed the president's immediate reelection, Álvaro Uribe was reelected as president of the Republic. In this way, its democratic security policy became more robust, and the military intervention in the IRE increased through its consolidation policy of subnational Rehabilitation Zones (Vargas, 2013), from which the Colombian government pretends (See Appendix 3) to recover the territories controlled by the guerrillas (Cardona, 2013; López, 2016).

In summary, the two periods of Álvaro Uribe's government lacked an explicit peace policy; that is, a policy formulated around recognizing the armed conflict and the existence of its socio-political causes (Valencia, 2019: 121). In contrast, the democratic security policy prevailed over any other type of peace policy, focusing on the demobilization of paramilitary structures and open military combat against the guerrillas (López, 2016; Villarraga, 2015; Ríos & Zapata, 2019). In terms of our research, the democratic security policy focused exclusively on the armed Enforcement mechanism.

With the presidential election of Juan Manuel Santos, in 2010, the democratic security policy seemed to achieve the continuity sought by former president Álvaro Uribe. However, a surprising twist in how Santos dealt with the guerrillas allowed the installation of a new peace-building scenario that would culminate with the Teatro Colon peace agreements in 2017. Notwithstanding the progress in this new institutional and legal period for peace, the armed combats with the FARC-EP guerrillas continued, as well as the refusal of the Santos government to decree liberated or demilitarized zones (Jaramillo, 2014).

This new path towards negotiated peace began with the Santos government's first approaches with the FARC-EP guerrillas during the years 2011 and 2012. His most significant action was acknowledging the armed conflict and the *Victims and Land Restitution Law's* presidential sanction that was partially dismantling the Uribe's democratic security policy (Valencia, 2019). Likewise, the Santos government's peace agenda sought international support from the United States and neighboring countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador, with which international relations had widely deteriorated.

The creation of a legal framework for peace, later known as the *Justicia Especial para la Paz* (JEP), became another of the Santos government's objectives to consolidate the negotiations

and the subsequent implementation of the agreements with the FARC-EP guerrilla. The creation of the JEP represented a notable turn in terms of the Entitlement mechanism dynamics, given the government's interest in promoting a transitional justice process that transcends the amnesty and pardon laws of the previous demobilization processes of the armed actors.

In that order of ideas, six points were designed within the framework of the Santos government peace negotiations (National Government - FARC-EP, 2018), which the Congress approved of the Republic after the plebiscite for the peace of the year 2016 said **NO** to its endorsement (Basset, 2018; Botero, 2017). They contemplate creating initiatives and institutions for the post-conflict after the National Congress approval and the issuance, up to now, of 219 essential norms to implement the final peace agreement (Consejería Presidencial para la Estabilización y la Consolidación, 2021 March 10).

In terms of the impact of these institutions for the Entitlement on the subnational dynamics of the armed conflict, the Santos government's peace process built a negotiation plan that explicitly contemplated a territorial peace approach (Jaramillo, 2014). Thus, in contrast to Grasa (2017) regarding the need to implement a version of the 3R Model (in Spanish *Resolver, Reconstruir y Renconciliar*) for the scope of post-conflict stabilization in Colombia (Page 9), my research identifies how achieving APS in a context of territorial peace (subnational) requires the implementation of a different mechanism. That is, a 3E Mechanism (Enforcement, Empowerment, and Entitlement) through which how the subnational legacies of the armed conflict (SLAC) determine the variation in the levels of APS (See Chapter 2).

Data observations and empirical evidence presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3 show the within-nation comparison of the 3E mechanism in subnational units with variation in the APS outcome. As mentioned above, in the case of Colombia, the alternating cycles of conflict and negotiation (See Appendix 3) allows us to analyze how the transmission sequence of vectors for stability (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) that start from Enforcement towards Entitlement is essential to achieve higher levels of post-conflict stabilization. Chapters 4 and 5 show the same in the between-nation comparison step of my Small-n geo-nested subnational research design.

3.2 Colombian Insurgent regions of Exception (IRE): Same armed conflict, differentiated impacts

In political and administrative terms, Colombia becomes a "country of regions" based on factors such as its cultural diversity (Castro-Gómez, 2008), the historical differences in the territories' ideological and economic vocation (Soifer, 2015), geographies of conflict (Echandía, 1999) and its decentralization processes (Falleti, 2010); that is, a country with multiple realities, institutions and local political practices (García Villegas, 2011).

Law 9 of 1989, Organic Law 388 of 1997, and more recently, Law 1454 of 2011; make up the basic legislation for Colombia's territorial ordering (IGAC, 2020). The technical, administrative, and political guidelines on the land use planning process in Colombia are defined through this legislation and divides the Colombian territory in six geographical regions.

The *Amazonía* is the largest region of the Colombian territory. Its extension includes 42% of the national territory and comprises eight departments located between the east and the south-east. This region includes border territories with countries such as Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador. The conflict had a differentiated set of impacts in this region:

On the one hand, the existence of protected and natural zones has been used for the illegals for financing the war and recruitment; on the other, the frontiers conditions play a crucial role in the face of the existence of strategic corridors for insurgent and illegal groups (Ríos, 2016; Pizarro, 2021; Salas, 2010). Beyond that, they are a kind of rearguard for insurgencies in the face of combat by the State and the search for supporting by states and transboundary subnational administrations (Lee, 2021).

The *Andean* Region comprises the seventeen departments of the central and western-central Colombian territory. In terms of the conflict, this Andean region is the core of insurgent armed strategies to expand and consolidate its objectives of armed revolution (Avila 2019; CNMH, 2011) from peripheries to the State's center.

The *Caribbean* region is in the north of the country and includes nine departments (two of them in the Andean region's limits). During the armed conflict, this region became a vital area of the Colombian counterinsurgent offensive (Avila, 2019), given local elites' interest in financing armed self-defense fronts against extortionate and military actions of the guerrillas. Likewise, insurgency's armed operations focused on this region due to its proximity to the Andean region's economic and political centers.

To the north (San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina) and south of this region (Malpelo), locates the Colombian *insular* region. In contrast with the dynamic of the armed conflict in Colombia's continental platform, it had a low impact in terms of the existence of IRE and legacies of violence. Still, criminal and corruption issues indirectly affect the economy of war and its sub-national dynamics. Finally, the *Orinoquia* and the *Pacific* regions localize in the border areas of eastern and western Colombia, respectively.


In the Colombian Orinoquía, the border with Venezuela has been a critical territory for the advancement and displacement of the Colombian guerrillas given its geographical characteristics and the Colombian's institutional weakness State (Morffe, 2016). Similarly, the border territory of the Orinoquía has traditionally been a strategic corridor for the illegal economy at the service of multiple criminal actors (Ávila, 2012). Historically, they are used this territory as a route for transit to the rest of the countries of the Latin American region.

On the other hand, the Colombian Pacific region is signed by the population's economic poverty, the high rates of violence, and the absence of the State throughout its multiple periods of armed conflict. The dynamics of violence in this region include the guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and drug traffickers in departments such as Chocó and Valle del Cauca (Ávila & Nuñez, 2010) and the territorial control of land and maritime border areas (Ecuador). In there, converge the illicit crops, illegal economies, and the Colombian State's military action against the illegal markets (Agencia Prensa Rural, 2009 December 1).

Map 3 illustrates the IRE number in Colombia following the Georeferenced Event Dataset from UCDP and internal armed conflict Colombian databases (Observatorio de Paz y

Conflicto; Cedema; MOE-CERAC; RNI – Unidad de Víctimas Colombia; DNP Data; SIEVCAC; Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto). For the Geo-referenced of IRE, my research selects subnational units of Colombia with the four types of insurgencies (Staniland, 2017) and SLAC identified in the geo-nested *medium-n* step of my research design.

Map 3. Colombian geo-referenced IRE




Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Map 3 shows the geo-referenced distribution of IRE in Colombia and the armed groups with a more significant presence within them. Based on the characteristics of these types of insurgent governance enclaves (See section 2.2), my research identifies a strong convergence of different kinds of insurgent armed groups in most of the subnational units impacted by the armed conflict. In line with our general hypothesis, this coincidence of insurgent armed groups in the territory explains not only the complexity of the multiple legacies of armed violence in the war territories (SLAC) but also its effects on the recurrence of the conflict and its differential levels Armed post-conflict Stability (APS).

The map evidences the coexistence of integrated guerrillas as FARC and ELN in geographic regions such as Andina and the Caribbean characterized by strategic economic, geographic and political variable conditions. In these subnational units, integrated and parochial groups with higher levels of rebel governance correlate with the Strong IRE proliferation.

Likewise, my research traces the existence of parochial and fragmented armed groups such as EPL and FARC-EP Dissidents in subnational units from Orinoquia, Pacific, and Andina regions. Even though parochial and vanguard armed organizations are less than the armed groups of the integrated type, their strategic distribution in borders and peripheral areas (Salas, 2010; 2015) explain their efforts to consolidate in weak IRE and the difficulties to exercise governance insurgent with higher levels of subnational anchorage.


Map 4 Colombian geo-referenced Type of IREs and SLAC



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Map 4 shows the distribution of Strong and Weak IRE in Colombia and their correlation with the type of SLAC proposed by my theoretical frame. As in Map 3, Map 4 shows the correlation between integrated and parochial armed groups with a higher level of rebel governance and civilian compliance in Strong IRE than the weak ones. Similarly, Strong IRE's predominance in subnational units with strategic conditions for making war shows the dimension and intensity of internal armed conflict in Colombia. However, the differences in terms of the type of SLAC are crucial for understanding the variety of impacts and conditions for stabilization after the war.

Map 5. Colombian IRE by Insurgent armed orders (SLAC variation)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013) Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 50(4).

With higher geo-reference precision, Map 5 disaggregates the distribution of armed insurgencies inside the Colombian regions. The maps on the top show the war zones where the stronger guerrillas focused their actions against civilians. Again, the Andina, Pacific, and Caribbean regions concentrate the highest number of armed groups and their IRE. Therefore, these IRE present both SLAC A and SLAC B legacies of insurgent violence. Figures on the middle and the bottom shows the georeferenced localization of insurgencies according to the type of armed organization.

The integrated and parochial guerrillas (FARC, ELN) expanded in most Colombian territory during the years of more intensity of the war. Nevertheless, they focused on strategic zonas in Andina and the Caribbean region. In contrast, the fragmented armed organizations (EPL) and dissents (EPL and FARC-EP) focus on Ecuador and Venezuela's border zones where the absence of the Colombian state is notorious, and the territory conditions allow a fast withdrawal of insurgent troops (Salas, 2015; Ríos, 2016).

3.2.1 Colombian Eastern Antioquia and Southwest Regions: Why these cases?

The geo-nested analysis of my research (see Section 2.4) showed how the coexistence of different SLAC types leads to higher levels of instability in the post-conflict. In the case of Colombia, the results evidence the existence of IRE along with the Colombian territories of war and the variation in the type of SLAC inside the subnational regions affected by the armed conflict. In this way, I work on the diverse cases strategy (Gerring, 2007), beginning with the within-country comparison stated in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 present the cases of subnational units in Ecuador and Peru as part of the between-country component of the transnational diverse cases strategy (Gerring, 2007; Sellers, 2019; Pepinsky, 2017).

In this section, I focused on two subnational units of Colombia for the hypothesis testing of the 3E mechanism: The Eastern of Antioquia (Colombian Andina Region) and the southwest of Nariño (Colombian Pacific Region). The case selection for Colombia responds to the variation in the legacies of violence linked to the SLAC inside the subnational units and the variation in APS levels. For an empirical balance between the subnational units, I selected cases with a similar rate of violence events inside the departments of Antioquia (Eastern region 15.855 events) and Nariño (Southwest region 11.788 events) between 1980 and 2017. This sample balancing let me control by design the high variance of geographic, demographic, and economic properties between the Andina and Pacific Region of Colombia.

At the same time, I follow the *small-n* step geo-nested analysis (Harbers & Ingram, 2017) related to war events during 1981 and 2017 (Sundberg & Melander 2013) and their impacts on the variation of APS inside Colombian subnational units. As seen in Section 3.1, subnational units of the Andina and pacific regions showed the most significant variation in terms of the SLAC and type of IRE.

The Eastern Antioquia region shows why the accomplishment of the Enforcement and Empowerment steps of the APS mechanism has a Stable Low outcome in a sequential bottom-up 3E stabilization process. In contrast, the Colombian Southwest region evidence empirically why the accomplishment of the Enforcement step in the absence of

Empowerment and Entitlement conducts to a highly unstable level characterized by a non-sequential Top-Down 3E post-conflict stabilization process.

3.2.3 Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region IRE and SLAC

The Eastern of Antioquia is a Colombian region located in one of the most productive economic zones in the country's center. Its geographic and environmental conditions divide this region into two extensive zones: The *Near East* and the *Far East* (PNUD, 2010a). This division coincides with the distribution of the population's ideological and political tendencies in both ends of the region.

In the Near East, the municipal seats of Rionegro and Marinilla concentrate the local elites, the Catholic Church's influence, and the liberal and conservative political parties who were in charge of promoting the development of commerce, agriculture, and industry beyond their traditional political disputes (PNUD, 2010a). In contrast, the *Far East* was historically a host territory for indigenous and peasant populations displaced by local violence dynamics. An example of the latter was the significant impact that partisan political violence had in this area of Antioquia.

However, the economic and territorial importance of the so-called Far East of Antioquia increased when in the 1960s, the national State became interested in the construction of mega-projects for energy development given the water and natural wealth of "distant" municipalities such as Guatapé, San Carlos, San Rafael and Calderas (PNUD, 2010a). Likewise, the municipalities' location in this region became a crucial development factor for the construction of large road infrastructure projects such as the Medellín-Bogotá highway that connects two of the most important economic centers in Colombia.

Consequently, increasing the conditions of strategic territorial importance and development brought the simultaneous interest of the State and the armed groups organized for the economic and political control of the region (CNRR-Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011; PNUD, 2010a). This economic and political conflict quickly led to an armed confrontation where: On the one hand, the State sought to turn the Antioquia east into a focus of industrialization and modernization based on megaprojects; on the other, the armed groups with strategic interests in the territory sought the "political instrumentalization" (CNRR-Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011; Ints. 31;33) of the discontent and resistance of the peasant and rural population against the State.

The case of municipalities such as San Carlos is emblematic for the empirical analysis of the legacies of violence in the Far Eastern of Antioquia:

In the history of San Carlos, the different moments of the national armed and social conflict are outlined: the dynamism of the social movement of the eighties and the political opening in the making; the instrumentalization of social conflict by the guerrillas; the arrival of the paramilitaries to counter the insurgents and neutralize any initiative for collective action; and finally, to close the cycle, the collusion of the authorities with paramilitary groups that called themselves spokespeople for the order (CNRR-Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011).

This convergence of factors applies to the case of San Carlos and the majority of municipalities that make up this region of eastern Antioquia marked by the vocation of strategic development, the robust collective action of the civilian population, and the armed threat of insurgencies and extreme right illegal groups.

In geographical and administrative terms, the municipalities of eastern Antioquia localize along four zones identified as *Altiplano*, which concentrates 60% of the population; the *Embalses* area where most of the violent events are focused; the *Páramo* area with a more agricultural than industrial vocation and the primarily rural *Bosques* area. Despite their territorial differences, the armed conflict, without a doubt, brought to the region a series of everyday events of violence that generated a territorial reconfiguration of eastern Antioquia from the 1960s (García, 2007).

The history of this territorial reconfiguration due to the armed conflict has in the so-called *Movimientos Cívicos de Oriente* (CNR-Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011; García, 2007; Olaya, 2017) an important precedent for Empowerment given the robustness of the civilian collective action. Their response to changes in the geography and industrial vocation of the region promoted by the national State, became sufficient reasons to build: “A movement against State policy, which now collects some of the keys to the discourse previously constructed by local civic movements and places them as antecedent and historical reiteration of what the State means for the region: the “decisions taken from outside the region,” “imposed without consultation” and with “enormous damages” (García, 2007: 139).

Due to nonconformity and exclusion from state decisions, the citizens of this region organized themselves into popular assemblies that included peasants, merchants, students, workers, and teachers who sought to vindicate their rights and promote new social leanings and empowerment processes for eastern Antioquia. (PNUD; 2010a). This legacy of social agency and collective action of the Civic Movements and the Eastern Provincial Assembly is key for understanding the civilian population's solid bottom-up resistance strategies against the exercise of insurgent governance in the region.


However, in the 1980s, the rapid process of consolidating civic organizations and movements in the region was stopped by armed groups' strategies to control the territory's economy, and politics declared strategic for the nation. Organizations from eastern Antioquia were the subject of unfounded accusations of supporting the insurgency and threatening the stability of local political institutions (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011, PNUD, 2010a). Likewise, its political leaders were the target of attacks, assassinations, and forced disappearance, destroying in this way: "the transforming citizen impulse that had marked their autonomy against the guerrillas, as well as against traditional parties and those of the left" (Page. 12).

In this way, the acts of violence escalated in the region due to the strategic importance and the political and armed confrontation between the insurgencies that claimed to defend the leaders of the civic movement from the paramilitaries and State security agencies. The 80s of the 20th century were, then, the scene of an armed struggle by insurgencies to establish strong IRE in strategic development areas such as *Embalses* and *Altiplano* (UNDP, 2010a; Verdad Abierta, 2014 February 6). In particular, integrated-type guerrillas such as the FARC-EP settled in the *Embalses* area with Front 9 (Municipalities of San Carlos, San Rafael and

later, San Luis, Cocorná, Concepción, and Alejandría) and Front 47 in the *Páramo* area (Municipalities of Algeria, Nariño, Sonsón, among others) (UNDP, 2010a; Echandía, 1999; 2004).

Map 6 shows the territorial distribution of IRE in the Department of Antioquia and the types of SLAC. As in most of the Colombian territory of war, Strong IRE's dominance is significant, but in contrast with regions such as the Southwest or Colombian Pacific, the existence of Weak IREs in the Eastern of Antioquia is also significant. At the same time, Map 6 shows a strong correlation between the SLAC A in enclaves of insurgent governance with a lower level of consolidation in the north, northeast, and east of Antioquia, where precisely the action of the guerrillas was contained by civilian and armed actors.

Map 6. Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region – Type of IRE and SLAC



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

My research states that, in the Eastern of Antioquia, the IREs are weak due to the rapid containment of insurgent governance exercised by actors quite different from each other: first, the political resistance of the civilian population inherited from the civic movements that gave high levels of the agency to the citizens; second, the strategic interests of the State, mainly in the area of *Embalses* which implied the reinforcement of military and security intervention in the region; and, finally, the interest of other illegal armed actors, such as the paramilitaries, who increased the level of territorial dispute and escalated the armed confrontation of the so-called “war against all” (CNRR-Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011).

In sum, the armed enforcement of the State, on the one hand, and the low levels of rebel civilian compliance, on the other, were crucial for defending the autonomy and political independence of territories of Eastern of Antioquia. Simultaneously, the so-called "Guerra sucia" (Int. 16) carried out by paramilitary groups, clans of local power, and sectors of the State limited the consolidation of the IREs in several of the municipalities of strategic interest to the insurgents (See Map 6).

The 90s of the twentieth century would be just the scene of consolidation of paramilitary violence in the region and civil victimization under the slogan of: “The armed counterinsurgent struggle” (Int. 32) Paramilitary groups such as the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Magdalena Medio, the *Bloque metro* of the AUC, and later the *Bloque Cacique Nutibara* entered the early 2000s pressure and militarily contained the activity of the subversion. In addition to the armed dispute between the FARC-EP, the national army, and

the paramilitary groups, the ELN guerrilla's arrival to the *Embalses* zone with the Carlos Alirio Buitrago front (PNUD, 2010a).

In contrast to the southwestern border region of Nariño, the Eastern Antioquia region had less presence of fragmented and vanguard guerrillas such as the M-19 and the EPL. However, in the area, militias and urban commandos from the *Valle de Aburrá* were present. They later demobilized in the framework of the peace negotiations promoted by the national government in the department of Antioquia (Valencia, 2019; Echandía, 2004).

With the escalation of armed violence, the exodus and forced displacement of the population became the main legacy of violence from the internal armed conflict in Colombia's region (García, 2007; PNUD, 2010a; Echandía, 2004; CNRR-Grupo of Historical Memory, 2011). The highest point of insurgent violence came in 2000 when attacks on public infrastructure increased, threats against mayors and local officials, and the planting of antipersonnel mines that sought to safeguard the IRE at any rate.

The State's response to the escalation of insurgent violence was consolidated with the increase in regional armed enforcement within the framework of the democratic security policy of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who, as said above, opposed any attempt at a truce or negotiation with guerrillas (See section 3.1). In turn, local landowners and warlords strengthened the financing of paramilitary groups who consolidated their presence in the territory under the strategic slogan of "removing the water from the fish" (Ints. 29;32); that is, weaken the insurgency by expelling and massacring the civilian population accused of sponsoring the action of the guerrillas (PNUD; 2010a):

Since the entry of the paramilitaries into the territory, and especially from 1996 when their action took on the more significant force in the region, the strategy defined by these groups to dispute the territories of the guerrilla domain, more than combat, was the dirty war, in what they call "removing the water from the fish." Thus, the population that militated on the left and the popular leaders, who claimed - as they continue to do today - the rights of the most impoverished population and who, to that extent, disturbed the interests of the establishment, were considered by the paramilitaries as the social base of the insurgency. Against them, they carried out an extermination campaign materialized in massacres, homicides, threats, torture, and forced displacement, among others (Page 16).


For their part, the civilian population wanted to contain the war's advance by requesting support for their threatened leaders by the armed groups. Likewise, promoting the construction of regional scenarios for dialogue and peace negotiations that were weakly responded to by the central government bent on the military defeat of its "internal enemy" (Int.32) Thus, the inhabitants of Eastern Antioquia were not only facing a forced exodus from their territories but also another of the war's legacies: the stigma and criminalization of their Empowerment strategies.

Contrary to the empirical evidence on the type of SLAC B with a higher level of rebel governance, such as the Colombian southwest, the Eastern Antioquia is one of the regions where the decline of insurgent armed action, and the high levels of the agency to resist the impacts of violence produces a SLAC A type. The latter characterizes by a higher level of fighting over the control of war zones that are considered strategic value for the State and

other illegal armed actors in contention. However, the magnitude of the multiple acts of violence that experienced the eastern Antioquia was not less in terms of the legacies of war inherited in other Colombia regions, such as the southwest of Nariño, Chocó, or Cauca, with a predominance of SLAC B.

Graphic 19 shows the number of acts of violence in the department of Antioquia between 1980 and 2017. The total number of violent events during the said period was 94,225, affecting a total of 111,303 people (Observatorio de Memoria & Conflicto CNMH, 2021). However, the variation in the dynamics of armed conflict inside Antioquia is significant, comparing the differences in the events of violence of strong and weak IRE. In that line, the number of violent events in strong IREs located in strategic areas of Urabá with a total of 15,855 cases of violence (19,260 people affected) and the Valle de Aburrá with 28,414 cases (32,101 affected people) contrasts with weaker IRE such as the west with 5,729 violent events or the north of Antioquia with 6,169 (Observatorio de Memoria & Conflicto CNMH, 2021).


Graphic 19. Violent events and people affected Department of Antioquia 1980-2017



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

Focused on the Eastern Antioquia region (Graphic 20), the number of violent events is significant compared to the areas with the greatest impact and insurgent legacy (Valle de Aburrá and Urabá). Between 1980 and 2017, the eastern Antioquia region experienced 15,708 events, left behind 18,518 people affected by violence's multiple legacies (Observatorio de Memoria & Conflicto CNMH, 2021). This figure is quite similar to the southwest of Nariño one, despite the SLAC type variation and the dispute over the IRE's consolidation in both territories.

Graphic 20 Violent events and people affected in Eastern of Antioquia Region 1980-2017



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]


The year 2000 marks the peak of armed violence events in eastern Antioquia, with nearly 2,000 cases that affected a total of 2,628 people (Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto - CNMH, 2021). Events of violence data observations support the causal narrative of post-conflict stabilization concerning the increase in warfare during guerrilla and paramilitaries hegemony in the region (Echandía, 2004; Olaya, 2017; Ríos, 2017b) and the subsequent decline in armed insurgent violence after the withdrawal of the guerrillas and paramilitaries demobilization.

The highest number of violent events in eastern Antioquia concentrated in crimes classified by the CNMH Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto as selective murders 45.3% (See Graphic 21). In contrast to the southwestern Colombian region where the focus of violence were the social leaders, the descriptive statistics in the case of Eastern Antioquia reveal the variation in the strategies and “targets of war” of the multiple actors in the internal conflict. This inference makes sense considering the high degree of armed dispute and control over the territory where the insurgency intended to consolidate its IRE.

Along the same lines, the high degree of armed dispute and degradation of violence (Ávila, 2019; Salas, 2018; González, 2014) reflected on the existence of war events such as kidnapping (15.2%), forced disappearance (14.8%), damage to civilian property (7.1%) and the laying of antipersonnel mines (3.5%). The proportion of violent events associated with military actions, that is, confrontations within the framework of the regularity of war, is significantly low (6.9%). The latter accounts for a high rate of irregularity in the logic of Eastern Antioquia events of violence.

This data, in turn, has a high level of correlation with the number of victims outside the events of the regular war (90.8%) compared with the direct victims of war actions (9,0%) (Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto - CNMH, 2021)

Graphic 21. Number of violent events by type in Eastern Antioquia





Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
 Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

Additionally, the georeference of events of violence in the Eastern of Antioquia shows a strong correlation between the coexistence of highly disputed IREs with variation in the type of SLAC. Map 7 shows in red the municipalities with a higher concentration of violent events (i.e., San Carlos, Granada, San Luís, Algeria) in which legacies of armed conflict were strong. In contrast, gray and brown municipalities (i.e., Santuario, Marinilla, La Ceja) experienced fewer acts of violence due to the dispute with the State and other armed illegal actors. In turn, these territorial foci of violence vary due to the greater strategic importance of the *Embalses* and *Altiplano* territory compared to the *Bosques* and *Páramo* areas (See Map 7).

The latter corroborate by identifying the geospatial distribution presented by the Unique Registry of Victims (RUV) of the Colombian Ministry of Justice (See Map 8) for the year 2017. Based on this entity, the municipality of San Carlos (*Embalses* Zone) registers the more significant number of victims (individual and collective) in eastern Antioquia, followed by the municipalities of Argelia and Sonsón (*Páramo* Zone).


Map 7. Events of violence georeferenced in Eastern of Antioquia Region





Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

Map 8 Geospatial distribution of victimization focus in the Eastern of Antioquia



Source: Mapa de Victimización [Unidad para la Atención y Reparación integral a las víctimas - Colombia]
<https://vgv.unidadvictimas.gov.co/mapavictimizacion/>

As said above, despite the coincidences with Strong IREs from other Colombian territories, in the eastern of Antioquia, there are a significant number of weak IREs due to a high capacity for agency and resistance from civilians towards the governance strategies of the armed groups over their territories (See Map 8).

The question at this point is, since the legacies of violence are so similar in the regions selected for my within-nation comparison, what makes the difference in terms of the levels of post-conflict stability achieved by one and another sub-national unit? The Hypothesis testing of my research (See Section 3.3) suggests that in the Eastern Antioquia region, a combination of insurgent armed orders with a lower capacity for territorial and population control (Weak IRE), as well as the active civilian response against war, explains the achievement of post-conflict stabilization. The latter, despite the Entitlement gaps and partial APS conquered after the end of violence and post-conflict cycles.

3.2.4 Colombian Southwest Region: IRE and SLAC

The southwestern region comprises the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo. It locates in the Colombian Pacific zone, one of the most affected areas by the multiple waves of violence during armed conflict (Banguero et al., 2019). This region's

settlement process indicates that during the first years of the colonization and formation of the republic, large populations of slaves and vulnerable populations moved to the Pacific, fleeing the violence exerted against them (Banguero et al., 2019). Since that time, indigenous and Afro-descendant communities coexist in this region.

During the first years of violence in the twentieth century, the region was the recipient of indigenous people, Afro-descendants, peasants, and rural inhabitants from the center and north of the country who sought refuge and economic alternatives in urban and rural areas of the Colombian Pacific. However, with the arrival of this population to urban centers, illegal armed groups also arrived, seeing in this region of the country a niche for their activities due to the border connection with other countries (Ecuador, in particular) and the rest of the strategic territories inside the country (Banguero et al. 2019).

Over time, the region was also subject to mining exploitation and the development of extensive crops by transnational companies that appropriated the region's productive dynamics despite poverty and social exclusion experienced by the peripheral population (Viloria, 2007): "Even in the first decades of the 20th century, the Department of Nariño continued to be isolated from the rest of Colombia. The trip from Pasto to Bogotá took at least forty days along dangerous roads, passing through moors, valleys, rainforests, mighty rivers and the risk of tropical diseases or being robbed" (Page. 9).

Nariño has an area of 33,268 km² (PNUD, 2010) and shares with Ecuador a 250-kilometer border and a broad set of economic, social, and cultural practices, mainly with the neighboring regions of Esmeraldas, Carchi, Sucumbíos, and Imbabura (El Comercio, 2018). After Law 677 was issued, which created the special economic export zones in municipalities of the region such as Ipiales, in 2003, the special zone of Tumaco was created, which due to its location in border municipalities were crucial to strengthen economic and social ties between Colombia and Ecuador (PNUD, 2010).

The Andes Mountain range penetrates the country's interior through the department of Nariño and forks into the western and central-eastern mountain ranges creating a mountainous landscape that geographically isolates this region from others such as central Colombia. Such is the dimension of this mountainous landscape that on his visit to the high plateau of Nariño, Alexander von Humboldt called it "The Tibet of America", considering it as one of the most isolated and elevated regions of the American continent (Rodriguez, 1961)

In this sense, the combination of geographic isolation, a low level of strategic importance for the State, and the advantages for cross-border transit made this department a territory of interest for illegal armed actors (Ríos, 2017b; Salas, 2015). The previous, mainly since the 80s of the 20th century when the insertion of drug trafficking in the national economy, caused an escalation of the armed conflict between the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and drug traffickers, for the control of illicit crops (Banguero et al. 2019: 142). Likewise, several global industries moved their operations centers to other departments in the region, such as Cauca and Chocó.

In the guerrillas' specific case, several factors made this region gain value: the exit abroad, the trafficking of ammunition and weapons, the use of the border zone as a strategic


rearguard, and the monitoring of the movements of Ecuador on specific issues such as his opposition to Plan Colombia (Agencia Prensa Rural, 2009 December 1).

In this way, the armed conflict, and not another factor, was what made the southwest of Colombia and its border municipalities visible during the final decades of the 20th century: “Nariño is characterized by its vocation for peace, by its multi-ethnic and cultural character, for its natural riches and for having been a ‘haven of peace’ until ten years ago, because since then it has been one of the most visible departments in the country due to the intensity of the armed conflict and its impact on civil society, the country and the bilateral relations” (PNUD, 2010).

In terms of the armed conflict, Nariño has been one of the Colombian departments with the most severe human rights violations and the highest armed dispute levels (PNUD, 2010). Since the implementation of programs to combat illicit crops such as Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative: “The State's presence in the Department has been predominantly military” (Int.34). In this way, the low rate of public investment by the State, the absence of an essential services infrastructure, and the exclusion and marginalization of its population have turned the Colombian southwest into one of the most peripheral areas of the Colombian nation.

Map 9 shows the territorial distribution of the IRE constituted by the insurgent armed groups during the last cycle of armed violence and peace negotiations described in the first section of this chapter. As a result of the convergence of several armed groups and continuous confrontations with the State and other groups outside the law, the territory of Nariño has received the impact of multiple legacies of violence, particularly typical of SLAC type B. That is legacies of violence generated by armed groups of an integrated and parochial type, with high levels of control and insurgent governance over the population and a consolidation of their IRE based on the weak state presence in the territory.

Map 9 Colombia Southwest Region – Type of IRE and SLAC



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

During the most intense stages of the armed conflict, Nariño experienced the presence of insurgent armed groups of a vanguard type such as the M-19 and an integrated-parochial type FARC-EP and the ELN (PNUD, 2010; 2014; Ávila & Nuñez, 2010). Since the 1980s, the armed groups showed a high interest in building IRE in the region after its rapid expansion in the departments of Huila, Meta, and Caquetá. Likewise, the emergence of insurgent

movements such as *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* in Ecuador, and the *Tupac Amaru* Revolutionary Movement in Peru motivated the armed rebels' transnational interests in a Latin American face insurgent revolution (PNUD, 2010).

The FARC-EP guerrillas settled in Nariño in the 1980s with the *Frente 8* attached to the Bloque Occidental, which since the 1970s was in neighboring departments such as Cauca (PNUD, 2010). In El Rosario, Leiva, Cumbitara, and Policarpa; The FARC-EP created the *Frente 29* to operate throughout the department and take over the region politically and militarily. In the 1980s, the FARC-EP consolidated its military actions in the region with the southern bloc fronts (2, 13, 32, and 48) and the two southwestern blocs (8 and 29). As a result, clashes with the Armed Forces increased, as did attacks on the region's oil infrastructure.

In 1997, the FARC-EP attack on the *Patascocoy* military base had a substantive effect on the Colombian government by showing it that its armed capacity could affect its military infrastructure. Therefore, a negotiated solution to the conflict was necessary (PNUD, 2010). Likewise, this guerrilla increased its actions against departmental public order by boycotting local electoral processes, increasing attacks on the region's road and economic infrastructure; as well as intensify the combat with other armed insurgent and paramilitary groups that sought to take armed control of the municipalities with the most influence and governance of the FARC-EP, among them: Leiva, La Llanada, Sotomayor, Policarpa, Cumbitará, Barbacoas, el Valle from the Guáitara River and El Rosario, Mallama, Olaya Herrera, Ricaurte, Samaniego, Sandoná, Tumaco, Mercaderes, Unión, Buesaco, San Pablo and La Cruz (PNUD, 2010: 22)

In this way, the FARC's presence would be joined by other insurgent armed groups such as the M-19, the ELN, and the EPL, as well as criminal structures of drug trafficking and paramilitarism that coexisted in the region. The ELN presence in the territory also occurred in the 80s of the 20th century when their political cadres declared against the conditions of marginality and geographic and political isolation experienced by the region (Echandía, 2013; PNUD, 2010).

The EPL and M-19 guerrillas operated with greater intensity in rural and border areas until the signing of the peace accords with President César Gaviria's government in 1991 (Valencia, 2019). In this sense, their legacy of violence is less compared to that of integrated armed groups such as the FARC-EP, which concentrate a high number of IRE in areas of Nariño such as *the Pacífico Sur, the Piedemonte Costero, Abades, Sabana, Occidente, Guambuyaco, and cordillera* (See Map. 10)

Map 10 also shows the type of SLAC of the enclaves of insurgent governance identified in my research. The existence of integrated armed groups as FARC-EP in most of the territory explains the high levels of territorial and population control of the guerrillas throughout the internal armed conflict and the strong legacies of violence inherited from SLAC B. In contrast, a smaller number of insurgent enclaves with legacies of type A in the region correlates with the relatively early demobilization of the guerrillas of the fragmented type (EPL) and vanguard (M-19).

In its seventh guerrilla conference in 1982, the FARC-EP decided to strengthen its military strategy in the region given the State's strong power vacuum (Ávila, 2019; Ávila & Nuñez, 2010) and the intention of the second-generation guerrillas to negotiate peace with the state. Thus, the FARC-EP launched a strategic plan for its territorial control based on a series of military orders, among them: the strategic positioning of the troops on the eastern mountain range, creating about a hundred new combat structures (Columns and mobile companies), massify popular militias, and last but not least, the order to “sacrifice the State” (Ávila, 2019); that is: "The electoral sabotage and the destruction of the institutional apparatus" (Page 38).

Consequently, increasing the insurgent war impacted the citizen agency capacities. The civilian response to guerrillas' actions was none other than asking the State to increase its institutional presence in the region in the face of the threat of forced displacement and investment of resources to promote regional development (Gutierrez, 2016). This combination of solid insurgent governance with a low capacity of the State for supporting civilians and resisting war increased the SLAC B's impact during and after the end of the war.


In the same line, Map 10 shows the coincidence between Strong IRE and SLAC B in the department of Nariño in contrast with the low proportion of Weak IRE in concrete zones such as the *Pacífico Sur* and the Ecuadorian borders of the *Piedemonte Costero*. The latter could be explained by the Ecuadorian State's efforts to prioritize its border security policy in the north (Gómez, 2013) and the guerrillas' armed strategy expansion from the south IRE to the center of Colombia (Ávila, 2019).

The empirical correlation between the existence of a strong insurgent actor, the high impact on civilians, and the absence of strategic interest of the State in the territories of war conducted to the inheritance of SLAC B on the southwest region of Nariño after the end of the most intense cycle of war. As a result, the department of Nariño experimented with a total of 10.783 events of violence between 1980 and 2017 that affected 11.788 victims of the conflict (Observatorio de Memoria & Conflicto CNMH, 2021).

Since the beginning of the peace negotiations between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2017, the number of victims decreased significantly; nevertheless, the omissions and difficulties in the implementation of the accords in the territory triggered a new cycle of violence expressed in the number of social leaders massacred by illegal groups, the FARC-EP dissidence and active guerrillas such as the ELN (Echandía, 2013).

The subnational territory of Nariño experienced the most intense years of armed violence since the early '90s when the confrontation of armed groups (Ávila, 2019; Salas, 2010) for control of the territory and the illegal economy of the department increased. Graph 22 compares the number of events of violence (10783 events) and the number of affected people (11788) of the southwest region of Nariño between 1980 and 2017. Despite differences in the 3E mechanism dynamic and APS outcome, the Graph shows a similar increase of violent events between 2000 and 2006 to that of Eastern Antioquia. In the Colombian southwest the peak of violence was in 2003 with about 1.000 events that affected more than 1.200 residents of this region. Additionally, In 2017, despite the signing of Teatro Colón Peace Agreements the increasing of violence events reactivated.

Graphic 22 Events of violence and affected people in Southwest region of Nariño between 1980-2017




Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
 Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

On the other hand, Graphic 23 shows the type of events of violence in Nariño, including in a higher proportion selective murder (27.4%), forced disappearance (17%), war actions such as military base attacks, and troop ambushes (14.8%). In a lower proportion, events of violence particularly directed to the civilian population, such as sexual violence (9.0%), antipersonnel mines (7.1%), and forced military recruitment (2.5%) (Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto - CNMH, 2021).

As in eastern Antioquia, the high percentage of the population that was a victim of the armed conflict in the region outside of the fighting between armed actors (regular war) is once again significant. Of the total victim population of the Nariño region between 1980 and 2017, only 11.8% (1,395 victims) correspond to victims of combats between the armed actors, 87.8% (10,345 victims) are victims of the outside population of the armed confrontations and fights in the middle of the war.


Graphic 23. Type of violent event in the Southwest region of Nariño (1980-2017)



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
 Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

The georeference of victimization focus and events of war coincides with the distribution of IREs in the Colombian Southwest region identified in my *medium-n* geo-nested analysis. The municipalities with the highest number of victims and violent events localize in the territories where the Strong IREs consolidated (See Map 10). Simultaneously, the SLAC B legacies evidence the high level of instability of this subnational unit after violence. Map 10 shows the concentration of acts of violence in the territory. Points in black and red on the bottom map georeference the strong IRE of the Pacífico Sur zone (San Andrés de Tumaco), Piedemonte Costero, Los Abades, centro and Cordillera zones with the highest proportion of acts of the war.

Map 10. Victimization Focus and Events of violence in the Southwest region of Nariño



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

At this point, it is possible to rule out how the descriptive statistics on the type of legacies of violence, the IRE characteristics, and the peripheral character of the southwestern Colombian territory indicate a significant concentration of within-case warfare over time that limits achieving APS. Despite a considerable decline in acts of violence in the territory (See Graphic 22) since 2003, my research's causal narrative shows the problems in implementing the post-conflict stabilization mechanism in insurgent enclave areas. Additionally, it explains the potential increase in events and legacies of violence that began to be observed again in 2017 after signing the final peace agreement between the FARC-EP guerrilla and the national government (See Section 3.3).

3.3 The 3E Causal Sequence and the negotiated “End” of Armed Conflict: How SLAC shapes APS In Colombia Insurgent Regions of exception

This section unpacks the dynamics of the 3E mechanism in the regions of Exception selected for my within diverse cases strategy (Colombia East Antioquia Region and Southwest Border). At the same time, it compares the subnational variation of wartime institutions (IRE), the social agency impacts, and binding territorial conditions for explaining how SLAC shapes APS levels in the Colombian subnational units selected for my research.

In this sense, I trace the partial and unstable Armed Post-conflict conditions in Colombia's case using CPO's priors, observations, and pieces of evidence for the hypothesis testing of the 3E mechanism.

3.3.1 Colombian East Antioquia Region: Partial Armed Post-conflict Stability Outcome: Stable Low (Sequential Bottom-Up EEE Vectors of Transmission)


As seen in Section 3.2, the dynamics of the stabilization mechanism in the case of Eastern of Antioquia shows how the vectors for the transmission of stability from the State Enforcement (E1) consolidated thanks to the existence of a social agency with high levels of Empowerment (E2) inherited from the legacies of social mobilization against violence (García, 2007; Olaya, 2017; Observatorio de Paz y Reconciliación del Oriente Antioqueño, 2007). Despite achieving stabilization in this subnational unit, its consolidation is at risk due to the absence of conditions for strengthening the Entitlement (E3). In this section, I unpack the transmission process of the recurrent APS outcome in the Eastern of Antioquia its actors, piece of evidence, and conditions (See Figure 17).

Figure 17 distinguishes two levels of my 3E hypothetical sequential mechanism. The figure on the top represents the theoretical level of the 3E mechanism for the stabilization designed in chapter 2 (See section 2.1). The scheme hypothesizes the relation between SLAC and the dynamic of the 3E stabilization sequence. The Figure on the bottom suggests the events and observable implications about the 3E steps and their APS outcome in the Eastern of Antioquia subnational unit.


The empirical evidence for testing the sequential stabilization mechanism covers all the municipalities of eastern Antioquia; However, given the concentration dynamics of the IRE and the impact of the legacies of violence, the in-depth analysis of the causal narrative of APS gives greater relevance to the case of the municipalities in the reservoir zone (See Section 3.3). This criterion of targeting and sample balancing for the comparison also applies to the selected sub-national units in the case of the within comparison with the Nariño region (Colombia), where the southern Pacific and coastal foothills concentrate the most significant events of armed violence (See Section 3.3.2).

Figure 17. Colombia - Eastern Antioquia Region 3E Mechanism Causal Process

Theoretical level



Empirical Level



Source: Own Elaboration

In the Eastern of Antioquia, the Enforcement step (E1) had a national-oriented framework controlled by Colombia's central government's actions to combat the insurgency. As seen in section 3.1, the failure of several negotiation processes and the progressive advance of parochial and fragmented guerrillas from peripheral to strategic IRE. Simultaneously, the Colombian State increased the investment of public resources in security and defense issues and the support of allied countries such as the United States through Plan Colombia (Ríos & Zapata, 2019; Ríos 2017).


This national-oriented framework of the State's Enforcement increased the military operations for fragmenting and weaken the armed insurgency actions in the Altiplano areas. Furthermore, the State forced them to withdraw into weak IRE in the *Bosques* zone and some municipalities in the *Embalses* area (municipalities such as San Francisco, Sonsón, Cocorná, San Luis, Argelia, and Nariño).

In the years of a most significant escalation of insurgent violence, the State imposed a military enforcement strategy through the *Operación Meteoro* in 2002 (Agencia Prensa Rural, 2008 November 5) designed to regain control of road mobility in strategic areas such as the Medellín-Bogota highway. In 2003, the State launched the *Plan Marcial* to regain control of eastern Antioquia, leaving an initial balance of 215 guerrillas killed, 85 captured, and 188 demobilized (Verdad Abierta, 2014, February 8). In the same sense, the Military forces implemented the *Plan Espartaco* and the *Plan Falange* (ADHH, 2016 July 19) as military strategies for weakening the control of the insurgency over its Eastern of Antioquia IRE.

On the other hand, the effect of the local confrontation between the insurgents and paramilitaries implied the withdrawal of the former to areas with less strategic capacity for war. However, the decrease in insurgent violence events contrasted with the increase in paramilitary violence against municipalities such as San Luis, Cocorná, Guatapé, Granada, and San Carlos (PNUD, 2010a) under the argument of recovering territorial control of the Eastern of Antioquia. The paramilitaries' armed strategy consisted of a kind of parallel

enforcement power over the population that sought to weaken the insurgents' social bases by massively displacing the civilian population accused of supporting them (See Graphic 24). In terms of the counterinsurgent paramilitary narrative, their strategy was to: “*Quitar el agua al pez*” (Int.19).

Graphic 24 Eastern of Antioquia Total Forced Displacement Victims by Municipalities



Source: Own Elaboration based on RNI – Unidad de Víctimas Colombia [Cutoff date: 2020, January 1]

Graphic 24 on the top shows the total number of victims of forced displacement in the Eastern of Antioquia until January 1, 2020 (Unidad de Víctimas Colombia, 2021). The order of presentation of the municipalities considers, from left to right, their proximity to capital cities such as Medellín to capture the variation in the amount of forced displacement as the distance to the regional periphery increases (Far East of Antioquia).

My results align with arguments about how the distance of the conflict zones from the capital (Cabeceras municipales) influences the conflict's scope and intensity (Buhag & Gates, 2002; Vásquez, 1995; Ríos, 2017b). In the Eastern of Antioquia, the number of internal forced displacement victims increases as the distance between the expelling municipality and the region's principal urban center increases. This argument reflects the vast difference between the number of people forcibly displaced from the *Near* and *Far East* municipalities of Antioquia (See Graphic 24).


Therefore, clustering the forced displacement data observations (Graphic 24 on the bottom) shows the differences between the minor number of displaced victims in the *Near East* municipalities (Rionegro, Guarne, El Retiro, La Ceja) compared with the *Far East* ones. As a result, Far East cluster municipalities such as San Carlos (23,770 cases), Granada (38,451), Cocorná (33,274), and San Luis (31,256) concentrated most of the forced displacement cases.

The same pattern could apply to the IRE’s capacities and its impacts on APS levels achieved. This argument reveals how the more distance from center-strategic municipalities, the stronger the subnational IRE. Consequently, the post-conflict legacies of armed violence in the Far East are most severe compared with the SLAC impacts on near Eastern region municipalities. At the same time, SLAC inherited in the Colombian southwest border zones (i.e., San Andrés de Tumaco municipality) is higher than Eastern Antioquia ones (See section 3.3.2).

On the other hand, the distribution of the acts of armed violence in the Eastern of Antioquia territory between 1981 and 2017 according to its alleged perpetrator (See Graphic 25) shows a more significant correlation of forces between the actors of violence. This fact probably explains why the rebels had more difficulty consolidating strong IRE in these territories recovered by the State's Enforcement Power.

Additionally, the amount of events of violence attributed to insurgent actors (35.84%) and paramilitary groups (26.78%) is higher compared to the percentage of events attributed to unidentified armed groups (11, 79%). Likewise, this percentage is higher than the number of State agents who acted outside the State Enforcement power (8.79%) (Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto - CNMH, 2021). In that sense, the higher level of dispute among illegal armed actors in the Eastern Antioquia could also explain why the SLAC varies in function of the strategic importance of the territory and the insurgent governance objectives.

Graphic 25. Alleged perpetrator of armed violence in the Eastern of Antioquia (1981- 2017)



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
 Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

Undoubtedly, the high percentage of violent events attributed to paramilitary groups and other unknown groups reveals the aggressiveness of these groups' actions for control of the territory. Three strategies characterized the incursion of paramilitary groups in eastern Antioquia (López, 2007): First, the execution of criminal actions to demonstrate their military power; second, the territorial and population control over the territories of insurgent presence; finally, the political cooptation of local political parties and figures for the achievement of public and electoral power that favors their interests.

In this vein, an illegal substitutive State actor added to the military enforcement State strategy for the “pacification” of the Eastern Antioquia region (Int.12). The above, despite the

multiple complaints about secret alliances between the Military State forces and paramilitarism and the new cycle of violence exerted by military factions and groups such as the AUC, the Bloque Metro and, later, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (Observatorio de Paz y Reconciliación del Oriente Antioqueño, 2007; PNUD, 2010a). My research identifies this issue as one legacy of armed conflict impacting the Entitlement (E3) step of civilians and the APS level achieved in the Eastern Antioquia Region:

The East suffered the paramilitary presence from massacres in San Rafael, San Luis, San Carlos, and in the village of La Esperanza of El Carmen de Viboral, followed by selective assassinations and more massacres. Its incursion and expansion resulted in serious human rights violations. In 2004 alone, there were five massacres in the region, in the municipalities of Algeria, Cocorná, San Luis, Granada, and San Carlos [...] According to testimonies of people from the region, in the small municipalities, these groups maintained control in the area urban, even in those with a police force. “Only in the municipalities of the Altiplano did they act clandestinely” (PNUD, 2010a: 15).


The new cycle of violence for "pacification" could only be contained with the beginning of a negotiation process between the Colombian government and the paramilitaries that led to the *Bloque Cacique Nutibara* demobilization in 2003 and the *Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio* in 2006. As a result, the Eastern Antioquia region has one of the highest demobilized paramilitaries populations (CNRR, 2011). However, local peace processes promoted by institutions such as CARE managed to create an environment of peaceful coexistence between victims and perpetrators beyond the programs financed for this purpose by the central government.

Given the high concentration of violence in selective killings (See Section 3.2.1), data on the type of victims in Eastern Antioquia are challenging to identify. This report about victimization is crucial for understanding the legacies of violence on the Empowerment Step. However, CNRR Observatory data (See Graphic 26) suggests that community leaders (10%), teachers (8.6%), and public officials such as municipal councilors (5.8%) concentrate the highest percentage of the population victim of the armed conflict after a large proportion of victims type non-identified (30.8%).

Between 1980 and 2017, the percentage of social and community leaders who were victims of the armed conflict in the Eastern of Antioquia and the Colombian Southwest is similar 10% (1851 people) and 16.9% (1992 people) respectively; however, the impact on Citizen agency varies in each of these territories, probably due to the strength of the collective action legacies and the organizational capacity of the former over the latter.

An additional explanatory factor is related to the effective implementation of protection measures for the civilian and reintegrated population Empowerment and Entitlement steps. However, data from the *Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz* (INDEPAZ) show a somewhat negative outlook by reporting a total of 971 social leaders murdered in Colombian territory after the signing of the peace accords between the State and the Guerrilla of the FARC-EP (Indepaz, 2020 July 15).

Graphic 26. Eastern Antioquia - Distribution of Victims of the Armed Conflict by their Vulnerability



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
 Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

Given the State Enforcement (E1) focus on the military victory against insurgency, the subsequent vectors of transmission of post-conflict stabilization pointed to institutional policies for war zones demining, the victims' reconciliation, and the return of the population. The above allowed the reduction of violence and the Empowerment (E2) of the citizen agency affected by armed violence's legacies.

The latter shows that, in the Eastern of Antioquia, the State Enforcement power's military path was not sufficient for the sequential transmission of the stabilization mechanism. The former also required a state presence beyond arms and a solid citizen response to promote ex-combatant reintegration and prevent recidivism in the war.

In this sense, in Eastern Antioquia, it is worth highlighting the initiatives of local State institutions, the church, civilian organizations, and NGOs to manage the post-conflict subnationally (PNUD, 2010a). As an example, in 2000, facing the armed group's threats, the regions' mayors promoted the creation of the *Consejo Subregional de Alcaldes* to promote the holding of local peace negotiations. Nevertheless, the national government did not authorize them and announced, on the contrary, disciplinary sanctions affecting the legitimacy of their regional local institutions (Int.16)

In addition, through the local catholic church (Diocese of Sonsón-Rionegro), the *Programa de Desarrollo y Paz para el Oriente Antioqueño* (Prodepaz) has played a prominent role since 1999 in promoting a subnational scenario for dialogue and armed conflict resolution (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, s.f; PNUD, 2010a):

Citizen culture in this region stands out at the national level. And although its critical organizational processes were affected by the acute situation of the conflict that occurred between 1993 and 2003, aimed at weakening organizations and community leaderships, among other purposes, the reaction of citizens and their organizational capacity have made the Eastern

Antioquia stands out for its way of reacting to the conflict and organizing itself to overcome its effects (Page 18)

Data from the ART-Redes Project (PNUD) and the Justicia y Paz Corporation record 1,576 social and institutional peace organizations that emerged in eastern Antioquia during the conflict post-armed conflict (PNUD, 2010a). Along with PRODEPAZ, the creation of the Second Peace Laboratory and the Peace and Development Program implemented locally is also emblematic. Also, local initiatives for peace such as the *Centro Acercamiento para la Reconciliación (CARE)*, *El Salón del Nunca Más* and *Jóvenes por la Paz* were born in the municipalities of San Carlos, Granada, and Nariño, respectively, for supporting the victims of the armed conflict and promote their participation in public decision-making on central issues such as the end of the armed conflict, victims return, and restitution of rights (CNRR - Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011; Tamayo, 2019).

Therefore, my research identifies the Eastern Antioquia as an emblematic case of stabilization through the Empowerment step (E2) managed subnationally (Bottom-Up APS transmission). In contrast to the Colombian southwest, where APS transmission vectors scarcely concentrated in the process of armed enforcement step (E1), Eastern local peace initiatives and the high citizen agency capacities for empowerment made social organizations and victims consolidate the still fragile legacy of stabilization promoted by the State.

In sum, in the Eastern of Antioquia, the Enforcement Step (E1) began when the armed conflict was still active, and the force's correlation was more favorable for the State. Its main characteristic was to reduce insurgent violence, prevent returning to war, and regain control over the IRE. In contrast, the Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) steps mostly comprised actions in the post-conflict framework, so the outcome of the APS depended mostly on the problems of implementation and consolidation of the vectors of transmission that connect them.

Data observations for implementing the Entitlement step (E3) during the post-conflict are a sample of the above. I am referring specifically to conditions such as the titling and restoration of rights, the return of forced displaced victims, and their participation in subnational Development Plans and local justice initiatives with a territorial approach. (See Table 12).

Table 12. Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region – 3E Mechanism APS process tracing

Based on the causal narrative of the 3E mechanism presented in this section, Table 12 summarizes the CPO’s priors, observations and pieces of evidence for the hypothesis testing of the 3E mechanism in the case of Colombia East Antioquia subnational Unit.

Mechanism Step	Hypothesis	Observations and pieces of evidence	Source
Enforcement (E1)	Increasing the State intervention in the Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region IREs is the primary condition to lead to stabilization in the earlier stages of the armed post-conflict pathway (HE1)	e1HE1: Military intervention, Disarmament processes and peace Agreements (National) e2HE1: Design of post-conflict institutions with a territorial (local) approach (Subnational)	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Empowerment (E2)	Previously achieved the conditions triggered by E1, empowering subnational non-armed actors in the Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region IREs increase the levels of stability in the post-conflict pathway (HE2)	e1~HE2: <i>Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz</i> postponed (¿rejected?) by Colombian government and National congress (National) e2HE2: Historical performance of the Civic movements of eastern Antioquia region (Subnational) e3HE2: Local resistance practices and experiences of collective return in the post-conflict (Subnational)	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Entitlement (E3)	Once E1 and E2 are implemented, increasing the binding force of subnational political autonomy through the Entitlement process in the Colombia Eastern Antioquia Region IREs increases the stability level in the armed post-conflict pathway (HE3)	e1HE3: Historical Memory experiences born from Empowerment organizations claiming for Justicia and Repair (Subnational) e2~HE3: Partial declaration of municipalities for collective rights reparation (Subnational) e3~HE3: Unilateral redesign and implementation of Peace Agreements (National) e4~HE3: SLJ with national Failures in the continuity of the processes of peace, justice and reparation (National) e5~HE3: Absence of prioritization for PDETS (National) e6~HE3: Vulnerability by IRE reconfiguration in nearby territories (Subnational)	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews


Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

The beginning of a long chain of experiences of collective historical memory of the local armed conflict was the key for the transmission of stability from Empowerment to Entitlement. In my approach, this reconstruction of the conflict from the memory of the victims is a crucial piece of evidence for the Entitlement in at least two senses: first, the memory of the victims is a central “instrument” for the justice and reparation processes (Ansari et al., 2012: 5) in contrast to the collective silence that derives from previous processes of pardon, forgiveness, and forgetfulness; second, the communitarian reconstruction of memory is an opportunity for the reconciliation of victims and perpetrators in a context of definitive cessation and non-repetition of the war (Jaramillo, 2013).

As said above, despite the violence and forced displacement, Eastern Antioquia is one of Colombia's regions with more experiences of collective action and local construction of peace (PNUD, 2010a; CNMH, 2015; Jaramillo, 2013). An emblematic result for the transmission of stability from the Enforcement to the Entitlement was creating local experiences such as the *Laboratorio de Paz del Oriente Antioqueño* (Int. 29) to return, commemorate, and repair the victims. Likewise, the reparation and recognition actions promoted by women's movements in the region such as *CARE* in the municipality of San Carlos and *El Salón del Nunca Más in Granada* (CNRR- Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011).

In 2005, the experiences of massive return of the displaced population added to the necessary conditions to achieve post-conflict stabilization by promoting, among other rights, the restitution of land, property, and social ties of the region's inhabitants (CNRR, 2011; Ramírez, 2015). However, the high number of victims of forced displacement who wanted to return and the lack of safe conditions for access to health, education, and decent work in the territories of return generated problems for the consolidation of the Entitlement in the region (See Graphic 27).

Graphic 27 Eastern of Antioquia Total Forced Displacement Victims and SVV Data



Source: Own Elaboration based on RNI – Unidad de Víctimas Colombia [Cutoff date: 2020, January 1]

Given the difficulties faced by sub-national institutions to guarantee the conditions for return, the national government launched the "*Retornar es Vivir*" policy as part of its strategies to address forced displacement and the effective guarantee of rights to truth, justice, and comprehensive reparation (UNDP, 2010b). However, the multiple obstacles for implementing this policy turned the population's return into an experience that, in the words of the citizens, was; "More complex than the displacement itself" (Int. 31; Verdad Abierta, 2011, October 12).

Similar problems experienced by victims in implementing local initiatives for political participation and justice vital to achieving the post-conflict stabilization scenario. A key event at the national level was the general rejection of the approval and implementation of Special Peace Circumscriptions for the representation of victims in the subnational territories most affected by the war. This initiative was included in the Colón Theater Agreements of 2017 and allocated temporary seats for victims in the national congress's lower house during the periods 2018-2022 and 2022-2026. Finally, the Congress of the Republic and Colombia's government postponed them indefinitely.

In Antioquia, this agreement for the Empowerment and Entitlement in the post-conflict contemplated the victims' option to obtain up to four Special Circumscriptions for Peace (El Mundo, 2017 June 18). The same applied to the case of the constituencies contemplated for the Colombian southwest region (See Section 3.3.2). Consequently, Entitlement vectors of transmission for achieving the strong APS at the subnational level are weak and incomplete. Despite this, in 2017, the first Local Justice Systems (SLJ by its Acronym in Spanish) were created in the Eastern Antioquia region promoted by the Ministry of National Justice to provide a territorial approach to justice administration post-conflict. Four municipalities in this region were prioritized: Argelia, Nariño, San Carlos, and San Luis (Prodepaz, 2017).

In contrast to the Colombian southwest -where there is only one municipal pilot test of the SLJ-, the Eastern Antioquia was once again a pioneer in the undertaking of actions for the Entitlement from the subnational level. However, difficulties in financing the nation, access to justice actions in rural areas, and the implementation of alternative justice mechanisms (Prodepaz, 2017) have slowed down these initiatives' operation and increased the challenges for its consolidation.

At this point, I state that despite the advantages of municipal prioritization for implementing policies to stabilize the post-conflict, it generates insurmountable gaps between the Entitlement conditions of the prioritized sub-national units and those that are not. Proof of it is the vast gap between stabilization conditions in the *Embalses* area municipalities (San Carlos, Granada, San Rafael), the *Páramo*, and *Bosque's* ones. The latter had a lower level of prioritization but the same level of victimization during the war.

Although Entitlement vectors of transmission for the stabilization existed, the eastern Antioquia experienced problems in this last step of the 3E sequence after the peace processes with paramilitary groups between 2002 and 2008 generated social and institutional tensions (Int. 17). In this regard, the victims 'organizations and civil society questioned how the State carried out the demobilized reincorporation processes and "neglected" the victims' demands for justice and reparation:

Demobilization has not ceased to arouse feelings such as anger or pain. Although the victims recognize that it is a duty of the demobilized to contribute to the clarification of the truth (especially the location of the disappeared), they are also aware that in the midst of the impunity in force in the national context, these achievements would hardly have been achieved through the mechanisms provided by law [...] The discourse of reconciliation has been led by local civil society organizations in search of autonomy in the face of an official discourse that is imposed in the context of impunity and the shortcomings of the Uribe Vélez government demobilization process (CNRR - Grupo de Historical Memory, 2011: 341).


In this sense, local NGOs and oversight bodies (El Espectador, 2020 December 15) expressed their concern about the risk of revictimization and the problems of building territorial peace in municipalities in the region such as *Abejorral*, *La Unión*, *San Francisco*, *Sonsón*, *El Peñol*, and *San Rafael*. The preceding adds up, to the present, a significant number of revictimization risks even in the framework of the most recent post-conflict scenario between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP guerrilla.

On the other hand, early warnings about phenomena such as the murder of social leaders in the department of Antioquia increased during the post-conflict period. Likewise, the complaints about new threats that affect reconciliation and the restoration of rights in the context of a fragile and recurring post-conflict:

The particularities of the conflict vary according to each of the nine subregions of the department. Still, generally speaking, there are, on the one hand, territories in which the influence of illegal armed structures would be so deeply rooted and naturalized that the leaders have chosen to remain silent. on this social control and, thus, get rid of its punishments (subregions of Urabá, Valle de Aburrá, Oriente and Magdalena Medio) (El Espectador, 2020 December 15)

Map 11 shows the territorial distribution of the nation's strategic investments in the department of Antioquia (Figure on the right) and, specifically, in the Eastern Antioquia region (Figure on the left). As can be seen, the strategic development projects of the national government concentrated in the municipalities of the *Altiplano* area (Rionegro, Marinilla, La Ceja) and *Embalses* (Granada, Guatapé, San Carlos) in contrast to the investment projects of the *Bosques* areas (San Francisco, San Luis) strongly affected by the armed conflict.

Map 11. State Investment in Antioquia (Colombia)



Source: Own Elaboration based on from DNP Data - Colombia

After the strong waves of military Enforcement, this panorama of national strategic development accounts for increasing the State capacities in the Eastern of Antioquia. However, the absence of a territorial peace approach framing the articulation with sub-national institutions and local citizens weakens the APS conditions achieved. This scenario of disarticulation and unilateral management of a territory that lived through the war for so many years does not cease to evoke the origins of the armed conflict in this region (Int.14) when the energy, road, and economic infrastructure projects of the State generated substantial negative impacts on the population (García, 2007; Echandía, 2004).

In 2017, the national government recognized two municipalities in the *Embalses* area (San Carlos and San Rafael) as subjects of collective reparation, allocating a set of repair actions that included: “Rehabilitation of roads, schools, bridges, parks, endowments to medical centers, educational institutions, rural health posts, houses of culture, collection centers and support for productive projects.” (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral de las Víctimas, 2019 July 9). Although these national government actions represented a fundamental goal for achieving APS through the Entitlement, their effect is insufficient considering the high level of victimization experienced by all the Eastern Antioquia's municipalities still in the most recent post-conflict.

Facts such as the absence of prioritization of the Eastern of Antioquia territory for implementing peace agreements generate a risk of destabilization and partial post-conflict in the region (See Table 13). The previous, despite the local leaders' call to the national government for including the Eastern of Antioquia municipalities in one of the first tests (pilot) for implementing the post-conflict agreements with the guerrillas (El Tiempo, 2016, February 21).

Additionally, the non-inclusion of the Eastern region of Antioquia's municipalities in the set of Development Plans with a Territorial Approach (in Spanish PDET) could be interpreted as a sign of the State's interest in managing its strategic development projects in the region. In turn, it would reflect a high degree of “lack of confidence” (Int. 14) regarding the affirmative actions of the region's inhabitants for the protection and defense of their territory, as well as the risk of re-instrumentalization of the population's demands by new groups with power by dissident and contest to the State. (Lee, 2021).

The previous also may increase the gap in the dynamics of stabilization and development between the PDET and non-PDET municipalities (DataRepublica, 2020, August 20) of the region. Simultaneously, it could weaken the articulation of the strategic development processes promoted by the national government and local development initiatives for peace of the inhabitants of the area to consolidate their Entitlement. Table 13 summarizes the main activities, entities, and pieces of evidence for tracing the dynamics of APS conditions in the East Antioquia Region and its Recurrent APS outcome.

Table 13. APS Process tracing narrative in Eastern of Antioquia Subnational Unit (Activities & Entities)

Condition	Theoretical APS Narrative	Activities and Evidence	Entities
C1 (Achieved)	The post-conflict is managed nationally to take control of Insurgent Exception Regions (IRE) and to strengthen the construction of sub-national State capacities.	<p>eA1C1: Military Operations in the Seguridad Democrática Policy: Meteoro (2002); Plan Marcial (2003); Plan Espartaco and Plan Falange on strategic IREs</p> <p>eA2C1: Demobilization process with Paramilitary groups (2003-2006)</p> <p>eA3C1: Negotiation process with ELN and FARC-EP insurgent groups</p> <p>eA4C1: Issuance Of Post-conflict Legislative Acts: Justice and Peace Law, Teatro Colon Peace Agreement & Peace with legality Law</p>	<p>eE1C1: National Executive Power and Military Forces</p> <p>eE2C1: National Executive Power, Paramilitary groups and mediating actors</p> <p>eE3C1: National Executive Power, FARC-EP and mediating actors</p> <p>eE4C1: Executive power, Congress of the Republic of Colombia and Legislative Power</p>
C2 (Achieved)	Armed actors surrender, demobilize or join civil organizations (i.e. Cooperatives, Social Organizations) or State Institutions (i.e. political parties), thus reducing the risk of reactivation of internal conflict.	<p>eA1C2: Implementation of actions for reincorporation and transition to legality: Paramilitaries and guerrillas (Success)</p> <p>eA2C2: Insurgent successor parties and political participation: Foundation of FARC political party and temporary seats in congress for FARC representatives (National)</p>	<p>eE1C2: Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (ARN)</p> <p>eE2C2: Leaders and ex combatants of FARC-EP insurgent armed group</p>
C3 (Achieved)	Civilian actors empower their territory, and post-conflict management is primarily subnationally oriented.	<p>eA1C3: Experiences of social and political participation</p> <p>eA2C3: Humanitarian demining of the territories and return of forced displacement victims</p> <p>eA3C3: Reconciliation Processes and victims political participation</p>	<p>eE1C3: Laboratorio de Paz, CARE, Salón del Nunca Más, Civil society Organizations</p> <p>eE2C3: Civilian People and organizations such as organizaciones como Polus and Campaña Colombiana Contra las Minas (CCCM).</p> <p>eE3C3: Municipalities civil society</p>
C4 (Not achieved at all)	The post-conflict is managed and implemented subnationally, and the post-conflict territorial initiatives come for C1, C2, and C3 formalize	<p>eA1~C4: There is dependence of the national management of post-conflict</p> <p>eA2~C4: Absence of prioritization in terms of policies such as PDETs</p> <p>eA3~C4: Risk of victimization of social leaders – risk of instability by recurrence of conflict in nearby zones</p>	<p>eE1~C4: Executive Power and National Government</p> <p>eE2~C4: National Government, subnational municipalities and victims</p> <p>eE3~C4: Victims, social leaders, local justice organisms</p>

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)


3.3.2 Colombian Southwest Region: Weak Armed Post-conflict Stability
 Outcome: Unstable High (Non-Sequential and Top-Down 3E Vector of Transmission)

As in Eastern of Antioquia, Figure 18 distinguishes the two levels of the 3E mechanistic hypothesis for the Colombian southwest subnational unit. Figure 18 on the top describes the theoretical level, whereas on the bottom shows the observable implications for the 3E steps in Colombia's Southwest region. As in section 3.3.1, the empirical evidence for this subnational unit includes data observations for all the municipalities of the Department of Nariño. However, the causal narrative of the 3E mechanism and the APS outcome focuses on legacies of violence in zones such as Pacífico Sur, Piedemonte Costero, Obando, and Telembi, which represents most of the impacts of the insurgent violence in the Colombian southwest region.


The empirical causal narrative of the APS in the case of Nariño points to a high instability (Weak APS) outcome as a result of failures in the sequential dynamic of the 3E mechanism and its stabilization vectors of transmission (Harbers & Ingram, 2017). In the southwest region, the focus on the State military Enforcement (E1) and the failures in the implementation of the agreements for the reintegration and political participation of the civilian and demobilized population not only affected the Vectors of transmission ranging from Enforcement (E1) to Empowerment (E2) but the effect on the Entitlement (E3) necessary for achieving a strong post-conflict stabilization.

Figure 18. Colombia – Southwest Region 3E Mechanism Causal Process

Theoretical level



Empirical Level




Source: Own Elaboration

In the Enforcement step (E1), the pieces of evidence derived from the legacies of the war and the attempts to negotiate with the insurgencies demonstrate the State's interest in militarily defeating the guerrillas rather than implementing peace in the territories of the insurgent governance south of the border. During the most intense years of the war in this region, the state's focus was on the armed confrontation and the implementation of security policies aimed at controlling the territory and eradicating illicit crops (Ávila, 2019; Ávila & Nuñez, 2010; Ríos, 2016).

As a result, at the beginning of the 1980s, the guerrillas drastically increased the contest, armed control of this peripheral territory. They projected their expansion to the national territory center intending to fight the State and its institutions (Ávila, 2019). Thus, the increase in the State's military operations in the region and the confrontation between the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers had a strong impact on the number of acts of violence and civilian victimization in this border area.

Graph 28 shows how the guerrillas with 47.3%, the paramilitaries with 16.4%, and State agents with 15.8% concentrated more than half of the responsibility for the acts of violence in the southwest region during 1980. and 2017. The figure shows the hegemony of the guerrillas against other actors in dispute for the control of southwest IRE and the armed capacity of the multiple actors in the conflict against the State. Additionally, in contrast to the case of Eastern of Antioquia, the correlation of forces shows the insurgency's capacity to consolidate Strong IREs and wartime institutions capable of destabilizing the border territory and producing legacies of violence that are difficult to intervene during the post-conflict period.

Graphic 28. Alleged perpetrator of armed violence in the Colombian Southwest (1981-2017)



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]


Nevertheless, as seen in section 3.2.2, the year 2003 marked a notable decrease in the figures of violence due, among other factors, to the effect of the armed state Enforcement (E1) and its objective of “recovering the internal sovereignty of the State and an all-out war against the insurgency” (Int 10). In the case of the southwest of Nariño, this defense policy found in the so-called *Operación Fenix* of 2008 (Pizarro, 2021), the event that definitively weakened the armed capacity of the FARC-EP guerrilla to carry out the war from their strategic war zones. (Pizarro, 2021).

The *Operación Fenix* carried out in the border between Nariño (Colombia) and the Ecuadorian province of Sucumbios (Ecuador's Planning Zone 1) (See Section 4.1) represented a critical juncture in the dynamics of the Colombian internal war and its diplomatic relations with Ecuador. The latter because the bombing attack of the FARC-EP secretariat Raúl Reyes camp by the Colombian military forces happened in a rebel strategic sanctuary in the north Ecuadorian border territory (Pizarro, 2021). The argument of Colombia in the face of the international demand for sovereignty made by Ecuador was framed in the set of “regional actions against terrorism” (Int. 24). The preceding, despite Ecuador's diplomatic position when declaring itself neutral in the face of the internal Colombian conflict.

On the other hand, the *Operación Fenix* reinforced the path of de-escalation of insurgent violence in Colombia since the early years of the 20th century and promoted the restart of a new cycle of peace negotiations between the Colombian government, led by Juan Manuel Santos, and the FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas with influence in the southwest. For Pizarro, the bombing of the Raul Reyes camp in the border converted to *Operación Fenix* in a definitive action for: “The strategic defeat of the FARC and for its decision to negotiate peace, ten years later, since the death of Reyes [...] ”completely changed the dynamics of the armed conflict.” (Eje 21, 2021, March 3)

Although the effect of armed Enforcement (E1) on the insurgency's wartime institutions in Nariño was crucial, the legacies of violence substantially impacted the social cohesion of citizenships and civil organizations in Nariño. As seen in Graphic 29, the community social leadership in the region was the most affected civil society sector during the war.

Graphic 29. Distribution of Armed Conflict Victims by Vulnerability



Source: Sistema de Información de Eventos de Violencia del Conflicto Armado Colombiano- SIEVCAC
 Observatorio de Memoria y Conflicto – CNMH [Colombia-2021]

Data on the acts of violence against social leaders, schoolteachers, mayors, and judicial officials represent the damage to the southwest's subnational institutions and citizens and social organizations' organizational ties during the years of the most intense war. As seen in Graphic 29, 16.9% of victims of violence between 1980 and 2017 were social and communitarian leaders, followed by schoolteachers (12.3%), vulnerable population (5.7%), and demobilized ex-combatants (4.9%). In the same sense, it is significant the violence against mayors (3.2) and indigenous leaders and authorities (7.8%) in charge of the administration and leadership of subnational institutions in the southwest.

In sum, this destruction of the social and organizational ties shows the difficulties to start the Enforcement (E1) step of the 3E mechanism and the difficulties for linking stabilization vectors of transmission between Enforcement (E1), Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3). As stated in Chapter 2, the sequential dynamic of the 3E mechanism conceived the Enforcement and Empowerment as a necessary condition for Entitlement's achievement. In the Colombian southwest, the effect of SLAC on Empowerment and Entitlement is crucial for understanding the causes of high instability in this subnational unit. Table 14 presents the CPO's priors, observations and pieces of evidence for the hypothesis testing of the 3E mechanism in the case of Colombia Southwest subnational Unit.

Table 14. Colombian Southwest - 3E Mechanism Process Tracing (Uniqueness & Certainty)

Mechanism Step	Hypothesis	Observations and pieces of evidence	Source
Enforcement (E1)	Increasing the State intervention in the Colombia Southwest Region IREs is the primary condition to lead to stabilization in the earlier stages of the armed post-conflict pathway (HE1)	e1HE1: Military intervention, Disarmament processes and peace Agreements (National) e2HE1: Design of post-conflict institutions with a territorial (local) approach (Subnational) e3~HE1: Focalized armed conflict, dissidence and new criminal governance (subnational)	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Empowerment (E2)	Previously achieved the conditions triggered by E1, empowering subnational non-armed actors in the Colombia Southwest Region IREs increase the levels of stability in the post-conflict pathway (HE2)	e1~HE2: <i>Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz</i> postponed (¿rejected?) by Colombian government and National congress (National) e2~HE2: Forced Displacement, Victimization and illegal practices that affect social linkages (Subnational) e3~HE2: Revictimization. Massacres and murder of social leaders before and during the post-conflict (Subnational)	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Entitlement (E3)	Once E1 and E2 are implemented, increasing the binding force of subnational political autonomy through the Entitlement process in the Colombia Southwest Region IREs increases the stability level in the armed post-conflict pathway (HE3)	e1~HE3: Lack of implementation of processes of peace, justice and reparation (National) e2~HE3: Social leaders promote historical memory, empowerment rights and entitlement but massacres and selective killings affect justice and reparation (Subnational) e3~HE3: Return and SVV objectives are deficit in most of the municipalities impacted by SLAC. (Subnational) e4~HE3: PDET prioritization but unilateral national state oriented (National) e5~HE3: SLJ limited only to one pilot experience affecting processes of peace, justice and reparation (National-Subnational) e6~HE3: Structural and judicial problems for rural land reform and land restitution (National-subnational) e7~HE3: Breach of the obligation to investigate and punish impunity and lack of truth (National-subnational)	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

Table 14 summarizes the dynamic in the APS vectors of transmission going from Enforcement (E1) to Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement. These ones are mainly absent in the case of the southwest Nariño region. The principal reason for the absence of linkages between Enforcement (E1) and Empowerment (E2) is the lack of implementation of victim's peace initiatives on the subnational level. Additionally, vectors of transmission between Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) failed not only by the partial municipal prioritization in the post-conflict PDET but the lack of conditions to consolidate the civilian initiatives for peace such as avoiding revictimization and forced displacement and solve the difficulties for returning of victims to their territories (Int. 33).

Phenomena such as the forced cross-border migration of southwest indigenous communities to Ecuador (González, 2018; González, 2013) are proof of how the militaristic State Enforcement power could generate similar effects to those of war when its approach never coincides with a social policy for victims in the post-conflict (González, 2013). In this regard, an emblematic case is that of the Awá indigenous community and the Associations of indigenous victims of the municipalities of Tumaco, Barbacoas, and Ricaurte (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2019 Early Warning N ° 045-19, October 31):

The Awá indigenous population of the department of Nariño is one of the ethnic groups most affected by events derived from the armed conflict in their territories, characterized by the presence of illegal mining, crops for illicit use, drug trafficking, dispossession, and abandonment of land, attacks on the trans-Andean oil pipeline, lack of road infrastructure, the conditions of social vulnerability and the risk of indigenous communities in the municipalities of Tumaco, Barbacoas and Ricaurte are evidenced, who are prone to the violation of Human Rights and Violations of International Humanitarian Law by the actions of armed groups in their territories (Page 9)

In the same line, the Colombian government prioritized its security policies in this area of the country within the Colombia plan framework based on systematic practices for the consolidation of its armed Enforcement strategy, such as the aerial spraying glyphosate on illicit crops (Maldonado, 2001). In this way, the national government put the victims at risk of re-victimization due to the negative impacts of aerial spraying (Aguilar-Gómez et al. 2016) and the lack of support for Empowerment policies (E2), such as the substitution of crops that linking peasants, social leaders and their families in social programs and policies for stabilization.

In this way, factors such as the failures of the national government to bring the State's social policies to the southwest territories of Nariño, as well as its fragile institutional presence in the region, add to the negative impact of the internal and cross-border forced displacement of the population (See Graphic 30) since the Colombian southwest towards Ecuador (See Section 4.1) and the rest of the Colombian territory (Indepaz, 2018)

Graphic 30 Colombian southwest Total Forced Displacement Victims



Source: Own Elaboration based on RNI – Unidad de Víctimas Colombia [Cutoff date: 2020, January 1]

In the Colombian Southwest, the civilians forced displacement represented one of the most challenging vectors for linking the Enforcement (E1) with the E2 and E3 steps. Along armed conflict, the highest number of forced displaced victims focused on Pacífico Sur municipalities (Francisco Pizarro, San Andrés de Tumaco), Telembí (Barbacoas, Magüi, Roberto Payán) followed by Los Abades (Samaniego) and Obando (Ipiales, Córdoba, Cumbal) nearer to the urban center of Nariño (Pasto) (See Graphic 30 On the Top).

This data coincides with the Eastern Antioquia trend to increasing armed violence and victimization as the distance between war zones and the primary urban centers expands. Although the proportion of the displaced population is similar for all municipalities, the difference between Center municipalities (Pasto) and peripheral border ones (San Andrés de Tumaco) is significant (See Graphic 30 on the Bottom). The above, once again, empirically

support the hypothesis about the greater the distance from the National State strategic territories, the higher insurgent capacities to consolidate Strong IRE. After clustering Southwest municipalities' total, the farthest *Pacífico Sur* one, San Andrés de Tumaco, is the most expelling war zone with 158. 815 victims followed by Barbacoas with a lower amount: 31.976.

In contrast with the Eastern of Antioquia case, the predominant control of insurgencies and multiple arms groups on the civilians limited them to develop “strategies for resisting the war” (Int. 34). At the same time, the State's absence for supporting and protecting the local leaders increased their vulnerability in the middle of the conflict. The above applies even for the years after the signing of the Teatro Colón peace agreement in 2017 based on data about murders of social leaders in the post-conflict: 971⁶, most of them in the Antioquia (Center), Cauca y Nariño (Pacific Southwest) Departments (Indepaz, 2020):

The leaders' role was strengthened in the moments of negotiation and immediately after the signing of the Havana agreement. However, the breaches of the peace agreement and the State's deception practices had delegitimized them before their communities and made them vulnerable to the actions of the illegal armed groups (Indepaz, 2018: 32)

In 2017, despite the implementation of partial peace agreements before the *Teatro Colón* Agreement, the homicide rate in the department of Nariño (30.8 per 100,000 inhabitants) remained above the national average (24.8 per 100,000 inhabitants) (DNP, 2020). Urban and rural security conditions were again affected by the territorial dispute between illegal armed actors, guerrilla dissidents, and Grupos Armados Organizados Residuales (GAOR by its Acronym in Spanish) (Indepaz, 2018). The preceding, mainly in the former territories of insurgent governance in which the State has not yet regained control and where the precarious institutional presence of the State contrasts with the advance of the criminal governance of drug trafficking and organized crime:


Armed disputes are associated with the control of territory for the appropriation of income. They focus on coca leaf cultivation areas and mobility corridors for arms and drug trafficking. And they have a regional character, at various scales, that transcend the municipalities of the Pacific coast of Nariño and Cauca, linked with Buenaventura and Chocó, and go to Ecuador [...] In this framework, the dominion over rivers, estuaries and the sea, is the main objective. The connectivity that bodies of water represent for the *Pacífico Nariñense* (Francisco Pizarro, Mosquera, La Tola, El Charco, Santa Bárbara) and between the various areas of the municipality of Tumaco, make them the central axis of social relations, as well as within strategies of war and illegality (Indepaz, 2018: 30)

On the other hand, the map of the State's strategic investments is considerably smaller in terms of economic resources compared to that of regions such as the Eastern of Antioquia. Map 12 shows a smaller number of investment projects in the southwest regions of Los Abades, Sabana, Centro and Telembí, and a minimal concentration of these in the *Piedemonte Costero* and *Pacífico Sur* areas (except in the municipal seat of Tumaco). In short, State Investment projects in the border zone with Ecuador highly impacted by the armed conflict are completely absent. Additionally, the national resource management

⁶ Indepaz. Data cut-off 2020, July 15.

repeated as in the Eastern of Antioquia as a sign of the State's little interest in promoting subnational post-conflict governance even in prioritized municipalities to implement the PDET.


Map 12. State Investment in Colombian Southwest (Nariño)



Source: Own Elaboration based on from DNP Data - Colombia
https://mapainversionesapp.dnp.gov.co/Home/Resultados?CENTRO_NEGOCIO=2

Along the same lines, the municipal prioritization for the implementation of Development Plans with a Territorial Approach (PDET) included some municipalities in the southern Pacific and coastal piedmont subregions, including Barbacoas, El Charco, Francisco Pizarro, La Tola, Magüí Payán, Mosquera, Olaya Herrera, Ricaurte, Roberto Payán, San Andrés de Tumaco, and Santa Bárbara; However, descriptive statistic shows minimal progress in terms of the indicators of overcoming vulnerability (SVV for its acronym in Spanish) of the population victims of the armed conflict and forced displacement living in said municipalities of the region (See Graphic 31)

Graphic 31. Colombian Southwest Region Total Forced Displacement Victims and SVV Data



Source: Own Elaboration based on RNI – Unidad de Víctimas Colombia [Cutoff date: 2020, January 1]

Data about civilian return, access to Housing, education, and family reunification of victims (SVV indicator) shows a level of success much lower than one achieved by the Eastern Antioquia region in terms of Entitlement APS conditions. Excluding the Southwest nearest urban center (Pasto), Samaniego and Cordoba municipalities, forced displaced victims in border and peripheral zones did not overcome the minimal conditions for restoring their rights (See Graphic 31).

Additionally, in terms of Empowerment (E2), the non-implementation of the peace agreements transitory *Circumscriptions of peace for victims* in the Lower House (Point 2 of the peace agreement) by the national State increased the representational gap that exists among the victims of the armed conflict in peripheral and border areas in comparison with the representation and political participation of victims in other regions of the country (MOE, 2017).

In the southwest case, the Circumscriptions of peace contemplated the political participation of social and community leaders from the *Pacífico Sur* and *Telembí* areas included in the C1 (Nariño-Cauca-Valle) and C10 (Pacífico-Nariño) districts with 24 and 11 municipalities each one (PARES, 2017). Additionally, the frustrated expected political impact on the participation of the victims for the local elections of 2018 estimated, in the case of the Colombian southwest, an inclusion Entitlement (E3) component for more than 50 indigenous reservations in the region victims of conflict and forced displacement (MOE, 2017).

In this sense, the armed conflict victims in the region still demand compliance with the agreements made between the guerrillas and the Colombian State regarding transitional justice, truth, and reparation. Leaders of the *Mesa Municipal de Víctimas de Pasto* (Nariño) have manifested to demand: “That the Agreement be fulfilled so that we can access the truth, justice, and reparation. The institutions must give us the guarantees of non-repetition, guarantees that today are not fully established” (Unidad para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, 2017 November 25).

Although, the Colombian National Development Plan (2014-2018), as well as the *Justicia para Una Paz Sostenible* Program, contemplated the creation of Local Justice Systems (SLJ) with the objective of: “Implementing a systemic model of justice with a focus on territorial and rural emphasis, prioritizing the areas and municipalities most affected by the armed conflict” (Ministry of Justice, 2019) by 2019 the national government had presented only a pilot project for implementing this system in a municipality of the Region: El Charco (Nariño) (Ministry of Justice, 2019 October 4)

Likewise, restoring victims' rights policies reduced mainly to “assistance programs” (Int.33) managed by the national government (Top-down implementation). In this way, the national government indirectly restricts victims and local institutions' direct participation in subnational post-conflict management. For example, the *Unidad para la Atención a las víctimas* informed, in its first monthly reports for 2020, the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Southwest populations most affected by violence and 1,590 compensations to people over 70 years of age or in the condition of vulnerability.

The same report also talks about the establishment of commitments for access to housing, productive projects, and education; as well as: “Soccer balls, basketball, volleyball, micro-soccer, cone games, volleyball nets, and bib games, to promote strategies for the proper use of free time, as a mechanism for the prevention of the recruitment of children and adolescents, benefiting more than 7,700 students from different municipalities.” (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación integral a las Víctimas, 2020 May 1)

Thus, the precarious implementation of policies for re-establishment rights and the absence of binding conditions for decisions emanating from the civil population evidence the absence of impact of the Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) sequential steps on the Colombian Southwest APS level.

In terms of guarantees for social justice and reincorporation of the demobilized rebels, although reports of the *Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación y la Normalización* (ARN) confirm the number of local demobilized ex-combatants in 340 reintegrated and 389 reincorporated to civilian population (ARN, 2020), the number of factions and dissidents of the guerrillas and armed criminal groups in the Colombian southwest increased after the sign of the Teatro Colón Peaceagreements. Their new war strategy is the focalized armed conflict in which forced displacement, land claimants' massacres, drug trafficking, and illegal practices converge: “The logics of action of illegal structures in the territories they are not associated with the seizure of political power, nor do they respond to articulated territorial controls; confrontations are placed in foci that respond to particular interests” (Indepaz, 2018: 28).

As a result, the number of social leaders and peasant land claimants assassinated between 2017 and 2020 increased (CNMH, 2021; Indepaz, 2021), as well as the number of incidents associated with the forced eradication of illicit crops. Data from the Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria (2021) evidence at least 18 incidents between the State (Police, ESMAD, Military forces) and civilians (Social organizations, Peasants, and indigenous population) related to the process of land restitution and illegal crops eradication.

Finally, the conditions for the return of forcibly displaced victims to their municipalities and villages are still precarious (Int. 33). Official data about returned people for 2019 show the final closure of the return process in only one municipality in this region (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación integral a las Víctimas, 2019 October 24). In turn, the conditions of access to particular justice for the victim population in the Southwest continue to be one of the lowest in Colombia. For the year 2018, the rate of judges in Nariño was 2.94 per 100,000 inhabitants; that is, 8 points down the National Average (10.95 x Every 100 inhabitants) (Consejo privado de Competitividad, 2018)

In conclusion, in the Southwest region, the vectors of transmission for achieving stabilization failed in the case of APS conditions provided by Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) steps. Table 15 summarizes activities and entities of the process-tracing of the APS outcome in this sub-national unit of my research.

Table 15. APS Process tracing narrative in Colombian Southwest Subnational Unit (Activities & Entities)

Condition	Theoretical APS Narrative	Activities and Evidence	Entities
C1 (Partially Achieved)	After the end of the war, the post-conflict is managed nationally to take control of Insurgent Exception Regions (IRE) and to strengthen the construction of sub-national State capacities.	<p>eA1C1: Military Operations on IRE during the conflict: Fenix (2008); Operación Libertad (2013). On post-conflict: Operación Atlas (2017); Operación Hércules and Operación David (2018).</p> <p>eA2C1: Issuance of Post-conflict Legislative Acts: Justice and Peace Law, Teatro Colon Peace Agreement & Peace with legality Law</p> <p>eA3~C1: State enforcement policies on the Colombian borders with Ecuador are fragile</p> <p>eA4~C1: Paramilitary and criminal groups dispute power and subnational territorial control in IRE.</p>	<p>eE1C1: National Executive Power and Military Forces</p> <p>eE2C1: Executive power, Congress of the Republic of Colombia and Legislative Power</p> <p>eE3~C1: National government of Colombia</p> <p>eE4~C1: Paramilitaries, guerrilla dissidents, drug traffickers and illegal groups</p>
C2 (Not Achieved)	Armed actors surrender, demobilize or join civil organizations (i.e., Cooperatives, Social Organizations) or State Institutions (i.e. political parties), thus reducing the risk of reactivation of internal conflict.	<p>eA1~C2: Guerrilla dissidents and ex combatants return to the armed conflict after Negotiation process with ELN and FARC-EP insurgent groups</p> <p>eA2~C2: Ex combatants and demobilized rebels of the FARC political party are targeted for crimes by illegal and residual armed groups</p>	<p>eE1~C2: Military forces, FARC-EP dissidences, ELN factions and criminal armed groups.</p> <p>eE2~C2: FARC-EP demobilized rebels, paramilitary and illegal armed groups.</p>
C3 (Not achieved)	Civilian actors empower their territory, and post-conflict management is primarily subnationally oriented.	<p>eA1~C3: Municipalities and social leaders fight for empowerment but revictimization and selective killings increase</p> <p>eA2~C3: Failures in the return of forced displacement victims. Internal and cross border forced migration persist.</p> <p>eA3~C3: Lack of political representation on victims (subnational) and unilateral dependency of National State for post-conflict subnational management</p>	<p>eE1~C3: Illegal armed groups against Social leaders, civilian people and victims</p> <p>eE2~C3: Social leaders, civilian people, victims, Humanitarian organisms.</p> <p>eE3~C3: National State government/Local civilian society and victims in the subnational context</p>
C4 (Not achieved)	The post-conflict is managed and implemented subnationally, and the post-conflict territorial initiatives come for C1, C2, and C3 formalize	<p>eA1~C4: Lack of continuity and territorial performance of peace agreements (Valencia Interviews 2020)</p> <p>eA2~C4: Post-conflict prioritization is selective and nationally managed</p> <p>eA3~C4: Local access to justice is limited – SLJ is deficient</p> <p>eA4~C4: SSV indicators are low and unstable</p> <p>eA5~C4: High risk of revictimization and instability by recurrence of conflict in border and active illegal practices zones</p>	<p>eE1~C4: Executive Power and National Government</p> <p>eE2~C4: National Government, subnational municipalities</p> <p>eE3~C4: National Government, subnational municipalities and local justice organisms</p> <p>eE4~C4: National State and subnational State institutions.</p> <p>eE5~C4: Social leaders and victims local organizations, National State and subnational State institutions.</p>

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

Chapter 4

Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) in Ecuadorian Regions of Exception: From National to Foreign insurgencies across borders

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian army attacked the camp of Raúl Reyes, second in command of the FARC-EP, in the province of Santa Rosa de Yanamaru, Ecuador's northern border with Colombia. It marked a fundamental milestone in the dynamics of the insurgent war in Colombia and the Ecuadorian border security policy (Pizarro Leongómez, 2021).

Like *Marquetalia*'s IRE in Colombian territory (See Section 3.1), foreign military forces attacked this Ecuadorian town in the Angostura region through an armed action involving a bomb. In turn, an exogenous shock that developed into a critical juncture led, on the one hand, to the beginning of an intense diplomatic conflict between the two nations; on the other, in a central milestone for the end of an internal armed conflict in Colombia from which Ecuador largely escaped despite the risk of overflow and the fear of “contagion” (Torres, et.al. 2018).

If in the case of Colombia, *Marquetalia* represented the most emblematic case of an insurgent governance enclave that served as a strategic rearguard for a guerrilla like the FARC-EP. In the case of Ecuador, the Raul Reyes camp on the border with Colombia is the equivalent of an Insurgent Region of Exception with the maximum value of strategic sanctuary (Pizarro, 2021) for a guerrilla facing the border pressure of the “anvil and the hammer” (Villaverde, 2018)

Ecuador's neutral position in the face of the Colombian armed conflict, as well as the defense of its sovereignty through official and *rebel*⁷ diplomatic channels (Arjona et al. 2015; Coggins, 2015; Huang, 2016; García, 2019), allowed it to face the risk of spillover from the Colombian armed conflict in its territory after face a war and negotiating the peace in 1998 on the other side of the border with Peru (Spencer, 1998). Additionally, after dismantling the national insurgent menace of *URJE*, *Alfaro Vive*, *Carajo!* and *Montoneros Patria Libre* were born on several subnational units, including the northern border with Colombia during the second half of the twentieth century.

Ecuador consolidated a policy for stabilization in the face of the foreign insurgent “contagious” that, despite its fissures, was nourished by the legacies of law *enforcement's legacies* against the Ecuadorian insurgencies of the 1980s and 90 and the consolidation of indigenous and social organizations *Empowerment* and *Entitlement*. As a result, the latter found a strategy to separate themselves from the armed insurgent violence in the contentious collective action.

⁷The term rebel diplomacy refers to a non-violent strategy of the insurgent armed groups to internationalize their domestic armed objectives. In conceptual terms: "Relax the notion that diplomacy is restricted to strategic communication between sovereign states or to the formal organizations that states create" (Arjona et al., 2015: 8)

With the construction of a cross-border security policy and implementing an *Entitlement* strategy, Ecuador recognized its national and foreign victims of insurgent violence on both sides of its border with Colombia. At the same time, it became a region of exception (Pepinsky, 2017) called for years as the "Island of Peace"⁸; meanwhile, its neighboring States of Colombia and Peru waged internal war against armed rebels in their subnational Insurgent Regions of Exception.

In 2007 the Ecuadorian Minister of Defense, Wellington Sandoval, stated that since Colombia does not maintain sovereignty over the border, Ecuador does not limit in the north with Colombia, but with the FARC-EP or the ELN insurgencies (El Tiempo, 2007 November 12). His public statement revealed, by proxy, the Ecuadorian informal border policy with the insurgent diplomacy (ISS; 2011) and the called “pragmatic convivence” of sectors of military forces with ELN and FARC-EP guerrillas at the northern border looking to contain their advance inside the country.

His words also evidenced the independence of the Colombian guerrillas for enforcing its rebel governance in the north border (Idler, 2019) beyond the potential interests of Colombia by affecting the Ecuadorian state consolidation through foreign insurgencies. In that sense, my findings of the Colombian and Ecuadorian insurgencies' role in the peripheral borders contrast with arguments about how States weakens their neighbors through foreign subversion (Lee, 2021) and the dynamic of opportunities and vulnerabilities underlining inter-rebel fighting (Pischedda, 2020).

In this chapter, I aim to empirically test the 3E causal mechanism for strong stabilization in subnational IRE and legacies of insurgent violence in the north of the Ecuadorian border with Colombia. To that end, I use the between-nation subnational comparison strategy announced in the small-n geo-nested step of my research design. At the same time, I follow my diverse case strategy for explaining APS subnational variation in Ecuador's case after dealing with the Colombian cases of weak and partial APS in Chapter 3.

Section 4.1 presents a brief overview of the Ecuadorian insurgent experience beginning with the origin of guerrillas such as *URJE* and *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* in planning zone 1 (Esmeraldas, Carchi, Sucumbios) as well as its strategies and alliances with foreign insurgencies for the creation of IRE in Ecuadorian territory. Similarly, I analyze the State response to the prosecution of the internal and foreign insurgent armed groups that led to the former's military defeat and the so-called “pragmatic coexistence” with the latter in border territories.

Section 4.2 delves into the subnational dynamics of internal and foreign insurgencies in the border territories of planning zone 1 and the impact of the legacies of violence on the


⁸ The idea of “the island of peace” was born within the framework of the national security doctrine of Ecuador and the actions of the Alliance for Progress launched by the United States. For Ecuadorians, the expression represents an idea of the rancid national oligarchy and its interests of progress under a social and exclusive economic model internally and externally (El Telégrafo, 2011 August 27); However, in this case, the idea of the island of peace is used in the sense of cross-border policies and as a symbolic and empirical reference to name a region of exception (Pepinsky, 2017) that has managed to contain the advance of the insurgent armed groups in a territory surrounded by internal conflicts.

stabilization processes implemented by Ecuadorian civil society and the State. In this section, the relationship between the impact of the so-called Ecuadorian "unfinished guerrillas" and the existence of a weak SLAC in their regions of influence takes on a particular value. Likewise, the State response of armed Enforcement, combined with a border security policy, is striking for a diplomatic response and humanitarian assistance to internal and foreign victims of the conflict with the Ecuadorian and Colombian insurgencies.

Finally, section 4.3 focuses on the empirical evidence for testing the 3E sequential steps of the APS mechanism for strong stabilization in Ecuador. At the same time, I show how Ecuador's idea as an "Island of Peace" symbolizes achieving a high level of post-insurgent stabilization beyond the multiple local meanings that expression has. I claim that this is the result of a State *Enforcement* power that transcends the scope of military security and focuses on processes of *Empowerment* and *Entitlement* of civil society connected by robust transmission vectors of a civilian *culture of peace* and strong APS.

Figure 19 guides and summarizes the Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 APS outcome and the 3E Causal Mechanism empirical testing presented in this chapter.

Figure 19. Ecuador – Planification Zone 1 APS Causal Mechanism



Source: Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013).

4.1 Ecuador: From Small-wars to insurgent low-intensity insurgent conflicts

4.1.1 Ecuadorian insurgency Dynamics: Policial State, Anti-subversive intelligence and Security policies

In contrast to the long history of abandonment and institutional absence of the State in the southwestern Colombian region (Viloria, 2007), the border territory of northern Ecuador became an area of strategic importance for the Ecuadorian State, particularly after the country's war on the southern border with Peru:

Since Ecuador resolved the conflict with Peru in 1998, it considered that the border to be guarded was the northern border. It was also evident that the armed conflict and the reception of refugees had escalated since 2001. Then the north border became important. With Plan Colombia, Álvaro Uribe's idea was to link all Latin America in the fight against terrorism. Still, Ecuador took a different stance, made an intelligent move by remaining formally neutral and marginalized from the conflict (Int. 24).

In this sense, phenomena such as the advance of Colombian guerrillas across the border and the escalation in violence and crime rates in the 1990s (Ministerio de Seguridad, 2008; Arcos, Carrión & Palomeque, 2003; Gómez, 2013) marked a shift in the Ecuadorian State's government attention to the north of the country. This new scenario consolidated internal and border security policies that, among other social, cultural, and legal factors, turned Ecuador into a non-armed enclave (the *Island of Peace*) amid the intense internal conflicts of its neighbors.

I traced the latter throughout various events and moments in its recent history that go back to the Peruvian-Ecuadorian war of 1941 (Spencer, 1998) followed by the signing of the Macro security agreements with the United States and the *Junta Militar* governments in 1963-66. At the same time, events such as General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara's dictatorship, the military triumvirate, and the authoritarian government of León Febres-Cordero (Rivera et al. 2018) between 1984-1988. Finally, the diplomatic tensions of Ecuador with Colombia by the bombing of Angostura after the convulsive years of struggle against the risk of "contagion" and instability by the neighboring foreign insurgencies (Pizarro, 2021; Rivera et al. 2018; Gómez, 2013; Carrión, 2013).

URJE: The beginnings of the armed struggle (1959-1963)

The triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 encouraged the Ecuadorian rebels to undertake a "*Proceso de liberación*" against the dictatorship and the resolution of inequalities through the defense of rural areas in Ecuadorian provinces such as *Los Rios* and *Guayas* (Int 28). Likewise, the Cuban revolution motivates discussions within the Ecuadorian communist and socialist parties regarding strategies to confront the government of Ponce Enríquez and mobilize citizens (peasants and indigenous) against the "passivity" of traditional political parties:

[The Insurgents] They did not conceive that while in Cuba a revolutionary process was triumphing, and in other countries, they were already beginning to hear the "shots," in Ecuador

nothing was happening. Nor did they conceive that in the face of repressive acts of the Ponce regime, such as the massacre in Guayaquil, the parties would not adopt a line of confrontation and would not be at the head of the struggle (Villamizar, 1990).

Consequently, in 1959, a "Youth Movement" known as the *Unión Revolucionaria de Juventudes Ecuatorianas* (URJE) emerged at the *Universidad Central del Ecuador* (Int. 24) to undertake, on its account, an armed struggle that was not backed by the communist party, nor by other sectors of the socialist left:

In the 1960s, with the Cuban revolution and the strengthening of the guerrillas in Latin America, we had a solid first dictatorship, although it was not so strong compared to the rest of Latin America. There we have the first guerrilla. A guerrilla arises from the university sectors, although with a considerable disconnection from the agrarian sectors (Int.24).

Its first constitutive convention was held in the city of Quito in 1960. A command structure was defined by brigades that included creating provincial directors elected at sub-national conventions. This structure of local brigades had as its primary objective the creation of fronts with strong subnational anchors in all Ecuadorian provinces: "Go out to take up arms, go out into the field and start the revolutionary war in our country" (Villamizar, 1990: 28). The strongest of them consolidated in Guayaquil, where they created brigades in popular neighborhoods of workers, the unemployed, and the vulnerable population. In the same way, companies were formed in the *Naranjal* Canton (south of the coastal region) made up of peasant population and the Sierra region, where a large part of the indigenous population converges (Villamizar, 1990).

To that end, from the beginning of URJE, relationships were woven with Latin American movements and organizations related to the objectives of the armed revolution inspired by the Cuban insurgency. One of the most significant links of URJE was the one established with the *Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino* (MOEC) in Colombia, given the interest of both revolutionary movements in promoting border integration of ongoing insurgent projects: "In these circumstances, we identify and support each other a lot [...] Our countries have common borders, they served us for relationships and also to save lives of persecuted in one country or another, and to seek practical solidarity from one people to another, from some fighters to others. In this framework and those perspectives (Villamizar, 1990: 28).

In that order of ideas, the subnational anchors of the insurgency in the territories of the northern border with Colombia gained importance for URJE and for armed organizations that would emerge later, such as *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!*: "URJE is fundamental because AVC and the Montoneros are the children of URJE" (Int. 28). However, the internal debates of the first *Urjista* conference led to *Guayaquil* province being chosen as the headquarters of the National Directorate of URJE in contrast to a sector of the movement that promoted a center of operations far from the leadership of the Ecuadorian communist party (Pacheco, 2006; Rodríguez, 2014).

Additionally, with the arrival of the fourth term of the government of President José María Velasco Ibarra, URJE militants were subjected to severe persecution by the State that included torture and prison detention of several of their members and leaders (Int. 24). At

that time, the US military intervention in the region began to influence the Ecuadorian State strategies to combat the national insurgencies (Ramos, 2009).

Proof of this was the capture by the Ecuadorian police, in May 1961, of a group of URJE militants heading towards *Pichincha* province, known as the *Guerrilla del Pinol*, after the CIA infiltrated the regional *de la Sierra* communist party Centrals (Villamizar, 1990). Then, this event was known as one of the pioneering actions of the State, with the support of the CIA, against the first insurgent outbreak carried out by URJE in Ecuador.

However, the sudden change of government that brought Vice-President Carlos Julio Arosemena to executive power revealed, among other things, the insurgent capacity of URJE in regions such as Guayaquil, where they supported the Arosemena's actions against the Velazquista dictatorship. In this way, although my research did not identify a high URJE's capacity to make Guayaquil a strong Insurgent Exceptional Region (Strong IRE), the events of 1961 at least demonstrate its ability to project an enclave of governance that left some legacies of insurgent violence on the Velasco authoritarian government but not against the civilian population in their territories of influence.

The preceding constitutes the main difference between the Ecuadorian guerrillas and the Colombian ones, given that their legacies of violence rarely affected the civilian population. His focus was always on the State and, eventually, on the country's political or economic class. Hence, the type of SLAC A is identified in its zones of influence (See Section 4.2).

Before the imminent coup against the Arosemena government in 1962 for its refusal to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, URJE promoted the so-called *Guerrilla del Toachi*. That is, an armed group of a parochial type (Staniland, 2017) located in the coastal province of *Santo Domingo de Los Tsáchilas* and made up of leaders and young *Urjista* militants from the provinces of Pichincha, Guayas, and Chimborazo: "The insurgents carry out various activities that They included: The recognition of the area, physical preparation, the study of documents and theoretically, the military insurrection. As quartermaster elements, they had boots and some short weapons" (Villamizar, 1990: 41).

However, the Ecuadorian armed forces quickly contained the advance of the insurgent factions of the *Guerrilla del Toachi*. On April 4, 1962, the Urjistas camps were located, and all its members were arrested. Additionally, factors such as the problematic conditions of displacement between the geographical areas of Costa and Sierra and the existence of infiltrated elements in the troops added to this early military defeat of the guerrilla a low level of subnational anchoring: "The guerrillas have an immense source of human potential to recruit, although it is difficult to attract the Indigenous and peasants because they have a very traditional religious mentality along with other influences" (Villamizar, 1990: 41).

The last URJE National Conference, in January 1963, would be the scene to end the insurgent operations of the *Urjista* guerrilla after the military defeat of *Toachi*. In this scenario, severe military cadres and leaders were expelled and blamed for the guerrillas' operational failure and the misappropriation of funds destined for their financing. This fact marked the decline and subsequent liquidation of the armed movement.

Vencer o Morir, D.O.S and the MIR: Insurgent Fragmentation inside the Guevarista continental struggle (1965-1968)

In 1963, the Arosemena government targeted a coup that led to installing a military junta backed by the United States government (Rivera et al., 2018). Although in strategic and military terms, URJE was already defeated, the new military junta installed a counter-insurgent model that included the potential sources of “terrorism and subversion” (Villamizar, 1990) of the guerrillas as well as the political parties, movements, and political leaders of the Ecuadorian left (Ramos, 2000).

From the repression exerted by the military junta, new factions of the left emerged with the participation of several members of URJE, such as the *Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista del Ecuador* (PCMLE) and the *Partido Socialista Revolucionario Ecuatoriano* (PSRE), who proposed the need to retake a line of armed struggle against the military junta. As a result, the *Vencer o Morir* (VM) movement arises as to the first expression of a vanguard insurgency in Ecuador: “As a group, it was structured for a political-military projection. It carries out in the city various types of actions. ‘*Remuévanse las frutas*’ was one of these actions that consisted of placing bombs on several banks. Work among the peasant masses was considered by VM as fundamental, aided by urban work” (Villamizar, 1990: 54).

Vencer o Morir could be classified as an avant-garde armed group (Staniland, 2017) due to its mainly urban militancy against bourgeois institutions such as private banks and promoting their ideas through massive propaganda medium printed with the same name of the armed group. However, as in the case of URJE, VM's strategic objectives came into check when its members unsuccessfully sought the support of peasants in rural areas and, at the same time, disconnected from the urban ties inherited from URJE.

In parallel, and with similar clandestine operations in the regions of Guayas, Manabí, and, partially, in Pichincha, the *Destacamento de las Organización Secreta* (D.O.S) was also created. In these territories, the D.O.S constituted a movement against the military dictatorship through sabotage and bombing actions such as the one carried out in the II military zone of Guayas (Guayaquil). Likewise, the activities of the D.O.S served as leverage for the installation in Ecuador of the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) outlined by the objectives of the continental revolutionary struggle of the rebel Ernesto “Che” Guevara:

The guerrillas here were the same as everywhere. They had a pyramidal, vertical, military structure. When the 80s arrived, the MIR came from a Chilean experience; it wants to cope with students, generates cadres that can come to power, looking from the popular with an ingredient of the rural and the ethnic highly marked because our very constitution recognized that we were a multi-ethnic country. When the 80s come, you already have the MIR, probably the most organized group. With a high presence of URJE ideologues and a mixture of objectives with the clarity of the MIR (Int. 23)

As in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, the MIR was installed within the framework of the Military Junta but in a period quite close to its end. In this sense, the political-military life of the MIR in Ecuador shifts between the end of the dictatorship of the Castro Jijón

military junta and the creation of a Constituent Assembly that, among other things, judged the members of the Military Junta.

The MIR used this scenario to carry out armed proselytizing actions in the Universities of Quito, Guayaquil, and Portoviejo (Villamizar, 1990) and establish international ties with countries in the region as Cuba. Again, the Ecuadorian guerrilla's operations focused on the *Esmeraldas* and *Manabí* regions (See Section 4.2).

However, the most critical blow experienced by the MIR guerrilla was internal fragmentation (Staniland, 2017). Apart from the difficulties encountered in the dense geography of Esmeraldas, events as the loss of weapons and the arrests of some of its members (its prominent militant René Pinto Acuña was allegedly shot when he launched an explosive device against the Ecuadorian-North American Center in Quito) involved an irreparable fracture in the dome of the MIR.

Simultaneous to this new fracture in the early history of the Ecuadorian armed insurgency, 1968 and 1969 were crucial years for the reactivation of the student movements despite the intense repression of the new government of Velasco Ibarra. The latter exerted on them with the support of paramilitary groups such as the *Frente Nacional Anticomunista* and the group *La Revancha* (Villamizar, 1990). During these years, small armed foci such as AU-SHIRIS (*Pueblo en Guerra*) in Guayaquil and some emerging factions of the MIR in the area of *Los Ríos*, *Valencia*, *Babahoyo*, and the banana area of *Quevedo*, carried out specific actions such as the assault on banking institutions, support for worker and peasant resistance actions until the period of a new dictatorial regime led by General Guillermo Ródriguez Lara (1972-1976).

In May 1972, after half of Rodríguez Lara's government, the so-called *Comando Obrero Revolucionario* (COR) arose in Guayaquil. A group made up of dissidents from the Ecuadorian Communist and Socialist Party interested in promoting an avant-garde insurgency in the style of the Uruguayan *Tupamaros* guerrilla. Despite its internal critic division, the actions of this armed group lasted until 1976, when the Ecuadorian State detained its members after they carried out an armed action against the Provincial Council of Guayas. The active members of the COR would later become part of the guerrilla bases of *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!*

Between 1976 and 1979, Ecuador experienced a new military government, this time under the *Triunvirato* or *Consejo Supremo de Gobierno* chaired by Vice Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano. The Triumvirate government fluctuated between the continuity of Latin American military dictatorships and citizens' demands, unions, and popular demand for democratization by way of a new constitution. In this sense, the objectives of this new military junta shifted from the anti-subversive approach that criminalized a large sector of the political left and the Ecuadorian social movement towards the modernizing "*Plan de Reestructuración Jurídica del Estado*".

However, the repressive actions of the State against the workers of the *Aztra* sugar mill, historically known as the *Masacre de Aztra*, among other hostile acts against the social and political movement, revived the insurgent outbreaks in the Guayas and Manabi regions. An

emblematic case of his actions was the kidnapping and subsequent murder of businessman Jose Antonio Briz (“Caso Briz”) involving militants of the so-called *Comandos Revolucionarios de Liberación* (CRL). After his capture, they managed to escape from their place of detention with the supposed help of the M-19 Colombian guerrilla.

At that time, the Ecuadorian authorities already had strong indications about links between the Ecuadorian and Colombian guerrillas in areas of strategic border importance, such as the province of *Esmeraldas*. The protagonists of this cross-border insurgent alliance were the armed movements *Alfaro Vive Carajo!* (Ecuador) and the *M-19* (Colombia). Their relationship marked a new moment in the dynamics of the insurgent armed conflict of the Ecuadorian guerrillas against governments such as León Febres-Cordero (1984-1988) and the strategic withdrawal of the Colombian foreign insurgencies:

AVC was the M-19 clone. It is not that it had much ideological clarity, but it does have a more vital anchor towards inequality and class struggle. They did have a nationalist relationship with the M-19. In all, they did have a bit of asepsis against rural areas, and they considered themselves more educated. It was a bourgeois guerrilla where the M-19 suited them because they are not a guerilla fighting in the jungle (Int. 23).

Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) and *Montoneras Patria Libre: Low-Intensity Armed Conflict⁹ or “Cold War” against the Insurgency (1983-1991)*

The AVC guerrilla has as a precedent the integration of several subnational insurgent nuclei such as the OPM (the “apparatus”); *Los Chapulos*, which operated in rural areas of the *Esmeraldas* province; *Los Nostálgicos* also from the Ecuadorian Coastal region and *Los Panchos* (Villamizar, 1990). Each group was engaged in political and military doctrine in their regions of influence before integrating into AVC.

In 1982, the most important founding member of the AVC militancy, Arturo Jarrín, wrote a document in which he rescues the figure of the general and former president of Ecuador, Eloy Alfaro (El Comercio, 2012), as an emblem of a new insurrectionary project and armed for the nation (Int. 28). In turn, he calls for creating a coordinating board in charge of planning an annual conference of the movement and its national promotion under the slogan: “1983, Year of the People. ¡Alfaro vive, carajo!” (Pacheco, 2006; Rodríguez, 2014).

In this way, the AVC guerrilla was born with a contingent of sixty militants who make up the *Frente Revolucionario del Pueblo Eloy Alfaro* (FRPEA) in the Coastal and border region

⁹ In the historical context of the cold war and the North American counterinsurgency policy, a low-intensity armed conflict aimed to defeat movements of popular rebellion and combat the risks of destabilization of governments allied to the United States of America (Strurgill, 1993). However, contemporary definitions of this term point to the dynamics of “small-war” were: “Wars are not considered ‘real wars’ to conventionally minded military professionals, however lethal they may be. Never quite dignified as ‘real fighting’, especially by military historians and theorists [...] This controversy is fanned by the fact that the combatants involved have seldom been recognized as lawful. Writers have described them as bandits, criminals, terrorists, and the like, whether they are the aggrieved group or the recognized authority” (Cann, 2006: 107-108). My research adopts the two (historical and contemporary) senses of the term for explaining how the Ecuadorian State confronted the national insurgencies in times of President León Febres-Cordero and prevented the escalation of a long-lasting armed conflict like the one experienced by neighboring States Colombia and Peru.

of *Esmeraldas* (Terán, 1994; 2006). The creation of this Armed Front happened after the election of a central AVC leadership made up of Arturo Jarrín and representatives of the sub-national armed groups that joined the new insurgent project. The central objective of this guerrilla aimed to:

Fight for a popular, democratic, anti-oligarchic, and anti-imperialist revolution. To this end, assuming a Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) strategy would accumulate 'hot' force, that is, acting politically-militarily in every conjuncture of the country, doing politics with the support of arms, without hiding from the people, making them aware of our political project (Pacheco, 2006: 8).

Similar to the media impact actions carried out by the M-19 guerrillas in Colombia, the members of the FRPEA assaulted, in August 1983, the Municipal Museum of Guayaquil, taking from the place the sword of General Eloy Alfaro as a sign of their declared armed conflict with the Ecuadorian State (Crisis Magazine, 2019; Pacheco, 2006). Also, the national leadership of AVC receives militants such as Fausto Basantes and Edgar Frías as AVC leaders, while Arturo Jarrin and a group of the FRPEA were trained militarily in Libya with the help of joint efforts with the Colombian M-19.

Between 1984 and 1985, AVC's operations included promoting its slogans in the public space, the taking over radio installations to express its political ideas against the recently inaugurated León Febres-Cordero, and the assault on government facilities such as the American embassy in Quito (Crisis, 2019). Likewise, the media and State authorities point to the AVC militancy as responsible for urban armed actions such as the robbery of banking entities, installing explosives, pamphlet bombs, and looting of factories (Pacheco, 2006; Terán, 1994; 2006).

However, the first AVC commanders conference, held in January 1985, was the space in which this guerrilla decided to strengthen its urban armed actions and extend its military force to rural areas (*Frente Militar Rural* - FMR) to obtain, as in the case of previous insurgent projects, the sub-national anchor necessary to link peasants, indigenous people and workers in their armed revolution. Likewise, that meeting of the leaders would be the scene where the kidnapping of the Guayaquil banker Nahim Isaías was planned as part of the organization's financing activities and armed advance against what they called "visible representatives of the Ecuadorian oligarchy" (Int. 28).

After the theft of arms from the Ecuadorian national police, on August 7, 1985, AVC armed commandos, with the support of the Colombian M-19, carried out the kidnapping of the Ecuadorian banker Nahím Isaías. This event represented a turning point in the dynamics of the urban armed struggle of AVC (Int. 28) and, in turn, in the security strategy of President León Febres-Cordero for State enforcement rule and the pursuit of the Ecuadorian insurgency (Rivera et al. 2018; Guerra, 2011).

The insurgent command in charge of the kidnapped requested, among other things, a large sum of money for the rescue of the businessman and the freedom of the imprisoned Alfarista militants (Diario Hoy, 1995 February, 12). This operation resulted from the death of Nahím Isaías in the middle of the armed confrontation that led to the attempted military rescue of

the kidnapped ordered by the Febrescorderista government (Diario Hoy, 1995). Similarly, before the rescue attempt, essential members of the armed operation were captured, such as the Ecuadorian Juan Cuví and the Colombians José Guevara and Fernando Castañeda (El Universo, 2010 June 20).

In the middle of this low-intensity armed conflict (Cann, 2006; Ramos, 2009), the government of León Febres-Cordero enforced its policy against the insurgency: "We are going to fight terrorism, as the maximum expression of crime in society" (El Universo, 2010 June 20). At the same time, he unleashed a series of actions of civil repression and political-military intelligence at the head of non-formalized organizations such as the Servicio de Investigación Criminal (SIC-10). In 2010, the last one would be accused of monitoring, torture, and executing extrajudicial actions by a large part of the AVC insurgent militancy, the Alfarista leader Arturo Jarrín (Comisión de la Verdad, 2010).

One of my interviewees regarding this strategy and its leading operating agent, the SIC-10, states:

In Ecuador, what is beginning to be seen is a strategy or tactic of fear. The government's plan was that if you were young, they could easily take you to jail or *Casas de Seguridad* and disappear you. Taking into account that most of the recruits from the guerrillas were young. There is talk that other methods existed, but these are not transcendent in the dismantling of the entire system [...] The SIC-10 did not exist anywhere in the organization chart. There was a unit in the Ministry called the *Unidad de seguridad pública*, which was also made by a Minister (ex-military). This *Unidad de seguridad pública* had the power to control public order through two fundamental weapons: The informants ("pesquisas") who infiltrate, and the police officer who obtained information (Int. 24).

As said above, these complaints about the human rights violations against social and political sectors of the Ecuadorian left were subsequently investigated by Entitlement mechanisms such as the *Comisión de la Verdad* (CVE) in 2007. However, the political-military intelligence of the Febres-Cordero government favored the development of an effective infrastructure for internal security based on institutional changes and international support to combat the insurgency (Rivera et al., 2018).

Among these actions, the alliance with The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (MOSSAD) was crucial bringing the anti-terrorist expert Ran Gazit (Int. 23), who trained the elite groups of the Ecuadorian National Police and State Special Intelligence Units: "The responsibility of training groups such as the *Grupo de Intervención y Rescate* -GIR- o the clandestine *Unidad de Servicio de Investigación Criminal* -SIC 10. [For that moment] Also appeared The *Unidad de Inteligencia Antisubversiva* -UIAS- and the *Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales* -UIES-: Intelligence agencies with technical and financial assistance from international cooperation (Rivera et al. 2018: 47)

With the assassination of the Alfarista leader Fausto Basantes in January 1986, the existence of these counterinsurgent agencies was revealed (Pacheco, 2006; Terán, 1994; 2006). Despite the imminent military defeat by the State, the *Alfaristas* declared 1986 as the year in which they would demolish the "Myth about the impossibility of implanting a rebel army in the country" (Int. 28). However, after Basante's death, there was also that of Hammet Vásconez

-head of the Alfarista nucleus of the so-called *Batallón América*- in September 1986, and that of Arturo Jarrín -maximum Alfarista leader- after his capture and torture by part of intelligence agencies of the Ecuadorian State (Pacheco, 2006; Villamizar, 1990; Truth Commission, 2010):

The death of the historical leader of AVC, and the last member of the Central Command, marked a milestone in the development of events. In front of the country, and a kind of non-existence, a period of political and military silence of AVC opened that, almost exclusively, was only broken by continuous falls of militants, dismantling of structures, the discovery of strategic plans and military operations without any political sense or correspondence with the situation. (Pacheco, 2006: 19)

Despite the above, the *Alfaristas* surviving the intense armed confrontation with the State claimed in their third national conference, held in 1988, the political-military character of AVC and ruled out any option of installing bilateral dialogues with the Ecuadorian government. Likewise, they rejected the possibility of surrendering their weapons and, much less, negotiating the possible State incorporation into the political and partisan life of the country (Pacheco, 2006).

Undoubtedly, the *Alfaristas* insurgent spirit constantly denied what they called the Ecuadorians aim to accept: "the electoral rules of the game and expectations and even hope about the new government" (Int. 28). However, as said above, it was precisely that "democratic hope" of Ecuadorian civil society and its "culture of peace" (Int. 25) that ratified the myth of the impossibility of armed struggle in Ecuador and its clear commitment to unarmed social mobilization:

Finally, nothing materialized with the different political and social organizations of the country. So, AVC "took the risk" of convening the *Diálogo Nacional* by itself through public events [...]. Thus, as of June 1989, AVC increased its "rooting in popular sectors". Its efforts were accompanied by a proposal to create "popular militias" that did not have acceptance in the social sectors because they were "foreign entities" (Pacheco, 2006: 31)

The previous also corroborates in the interviews with former AVC militants and members of the Ecuadorian government conducted during my research:

Subversion in Ecuador was more difficult because of the government's enforcement and empowerment strategies than the guerrillas' impact. This government [the Febres-Cordero one] was highly controlled and authoritarian. So, the idea of subversion and the armed left in Ecuador is not an idea of significant impact on the historical memory of Ecuadorians. (Int. 24)

Likewise, I identified this argument in the historical testimonies regarding the little interest in the armed struggle of AVC on the part of social and indigenous organizations: "When the expectations of achieving a *Diálogo Nacional* vanished, AVC moved towards abandoning the weapons. 'Pacification' became, then, the central term of the Alfarista discourse" (Pacheco, 2006: 32). In this way, and after the end of the insurgent violence of the 80s and 90s, political movements with a strong capacity for collective action were consolidated, among them: The *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* and the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (CONAIE). The latter was created in 1986.

At the beginning of 1989, the Alfarista insurgents finally established a peace agreement with the government of Rodrigo Borja (Terán, 1994; 2006). Their disarmament took place two years later, in February 1991, with the mediation of the Catholic Church and the guarantee of international observers (El Universo, 2010) (See section 4.1.3), thus leaving a strong impression on the effectiveness of the State for containing the advance of national insurgencies:

The end of AVC evidenced a precise, direct containment and total public rejection against the insurgency. In the '80s, the government's strategy's effectiveness was very high and prominent. I believe that we also did one thing that remains 35 years later: To have an extraordinary capacity for political intelligence. A political intelligence to deter the internal armed conflict that was extraordinary compared to Colombia and Peru cases (Int. 24).

4.1.2 M-19, FARC-EP, and ELN Colombian Foreign Insurgencies: Post-conflict instability on the northern border and the new risk of “contagion”

M19: Batallón America and Alliances with AVC

The *Batallón América* became one of the first insurgent experiences that summoned several armed movements in the South American region against their countries' oligarchic and dictatorial power. It was also the scene for the incursion of the foreign insurgencies of Colombia, and partially Peru, into Ecuadorian territory (Int. 28). In this sense, more than an armed experience derived from the internationalization of the internal Colombian conflict (Borda, 2009; Trujillo, 2013), the *Batallón América* was an expression of the insurgent project that linked Ecuador with the internal armed struggle based on pioneering alliances between AVC and M-19:

Apart from armed propaganda operations, AVC's aimed its actions to obtaining the necessary resources for the maintenance and development of a rural military force that, fighting at that time in the Colombian southwest region, was part of the “Batallón America” (BA): An embryo of the Latin American army made up of Colombians, Peruvians, and Ecuadorians, whose existence was made public on February 19, 1986, by taking over a radio station in Quito (Pacheco, 2006: 17).

The first presence of the M-19 in Ecuador dates to 1979 when its former Colombian leader Jaime Báteman Cayón used the Ecuadorian border area as a rearguard zone for his troops after the theft of more than 7,000 weapons from the North Canton of the Colombian Army in the city of Bogotá (Villamizar, 1990). By that year, there were rumors about alliances between the Ecuadorian and Colombian guerrillas for military training and the joint development of military operations (International Crisis Group, 2003; El Universo, 2010 June 20a).

In March 1981, the Ecuadorian authorities captured and later handed over to the Colombian authorities a group of forty guerrillas from the Southern Front of the M-19 identified in the Ecuadorian region of Esmeraldas after intense combats between the Colombian army and the insurgents in border territory (CNMH, 2016). As a result of its capture, the M-19 deployed a

series of attacks, ambushes, and armed clashes against Ecuadorian military patrols in the regions of *San Lorenzo*, *La Bermeja*, and the eastern border that were responded to by an "anti-guerrilla plan" executed by the armed forces of both countries (Villamizar, 1990).

On the other hand, to the use of Ecuadorian territory as a strategic rearguard for the M-19, military actions added to those sought to consolidate the AVC's insurgent alliance with the M-19 in areas of strategic interest to the former. Proof of this was the participation of the M-19 in multiple insurgent operations, such as the assault on the *Banco Nacional de Fomento de Lago Agrío* (Sucumbios province) attributed to the insurgency *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* and the kidnapping of the Guayaquil banker Nahím Isaías in 1985.

The panorama of this alliance changed in August 1984 when the M-19 initiated a peace process with the Colombian government of Virgilio Barco that led to its demobilization and disarmed in March 1990 (Villamizar, 1990; 2017; Valencia; 2019). As said above, for 1989, AVC did the same with the government of Rodrigo Borja as clear evidence of the difficulties of undertaking an insurgent armed struggle in Ecuador without the support of the population and foreign insurgencies that supported their armed conflict for several years (Int. 28).

FARC-EP: Insurgent Diplomacy and Conflict on the Northern Border

The presence of the Colombian FARC-EP guerrilla in Ecuador was part of its internationalization strategies for searching the status of belligerence outside the national territory (Trujillo, 2013; Borda, 2009). Although antecedents linking foreign insurgencies with rebel groups in Ecuador (ISS, 2011) -and even with some social and indigenous organizations (Trujillo, 2013)- existed, their direct actions against the Ecuadorian State are not comparable with those established by armed groups such as AVC and M-19. However, by 1987 the FARC-EP would have militarily trained AVC fronts (ISS, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2003). Likewise, there was talk of new alliances with armed strongholds of AVC at the time of the structuring of the so-called *Frente Bolivariano* in Ecuador (BBC, 2005 June 30).

My research identifies at least three actions of strategic interest of the FARC-EP guerrilla in Ecuadorian territory: First, the search for political recognition by the Ecuadorian governments distancing themselves from US and Colombian policies to combat the regional insurgency (Trujillo, 2013; Int. 24); second, the FARC-EP's interest in controlling Ecuadorian territories on the northern border (Carchi, Imbabura, Esmeraldas, Sucumbios) for practicing insurgent governance and manage routes and illegal revenues linked to operations such as drug trafficking (InsightCrime, 2011; Idler, 2019); and finally, the use of the northern border territory as a rearguard and strategic sanctuary for its cross-border armed operations (Pizarro, 2021).

Although this set of strategic actions did not seem to configure a direct risk of armed conflict between the FARC-EP and Ecuador, the rebel governance and insurgent diplomacy in Ecuadorian territory generated legacies of violence and infractions of international humanitarian law (ISS, 2011; Idler, 2019; García, 2019). After Ecuador's peace negotiations with its national guerrillas, the latter threatened post-conflict stability. Thus, since the 1990s, the FARC-EP strategy shifted from the development of armed actions against the Ecuadorian

militaries (El Tiempo, December 28, 1993) to a policy of domination on the border and a threat of “infiltration” of the Ecuadorian social, political and military apparatus capable of destabilizing and “infecting” the exercise of the national government with the insurgency.

The above happened due to the consolidation of the FARC-EP's IRE on both sides of the Colombian-Ecuadorian border and the effectiveness of insurgent diplomacy with Ecuador in the best style of a border *para-State* with governance capacities in territories of high State precariousness in Colombia. Likewise, to destabilize its non-insurgent Ecuadorian neighbor (Idler, 2019). Evidence of the latter was the statement, in July of 2000, of the so-called FARC-EP *canciller*, Rodrigo Granda, warning Ecuador on why: "The Ecuadorian government must maintain strict neutrality in the face of the Colombian conflict" (EFE News Services, 2000 July 19).

Ecuador's response rejecting the threats of the FARC-EP was immediate. However, the efforts of the International Committee (COMINTER) of this guerilla, created in 1999, for the political recognition and status of belligerence on the part of Ecuador consolidated the so-called “International Front” in countries of Central, South, North America, and Europe (Trujillo, 2013). In neighboring countries such as Ecuador, after their targeted attacks on the border, the FARC-EP's strategy consisted of establishing new political ties and alliances with leftist governments in such a way as to isolate the actions of the Colombian government for regional cooperation against the armed insurgency (ISS, 2011: 305).

In that way Rodrigo Granda sought, since the early 1990s, to “infiltrate” (ISS, 2011) in social and political organizations in Ecuador to seek support and legitimacy for the armed group. By the year 2000, the FARC-EP would have managed to support the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad by the Ecuadorian indigenous movement and middle ranks of the Armed Forces. They warned in the figure of Mahuad, a potential ally of Colombia and the United States that threatened to extend the armed conflict towards Ecuador.

The FARC-EP's insurgent diplomacy also included contacts with members of the country's politics and internal security. The insurgency offered incentives to hinder Ecuador's intelligence and counterinsurgent cooperation efforts (ISS, 2011). Based on the files seized on Raúl Reyes' personal computer, after the bombing of his camp in the Sucumbios region, the insurgent diplomacy of the FARC-EP would have established direct deals with the governments of Lucio Gutierrez (2003-2005), Alfredo Palacio (2005-2007) and Rafael Correa (2007-2017) (ISS, 2011). These governments would have had to include the FARC-EP in its “informal” diplomatic agenda to keep stable the post-conflict scenario inherited from the *post-febrecorderista* governments.

In this sense, Ecuador's response focused on maintaining its neutrality in the face of the Colombian internal armed conflict and strengthening its border security policy (Trujillo, 2013; ISS, 2011). The preceding, except for Lucio Gutierrez's government which, in January 2004, captured and subsequently extradited the FARC-EP *Canciller* Rodrigo Granda (El Universo, 2005 January 12) and dismantled multiple of their camps on the border with Colombia (InsightCrime, 2011 January 7).

A few days after the extradition of Rodrigo Granda, representatives of the political and social sectors accused President Gutierrez of breaking the conditions of political neutrality in Ecuador in the face of the Colombian armed conflict and putting the stability of the country at risk due to the potential armed responses of the guerrilla of the FARC-EP in its national territory (García, 2008).

Changes in this scenario of insurgent diplomacy would come in 2008 with the bombing of the Raúl Reyes camp in Santa Rosa de Yanamaru (Angostura) by the Colombian army within the so-called *Operación Fénix* (Pizarro, 2021). This military operation unleashed diplomatic tension between the two countries. It marked the beginning of a series of international complaints about the violation of Ecuadorian sovereignty (Comision de Transparencia y Verdad Angostura, 2009).

Thus, the Angostura bombing became a key milestone for implementing a human security strategy for the border that openly contrasted with the militarist policy of *Plan Colombia* and offered better conditions of post-conflict stability to the northern border through *Plan Ecuador* (See Section 4.3):

[The bombing of] Angostura was not a victory for Ecuador. It reflected weakness in a border zone with special needs. After that, we achieved things like the States could not carry out more preventive armed attacks in Latin American territory. Still, the important was the beginning of relations with foreign agencies and, on the other hand, invested a lot in infrastructure, political intelligence, and development on the northern border (Int. 24).

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN): Attacks on the Border and Its “Silent” Expansion Through Ecuador after FARC-EP border governance

The ELN presence in Ecuador was similar to that already exposed on the M-19 and the FARC-EP insurgencies. However, ELN achieved its highest territorial and armed penetration on the Colombian-Ecuadorian border after the FARC-EP foreign insurgency signed the comprehensive peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2017 (ISS, 2011; Pizarro, 2021).

Based on statements by Pablo Beltrán, member of the ELN's *Comando Central* (COCE), this guerrilla finances its insurgent activities by charging a tax to intermediaries in the illegal narcotics business in areas such as the Colombian-Ecuadorian border. That means growing and selling the leaf of coca in territories under its total control (Primicias, 2021 March 21). In this vein, apart from the strategic rearguard functions, the Ecuadorian border territory serves as an enclave of governance, “insurgent federalism” (González, 2021), and an illegal economy to finance some fronts of this highly fragmented and regionalized guerrilla.

One emblematic case of the critical armed risk for Ecuador was the alliances between the ELN and the *Oliver Sinisterra* front: “Members of the ELN have contact with the dissidents of the Farc, one of them was the group commanded by *alias Guacho*. The latter indicates that the ELN used Ecuador to strengthen its position and establish contacts for its illegal activities” (La FM, 2021 February 1). However, military operations of Colombia and Ecuador in the Planification Zone 1 led to the death of *Oliver Sinisterra* Front leaders (El

Comercio, 2018 December 22) and intensifying the armed conflict between guerrillas, Illegal armed groups, and paramilitaries that threaten to remain with armed control of this border area (Primicias, 2021 March 21; Planv, 2021).

With the end of the insurgent diplomacy strategies and the arrival of the Lenín Moreno government (See Section 4.3), the Ecuadorian authorities denounced ELN guerrilla groups in Quito to presumably support indigenous protests against the president's economic measures (Int. 24). They also accused him of planning actions of "urban guerrillas" within the context of the *Paro Nacional* in October of that same year. On the other hand, the Ecuadorian State has denounced the actions of the ELN's *Comuneros del Sur* Front since its incursion into the northern border through the Colombian department of Nariño (Planv, 2021).

In this sense, the Lenín Moreno government replaced the responses to the pragmatic insurgent diplomacy used during the FARC-EP years of rebel governance on the northern border for military cooperation with the Colombian State and, in turn, the mediation for a peace dialogue with the ELN guerrilla in Ecuadorian territory (See Section 4.1.3).

However, with the failure of the peace negotiations inaugurated in 2017, threats regarding possible attacks on military installations and units in the municipalities of *Mira* in the province of *Carchi* and *San Lorenzo* in Esmeraldas were also attributed to the ELN's *Comuneros del Sur* Front as a result of: "Retaliation against the Ecuadorian government for expelling the country from guerrilla leaders, after having refused to continue to be the guarantor of the peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government" (El Comercio, 2019 January 29).

Today, the alerts about possible attacks in Ecuadorian territory were the object of attention of the national authorities who reactivate their investigations on the potential links of the ELN in Ecuador established during the failed peace process with the Colombian government and reinforced their security policy in the northern border.

4.1.3 End of the internal armed insurgency and negotiating peace in neighboring armed conflicts.

Most of the Ecuadorian guerrillas inspired by the Cuban and Sandinista revolution and the armed conflicts in neighboring countries (Colombia and Peru) were militarily defeated by the Ecuadorian State or entered into a dissolution, and internal fragmentation process ended their projects of armed revolution. However, the attempts to break the Ecuadorian myth of the "*imposible revolución por vía de las armas*" (Int. 28) configured in the '80s, as mentioned above, a low-intensity conflict between the AVC guerrilla and the Ecuadorian State, which led to the peace process between AVC and the government of Rodrigo Borja, and the subsequent disarm in 1991.

In the words of one of its founders, AVC found it necessary to negotiate peace with the Rodrigo Borja government after this guerrilla suffered a high number of casualties from the Ecuadorian police and political intelligence agencies created in times of *Febrescorderismo*: "Between 25 and 30 AVC militants (all Ecuadorians) died during the Febres-Cordero

government in clashes with the Police, extrajudicial executions or torture, and that another 130 were arrested and served sentences" (El Universo, 2010 June 20th).

Although in its 3rd National Conference in 1988, the AVC guerrilla ratified "the need for armed rebellion" (Int. 28). For that same year, AVC began conversations with a view to a possible peace negotiation with the newly established government of Rodrigo Borja. By November 1988, AVC advanced several internal discussions on the conditions for negotiation and the new *Alfarista* Democracy project (Pacheco, 2006; Villamizar, 1990). It generated armed dissidents such as the one headed by Commander Eloy García in 1988 and Patricio Baquerizo in 1990 (El Telégrafo, 1991 February 26). However, the *Alfarista* leadership adopted changes in its political discourse in the face of the negotiation's public phase, finally known in November of that same year (La Hora, 1988, November 24).

The negotiation promoted by the AVC insurgency included at least four moments of what they called "a process of concertation" with the government and the social and political forces of Ecuador. The latter, in contrast to the thesis of the surrender and lay down of arms publicized by the government of Borja. The four moments of the dialogue included: First, an inclusive national and subnational debate based on the construction of consultation scenarios in each province of Ecuador, leading to the subsequent installation of a National Assembly; second, a national representation of popular sectors participating in the dialogue; third, national dissemination of the debates and proposals achieved during the talk; and finally, a binding agreement that turns the arrangements into government plans. (Pacheco, 2006).

From this forthcoming peace route with constituent process overtones, the Ecuadorian government agreed to carry out actions for the national dialogue that, among other effects, led to a general agreement on March 7, 1989, for the cessation of armed operations by AVC (Today, 1989 March 7). Similarly, the public phase of the national dialogue included proposals for the pardon and amnesty of the AVC militants imprisoned in Ecuadorian prisons and the absolute surrender of weapons.

In March 1990, advances in the peace agreements with the Borja government included the laying down of arms and the possibility of creating a route for the incorporation of AVC into the political life of Ecuador (Int. 28). This proposal had as a condition the reinforcement of participatory democracy, the implementation of social policies for the population, and the creation of actual guarantees for a political party building (Hoy, 1991 February 21). However, dissidents from the AVC leadership, the right-oriented mass media, and sectors opposed to the dialogue questioned the effective AVC disarmed process. They denounced the alleged existence of economic agreements between the government and the guerrilla negotiators (El Telégrafo, 1991 February 26).

Finally, in January 1991, AVC announced the final lay down of its arms in a public ceremony on February 26 attended by political leaders from Uruguay, Spain, and Colombia. The latter was represented by the political Antonio Navarro Wolf, Former leader of the defunct "twin" guerrilla of AVC and, at that time, nascent post-insurgent political party M-19:

AVC announced the hand over its arms to successfully conclude the pacification process that began in March 1989 [...]. A new stage of the alfarista discourse began whose characteristics

refer to the arguments once raised by the Ecuadorian right. Through a public act whose climax was supposed to be the definitive crushing of the war arsenal, the laying down of arms formally closed the history of an unfinished guerrilla. The Ecuadorian government authorities, the Church, and the National Police expressed their approval (Pacheco, 2006: 33)

The presence of ex-M19 leader Navarro Wolf in the AVC disarmament ceremony also evidenced how the peace agreements between the M-19 insurgency and the Colombian government of Virgilio Barco motivated the AVC guerrilla to establish a negotiated solution with the Ecuadorian state. At the same time, M-19 peace negotiations enforce its subsequent efforts to incorporate into the partisan political competition. As a result, both M-19 and AVC, created or incorporated insurgent successor parties (Holland, 2016) in Colombia and Ecuador, respectively, after negotiated peace processes that moved them from arms to the polls with relatively favorable results (See Section 4.3).

In that line, my research shows how the role of foreign insurgencies for weakening the State suggested by Lee (2020) seems not to be fulfilled in the specific case of AVC and M-19 alliances in Ecuador. First, the Colombian State never supports M-19 foreign insurgency operations against Ecuador. Second, although the two “sister” insurgencies carried out multiple joint armed actions against Ecuador, the peace negotiations legacies of the M-19 with the Colombian State illustrated an alternative to intervene in the weak AVC legacies of violence in Ecuador and, in turn, arbitrate its national insurgent disarmament process.

After the success of the peace process of the Ecuadorian State with the AVC guerrilla in the '90s, few experiences of armed national insurgency could have an echo in the Ecuadorian political and media agenda. As an example, the armed operatives of the so-called *Grupo de Combatientes Populares* (GCP) active between 1992 (1997?) and 2010 did not go beyond threats about the use of bombs to attack some universities and the media in cities such as Quito and Guayaquil (El Comercio, 2012 December 21)

Likewise, the efforts of the Ecuadorian government for mediating the negotiation of peace in Colombia occurred after Ecuadorian president Jamil Mahuad signed the so-called Peace of Brazil (Int. 24) for ending the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru known as *Guerra del Cenepa* (Spencer, 1998). With the threat of the armed conflict on the border with Peru resolved, the post-conflict security and stabilization policies targeted the Colombian-Ecuadorian border (See Section 4.3).

A few years later, President Gustavo Noboa visited his Colombian counterpart Andrés Pastrana in the scenario of Colombia's peace negotiations with the FARC-EP guerrillas to express Ecuador's support for peace in Colombia:

Based on the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the states and the self-determination of the peoples, the Government of Ecuador considers that the Colombians must resolve the current Colombian conflict. However, and within the strictest adherence to the principles of international law, [Ecuador] is willing to collaborate in whatever Colombia requires for the deepening of the peace process (El Tiempo, 2000 August 23).

Although the meeting of national leaders oriented to peace issues, Noboa's formal diplomatic management included the intervention of his Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller to express Ecuador's concern about the potential risks of *Plan Colombia* on its northern border. Issues such as the use of glyphosate for the fumigation of coca crops (See Section 4.3) and the impacts on the Ecuadorian population due to the armed confrontation between the Colombian army and the guerrillas in border territories were part of the official diplomatic management of the Ecuadorian State in the times of Noboa (El Comercio, 2014 June 13).

In a similar line acted Lucio Gutierrez (ISS, 2011), who in 2002 visited Colombia, as president-elected, to deliver to President Álvaro Uribe a peace plan for Colombia and, especially, for the Colombian-Ecuadorian border (El Universo, 2002 November 28). Likewise, the subsequent government of Alfredo Palacio expressed unrestricted support for *Plan Colombia* despite the multiple criticisms of Ecuador for the impacts of said security policy on the internationalization of the Colombian armed conflict towards its neighboring countries (García, 2002).

However, confidential communications were published by the ISS in 2011, revealing contacts from the FARC-EP leaders such as Raúl Reyes and Rodrigo Granda with the Ecuadorian Government. They constituted new evidence of how foreign insurgent diplomacy dealt with Ecuadorian civil, military officials and intermediaries to maintain stable the conflict scenario on the Colombian-Ecuadorian border. This double “management” with Colombian State and insurgent diplomacy constituted one of the crucial strategies for enforcing the border security policy that led Ecuador to consolidate its APS strong level after negotiating with the national guerrillas (See Section 4.3).

In 2016, the government of Rafael Correa expressed its desire for Ecuador to be the host for negotiations between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the ELN guerrilla (Europa Press, 2016 September 10). The negotiation plan agreed between the parts would be formally discussed in Quito and included six essential points: Participation of society, democracy for peace, transformations for peace, victims, end of the armed conflict, and implementation. (Verdad Abierta, 2017 February 8).

After several armed operations by the ELN to show its capacity against the Colombian State military attacks, the public phase of the negotiations began on October 27, 2016, in Quito. However, the ELN's failure in pre-conditions, such as to deliver the civilian hostages captured during the war, led to a temporary suspension of the negotiations (January 7, 2017). After intense negotiation cycles, accompanied by the government of Ecuador, on September 4, 2017, the ELN and the Colombian government announced a temporary ceasefire until January 9, 2018.

However, the route of negotiation changed when the ELN's *Frentes de Guerra Occidental* and *Suroccidental* broke the agreed ceasefire and committed attacks on the civilian population, including the murder of indigenous leader and the massacre of 13 people in a rural area of the *Magüi Payán* municipality, Nariño (border with Ecuador). Finally, on April 18, 2018, the Ecuadorian government of Lenín Moreno decided not to continue hosting the negotiations, given the strong wave of armed violence on the border that led to the death of at least seven Ecuadorians.

President Moreno's announcement opened a new question about Ecuador's strategy to maintain its status as "Island of Peace" and avoid contagion of instability after the FARC-EP and the reactivation of ELN hostilities on the northern border. Likewise, the Colombian-Ecuadorian border was once again at the mercy of disputes over armed control that currently threaten to break the post-conflict stability of Ecuador and delve into the weak APS level of neighboring regions such as the Colombian southwest described in chapter 3 of my research (See Section 3.3).

4.2 SLAC and Armed Hostility Dynamics: From center to the peripheral Insurgent Regions of Exception (Pichincha to Planning Zone 1)

After tracing the dynamics of the low-intensity armed conflict and the posterior peace agreement with the guerrillas in Ecuador, my research focuses on the subnational IRE geonested analysis based on the Ecuadorian decentralization process that divided, in 2010, the national territory in planning zones as seen in Map 13 (IGM, 2010). In this line, the provinces integrating the Ecuadorian planning zone selected as the unit of analysis are independent of my research design. Likewise, they do not alter the Ecuadorian political and subnational administrative division.

Additionally, the provincial integration resulting from the Ecuadorian planning zones serves as a functional equivalent of the Colombian and Peruvian sub-national units (Regions) configuration. The latter is also for balance and comparability of my within and between nation diverse cases strategy. Likewise, the inclusion of border provinces belonging to the three regions of Ecuador allows us to cover the variation associated with the state presence, social repertoires, and strategic importance of the territories of Ecuador with the presence of national and foreign insurgencies.

As said above, the *Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo* presented, in the first decade of 2000, a proposal for designing a "decentralized and autonomous Regional State" (Muñoz, 2008) as an alternative to the historical "bicentralization" (Guayaquil and Quito) of the Ecuadorian strategic development. In this way, the sub-national dynamics of the country underwent a shift in its territorial configuration that sought an environmentally and socially equitable development, as well as more economically profitable (IGM, 2010).

As a result, Ecuador defined seven planning zones (See map 13) in the manner of regions or administrative organization entities to deconcentrate state management and implement its policies throughout the national territory based on parameters such as:

A local government level close to the population; a central government guiding and promoting the country, with an overall vision; and an intermediate level of government that favors coordination and complementarity between the local and national levels, and that also assumes sub-national development (Muñoz, 2008).

Map 13. Ecuadorian Regions/Planification Zones



Source: Own elaboration based on SENPLADES/PAD 2007

In this sense, the Ecuadorian border sub-national units selected in the Medium-n step for the between nation comparison of my research (See Chapter 2), located in the Planning Zone 1 (PZ/Region 1). It composes of four provinces that, in turn, are part of the three geographical regions of Ecuador: *Esmeraldas* (Costa Region), *Carchi and Imbabura* (Andean Region), and *Sucumbios* (Amazon Region). In what follows, I describe the dynamics of Ecuador's national and foreign insurgencies and its SLAC within their regions. At the same time, I show why Planning zone 1 became the focus of border security and humanitarian policy that triggered the 3E mechanism necessary to achieve a strong APS level in Ecuador.

As in the Colombian case, I georeferenced the non-insurgent armed conflict events between Ecuador and Peru based on data from Sundberg & Melander (2013). The georeferencing of insurgent foci and subnational armed events within Ecuador was carried out based on own data and Fieldwork (See Appendix 5). The previous because the low-intensity armed conflicts in Ecuador against its national and foreign insurgencies are not registered in the global internal armed conflict databases. However, the subnational war events were coded based on the criteria established by Sundberg & Melander (2013) to integrate them into the UCDP database. Likewise, the coding of the SLAC and IRE types corresponding to the case of Ecuador follows the same criteria used for the sub-national units of Colombia (Chapter 3) and Peru (Chapter 5).

4.2.1 Ecuadorian Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE)

The administrative division of the Republic of Ecuador is made up of parishes, cantons, and provinces distributed throughout its 256,370km² (Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 2008; INEC, 2021). The Andes mountain chain divides the territory into three large

continental geographic regions: *the Coast, the Sierra, and the Amazon*. Likewise, Ecuador has an insular region composed of islands in the Pacific Ocean of great richness and biodiversity (IGM, 2010).

Thirteen major islands located 1,200 km from the Ecuadorian continental integrate the *Insular Region*. Likewise, the Coast region includes the provinces located from the coastline to the western branch of the Andean Cordillera, that is, *El Oro, Esmeraldas, Guayas, Los Rios, Manabí, Santa Elena, and Santo Domingo de Los Tsachilas* (IGM, 2010). Each one vary due to their geography, cultural practices, and economic vocation, being *Guayas*, in the coastal region of southwestern Ecuador, the provincial with the highest concentration of population and the highest level of productive economic development (IGM, 2010: 9). The province of *Esmeraldas* locates on the northwestern coast of the country and, together with *Carchi, Imbabura, and Sucumbios*, forms the axis of border provinces with Colombia (Planning Zone 1).

The western and eastern mountain ranges cross the Ecuadorian territory from south to north, shaping the *Sierra* region. Around this inter-Andean alley are the provinces of *Pichincha, Carchi, Tungurahua, Chimborazo, Cañar, Azuay, Loja, Imbabura, Bolívar and Cotopaxi*. The province of Pichincha houses *Quito*, the capital of the country that, together with *Guayaquil*, makes up the metropolitan districts of Ecuador. Likewise, the provinces of *Carchi* and *La Loja* locate on the northern and southern border limits of Ecuador, respectively, with *Carchi* being the second province that integrates Zone 1 selected as a sub-national unit of my research.

Finally, the continental *Amazon* region extends from the eastern slope of the Andes mountain range to the east limit with Peru, including *Morona Santiago, Napo, Orellana, Pastaza, Sucumbios, and Zamora Chinchipe*. This region has the most extraordinary biodiversity in Ecuador, and it is the territory of multiple indigenous populations. However, it is one of the regions with the lowest levels of development in Ecuador. The province of *Sucumbios* locates in the north of the Amazon region. It borders the Colombian departments of Nariño and Putumayo, where the intensity of the internal armed conflict, as said in Section 4.1, represents a strong-armed threat to the border territory and has left legacies of violence for the Ecuadorian population.

After the Peruvian-Ecuadorian war of 1941 (Spencer, 1998), the attempts of the national guerrillas to install enclaves of insurgent governance in Ecuador began in the '60s of the 20th century when the armed militancy of URJE declared the province of *Guayas*, specifically the city of *Guayaquil*, as the headquarters of its National Directorate (Villamizar, 1990). Likewise, the creation of rural fronts motivated the installation of IRE in the *Costa* and *Sierra* regions. There, the massive presence of workers, peasants, Afrodescendants, and indigenous people would allow URJE to achieve a higher level of social support and subnational anchoring for the revolutionary war:


What generates this movement is an element that was not visible in Ecuador: the indigenous and the Afro. Imbabura, after Esmeraldas, is the seat of a large Afro community. So, the guerrillas see the perfect laboratory of what the rural experience could be: You have a

countryside, you have a farm, you have an Afro (which no one had seen), you have indigenous Otavalo. You have all of Ecuador concentrated there (Int. 23)

Map 14 shows the creation of sub-national IRE in border areas that allowed to the national insurgent groups at least two things: On the one hand, alliances with foreign insurgencies and, on the other, the creation of armed foci for bringing the guerrillas closer to strategic areas of political power in the Ecuadorian capital (*Pichincha* Province). In this way, the national insurgency plans for creating IRE in urban and rural areas of the coastal region failed to consolidate due to critical leadership and militancy fragmentations. Likewise, the effective securitarian response of the State and the lack of strong ties with the civilian population limited the insurgency capacities to control strategic subnational enclaves of rebel governance, in contrast with the Colombian southwest border provinces.

Map 14 Ecuadorian National and Foreign Insurgencies Georeferenced

Ecuadorian National and Foreign Insurgencies



Source: Own Elaboration based on Own Data and Sundberg & Melander (2013)

For this reason, the national guerrilla's efforts for creating rural fronts capable of emulating the achievements of the Cuban rebels' *foquista*-type war (Villamizar, 1990) moved to the *Sierra* and *Costa* peripheral regions bordering with Colombia. One of the experts interviewed for Ecuadorian border security issues confirms this interest of the national guerrillas in settling precisely in provinces like *Imbabura* so that the connection with the Colombian border becomes strategic:

By 1977, we already have cells from the MIR, nascent cells from Montoneras because the recruiting element continues to be students. However, for this new moment, the rural ingredient is already put. They began to operate in the Imbabura area and extending towards the northern border, not devoid of relations with the Colombian guerrilla groups. Then a network of training and sharing experiences is being formed from Imbabura (Int. 24).

As evidence, I georeferenced in Map 14 the concentration of insurgent outbreaks in the province of Esmeraldas by guerrillas such as the MIR. They intended to exercise strategic control of peasants and potential urban militants from the *Guayas* and *Pichincha* region. With the same objective, guerrillas such as *Los Chapulos*, *Los Nostálgicos* and *Los Panchos* (Villamizar, 1990) emerged in coastal rural areas of Esmeraldas, all of them parochial-type armed groups that would later join the AVC guerrilla.

4.2.2 Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1: Foreign insurgency and Border Rebel Diplomacy

From the first stages of the insurgent struggle in Ecuador, with URJE at the head of this movement, the northern Ecuadorian border, and east coast were seen as strategic territories for the anchorage and consolidation of the rebel governance. As in Colombian southwest border insurgencies, these subnational enclaves were necessary to seize political power via armed revolution. In one of the interviews granted by the *Urjista* leader, Carlos Carillo, he comments that URJE's recruitment strategy contemplated the need to enter the eastern zone, expressly, in the coastal region of Esmeraldas bordering Colombia:

The objective was to go much further. One of the objectives was to cross the *Río Blanco* and approach the eastern zone towards Esmeraldas. It was a critical geographical situation, given the density of the forest in that sector and the possibility of being able to count on the necessary material aid for the preparation and the insurgency since in the case of weapons, they could enter through *Esmeraldas* or other places very close to the coast, which provided logistical ease to carry out the work (Int. Cited by Villamizar, 1990: 40)

The first alliances between Colombian and Ecuadorian insurgents just consolidated in this northern border region with Colombia. In 1986, the Colombian region of Cauca sheltered about 600 rebels inside a camp called *Campoamérica* (Villamizar, 1990). The objective was to build an IRE that would serve as a refuge for the nascent *Batallón América* under the command of the Colombian insurgent leader and later a presidential candidate for the M-19 political party, Carlos Pizarro Leóngomez (CNMH, 2016).

As said in section 4, opposite Pischedda (2020) findings the *Batallón América* evidenced the existence of a continental guerrilla in Latin America made up of insurgents from the Colombians *Movimiento 19 de Abril* (M-19) and indigenous organization *Quintín Lame*, as well as the Ecuadorian *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* and the Peruvian insurgency of *Tupac Amariú*. Map 15 shows territories in which the armed actions of national and foreign armed groups converged.

The strongest and highest level of sub-national anchorage were those developed between AVC and M-19 in the border provinces of *Esmeraldas* and *Carchi*. Similarly, the joint armed actions of the *Batallón América* and the so-called *Frente Militar Rural* - FMR, with which AVC intended to install Strong IRE in the rural cantons of this region, took place on both sides of the border.


Map 15 also georeferenced the northern border areas where the Colombian Foreign Insurgencies (M-19; FARC-EP; ELN) established IRE with strategic rearguard and sanctuary functions (Pizarro-Leóngómez, 2020). The above occurred after the disarmament and negotiation process of the Ecuadorian State with the national guerrillas. For the M-19 foreign insurgency, the province of *Esmeraldas* was strategic to evade the Colombian State operations after the theft of military forces' weapons in the northern canton of Bogotá. At the same time, after supporting AVC armed operations as the kidnapping of merchants and bank thefts in Ecuadorian provinces (See Section 4.1).

Cantons and villages in the provinces of *Esmeraldas* and *Carchi* such as *San Lorenzo*, *Tulcán*, *Mira*, *La Bermeja*, or *Tufiño* also served for the installation of the rearguard and strategic sanctuary IRE for foreign insurgencies such as the ELN and, in recent years, FARC-EP dissidents and Colombian paramilitaries (See Map 14). Similarly, the province of *Sucumbios*, in rural areas of *Lago Agrio* and *Santa Rosa de Yanamaru*, became territories where the FARC-EP guerrillas installed Strong IRE for its insurgent diplomacy with social, political, and military sectors of Ecuador and other countries associated with its International Committee (COMINTER) (ISS, 2011; InsightCrime, 2011 January 7).

In contrast to the neighboring cases of Colombia and Peru, the existence of national and foreign insurgent foci in the geographical regions of Sierra and Costa did not have a more significant impact on the population nor consolidate territorially (Fernández & Pazzona, 2017). In this regard, one of the interviewees states: “The profile of the AVC people or the URJE people is not popular. They have a much clearer connection to the urban. It was a lack of reading of the rural area that prevented them from expanding” (Int.22).

Map 15 shows how the national and foreign insurgencies territories of influence were predominantly weak IRE, except, in the case of Sucumbios where, as said above, the FARC-EP consolidated a strong IRE for its insurgent governance and diplomacy. In the same line, the coastal province of Esmeraldas where FARC-EP dissidents and ELN fronts disputed the exercise of insurgent governance after the Peace Accords of the *Teatro Colón* in Colombia: “What the guerrillas do is locate in these territories like *Imbabura* to carry out ideological exercises and join social movements, but in the area of *Esmeraldas* and *Sucumbios* interested them in another type of training, one more of a military and strategic rearguard type” (Int. 24).

Map 15 Ecuadorian geo-referenced Type of IREs and SLAC



Source: Own Elaboration based on Own Data and Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Based on my dimensions for SLAC operationalization (See Section 2.3), the majority concentration of Weak IRE in the Ecuadorian territory correlates with the existence of fragmented and vanguard insurgent armed groups and low insurgent governance levels in

Ecuadorian strategic border zones. The above constitute crucial evidence for explaining why SLAC A shaped the conditions necessary for achieving a Strong APS level compared with the Colombian and Peruvian cases.

In this sense, the causal narrative for this majority tendency to SLAC A in the Ecuadorian Planning Zone 1 points to the Ecuadorian State capacity to negotiate peace with the national guerrillas and its security and intervention plans against foreign insurgencies in strategic areas of its northern border (See Section 4.3):

The Ecuadorian State, still with the conflict, said that we need to do the same in the north border because the presence of the Colombian State there is almost non-existent. The military hypothesis was that Colombia and Peru were neighbors and allies. Therefore, we must have a controlled border (Int. 26).

Likewise, SLAC A resulted from social organizations and civilians rejecting Ecuador's integrated national guerrillas with greater capacity to establish Strong IRE in their territories of influence (See Section 4.3). In short, the SLAC A came of conditions such as the enforcement of state presence on strategic border zones and the low civilian anchorage of insurgencies for consolidating its rebel governance.

In the first case, Ecuador's internal security operations were essential to the subsequent peace negotiation between AVC and the government of President Rodrigo Borja (See Section 4.1.2). Similarly, the use of a security strategy based on political intelligence -investigated (El Universo, 2010 June 20) and subsequently judged for its impacts and legality (Truth Commission, 2011)- but which became an instrument for the intervention of the early legacies of insurgent violence in Ecuador. The above, in contrast to countries such as Colombia and Peru that confronted them from intense and prolonged armed conflicts with their internal guerrillas.


Ecuador controlled the insurgent conflict at the time. When the guerrilla operations began, Ecuador had always been important that the armed forces maintain their presence on the borders with a clear policy of maintaining certain services for the border populations derived from the lessons learned from the conflict with Peru. The response in Ecuador was clear; we had never had a conflict of the levels seen, for example, in Peru and Colombia. The armed conflict did not have force because precisely the first thing controlled was the territory (Int. 24).

In the second one, it was determinant the difficulties in reaching a high level of sub-national anchoring as a result of the absence of support and civilian compliance on the armed objectives of the insurgency such as the construction of rural fronts: "There was, for example, a criterion that privileged guerrilla actions at the rural level, argued that at that time it was necessary to build a guerrilla front in the countryside (Villamizar, 1990: 127).

However, the kidnapping and subsequent Nahím Isaías killing (See Section 4.1) negatively impacted one of the insurgency's main objectives, which was to obtain economic resources to finance the rural front in the sub-national territories of the northern border. Undoubtedly, this insurgent operation weakened and lost reach and legitimacy among the urban and rural population of its areas of rebel influence.

In this way, my findings suggest that low subnational anchoring of national guerrillas promoted their IRE peripheralization in the border territories and justified the alliances with foreign insurgencies (See Graphic 32). Likewise, the lack of social support in strategic regions and the low capacity for insurgent governance explain the armed group's legacies of violence (SLAC A) in Ecuadorian territory. Also, the successful State intervention through security policies and the subsequent negotiation and insurgent disarmament processes (Sanchez & Illingworth, 2017).

Graphic 32. Ecuadorian National and Foreign Insurgencies SLAC by IRE



Source: Own Elaboration based on Own Data and Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Graphic 32 shows the number of war actions carried out by armed groups in the context of armed conflicts in the provinces of Ecuador. Except for the so-called *small-war* events (Spencer, 1998) between Ecuador and Peru in the Amazon border province, the highest number of armed actions and insurgent groups concentrated in the provinces of Planning zone 1 (Carchi, Esmeraldas, Imbabura, and Sucumbios).

This IRE peripheralization, like Colombian subnational units, is in line with Buhaug & Gates (2002), Vásquez (1995), Ríos (2017b) regarding the geography of the war and the creation of insurgency centers in regions with greater distance from the most populated urban centers. Likewise, the predominance of Weak IRE and SLAC A is evident in most cases, except IRE with strategic rearguard functions such as the 48th front of the FARC-EP guerrilla (International Crisis Group, 2003).

In that order of ideas, the alleged alliances with indigenous people and peasants weakened in regions such as *Quito*, *Guayaquil*, *Esmeraldas*, or *Carchi* (Int. 28). Likewise, the explicit intention of the local social and indigenous organizations to continue with their political struggle from their Empowerment process, excluding the use of arms, became a fundamental milestone for limiting the national guerilla's possibilities of territorial expansion and subnational anchoring in strategic territories of Planning zone 1 of Ecuador:

Empowering the indigenous people was a key strategy after implementing enforcement in strategic parts of Ecuador. This one included the military presence on the northern border and agrarian reforms so that they were the landowners. In this way, they could exercise territorial and sovereignty to contain internal and foreign insurgent outbreaks. In reality, it is a strategy of incorporating the sector that is territorially managing the central highlands. That is also the provider of food, water, as we saw in October [2019]. Territorially they can paralyze you, but not as people would understand to block others, but because they are owners of the territory.

These indigenous peoples' centers of development expanded territorially from Imbabura. In this sense, they generate development networks where they implement their productive cooperatives of cheese, ponchos, markets ... but what is the cooperative for you? The issue of resources helps you, but also the point of political articulation. (Int. 24).

In this way, State *Enforcement* power, on the one hand, and social *Empowerment*, on the other, articulated in a long but solid process of post-conflict stabilization from the early stages of the armed conflict of the Ecuadorian government against national and foreign insurgents into their territorial borders (See Section 4.3). With the social *Empowerment*, the *Entitlement* would also arrive to legalize and title the indigenous land property and consolidate their constituent processes.

The latter gave rise to the 1998 and 2008 constitutional texts and promoted truth, justice, and reparation processes such as those advanced by the *Comisión de la Verdad* (CVE) and the *Comisión Especial para la Verdad, Justicia y Reparación* (CEVJ) created in 2007 and 2020 respectively. Map 16 georeferences, with higher precision, the insurgent governance zones according to the origin of the guerrillas. Once again, it is observed how the *Costa* and *Sierra* provinces of planning zone 1 concentrated the national insurgent foci during the most intense year of armed activity.


Similarly, the penetration of foreign insurgency in this border region is shown in a much lower proportion than the georeferenced IRE on the Colombian side (See Map 17). The dotted line in Map 17 divides the Colombian southwest region and the Ecuadorian Planning zone 1 for showing the differences in the number and type of IRE and the type of SLAC on both sides of the border.

Map 16 Ecuadorian Geo-referenced Origin of Insurgencies and Type of SLAC




Source: Own Elaboration based on Own Data and Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Map 17 Colombian Southwest Region and Ecuadorian PZ1 Geo-referenced IRE and Type of SLAC



Ecuadorian PZ1 Geo-referenced IRE and Type of SLAC



Source: Own Elaboration based on Own Data and Sundberg & Melander (2013)

In the foreign insurgencies IRE in Planning Zone 1 showed in Maps 16 & 17, the northern Ecuadorian border policy (Plan Ecuador) added to its preventive and multidimensional human security components (Resdal, 2007) an “informal” contact with the insurgent diplomacy of the FARC-EP (See Sections 4.1 & 4.3). In this way, it was facilitated, on the one hand, the containment of the guerrilla actions towards Ecuador. On the other hand, keeping the distance to the security cooperation actions between Colombia and the United States could affect Ecuador's internal sovereignty.

For several years, this double strategy configured that kind of "pragmatic coexistence" or the called by me as a *cold war* against the foreign insurgency in the northern border territories that allowed armed groups such as FARC-EP to install IRE with strategic sanctuary functions in the planning zone 1 (*Esmeraldas, Carchi, Sucumbios*). In turn, it launched a protection strategy against the escalation of insurgent violence in the Ecuadorian territory:

According to Colombian military sources, the armed group has established at least eight stable camps, from where it carries out arms trafficking, drug transport, and indoctrination of the populations. "The entire border area is safe on the Ecuadorian side [...] We make our camps on farms, and we supply ourselves in the communities. Senior military leaders support us with logistics, weapons, tents, and uniforms. In the 48th Front we wear Ecuadorian uniforms because it is easier than waiting for the [FARC-EP] Secretariat to send them from Colombia", says former guerrilla Miguel, a member of Raúl Reyes's security (El País, 2008 March 11)

My research also considers this pragmatic coexistence in the Planning Zone 1 governance enclaves (IRE) as a type of *Enforcement* and forbearance mixed strategy (Holland, 2017) for foreign insurgent trade and storage of weapons, explosives, food, medical supplies, health, immigration, or residence (ISS, 2011: 306). Likewise, for the insurgent diplomatic activities such as practiced by FARC-EP Raúl Reyes commandant (Kingsley, 2014;) in his *Lago Agrio* rearguard camp (*Sucumbios* Province) up to the events of the *Operación Fenix* in 2008 (Pizarro, 2021):

[Raúl Reyes] carried out contacts with Colombian and foreign interlocutors without interference from third parties [...] In fact, the section of the Colombian-Ecuadorian border chosen by Devia [Raúl Reyes] turned out to be ideal for this purpose without the knowledge of the Colombian government. Thus, visitors from all over the Americas and Europe could enter Ecuador and travel north to reach the oil town of Lago Agrio (the capital of Sucumbios province). From there to remote border crossings to be taken by guerrillas or FARC collaborators to meet with Devia, whose agenda was often quite busy (ISS, 2011: 306).

As seen in Section 3.3, despite the strategic military coup of *Operación Fenix* and the subsequent FARC-EP peace negotiation process, the Colombian State was unable to consolidate its enforcement on the FARC-EP's IRE after abandoning their camps in southern Colombia. On the contrary, the border with Ecuador became a new territory of the dispute between ELN Fronts, paramilitaries, criminal groups, drug cartels, and guerrilla dissidents such as the self-styled *FARC-EP Segunda Marquetalia*: "Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), the ELN gained space, leveraged by income from drug trafficking, illegal mining, kidnappings and extortion" (Primicias, 2021 March 21).

Additionally, the ELN's incursion into Ecuadorian territory has left legacies of violence in the *Esmeraldas* and *Carchi* planning zone 1 provinces: "This armed group carries out indoctrination activities among the peasant and Afro-descendant population" (Int. 28). Recently, the ELN armed operations have included the kidnapping and extortion of Ecuadorian farmers and merchants and illegal mining activities in the provinces of *Carchi* and *Imbabura* (Primicias, 2021 March 21).

The most recent threats to the post-conflict stability of the Planning Zone 1 were carried out by the FARC-EP dissident front *Oliver Sinisterra* led by the Ecuadorian rebel Walter Arízala Vernaza. In his statements to international media, the FARC-EP Dissident stated: “This group did not accept the peace agreement signed in November 2016 between the Government and the FARC because he considers that there was an inequality between the guerrilla middle managers and the troops”(El Mundo.es, 2018 September 16).

Since 2016, the *Oliver Sinisterra* Front has carried out military operations on both sides of the Colombian-Ecuadorian border that included attacks on the Colombian energy structure and Ecuadorian patrols in the border area of *Mataje* (Esmeraldas Province). The Ecuadorian army dismantled several FARC-EP camps (InSightCrime, 2011 January 7). On the same border, the FARC-EP dissidents also kidnapped and subsequently murdered the three Ecuadorian journalists from the newspaper *El Comercio* and a couple of civilians discussed in Section 4.1 (El Tiempo, 2018 October 24).

The preceding intensified the armed confrontations between the military forces and this FARC-EP faction, resulting in the death of the insurgent leader Walter Arízala Vernaza in 2018, in the vicinity of the Colombian southern border (El Comercio, 2018 December 22). In this new scenario, President Lenín Moreno expressed that it was necessary to return to a border security strategy that prioritized military defense over the precedents government's development and humanitarian initiatives:

With the Lenín Moreno government, the security issue changed radically. The issue of the border was once again seen from the risk and not from the development itself. With the murder of the three journalists from *El Mercurio*, the defense strategy based on military presence on the northern border came again. We have on Colombia's border the violent rearrangement caused by the post-conflict, bringing back all this spiral of violence for the armed group's territorial control and the drug trafficking routes. So, Moreno's job is to take up the formula of national security and return to classic border security (Int. 26)

However, the Ecuadorian APS level is still high despite the most recent destabilization risks generated by the Colombian insurgencies and the military operations between Colombia and Ecuador armed forces for fighting them. These findings reinforced the contrast of my research with arguments about the use of foreign insurgencies by national States for destabilizing their neighbors (Lee, 2021). Furthermore, Characteristics of the FARC-EP, such as their nationalism, autarkic profile against the Colombian State (Borda, 2009), as well as their economic and financial autonomy (Ávila, 2019), make it impossible to identify any alliance or military action between the foreign insurgencies and the Colombian State against Ecuador or vice versa.

In short, the low-intensity armed conflict (Cann, 2006) confronting the Ecuadorian State and national guerrillas such as AVC was the result of a long and arduous process of the armed organization by a vanguard guerrilla (Staniland, 2017) that did the impossible to consolidate its IRE at the subnational level. Likewise, a State with a conjunctural but effective strategy (Ramos, 2009) to combat insurgencies in the Latin American region's cold war and national security doctrine (Rivera et al. 2018; Cann, 2006).

Additionally, the strategy of the Ecuadorian State to confront foreign insurgencies in planning zone 1 focused more than anything on a human security policy (Resdal, 2007) where the issue of borders: “[It became] an aspect of vital importance not only for the nationalist claim of Ecuadorians but also a topic of the first order in their international policy agenda (Ostos, 2010).

Similarly, in the case of the FARC-EP foreign insurgency, the existence of a state spokesperson through the Bolivarian Movement, led by retired generals René Vargas and Jorge Brito (ISS, 2010), meant implementing an unofficial way for dealing with insurgent diplomacy on the northern Planning Zone 1. This strategy yielded its effects in terms of an informal policy for the "pragmatic coexistence" in the Ecuadorian guerrilla's strategic sanctuaries and enclaves of insurgent governance (See Section 4.3).

4.3 The 3E Sequence in the Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1: After National insurgent peace process... borders policies against the foreign insurgencies’ “contagious”

This section focuses on the dynamics of the 3E mechanism and how SLAC shapes levels of APS in the selected Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 subnational unit. In that sense, my research shows pieces of evidence, activities, and entities (Agents) for tracing the dynamics of Ecuadorian and foreign wartime institutions on the northern border and the vectors of transmission for achieving a Strong APS.

I claim that down the scale to the subnational level, let us see the Ecuador high APS level achieved after the low-intensity armed conflict with national guerrillas such as AVC. Likewise, the effective containment of the armed organization and the control of the weak IRE in the *Guayaquil, Imbabura, Esmeraldas, and Carchi* regions. Similarly, with the subsequent attempts by AVC to negotiate a disarm process with the Ecuadorian government, join the legal, political contest and definitively stop the rebels' advance towards the centers of political power in Ecuador (Pacheco, 2006; Int. 28).

In this way, the early URJE legacies of violence and the armed confrontation and subsequent negotiation with AVC allowed the Ecuadorian State to structure an internal security policy similar to what I call a “cold war” or a low-intensity conflict against the internal insurgent enemy. Likewise, for the containment of a foreign insurgent enemy (Salehyan, 2009; Lee, 2021) in the years of the most security crisis experienced in the northern border planning area with Colombia (Pizarro, 2021; Rivera, 2018; Idler, 2019).

The latter makes Ecuador and, particularly, its security policy in the border zones an emblematic case of a high insurgent post-conflict stabilization. In that sense, my findings contrast with State-oriented perspectives that dismiss the existence of an armed conflict in times of *URJE, AVC, and Montoneras Patria Libre* insurgencies (Trujillo, 2013). At the same time, I take distance from diagnoses on the democratic instability of Ecuador based on factors such as the existence of weak and temporary governments since the 90’s decade (International Crisis Group, 2007).

4.3.1 Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1: Strong Armed Post-conflict Stability *Outcome: Stable High (Sequential Bottom-Up 3E Vector of Transmission)*

Section 4.2 showed how Planning Zone 1 became the Ecuadorian region most prone to the consolidation of Strong IRE after the low-intensity armed conflict of the State with its national insurgencies (Cann, 2006). In this case, the new threat of post-conflict instability came from the potential alliances of foreign insurgencies with strongholds and minor factions of national rebels such as *AVC*, *Montoneras Patria Libre*, and *Grupo de Combatientes Populares (GCP)*. Likewise, the effects of "contagion" (Torres; et al., 2008; Rivera, 2018; Ostos, 2010) and the internationalization of the Colombian armed conflict (Borda, 2009) given the progressive increase in foreign insurgent governance in the northern border territories.


After the so-called *Cenepa* small-war on the southern border with Peru, and due to the threat of foreign insurgencies to post-conflict stability, the Ecuadorian State transferred its State *Enforcement* power against rebel governance to the northern border provinces and cantons threatened by the implementation of policies such as *Plan Colombia* (Santillán et al., 2007; Moreano, 2005; Cadena, 2011; Kingsley, 2014). In this way, Ecuador promoted the implementation of human security policies (Torres, 2018; Rivera, 2018; Resdal, 2007) focused on the economic strengthening, social *Empowerment*, and territorial *Entitlement* of subnational institutions and regional populations that triggered the necessary conditions to avoid a new insurgent armed conflict. This time, on its northern border and reaching a higher level of APS compared to the level achieved by its neighbors:

When the guerrilla operations began, it had always been important for Ecuador to maintain its presence on the borders with a clear policy of maintaining certain services for the populations derived from the lessons learned from the conflict with Peru. In this sense, this border policy establishes that every population must have a school, a health center, and essential services. Why? Because I need to consolidate the State, the people cannot look to Colombia or Peru as an alternative, and they have to generate an awareness of belonging that allows the State to act there. (Int. 24).


In line with my research design, Figure 20 on the bottom shows the empirical level of my 3E mechanistic hypothesis for achieving a high level of stability (Strong APS) in the case of Ecuador. The causal narrative suggested in Figure 20 begins with the low-intensity armed conflict against the national insurgencies in the '70s and '80s and the securitarian border policies for dealing with foreign ones (E1). In this step, the Ecuadorian State enforced a conjunctural strategy for fighting against fragment and vanguard insurgent armed groups that finally disappeared with the peace processes between president Rodrigo Borja and the AVC national insurgency in 1989. On the other hand, with the implementation, since 2007, of Plan Ecuador (Resdal, 2007; CODHES, 2007) and the *Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado* in 2009 (Rivera, 2018)

Figure 20. Ecuador – Planification Zone 1 3E mechanism Causal Process

Theoretical level



Empirical Level



Source: Own Elaboration

Given the low impact of the national guerrillas' legacies of violence (SLAC A) and the final armed confrontation with them, the Ecuadorian State *Enforcement* power (E1) found APS vectors of transmission through linkages with the organizations and social movements process of *Empowerment* (E1*E2). The latter once rejected the armed revolution proposals of the guerrillas, promoted non-armed collective action, and motivated the policies of the Borja government to strengthen social organization (Borja, 2011).

From this new armed post-conflict scenario with the insurgency, social organizations such as CONAIE (Borja, 2011; Jameson, 2011) and the *Pachakutik* indigenous movement were

consolidating their great importance and incidence at the national and subnational Ecuadorian political levels:

The indigenous people become the new bastion mainly of the left movements, but it was precisely what AVC could not finish. On the other hand, in its last two years, the Febres-Cordero government generated a clear guideline on the issue of cultural revaluation, that is, to promote this idea that in Ecuador, we all have something indigenous. So he starts a crucial topic about culture. They give resources to the houses of culture and try to make museums a matter of memory; we are all Andean, we are all indigenous. When Borja arrives, the theme is consolidated (Int. 25).

In this scenario of progressive post-conflict political incorporation and indigenous movements consolidation, Ecuador triggered vectors of transmission for the Entitlement (E1*E2*E3). Pieces of evidence point to the titling of indigenous property and the constituent processes that led to the National Constitutions of 1998 and 2008. At the same time, actions for justice and restitution of rights inherited from the insurgent conflict, such as creating the *Comisión de la Verdad* (CVE). The latter emphasized crimes against humanity in Ecuador between 1984-1988 concerning Alfaro Vive, Carajo! and the *Comandos militares participantes del Taurazo* (Comisión de la Verdad Ecuador, 2010).

Having reached a high level of post-conflict stabilization and faced the risks of destabilization in neighboring Peruvian and Colombian armed conflicts, the Ecuadorian State launched a new moment in its stabilization strategy. This time aimed at the northern border with Colombia (Planning Zone 1 described in Section 4.2) through policies such as *Plan Ecuador*:

We are convinced that with a preventive peace and security policy, it is possible to face all the challenges that violence and criminality problems generate at a lower cost and in an ideal manner. In addition, an effective response will be given to the needs of the border population, to the challenges of the fight against extreme poverty, social exclusion, corruption, and citizen security (Resdal, 2007: 3)

In short, foreign insurgencies threats and negative impacts of *Plan Colombia* implied Ecuador to implement subnational autonomy (Muñoz, 2008) and human security (Gómez, 2013) policies for the State *Enforcement* power (E1) in strategic northern border zones. These humanitarian policy foci were diametrically opposite to Colombian's militaristic plans adopted in its southern border conflict zone. Likewise, within the *Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado framework*, Ecuador implemented a new set of Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) initiatives and social policies, such as *Plan Ecuador*, which mainly protected national victims and refugees of forced cross-border displacement.

These border populations undoubtedly faced the highest risk of destabilization -*Contagion* for Ecuadorians- coming from intense conflicts with the insurgent governance that threatened the Strong APS level achieved by the Ecuadorian "Island of Peace" (Torres et al., 2018; Idler, 2019; Ostos, 2010; Villaverde, 2018; Kingsley, 2014).

In contrast to Trujillo (2013); ISS (2011); Torres et al. (2018) statements about the foreign insurgencies' instability on the northern border due to: "The inability of the Ecuadorian State to exercise an effective monopoly of force and guarantee security in the border regions"

(Trujillo, 2012: 614) my findings show the effectiveness of the Ecuadorian APS mechanism for dealing with the national and foreign insurgencies in different moments and subnational spaces. In the first case, the focus of counterinsurgent actions, as said before, was placed on political intelligence operations (Rivera et al., 2018) that led to a progressive dissolution and negotiation with the national guerrillas:

When Febres Cordero arrives, the COSENA [Consejo Nacional de Seguridad] anticipate two significant risks that Ecuador must be controlled. The first new threat was the northern border where drug trafficking and illegal practices financed the guerrillas; the second would be internal terrorism. Guerrillas were going to affect us because we have this border adjacent to Colombia. The Armed Forces said: We have controlled the border territory with a strategy, but not the urban part. The urban control is of the police.

We then have two strategies, one directed by the Armed Forces towards the border to contain the external insurgent threat, and one towards the center at the head of the police and political intelligence that sought to stop the internal guerrillas' strengthens. This need for enforcement over urban control leads them to develop new mechanisms of political intelligence with solid funding and training. The urban territorial control strategy began by justifying the police presence in the streets to combat crime.

The State formed a generation of political intelligence with the capacity to efficiently contain and dissuade the subversion. It was efficient because the insurgent outbreaks in Ecuador never managed to anchor themselves. And this is what happened again now in October [2019]. It was the most challenging outbreak, with absolute territorial control, but Ecuador is the only country with that level of conflict still at peace (Int. 23).

Following the peace agreements between AVC and the Borja government, integrating national guerrillas' ex-combatants into post-insurgent movements, social organizations, and political parties reinforced the *Enforcement* (E1) process from a different perspective. That is, opening an alternative to join the non-armed political contest would prevent the demobilized insurgents from returning to the war and lessen the risks of strong-armed dissidence. One of the interviewees specifically cites the case of the MIR militants' political incorporation:

For Borja, it was straightforward dealing with the bourgeois guerrillas. His political tool was to dialogue and negotiate after all the violence that Febres-Cordero had implemented. The MIR is already beginning to form political cadres who could already be Quito or Ibarra councilors or even assembly members. They do manage to jump to the formal political level through parties. The Miristas join but continue to maintain URJE's ideas already in politics. They are its ideological referents (Int. 28).

Thus, the peace process with the insurgency and the progressive political incorporation of its leaders triggered a vector of transmission from Enforcement to Empowerment for achieving a higher level of APS absent in the Colombia and Peru cases (See Sections 3.3 and 5.3). Comparing the stabilization effect brought by the peace negotiation between the Borja government and AVC and the repressive-authoritarian style of the Febres Cordero government says one of my Ecuadorian interviewees:

Borja's characteristics were in high contrast to those of Febres-Cordero, who was imposing and radical. Borja was an urban intellectual convinced that decisions took time, required dialogue, did not require impositions but rather political security where everyone could be included. Negotiation is the only tool you have to solve the conflict (Int. 28).

Under the argument of reaffirming the political commitment with the definitive peace in Ecuador, AVC political leaders' signatories of the peace agreement such as Pedro Moncada, Juan Cuvi, Marco Troya, Santiago Kingman, among others; joined the Social Democratic Left led by President Rodrigo Borja (El Tiempo, 1991 October 22). Subsequently, several of its members joined political movements of the new Ecuadorian left. Finally, with the arrival of Rafael Correa to the Ecuadorian executive power, the ex-combatants found a unique opportunity to constitute in 2014 the *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* Political Movement.

On the other hand, the risk of destabilization or "contagion" (Torres; 2018; Carrión, 2013) by way of foreign insurgencies was faced with a security strategy based, as said above, on a security plan for the northern Ecuadorian border (Planning zone 1). This plan was conceptualized and designed from 2000-2001 (Rivera, 2018), but it had significant visibility with events such as the Angostura bombing in 2008. Likewise, my research identifies an additional strategy for State Enforcement power, announced in Section 4.2, based on developing an informal policy for a "pragmatic coexistence" with the insurgency in their planning zone 1 IRE bordering Colombia (ISS, 2011). In what follows, I explain these two strategies.

In contrast to *Plan Colombia's* anti-drug and militarization law enforcement policy in areas such as the Colombian southwest (Lucas, 2000; García, 2002), *Plan Ecuador* was a humanitarian security policy for the northern border based on two strategic pillars: Peace and development. Both principles moved away from the militaristic approach of the State enforcement power implemented on the Colombian side and oriented at least three objectives for increasing the State presence of the northern Ecuadorian border: First, consolidating security and a culture of peace focused on the human capacities of the inhabitants from the north Ecuadorian border zone; second, establishing equitable and supportive treatment with neighboring countries; and, finally, designing a defense policy based on the local people, natural resources and effective territorial control (Resdal, 2007).

Together with State governance reforms for endowing its subnational institutions with greater regional autonomy (Muñoz, 2008), *Plan Ecuador* was the most solid strategy for enforcing (E1) the State rule in the northern border and improving their inhabitants' social welfare (El Universo, 2010 December 12). Although this policy was born within the framework of the so-called Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) (US Department of State, 2010), its approach to human security and social development allowed Ecuador, unlike Colombia, to focus on preventive security policies that would provide economical alternatives for the residents of the northern border.

In this way, the Ecuadorian State prevented foreign insurgencies, paramilitary factions, drug traffickers, and other neighboring countries' armed groups from consolidating strong IRE in the country: "The Plan Ecuador, faced with the impacts of the Colombian internal conflict on Ecuadorian society, guides their efforts based on a preventive, multidimensional and

multisectoral approach, which aims to solve the serious problems derived from poverty, exclusion, and violence” (Resdal, 2007: 1).

Thus, *Plan Ecuador* was the State's response to the effects of *Plan Colombia* (Santillán et al., 2007; Moreano, 2005; Cadena, 2011), but at the same time, it was a strategy to consolidate its law enforcement in territories threatened by the armed insurgency. The latter acquired relevance for the state agenda after the multiple diagnoses on the impacts of the armed border conflict (UASB, 2002) and the existence of two symmetrically opposed binational models to confront it: “It is evident that two different models of security converge today on the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, two different development processes and a conflictive situation, with high levels of violence” (CODHES, 2007: 6)

Hence, apart from the economic and human resources allocated to the Ecuadorian security forces, the central axis of this policy gravitated around the strengthening of border provinces economy, the quality of life of the local population, and the coordination of National State institutions with subnational governments and local social organizations (Resdal, 2007; Muñoz, 2008). This relevance of sub-national institutions and social organizations was undoubtedly one of the most determinant factors in implementing the 3E mechanism for containing a new armed conflict led by foreign insurgencies and strongholds of former Ecuadorian rebels’ nuclei.

Likewise, it allowed Ecuador to distance itself from the United States and Colombia's security policies that threatened its sovereignty on the border conflict zones:

I have always said how complex it was to launch that strategy of controlling subversion based on land ownership, human security, and local, territorial development. In that sense, we have been very proactive and very assertive. And Ecuador is a complicated case because we have indigenous people, Afro, and everything because we are multicultural (Int. 24).

Plan Ecuador designing dates to 2001 when the Ecuadorian State asked its armed forces to develop a plan to prevent the “spillover” of the armed conflict on the border with Colombia. The *Consejo de Seguridad Nacional* (COSENA) and the Armed Forces military intelligence systems took over the task. In this sense, *Plan Ecuador* could have been born of a markedly militaristic initiative (Torres, 2018), sponsored by the United States, despite the risks of instability proved by neighboring security policies such as Colombia.

However, *Plan Ecuador* considered the intimate nature of the human security and development components as the best way to offer an alternative security approach to the Ecuadorian northern border population at risk by the unstable and conflictive plan Colombia: “More security factors concerning mobility, the properties of foreigners in the border area, in the weakness of the institutions, in the deficit of national media coverage” (Rivera, 2018: 90).

President Lucio Gutierrez's government (2003-2005) emphasized security policies as a matter of development rather than militarization. In this way, in 2003, the *Plan Ecuador* transformed into the *Unidad de Desarrollo del Norte* (UDENOR) and administratively anchored to the National executive power. Thus, Institutional ties with the mayors and

subnational border institutions strengthened despite criticism of the clientelist use of this policy and its international financing (Rivera, 2018). One of the border security experts interviewed stated about this policy:

We had maintained since 1998 this program called UDENOR, a strategic unit with a presence on the border. From there, we made sewers, electricity networks, schools, brigades, etc. It worked with USAID international cooperation resources, Korea and the European Union resources, and a key component: citizenship and human rights. Obviously, when the number of refugees began to rise, the crime rate also increased, mainly in Sucumbios and Esmeraldas (Int. 26).

With President Rafael Correa in 2007, *Plan Ecuador* returned, this time, attached to the *Secretaria Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo* (Senplades) and implemented with greater emphasis in the provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi, Imbabura, Sucumbios, and Orellana. At least three of the most critical risks of “spillover” from the armed border conflict towards the interior of Ecuador concentrated there: The proliferation of IRE with strategic rearguard functions for foreign insurgencies, the increase in forced cross-border displacement, and negative impacts of the spraying of illicit crops with glyphosate caused by the *Plan Colombia* against drug trafficking:

Zone 1 is a strip, practically the entire northern border. Correa and his foreign ministers had the vision that security issues could be in the background if you had development. An idea very typical of the 90s, within the framework of the modernization approach. If you change people's living conditions, they will stop getting involved in drug trafficking and armed groups. When the Plan Ecuador comes out, maintaining that development criterion for the border in the first months of Correa. Correa dedicated himself to controlling his border territory and did not care about anything else (Int. 24).

Despite the relentless critiques of scholars, military, and security experts to the *Plan Ecuador* regarding the loss of its original security vocation and the use of sub-national connections for political patronage (Rivera, 2018), my research identifies pieces of evidence for tracing why President Gutierrez, Palacio or Correa governments maintained, with its variants, the emphasis on development and human security (See Table 16). The preceding contrasts with the eminently militaristic and more unstable strategy such as those demanded by the sectors mentioned above.

Table 16. Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 Region – 3E Mechanism Process Tracing

Table 16 presents the CPO’s priors, observations, and pieces of evidence for the hypothesis testing of the 3E mechanism in the case of Ecuadorian Planification zone 1 subnational Unit.

Mechanism Step	Hypothesis	Observations and pieces of evidence	Source
Enforcement (E1)	Increasing the State intervention in the Ecuadorian IRE is the primary condition to consolidate the stabilization in the earlier stages of the armed post-conflict with national insurgencies and contemporary foreign ones (HE1)	<p>e1HE1: National Security Tactics and counterinsurgency strategy during Febres-Cordero government (National and Transnational insurgencies)</p> <p>e2HE1: Peace Process and ex-militant AVC insurgents coalition with Rodrigo Borja Social-Democrat government (National)</p> <p>e3HE1: Institutions and Policies for social investment and regional Autonomy (Planification Zones and <i>Estado Regional descentralizado y autonómico</i>)</p> <p>e4HE1: National security Strategies for containing foreign insurgencies and Plan Colombia conflict impacts on the northern border : COSENA Programs-UDENOR-Plan Ecuador (Planification Zone 1 - Subnational)</p> <p>e5HE1: Foreign Insurgent Diplomacy responses and border security policies (Planification Zone 1 – Subnational)</p> <p>e6HE1: Political mediation and guarantees for negotiation between foreign States and Insurgencies (Colombia) (National-Subnational)</p>	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Empowerment (E2)	Previously achieved the conditions triggered by E1, empowering subnational non-armed actors in the Ecuadorian central and borders IREs increase the levels of stability in the post-conflict pathway (HE2)	<p>e1HE2: Former members of the national guerrillas join political parties, institutions and social movements (National-Subnational)</p> <p>e2HE2: Indigenous and social movements opposite to armed violence on subnational IRE and trigger transition to insurgent collective action (National-Subnational)</p> <p>e3HE2: Social and indigenous political participation consolidates in organizations such as CONAIE and MUPP-18 (National-Subnational)</p> <p>e4HE2: State and civilian initiatives for protecting civilian and social movements collective action from foreign States intervention and foreign insurgencies governance (National and subnational)</p>	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Entitlement (E3)	Once E1 and E2 are implemented, increasing the victims recognition and binding force of subnational policies through the Entitlement process in the Ecuadorian IRE increases the stability level in the armed post-conflict pathway (HE3)	<p>e1HE3: Design and implementation of transformative policies and social justice after “years” of denialism of insurgency violence events (i.e Comisión de la Verdad para Ecuador) (National)</p> <p>e2HE3: Agrarian reform for the ownership of indigenous land and subsequent constituent processes.</p> <p>e3HE3: Recognition and Entitlement of victims of state crimes during insurgent violence and DDHH Infractions (National)</p> <p>e4HE3: Refugee and forced displacement policies for protecting foreign and national victims of armed conflict in the northern border (Planification Zone 1 – Subnational)</p> <p>e5HE3: Border policies to consolidate a human security approach to the risk of destabilization (Planification Zone 1 - Subnational)</p>	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

Enforcement: Formal and informal securitarian strategies on subnational border zones

I already mentioned the first piece of evidence in this section. It pointed to how the development, human security, and culture of peace axes of *Plan Ecuador* allowed the State to distance its stabilization border policies of *Plan Colombia* contents. That order of ideas explained why *Plan Ecuador* was the Ecuadorian State's most significant reaction to the militaristic alliance between Colombia and the United States (*Plan Colombia*). At the same time, to avoid the unstable neighboring countries policy diffusion despite the *Plan Colombia* focused on the Ecuador and Venezuela borders:

This double-track underestimation of the [Colombian] government made it forget that the security of a state depends mainly on that of its neighbors. A state with land borders cannot behave like an island. Therefore, it is necessary to create policies towards and with neighboring countries that stabilize their borders. (Trujillo, 2012: 616)

Thus, knowing the *Plan Colombia* effects on the internal armed conflict escalation (See chapter 3), Ecuador found in the agrarian reforms, the legalization of lands, and the formulation of a human security policy the best alternative for increasing your State Enforcement power at the northern border. In passing, the State promoted social Empowerment and its population's Entitlement in the face of the threats of insurgency, forced cross-border displacement, and the impact of the Colombian Armed force's fumigation of illicit crops.

When questioned about this issue, one of the interviewees commented on how the Ecuadorian agrarian reform legalized the lands of indigenous communities, thus deactivating the armed insurgent projects and allowing the long-term Empowerment of indigenous peoples. The latter radically contrasts with Colombia's absence of an early agrarian reform that constituted one of the objective causes of the armed conflict with the insurgency:

In 1980, the issue jumped. You do the cadastre of what the landowners, the indigenous, and the mestizo population have, and contrast begins to appear. I mean, the weapon you used to contain the insurgency gave power to the weakest in the relationship in the 70s. And that is evident in the 80s, and in Ecuador, there begins to be a solid public policy towards considering that indigenous sectors have to be incorporated into society. It is impossible to govern without them. Those who now dominate and own these lands are the indigenous (Int. 24).

The second piece of evidence points to the Ecuadorian emphasis on its northern border social development in contrast with the militaristic strategy of its neighbors. This strategy allowed Ecuador to reconcile its security policy with its declaration of neutrality or non-intervention in neighboring armed conflicts (Ostos, 2010). However, the preceding should not be understood exclusively as the absence of actions by the Ecuadorian army against foreign insurgencies, nor the lack of joint efforts with the Colombian State for border security.

Proof of this was the dismantling of several foreign insurgencies' camps through intensive security operations of the Ecuadorian State to reduce the risk of consolidating the IRE on its borders (El Universo, 2011 January 6; Idler, 2019). Likewise, the bilateral collaboration in military intelligence operations, according to which: "The Colombian intelligence services

worked in coordination with some sectors of the Ecuadorian Public Force, without the [Rafael] Correa government having all the information" (Trujillo, 2012: 614).

However, at least until the bombing of Angostura in 2008 (Pizarro, 2020), the declaration of neutrality implied that Ecuador strategically conserved a certain level of tolerance or informal coexistence with the rebels in border areas. The previous to reduce the risk of armed confrontation with foreign insurgencies in their rebel governance's territories (i.e., Raúl Reyes FARC-EP camp in *Sucumbios*). Likewise, the Colombian State constantly pressed for Ecuador to align itself in the so-called counter-terrorism regional struggle.

In that line, the third piece of evidence and, in turn, one of the most relevant findings of my APS process tracing is using an informal strategy for dealing with insurgent diplomacy (See Section 4.1.2). This evidence shows how Ecuador consciously maintained an enclave or *region of exception* for the foreign insurgencies' containment in the border territory. The latter, in contrast to using a militaristic strategy in *Plan Colombia* fashion that would lead to the dispersal incursion of the foreign insurgencies into its territory:

It is said that Correa had certain deals with some of these groups and that, therefore, the border remained stable. Possible evidence of this is that Correa himself applied to Ecuador for the ELN negotiations with the Colombian government and precisely in the territory of the Northern Border Planning Zone 1. That is clear evidence. Also, that his chancellor, the former insurgent Ricardo Patiño, left *Montoneras Patria Libre* to make Christian democracy. Likewise, Correa brought crucial actors such as Francoise Otari, who was part of the negotiating table. Part of the reasons why [Lenín Moreno] asks that the negotiation between the ELN and Colombia in Ecuador be ended was precisely for those reasons associated with Correa (Int. 24).

In this regard, the statements of Ecuador's defense minister Wellington Sandoval in 2007 reveal a crucial element of the Ecuadorian State's strategy for post-conflict border stabilization in the previously mentioned sense: "The problem is that Colombia does not maintain sovereignty over the border. We limit the north not with Colombia, but with the Farc or the Eln "(El Tiempo, 2007 November 12). This statement reflected the need for the Ecuadorian State to confront the insurgent diplomacy (parallel) of foreign guerillas such as the FARC-EP, particularly after the end of the peace negotiations with Colombian President Andrés Pastrana. At the same time to intervene in the foreign insurgency plans to seek the support of neighboring governments with some ideological affinity.

If so, I could more clearly trace my argument linking the pragmatic coexistence thesis and the insurgent border diplomacy in the Ecuadorian case. Pragmatic coexistence implied a type of strategic recognition of the FARC-EP insurgent governance on their border IRE with Ecuador (Kingsley, 2014). Furthermore, thinking about the growing hostility between Ecuador and Colombia governments security policies: *Plan Ecuador vs. Plan Colombia*.

More than their direct attack on the border, informal diplomacy strategy with foreign insurgents served as an alternative to the internal and cross-border armed conflict escalation in Ecuador. This Ecuadorian State capacity for diplomatic "dealing" with foreign insurgents could be understood as a tool for the insurgent armed conflict stabilization on the border with Colombia and, in turn, a strategy to contain the internationalization of the neighbor insurgent

conflict towards its territory. In this sense, more than an Ecuadorian State weakness argument (ISS, 2011; Trujillo, 2013), I claim that Ecuador's post-conflict stabilization policy was a State *Enforcement* strategy based on pragmatic coexistence and “implicit” negotiation with foreign border insurgencies.

In sum, the convergence of the three previously exposed reasons could explain why, after President Jamil Mahuad, the Ecuadorian State Enforcement strategy was to distance itself from the anti-drug and counterinsurgent policies of Colombia (ISS, 2011) backed by the American government. It establishes informal channels to contain the threat of armed conflict on the northern border through diplomatic treatment with the foreign insurgency. In this way, the State enforcement power on the border adjusted to the policy of pragmatic coexistence with the foreign FARC-EP guerrilla in opposition to the military strategy imposed by Colombia on the other side of the border.

Empowerment: From Armed insurgency to insurgent collective action

Pieces of evidence for the Empowerment (E2) focus on citizenship collective actions after the low-intensity armed conflict with the national insurgencies. Although the social mobilization until the '80s focused on the Ecuadorian unions such as the *Frente Unitario de Trabajadores* (Borja, 2011), externalities such as the incorporation of a new labor model, the weakening of labor unions strategies, and the implementation of neoliberal policies by the government, divided and excluded the union movement from the political scene.

In this context, social movements associated with the trade unions claimed their fundamental rights through a type of insurgent collective action (Wood, 2003), rejecting the armed strategies but keeping on their explicit “contentious and revolutionary” character (Borja, 2011). Peasant federations, indigenous communities, university students, artisan unions, and retail traders were among these social sectors. Additionally, a broad group of citizens living in poverty organized since the 1970s in the so-called *Comité del Pueblo* urban enclave (El Telégrafo, 2015 January 25)

Insurgent collective actions coming from *Comité del Pueblo* inhabitants and other *Comités barriales* faced State reforms such as the rise in transport prices (*guerra de los cuatro reales*) and housing through *de facto* and negotiated possession of the land. This vindictive attitude became more robust in the Costa provinces such as *Santo Domingo de Los Colorados* and *Guayas, Manabi, and Pichincha* regions. Thus, Left-wing political parties and MIR and *Montoneras Patria Libre* national insurgencies pretended to penetrate the citizen movements for increasing its social impacts and armed revolution objectives in these subnational units.

However, the rise of the human rights discourse during the 1980s against the *febreorderismo* more than the revolutionary “offer” by the armed insurgents, captured the interest of the emerging neighborhood movements (Borja, 2011). At the same time, it promoted the birth of pioneering organizations such as the *Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos* (CEDHU) and the *Asociación Latinoamericana para los Derechos Humanos* (ALDHU):

The 90s is one of the collective rights [...]. Those years are those of the diffusion in the Ecuadorian society, of a citizen platform of rights. Previously, rights were a notion at the base of the social pyramid. However, in general, our society had never been characterized by appropriating and, worse still, by practicing a culture of rights (Borja, 2011: 129).

In this sense, the integration of citizen movements from different Ecuadorian provinces and cantons constitutes a piece of vital evidence for understanding the low level of civilian compliance and subnational linkage with the armed organizations in their influence regions. Borja (2011) shows this collective citizenship independence in the protests of the *Federación de Barrios Populares del Noroccidente de Quito* against the *Cordón Verde* Law Project¹⁰ even though the State attributed the radicalization of some neighborhood leaders to the AVC guerrilla discourse: “Agitators who ‘se sacaban la madre gritando’... whom the residents did not exclude from the marches, although the open party presence of anyone was not allowed” (p. 42).

At this point, it is worth highlighting how this dynamic of insurgent collective action bears a broad similarity to the case of civic movements in the Colombian Eastern of Antioquia region (See Section 3.2). Their solid legacy of the organization and social movements represented critical factors in rejecting the armed insurgency and implementing the post-conflict stabilization mechanism through *Empowerment* (E2).

With President Rodrigo Borja's arrival in August 1988 and the subsequent peace process with the AVC guerrilla, Ecuadorian organizations and civil society found a "window of opportunity" to strengthen their *Empowerment* through a wide range of social, health, and well-being government's policies: "The neighborhood organizations leap when the State provides services such as childcare centers and health centers. The situation was favorable: the social-democratic government of Rodrigo Borja and his minister Raúl Baca Carbo (MBS) did what later, from the United Nations speech and some international cooperation organizations, was called 'social investment'" (Borja, 2011: 59).

These crucial well-being policies demanded by the social movement, as well as the response of the Ecuadorian State to strengthen the scenario of armed post-conflict and post-dictatorship, inherited from the military and authoritarian governments, constitute the second piece of evidence for the *Empowerment* (E2) Step after the strategies for ending the national revolutionary armed projects in Ecuador (See Table 19):

At the end of the 90s, the system looks for stability. The State responded to the demands of the social movements in an institutional and bureaucratic way. Left and right Councils were created: Council of Women, Disabilities, Indigenous Peoples [...] The National Youth Directorate was created for young people [...] Congress was not excluded from this dynamic and called on the young people to participate in the construction of the Youth Law approved in 2001 (Borja, 2011: 134).

¹⁰ The *Cordón Verde* Bill established the maximum elevation of the city of Quito (Ecuador) above which urban housing could not be built. At the end of the 80s, the inhabitants of the peripheral neighborhoods of Quito joined social movements to fight against this bill.

Likewise, it serves as evidence of the armed insurgency rejection by social organizations and citizen movements and their commitment to the so-called culture of peace that helped President Rodrigo Borja to call Ecuador as the *Latin American island of peace* (Int. 25): "A few days before the act in Quito, Juan Cuvi justified the [AVC] demobilization in that 'the people were not willing to embark on an insurgency proposal, to turn to the armed struggle movements as a way to solve political and social problems'" (The Universe, 2010 June 20a)

For Terán (2006), a former member of the AVC, this lack of anchorage and civilian compliance also led to the fact that the national guerrillas showed themselves as a continuation of the Ecuadorian left that was strongly criticized by the population, rather than an alternative with a political project that surpasses it (Page 61). In this regard, internal discussions about the validity of the electoral strategy for searching popular support turned on the guiding principles of a new discourse for access to political power through civilian organizations as the indigenous one: "The leftist denominations that evoked the insurrection as the way to reach the power, they believed they found the new paradigm in the emergence of the indigenous movement"(Borja, 2011: 98).

In that sense, the next milestone in the Ecuadorian Empowerment Step was creating social, peasant, and indigenous organizations such as the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (CONAIE) in 1986 and the *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP-18) in 1995. These organizations continued on the path of social Empowerment. They favored the creation of a social scenario ready for dialogue between civil society and the State and for access to power that eluded the armed insurgency (Herrera, 2005). In this regard, several of the interviewees expressed:

AVC is over, and where did they go? They went to the indigenous people. CONAIE brings together all indigenous groups. They all meet to draw up common agendas, but deep down, they are running on different paths to power. Then this momentum begins. When Borja arrives, the indigenous issue becomes a transnational issue, and they demand power. They did not claim for schools or credits; they ordered participation in governance. This real presence in power of the indigenous sector rethinks, between the lines, the construction of the State that we have not finished doing yet (Int. 24)

[...] When Borja takes office, the alarm of a possible insurgency is the indigenous people. Even the indigenous movement is seen as a threat to national security. This threat constituted: One, by its territorial capacity; two, the possibility of internal indigenous economic structures; third, its alliances with left-wing sectors and evident participation of communist movements capable of generating cadres of leaders (Int.26).

However, the indigenous movement differed from the armed insurgent projects and the union trade movements on two specific issues: On the one hand, the predominance of a democratic interest over the antagonistic discourse of class struggle of the conventional left (Rodas, 2000); on the other hand, a clear intention of economic empowerment in the face of the competition for political power: "They had an organization plan thanks to their horizontal cooperativism, not with this verticality that the guerrillas of the mestizo left had. Indigenous is a horizontal movement where the leader is elected fully [...] The indigenous movement here in Ecuador has those nuances that they do not have elsewhere, which are high economic

capacity, high organizational and territorial capacity, territorial control, and it has a clear position in front of the power”. (Int. 25).

Likewise, they promoted the achievement of political objectives that would make it a continental, not only national, reference of the ethnic and social empowerment: “The indigenous people begin to have this organization, and when the indigenous movement came out in 1992, it is of such repercussion that would not have been thought in the '70s and '80s. Thus, the indigenous movement begins to export its organizational model” (Int. 24). At the same time, a radical stance against the need to replace violence with a culture of peace and social dialogue that favored its approach to civil society and state recognition through social policies agreed with administrations such as Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992):

This aspect also helps to explain the transitory nature of the AVC as a prelude to the indigenous movement, not only because the stigma of terrorism overcame others, but also because it influenced the construction of a situation of terror, which was later modified to one of peace and dialogue, in such a way that in the indigenous mobilizations the repression was no longer generalized or reckless, indeed, State scenarios opened to deal with ethnic segregation (Herrera, 2005: 92)

As seen, the Ecuadorian social movement consolidation along with the Borja government's peace negotiations with AVC in 1989 -including the subsequent delivery of arms in 1991- is more than a mere coincidence (Herrera, 2005). On the contrary, it shows how the legacies of the “impossible” insurgent revolution of AVC converged on the “insurreccional” struggle of the indigenous peoples and the windows of opportunity that Ecuadorian social movements found to promote their political demands through an unarmed route. This particular transition from the armed insurgency to the contentious collective action brought transmission vectors for achieving a higher APS level after the armed insurgencies:

Making the public existence of the AVC as an armed project meant an essential turn in Ecuador concerning other political-military organizations in the country. Both because it fractured the discourse of the Marxist left, from the left itself, by modifying its rhetoric of class struggle and making its discourse of armed struggle visible. Also, because it positioned as a scapegoat, different from the xenophobic constructions of miscegenation that influenced a terror policy from the State. The latter not only stigmatized subversion but also created conditions for later make viable policies of the satisfactory agreement for the articulation of a citizen movement, of which the indigenous emergency stood out (Herrera, 2005: 101)

Entitlement: Truth, Justice, and Restoration of Rights

Linking these vectors of transmission with the *Entitlement* (E3) process reveals one of the most crucial pieces of evidence in the social movements, youth people, peasants, and indigenous restitution of rights actions. That is the recognition of social demands in the 1998 and 2008 Ecuadorian plurinational constitutions: “The 2008 constitution refounds Ecuador, but since 1978 we have a constitution that enshrines the plurinational and multicultural State. The preceding makes conflicts different, and it seems to me that this is why cases of armed subversion remain as an agenda located in a minority sector” (Int.24). Borja (2011) implicitly recognizes, in the case of youth movements, what my research claims as to Empowerment (E2) to Entitlement Step (E3):

Between 1994-1996 [the Assembly for the Rights of Young People] had grown as an organization with a discourse that denoted the young people's involvement and recognition of their rights on the social and political scene. Between 1997-1999 the discourse changes and speaks more than anything about the participation of young people in the elaboration of the Constitution (Page 134)

In this sense, pieces of evidence for the Entitlement step divided into two specific conditions and moments: On the one hand, post-insurgent actions consolidating the social organization *empowerment* through unarmed and pacific means, as well as justice processes for investigating crimes and systematic violation of human rights by the State since *febrescorderista* era (CVE, 2011). On the other hand, actions for restoring the civilian population's rights were affected by the new cycle of insurgent violence on the northern Ecuadorian border after the incursion of foreign insurgencies and the risk of spillover from neighboring armed conflicts.

Concerning the pieces of evidence coming from the post-insurgent constituent processes and the social-democratic policies of President Rodrigo Borja in the late 1980s, one of my interviewed states:

In the 90s, the indigenous people transformed into a political force that changed the country's political arena. The question was, if you want stability, you have to include this political force. In addition, they are a guarantee of stability because they are not seeking an armed revolution, regime change, or refounding the State as the national armed insurgencies. It is a political project without weapons. There are no weapons. But it is this clear possibility of having the conditions to remain in a political scene as legitimate as a right party or left party. But this is not the goal of the guerrillas nor the subversion. The indigenous people express that "I am the best" in these rules of the game (Int. 24).

When speaking about the victims of the armed conflict with AVC and their related human rights violations, attention directs to the legacies of violence intervened through actions for the Entitlement, such as creating the *Comisión de la Verdad para Ecuador* (CVE) in 2007. This commission, created by Rafael Correa's government, evidenced the responsibility for human rights violations and State crimes during the low-intensity conflict against national guerrillas and clarified political violence events between 1984 and 2007.

Alfaro Vive Carajo! former members strongly influenced building the CVE. In the political campaign acts of candidate Rafael Correa, they asked him to create this commission to identify the responsible for the armed conflict with the national guerrillas. Likewise, to promote legal reforms and design reparation policies for victims not only of the government of *Febres-Cordero* but of the legacies of his policies after the end of his mandate:

Although the [CVE] Decree expressed the specific interest in directing the investigation towards the presidential term of former President León Febres Cordero (1984-1988), it also opened the possibility of including the successors' governments until 2007. The latter could be understood as acknowledging political violence experienced in subsequent governments as an inheritance of the policies, institutions, and repressive structures implemented during the *Febrescorderato*. (Solís, 2018: 185).

The final report of the CVE led to the identification of 456 victims associated with 118 cases of violation of the human rights of political activists, leaders, and members of Ecuadorian civil society -136 cases if are taken into account the extension of five months that the CVE had (Valencia, 2011)-. 68% of them correspond to cases that occurred in the provinces where focused on the counterinsurgent actions of the government of President León Febres-Cordero (CVE, 2010). Likewise, the Report identifies actors and places related to extrajudicial arrests, forced disappearance, torture, and other crimes against humanity committed mainly through official and non-official members of the Ecuadorian Police (49% of cases) and the Armed Forces (28%) (CVE, 2010).

Even though the CVE appeared many years after the *Febrescorderista* government and received much criticism about its implementation (Solís, 2018; Reyes et al. 2015; Primicias, 2021), I add its creation to the pieces of evidence related to the intervention of the legacies of armed and political violence through the *Entitlement* (E3). In its Final Report, the CVE promoted initiatives for reparation (material and immaterial), restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, and guarantees of non-repetition (CVE, 2010) that were finally taken to the Congress of the Republic and most recognized in November 2013 through the *Ley para la reparación de las víctimas y la judicialización de graves violaciones de derechos humanos y delitos de lesa humanidad ocurridos en el Ecuador entre el 4 de octubre de 1983 y 31 de diciembre de 2008*.


Likewise, it founded the *Programa de Reparación para la Víctimas*, the *Dirección Nacional de Reparación a Víctimas y Combate a la Impunidad*, in April 2014. Perhaps most importantly, it installed a normative background regarding justice and repairs mechanisms required in armed post-conflict scenarios. Proof of this, concerning the most recent civilian and indigenous non-armed citizen mobilization, was the creation by the Ecuadorian Ombudsman, on October 16, 2019, of the *Comisión Especial para la Verdad y la Justicia* (CEVJ) for searching truth, justice, and reparation for all the victims of the national protests unleashed in October 2019 (Defensoría del Pueblo de Ecuador, Resolución n.º 098-DPE-DP-2019 de 16 de Octubre de 2019).

On the other hand, policies for protecting the collective action aimed at promoting the *Entitlement* (E3) to defend the legitimacy of social mobilization face international pressure from Colombia and the US regional war against terrorism. At the same time, it rejects the criminalization of indigenous protests accused of destabilizing the national executive power decisions (La FM, 2019 October 11). Likewise, it offered a shield for social mobilization charged by Colombia for the infiltration of armed groups in the Ecuadorian social protest as a strategy to forge and consolidate their subnational anchors in neighboring countries.

After the new risk of destabilization through border “contagion” with foreign insurgencies, *Entitlement* (E3) evidenced actions for protecting civilian victims, and cross-border forced displaced communities, as well as the illegal crops spraying, focused on the border territories of Planning Zone 1. Data from UNHCR (2020) shows how between 1980 and 2020, the number of forcibly displaced victims, mainly from Colombia, increased dramatically (See Graphic 33). Most of them enter and settle in the cantons and provinces of the northern border.

Graphic 33 Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from Colombia to Ecuador (1981-2020)

Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from Colombia to Ecuador (1981-2020)



Source: Own Elaboration based on UNHCR Refugee Data Finder (2021)

Graph 33 shows how the highest increase in the Colombian refugee population by the Ecuadorian State began in 2000 when a total of 1,734 refugees exploded to a maximum of 264,255 in 2007. These numbers broadly coincide with the years of a more significant escalation of the Colombian armed conflict in border regions such as the Southwest (see Section 3.3) and an increase in the incursion of foreign insurgencies into the Ecuadorian Planning Zone 1.

This drastic change in the number of refugees due to the armed conflict on the Colombian-Ecuadorian border implied a substantial effort for Ecuador to provide humanitarian assistance to the population settled in its northern border. Likewise, the implementation of legal recognition and protection mechanisms for the national armed conflict victims due to practices such as the illegal crops traffic and the increase of foreign insurgent governance in their IRE with strategic protection functions (Resdal, 2007; CODHES, 2007).

About the protection of Ecuadorian and Colombian population victims of forced cross-border displacement, the initiatives for the refuge represented to Ecuador multiple recognitions for its humanitarian work against this legacy of internal war. Between 2000 and 2020, asylum applications by the displaced Colombian population arriving at the northern border totaled 175,508 applications (UNHCR, 2021), with 2009 and 2010 being the years with the highest concentration with 31,222 and 24,595 applications, respectively.

This increase in the number of asylum applications for the years 2009 and 2010 corresponds, in turn, to the maximum value reached by the Colombian refugee people on the northern Ecuadorian border registered in 2007. For the same period, the highest number of approved asylum applications correspond to the year 2009, in which Ecuador recognized a total of 26,223 victims of Colombian forced displacement (UNHCR, 2021).

In this sense, Ecuador became the country with the highest level of refugees from the Colombian armed conflict (CODHES, 2007; UNHCR; 2021), but, at the same time, a guarantor of social mobilization and empowerment of more than 117 refugee organizations and victims of the insurgent armed conflict (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad

Humana, 2018; ACNUR, 2015). They found in the territorial refuge of planning zone 1 an opportunity for the subsequent urban labor and social insertion (FLACSO, 2011; Ortega, 2010; Palma, 2017; Rebellón, 2019) and strengthening your organization and Entitlement measures denied by the Colombian State.

Finally, Ecuador assumed the international legal actions against the spraying of illicit crops with glyphosate on the northern border as a strategy for its population and natural environment protection and rights restoration (Razón Pública, 2013 October 21). As seen in Graphic 33, during most Colombian armed conflict escalation, Plan Colombia aimed to reduce the total number of coca leaves hectares under the argument of attacking the illegal finances that strengthen the armed groups, including the guerrillas.

In this sense, the increase in coca leaves hectares sprayed with glyphosate was remarkably higher than calculated for 2006, namely more than 50% (See Graphic 33). However, the impact of the glyphosate spraying generated not only a massive exodus of civilians in regions such as the Colombian southwest towards the interior and the northern border of Ecuador but also the internal forced displacement of the Ecuadorian border population affected by fumigations, the armed confrontation by foreign insurgencies and the massive arrival of cross-border migrants to their territories (Int. 21).

Therefore, the aerial eradication of illicit crops became a collateral problem of the armed conflict unleashed on the northern border and a new focus of public policies of security, protection, and entitlement of nationals and refugees concentrated in the border territories: “This discourse was maintained until Correa left. That is why I say, amid our small military capabilities, the ability to draw the best protection strategies is highlighted, not necessarily from the strong-armed confrontation on the border” (Int. 24).

In July 2007, after several attempts at conciliation with the Colombian State, Ecuador filed an official lawsuit against Colombia in the *Corte Internacional de Justicia* (ICJ). Ecuador denounced the policy of illegal crop aerial spraying on the border. It demanded protection and rights restoration to the national and refugee victims in the Planning Zone 1 provinces and cantons.

Graphic 34 shows on the bottom the number of coca leaves hectares sprayed in 2006 and 2007. It became the highest in the entire history of illegal crop fumigation (172,025 and 153,134 hectares, respectively). In this way, the data coincide with years of the Colombian population's highest cross-border forced displacements, refugee, and asylum requests in Ecuador (See Graphic 34). Likewise, since 2012, the level of hectares sprayed by air has begun its decline while the manual eradication strategy increases, among other things, due to the ruling issued in that same year by the ICJ in which Colombia is obliged to:


1. Maintain an exclusion zone of 10 kilometers on the border where aerial spraying with glyphosate cannot be carried out and cannot be reduced to less than 2 kilometers.
2. Maintain a specific formula and composition of the herbicide, consulting any changes and asking for consent from the government of Ecuador.
3. Provide Ecuadorian nationals with a complaint procedure at the border through a “special, expeditious and simple Protocol (which) must be agreed upon no later than 15 calendar days

following the date of this Agreement, the same as it will be incorporated as Annex No. 2 and will form part of it”.

4. Assign to Ecuador an economic contribution equivalent to 15 million dollars, oriented to social and economic development in the border areas, particularly Esmeraldas and Sucumbíos. The sum must be disbursed no later than December 9, 2013 (Public Reason, 2013 October 21).

Graphic 34 Illegal Crops in Colombia vs. Eradication Strategies impacting Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1

Colombian Illegal Crops Vs Eradication Strategies



Source: Own Elaboration based on United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Observatorio de Drogas En Colombia (ODC) (2021)

Finally, the international litigation mentioned above and peace talks between Colombia and the FARC-EP guerrillas in 2016 (See Graphic 34) oriented the dismantling of illicit crops spraying on the northern border and transformed *Plan Ecuador* into a determinant tool supporting the civilian collective action (Empowerment). Likewise, linking Empowerment with legitimacy (Entitlement) of social demands (indigenous, peasant, and citizen) against practices derived from the internal armed conflict such as cross-border forced displacement and the adverse effects of illicit crop spraying:

The Ecuador Plan was and is vital for the Ecuadorian State and society. We are much more so now that we are exposed to the negative consequences of the Colombian post-conflict and the exponential increase in organized crime on the pacific northern border that both countries share (Rivera, 2018: 98).

In short, *Enforcement* and *Empowerment* triggered vectors for the transmission of stability intervening in the legacies of center and border insurgent regions. Consequently, the national victims and refugees *Entitlement* process closed the Ecuadorian cycle of stabilization inherited by the national insurgent armed scene beginning in the 1980s and the subsequent internationalization of the Colombian armed conflict implicit until the bombing of Angostura events.

My APS process tracing shows an effective Ecuadorian State capacity to reach and maintain a strong APS level compared with Colombia and Peru. My findings contrast with approaches about how Ecuadorian and foreign insurgent nuclei in the center and the peripheral

subnational units result from factors such as the fragility of the Ecuadorian regime (ISS, 2011; Trujillo, 2013).

On the contrary, the non-structural character of armed conflict inside the country (Soifer & Vergara, 2019) and the subnational variation in its outcome show an effective securitarian response for fighting with the national insurgencies during the '80s and '90s. At the same time, for designing an intense political and diplomatic policy to manage the APS scenario subnationally. The latter, including the border's control policies for containing foreign insurgencies' menace after the peace negotiations with AVC armed group.

Likewise, my pieces of evidence about the insurgent diplomacy strategies for containing the Colombian foreign insurgencies depart from arguments about how the Ecuadorian instability of executive power after the 90s (Trujillo, 2013) harmed the consolidation of armed post-conflict stabilization. In several of my interviews, the testimonies about the role of indigenous empowerment and its interest in achieving stabilization contrast radically with the thesis on the causes of the instability of the Ecuadorian executive power:

Recognition and inclusion of indigenous people is a matter of social demand where the core is that they incorporate you. It is not the search for conflict and instability; if there has been conflict, for example, in the case of presidents, it is because they have put stability at risk. The indigenous people do not want much change. And that has implied you had social barriers that do not point to change but stability, which makes the conflicts associated, for example, with the figure of presidents very radical. Here the presidents fall in 3 or 4 months just for that (Int. 23).

[...] Here, we have this historical memory of pressure and citizen pressure mechanisms reconstituted very well by the indigenous movement. That is why the indigenous people come out in the first row of the protests, and then the whole people come out. But the conflict here flares up so much that it ends quickly as well, but it ends with decisions that have consolidated stability after the conflict (Int. 24).

An additional interviewee ratifies this idea of post-conflict stability achieved thanks to the post-insurgent indigenous movement. The testimony points to why the arrival and departure of presidents - seen, as said above, as a sign of political instability - is quite the opposite to instability when risks of its political reforms or unilateral decisions affect the equality, well-being, and recognition achieved by the Ecuadorian civil society since the 1990s. For example, the emblematic case of the social security program and its privatization attempts by the executive power have implied the fall of several presidential figures:

Social welfare in Ecuador, for example, is a bastion of social stability. So in the 90s, the neoliberal measures were precisely to privatize social security. We lowered every so often all the presidents who threatened to privatize our social welfare. There is also the peasant social insurance that allows many people in the rural sector to access the service with the same conditions that the inhabitants of the urban sector have (Int. 28).

In this sense, beyond the unstable and continuous changes in the executive power of Mahuad (1998-2000), Noboa (2000-2003), or Gutierrez (2003-2005), Ecuador aligned its State and civilians action in favor of the post-conflict stability and against the new risks of instability

by foreign insurgencies (ISS, 2011). Likewise, in line with the demands of the Ecuadorian social and political movements, it maintained neutrality concerning the neighboring armed conflicts and even offered international mediation services for its peace processes (Europa Press, 2016 September 10; El Universo, 2002 November 28).

Consequently, the Ecuadorian “Island of peace” enclave results from an APS mechanism where transmission vectors go from the State Enforcement Power to the social Empowerment and the civil and territorial Entitlement. This mechanism has been active since the peace process that ended the 70-80s' low-intensity armed conflict with national insurgencies to the border conflicts with radicalized foreign ones during the '90s. Additionally, it stabilized from a complex humanitarian security policy, remarkably, on the subnational border after the 2008 Angostura bombing events. Today, after the most recent scenario of armed post-conflict in Colombia, scholars, policymakers, and Ecuadorian politicians demand the need to reinforce and update a new plan for Ecuador that sets in motion the stabilization mechanism in the face of new threats on the northern border (Rivera, 2018; Torres et al., 2018).

Table 17 focuses on activities, entities, and pieces of evidence for tracing the dynamics of APS conditions in the Ecuadorian Planification zone 1 border Region and its Strong APS outcome (See Table 17).

Table 17. APS Process tracing narrative in Ecuadorian Planification Zone 1 (Activities & Entities)

Condition	Theoretical APS Narrative	Activities and Evidences	Entities
C1 (Achieved)	After the end of the war, the post-conflict is managed nationally to take control of Insurgent Exception Regions (IRE) and to strengthen the construction of sub-national State capacities.	<p>eA1C1: Design and implementation of counterinsurgent national security tactics (National)</p> <p>eA2C1: Disarmament processes and peace agreements of AVC with the government of Rodrigo Borja (National)</p> <p>eA3C1: New subnational insurgent focus: Ecuador's comprehensive national security plan implemented against Foreign insurgent IRE in border areas with Colombia (Subnational)</p> <p>eA4C1: Plan Ecuador (Since 2001) and Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado designs in 2009 (National and subnational)</p> <p>eA5C1: Angostura bombing events and Foreign insurgency Camps dismantling on the border (Subnational)</p>	<p>eE1C1: National government of Febres-Cordero and Political Intelligence agencies</p> <p>eE2C1: National Executive Power of Ecuador and National Insurgencies</p> <p>eE3C1: FF.AA – Cosena-Senplades – Subnational State Institutions</p> <p>eE4C1: Senplades – National Congress</p> <p>eE5C1: FF.AA – National Police and Ecuadorian Government</p>
C2 (Achieved)	Armed actors surrender, demobilize or join civil organizations (i.e., Cooperatives, Social Organizations) or State Institutions (i.e., political parties), thus reducing the risk of reactivation of internal conflict.	<p>eA1C2: Progressive incorporation of former insurgent actors into political parties and state institutions (National)</p> <p>eA2C2: Political coalitions and emergence of new political movements (i.e., Movimiento Político Alfaro Vive Carajo) (National-subnational)</p> <p>eA3C2: Security Plan for northern Ecuadorian border (Planification zone 1) Plan Ecuador against Plan Colombia and foreign armed conflict contagious (Subnational)</p> <p>eA4C2: Human security turn in policies against foreign insurgencies [i.e., Peace and development programs and Dismantling Manta's US Military Base] (Subnational)]</p>	<p>eE1C2: AVC-Governments of Rodrigo Borja and Rafael Correa</p> <p>eE2C2: AVC post-insurgent movement and political parties</p> <p>eE3C2: National Government - Senplades</p> <p>eE4C2: Senplades – Subnational State Institutions</p>
C3 (Achieved)	Civilian actors empower their territory, and post-conflict management is primarily subnationally oriented.	<p>eA1C3: Process of political incorporation of indigenous and ex-insurgent sectors (National – Subnational)</p> <p>eA2C3: Comité del Pueblo and Comités Barriales promotes civilian Empowerment in previous national insurgencies regions of incidence (Subnational)</p> <p>eA3C3: Indigenous and social movements promotes new projects of constituent assemblies (Political constitutions of 1998 and 2008) (National-Subnational)</p> <p>eA4C3: Risks of armed insurgent instability on the northern border promotes new Crossborder and national forced displaced organizations (Subnational)</p>	<p>eE1C3: Social movements and indigenous movements (CONAIE) - (MUPP-18)</p> <p>eE2C3: Comité del Pueblo and Comités Barriales</p> <p>eE3C3: Indigenous and social movements – National Constituent Assemblies</p> <p>eE4C3: Forced displaced organizations – Ecuadorian National Government - ACNUR</p>
C4 (Achieved)	The post-conflict is managed and implemented subnationally, and the post-conflict territorial initiatives come for C1, C2, and C3 formalize	<p>eA1C4: Former President Rafael Correa creates the (CVE). Final Report published in 2010 (National)</p> <p>eA2C4: National Congress approves the Ley para la Reparación de las Víctimas (National-subnational)</p> <p>eA3C4: Former President Rafael Correa complaints bombing attack of Colombia against foreing insurgency on Ecuadorian border (Subnational): Cumbre de Rio 2008</p> <p>eA4C4: International Ecuadorian lawsuits against Colombia (CIJ 2012) for the policy of fumigation of crops on the border and impacts on internal and cross border forced displacement (Subnational)</p> <p>eA5C4: National calls for improving a New Plan Ecuador after Colombian Armed postconflict and risks of instability in the border</p>	<p>eE1C4: Government of Ecuador and CVE</p> <p>eE2C4: National Congress and National and foreign victims</p> <p>eE3C4: National and Colombian Governments</p> <p>eE4C4: National Government, CIJ, National and Foreign victims organizations.</p> <p>eE5C4: National executive power and National Defense Ministry</p>

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

Chapter 5

Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) in Peruvian Regions of Exception: Legacies of armed violence and neoinsurgent risks

On December 3, 1982, *el Presidente Gonzalo* (Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso) announced from Ayacucho (*La Esquina de Los Muertos* in Quechua language) the birth of the so-called "Ejército Guerrillero Popular". An armed group with which the PCP-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) sought to build the *República popular de nueva democracia* since the end of the 70s of the 20th century (Bonilla, 2003). The insurgent enclave devised by Guzman had the characteristics of a power parallel to that of the State (González, 1984). It was based on the indigenous and peasant population of marginalized regions such as the Peruvian Amazon organized against the so-called "Senshi malvados"¹¹ (Zeledón, 1995).

Given the long history of social and political exclusion of its population, the creation of this new democratic republic should be born out of a "violent revolutionary war from the countryside to the city through bloodbaths" (Bonilla, 2003: 61). The cradle of this insurgent project was the province of Ayacucho, and its first insurgent rearguard enclave was the San Cristóbal de Huamanga University.

After a long history of insurgent and counter-insurgent violence, including multiple events of violence, displacement and forced disappearances, massacres, and more than 30,000 victims (CVR, 2003), President Alberto Fujimori launched an armed Enforcement strategy legalizing the peasant self-defense groups (Rondas Campesinas) and finally capturing the PCP-SL maximum leader Abimael Guzmán. Likewise, the armed strategy of the State led to the extermination of other insurgent groups of a parochial and fragmented type, such as the MRTA, which has risen in arms since 1982 (La Serna, 2020).

In Peru, the victory of the State Enforcement power found in prison (Renique, 2003) and the peripheralization of the insurgents, the functional equivalent of reincorporation and reintegration experienced in other insurgent armed conflicts such as that of Colombia (See Chapter 3). However, the legacies of violence against civilians were harmful despite the State programs of return, justice, and victims' restoration. Today, social organizations continue to demand local Empowerment and territorial autonomies conducive to the effective titling of their rights. The latter is in sharp contrast to the assistance actions of the State towards the victims promoted during the post-conflict years as the equivalent of Empowerment.

¹¹ The expression "Senshi malvados" belongs to Mao Tse Tung and is taken up by Abimael Gúzman to refer to all the agents of the capitalist state on whom the action of the revolutionary path to seize political power falls: "Sendero must consider that the [Senshi malvados] are all those who have had to do with the State or with the incipient Capitalism that also arrived. And that is why local authorities, small merchants and even the office of a ministry that arrives there is considered the equivalent of the [Senshi malvado]" (González, 1984: 17 cited by Zeledón, 1995: 23)


In this way, the fractures in the intervention of the legacies of violence on the *Empowerment* affected the transition from the stability intended militarily towards the stability of the rights and justice of the populations and territories affected by insurgent violence. That is *Entitlement*. Likewise, there are “criticisms” of the legitimacy of the pathways adopted by the State to combat the insurgency, “reintegrate” socially and politically the ex-insurgents who leave prisons (Valenzuela, 2019), as well as the reactivation of *neo-senderista* insurgent violence (Díaz, 2015; Sánchez, 2003) in a new IRE (the VRAEM). In this new enclave, insurgents, drug traffickers, and other criminal organizations converge, turning Peru's post-conflict experience into a case of *Fragile APS* that shows that military victory is not properly peacebuilding.

This chapter deals with the Peruvian armed post-conflict, which means the last case of the *small-n* step of my subnational geo-nested research design. With this case, I aim to empirically test the 3E mechanism in the Fragile APS case of Peru after comparing within and between subnational units of Colombia (See Chapter 3) and Ecuador (See Chapter 4). Finishing with the fragile Peruvian APS let me complete the comparison of the whole APS specter of variation hypothesized in my diverse case empirical strategy (Gerring, 2017).

Section 5.1 presents a synthesis of the periods of armed conflict in Peru and the actions leading to the partial end of insurgent violence after the demobilization and imprisonment of the armed rebel leaders. Section 5.2 focuses on the subnational dynamic of internal armed conflict beginning with the armed violence events in the Ayacucho province and the attempts of *neo-senderismo* to build a new IRE in the *Valle de los Rios Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro* (VRAEM region). Additionally, Section 5.2 explores the effects of the SLAC on civilians, territories, and local State institutions for explaining how legacies of insurgent war have conditioned the achievement of a Strong APS level in Peru.

Finally, Section 5.3 deals with the process tracing of the 3E mechanism and the dynamics of APS transmission vectors in the Peruvian armed post-conflict. According to my APS typological purpose, as seen in the Colombian (Chapters 3) and Ecuadorian (Chapter 4) cases. Figure 21 summarizes the Peruvian outcome. At the same time, it shows the 3E Causal Mechanism sequence empirically tested in this Chapter

Figure 21. Peru - VRAEM Region APS Causal Mechanism



Source: Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013)

5.1 The Peruvian-Armed Conflict

The regional origin of the PCP-SL in the province of Ayacucho (Theidon, 2004) is closely related to the division of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) at the national level. In turn, the multiple fractures and splits experienced by the PCP since the 1960s derived from the breakdown of international communism between its pro-Soviet wing and the pro-Chinese wing (McClintock, 2001; Stern, 1998). By the end of the 1960s, the PCP divided into two blocks: on the one hand, the *PCP-Unidad* followed the Moscow principles of “peaceful coexistence”; on the other, the *PCP-BR (Bandera Roja)* declared Maoist affiliation and was convinced of the revolution by way of arms.

After the 6th National Conference of the PCP-BR, held in 1969, at least four factions with a Maoist tendency coexisted within the party: *Bandera Roja* itself, led by Saturnino Paredes; *Patria Roja*, opposed to the dogmatic leader of the party; the so-called *Facción Bolchevique*; and finally, the *Facción Roja* coordinated by what would be the prominent leader of the armed insurgency in Peru, Abimael Guzmán (Guzmán & Iparraguirre, 2014). From the internal struggle between these four factions of the PCP-BR, the *PCP-Sendero Luminoso (SL)*¹² would be born, making its commitment to reconstituting the armed revolutionary process of the PCP-BR and finally, separating from its original matrix, through a new motto and ideological horizon inspired by the ideas of Mariátegui and Mao: “Along the luminous path of Mariátegui”¹³.

As in the case of the Colombian FARC-EP guerrilla in *Marquetalia*, the province of *Ayacucho*, specifically, the *Universidad de Huamanga*, became the insurgent exception enclave (IRE) of the rising PCP-SL (See Section 5.2). At the same time, it turns into your most important strategic and ideological sanctuary:

The *Universidad de Huamanga* was for Sendero Luminoso what the *Bandera Roja* was for the *Facción Roja*, a haven for its growth. It seemed that the attitude of Guzmán and his supporters was to conceive of organizations as guests of others until their ideological and political maturity. In this way, a party organization germinated that put into practice its vision and radical conception of transforming Peruvian society through arms (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018: 47).

The *Universidad Nacional San Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH)* was founded in 1677 but suffered several closing events, particularly in 1876 and 1886, because the country's economic and political situation made it impossible to sustain its academic life (Giusti &

¹² My research follows the line of studies that highlight the name PCP-SL instead of *Sendero Luminoso* [Shining Path] to reflect the importance of the organizational components of the armed group borrowed from Maoist thought. According to Guzmán and Iparraguirre (2014), the popular struggle guided by the theoretical principles of Maoism included three fundamental instruments: the party, the army, and a united front made up of all revolutionary social classes. Of the three instruments, the party turns out to be the most essential and articulating of the others. Additionally, the name PCP-SL serves as a differentiating element of the integrated character of the Peruvian armed group in contrast to avant-garde or parochial guerrillas if we follow the typological proposal suggested by Staniland (2017)

¹³ José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930) was one of the most essential Peruvian Marxist thinkers and founder of the Peruvian Socialist Party (Löwy, 2006). He was for Sendero Luminoso, the clearest formulator of the general laws necessary to carry out the class struggle in Peru (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018: 59).

Sánchez-Concha, 2013). However, after multiple protests by regional social movements and organizations, the UNSCH was reopened in 1959 under the leadership of teachers and intellectuals who gave it a clear progressive imprint and promoted its rapid academic consolidation in the department of Ayacucho and its neighboring provinces.

In turn, the UNSCH quickly became a focus of political and ideological training for students and young people of peasant origin who for decades demanded a model of free education in the poorest and most excluded provinces of Peru. By the 1970s, the legacies of the social mobilization process promoted by the *Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho* (FREDEPA) and the *Federación Universitaria San Cristobal de Huamanga* (FUSCH) would open the door for the nascent PCP-SL and its political and armed base organization. Through an intense process of recruiting students and members of social organizations, the above would constitute the first combatants of the *Senderista* organization (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018).

At this point, it is essential not to understand the UNSCH and PCP-SL historical linkages in a way that affects the academic integrity or the former academic center. Its importance for economic development, social and culture of the region was crucial despite the stigma statements pronounced by the Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963-1968) and General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) governments. The latter accused the UNSCH of being a "home of subversion" (Degregori, 2010) that had to be subject to a substantial budget cut and a reorganization process like the one promulgated by the military government in early 1969 (DS No.066-69 / EP).

On the contrary, the events linking the history of the Peruvian regional University and armed groups such as the PCP-SL show how the conditions of poverty, isolation, and State abandonment (See Section 5.2) served as an excuse for the armed organizations to weave strong ties of civilian compliance in this region. Additionally, subnational anchoring with institutions and social organizations to install insurgent governance enclaves (IRE) and develop their long-term popular war (Heilman, 2010; Stern, 1998).

Between 1969 and 1974, the UNSCH became one of the first scenarios where the nascent PCP-SL developed academic-political activities (Degregori, 1990; 2010) ideologically oriented by Abiel Guzmán and directed to students, members of the university community, and future applicants from the UNSCH. In this way, Maoist political training and the objectives of reconstruction of the party and mass formation started by the PCP-SL (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018) developed publicly in the Department of Ayacucho. The latter, in contrast to the trend of most Latin American insurgent groups that carried out such work clandestinely (Villamizar, 2017).

By the same token, it is understandable why the Ayacucho organizations and social movements conferred legitimacy and a high level of civilian compliance to the PCP-SL. Among teachers and students of the UNSCH, the Maoist guerrilla was a social and political alternative to invisibility and economic precariousness historically offered by the Peruvian State. Thus, since 1974, the actions of the PCP-SL focused on preparing the popular war that would have as protagonists the regional peasantry gathered in the future *Ejército Guerrillero Popular* (EGP) (Guzmán & Iparraquirre, 2014).

This new Maoist-inspired illegality moment in the process of the PCP-SL would reorient and expand its objectives towards the entire province of Ayacucho under the argument that the armed revolution required union with the people. At the same time, this radical turn towards clandestinity implied to the PCP-SL a high level of marginalization of the Peruvian national political left. Still, it meant the support of the regional committee of Ayacucho's communist party in Ayacucho to develop his mass work in the region through what they called *organismos generados* (Stern, 1998).

Those called by Guzmán as *Organismos generados* were a broad set of popular organizations in charge of supporting the clandestine activities of the PCP-SL in the public sphere (Guzmán & Iparraguirre, 2014). For example, the *Centro de Trabajo Intelectual Mariátegui* (CETIM), founded in 1968, became one of the most important organizations for forming political cadres for the *Senderista* organization (Degregori, 2010). In this way, the *Organismos generados* add a new way of promoting the PCP-SL armed objectives among scholars, academics, and inhabitants of the region and a recruitment strategy for the popular war. Thus, the *Senderista* war strategy would find a sufficient level of subnational anchoring to make Ayacucho, and its neighboring provinces, its most important Insurgent Region of Exception (IRE).

In general terms, what significance did the presence of legal organizations have for a clandestine political organization? The *organismos generados* were actual transmission belts that varnished population groups with the Maoist ideology of *Sendero Luminoso* [...] For *Sendero Luminoso*, the proletariat developed these legal organizations, which followed the correct ideological line (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018: 47).

5.1.1 From Ayacucho to Lima's Insurgent Regions of Exception

The integrated character (Staniland, 2017) that characterized the PCP-SL since its inception is fundamentally explained by the principle of democratic centralism adopted and nuanced by the Maoist thought of Guzmán (*Pensamiento Gonzalo*) from the ideas of its historical revolutionary figure José Carlos Mariátegui (Arce 1989). In the same line of the Ecuadorian AVC insurgency inspired by the ideas of Eloy Alfaro (See Section 4.1), the Peruvian *Senderistas* saw in Mariátegui's slogans of *Solidaridad y Disciplina* two necessary conditions to organically build the central leadership of their organization. They develop the historic task of leading the people, particularly the peasantry, in solidarity and democracy (Granados, 1981).

This particular mixture of the Mariátegui and Maoist thought founded the ideological bases of the armed struggle of the PCP-SL, as well as the characterization of Peruvian society as semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Hence, the popular war should take place from the countryside to the city (Sotomayor, 2009) and the armed revolution marked the course of the Maoist-inspired *República de Nueva Democracia* (Guzmán & Iparraguirre, 2014).

By the late 1970s, the PCP-SL began what no other left-wing organization or party had ever done: Moving from a militarist discourse to a “revolutionary praxis” (Degregori, 2012). It contemplated two clear objectives: On the one hand, to transform the semi-feudal character of Peru through an armed struggle that would redistribute the land between peasants and indigenous people (the majority population of Peru); on the other hand, promoting the anti-

imperialist struggle through a worker-peasant alliance that would end the semi-colonial character of the nation and reorients its consciousness towards the indigenous population (Degregori, 1990).

A relevant fact radically contrasts the Peruvian insurgencies with the Colombian and Ecuadorian ones described in chapters 3 and 4. In Colombia, one of the objective causes of the insurgent conflict led by integrated guerrillas such as the FARC-EP or ELN rooted in the absence of agrarian reforms that put an end to the dominance of rural elites and the problem of the concentration of productive lands (Guzmán, Fals Borda & Umaña, 2005). It was precisely the persistence of this condition that consolidated the scenario of the longest-lasting armed insurgent confrontation in Latin America.

On the contrary, the PCP-SL origins and the subsequent popular armed struggle occurred after the military government of Velasco Alvarado (Decreto Ley No. 17716) implemented an agrarian reform law for deconcentrating and transferring the land tenure to organized peasant and indigenous communities (Saleth, 1991; Kay, 1982). A similar reform to the Ecuadorian one where governments of the Junta Militar promoted land ownership reform to empower the indigenous population (Terán, 1994).

In a nutshell, while the Colombian insurgent armed conflict began due to the absence of comprehensive agrarian reforms; in Peru, its implementation was precisely one of the objective reasons to initiate an armed conflict. The argument of Guzmán and the *senderistas* was quite clear: The agrarian reforms carried out by the military government were nothing more than “disguised” capitalism compared to that could be achieved through the only correct path, that is, the armed revolution of the *Nueva Democracia*:

For Sendero, the agrarian reform of the Junta Militar continued to be feudalism or a type of capitalist reform that maintained the semi-feudal and semi-rural character of the country. There was no other alternative than constructing a new model of State and society by way of Arms. The Peruvian armed conflict was born in democracy, I mean unlike several regional conflicts began with the lack of democratic reforms, ours arose against the democratic reforms considered by the insurgency as feudal and deceptive (Int. 4)

Despite the contrast, *Senderistas'* response to the agrarian problem was too similar to the Colombian insurgencies but much more violent and radical than *Alfaro Vive Carajo!* Ecuadorian avant-garde revolutionary objectives. Likewise, it revealed the true meaning of the political project of *Nueva Democracia* through the popular struggle of the PCP-SL in contrast to the reformist path promoted by the Peruvian State.

The preceding also explains the higher territorial anchoring achieved by the mass formation Maoist strategy of the Peruvian insurgency, as well as the weight of its Subnational Legacies (SLAC) compared to the Ecuadorian insurgents who opted for a war of the urban-focus type: “The peasant problem is, then, the basis and essence of our people's war, at the bottom of our popular war it is a war, it is a peasant war, or it is nothing (Guzmán and Iparraguirre, 2014: 220).

One of the most emblematic events in this line and that, incidentally, became the beginning of the insurgent armed confrontation in Peru, on May 17, 1980, was the burning of amphorae and electoral rolls in the district of *Chuschi*, Cangallo province, in Ayacucho (IDEHPUCP, 2020 May 19). After years of military dictatorship and restriction of their fundamental rights, local people would exercise their right to participate in the presidential elections for the first time. However, the contingent of the PCP-SL that carried out the attack, before developing local political recruitment activities, wanted to declare war on the Peruvian State and society from the Ayacucho region, which they called “*El faro de la revolución mundial*” (Manrique, 2007; Sánchez, 2015).

In this way, the focus on the rural PCP-SL strategy quickly achieved a high level of subnational anchoring compared to cases of urban avant-garde guerrillas such as Alfaro Vive, Carajo! in Ecuador, or the M-19 in Colombia. Likewise, it favored the creation of IRE, where subnational insurgent governance overlapped the broad set of initiatives of the national State for the return of democracy. In summary, by 1980, the subnational insurgent project and national democracy converged in a scenario that led to each of the Peruvian armed conflict stages.

My research follows, but not strictly, the *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (CVR) historical periodization of the Armed conflict distinguishing five conjunctural moments between 1980 and 2000. Although the CVR determines five periods of the armed conflict, my argument considers only the former three as stages of the internal war strictly. The latter two could be viewed as the initial stages of the armed post-conflict because it is possible to identify subnational conditions that end the armed hostility and configure the beginning of post-conflict in terms of the dynamics of the 3E mechanism hypothesized in my research.

The Beginning of Violence from the Periphery (1980-1982)

The beginning of the armed insurgency operations on May 17, 1980, in *Chuschi*, revealed at least two characteristics of the Peruvian armed conflict: First, the rural type of the PCP-SL armed revolution; and second, the wide gap between the National State and the political dynamics of its peripheral regions. This high disarticulation allowed the *senderistas* to quickly consolidate their insurgent governance practices under the ideological repertoire of the so-called *Pensamiento Gonzalo*. That is, as said above, the Abimael Guzmán's adaptation of the Peruvian reality to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism that guided the first years of the PCP-SL (Ramírez & Nureña, 2012; Rénique, 2003; Arce, 1989).

In this sense, the *senderistas'* armed violence extended from the countryside to the city became a crucial factor for the rocketing growth of the insurgent organization. Additionally, the State abandonment of the peasant, indigenous and poor population of the Peruvian rural periphery where the PCP-SL consolidated (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018; Ron, 2001).

After the political and ideological training developed by the *senderistas* since the 1960s and 1970s, the armed indigenous-peasant revolution ensued. They were driven by a discourse that demanded equality and social justice for the most vulnerable population of Ayacucho and its neighboring regions. “Popular support is mobilized from the bottom up rather than the top-down, through a staged process of organization building. Success under this strategy

is much less sensitive to the strengths and weaknesses of the State and society” (McCormick, 1993: viii)

In its *central* and *south-central* of the country insurgent governance enclaves (See Section 5.2), the PCP-SL became a substitute State actor (Helmke, G. & Levitsky, 2004) with the capacity to administer justice and exercise population and territorial control in the absence of subnational political institutions enforcement (Sánchez, 2015; McCormick, 1993; Stern, 1998). Thus, the *senderistas* quickly consolidated an insurgent rebelocratic regime (Arjona, 2014; 2016) with very little chance of resistance by peasants and indigenous people. Until the insurgents promoted the social justice initiatives, the latter turned into repressive and authoritarian measures against the local population. Particularly against those individuals and social sectors that resisted being part of the armed revolution.

At this point, I identified three conditions for explaining the intensification of the armed conflict in the early 1980s: First, the little importance given by the central government and Peruvian society to the first insurgent armed actions compared to the political expectations of the return to democracy; second, the lack of credibility of political and social institutions in the potential effects of an armed insurgent revolution; and third, the weight of the national security strategy of the military forces that, in the early 1980s, focused their attention on the events of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border war of the *Falso Paquisha* or *Alto Comaina* (Gambetta et al. 2018; Ríos & Sánchez, 2018):

For several years the governments did not give importance to the guerrillas. We always heard that it was a minor issue in some Andean areas of the country. The problem was that they belittled the internal enemy, and when Sendero had already grown enough, the State realized that the war with Ecuador was not the only priority in military terms. I think that it marked the beginning of the conflict substantively because Sendero grew very fast, and let's put it like this, the government, not even the people, believed it.

In contrast to scholars focusing on the former two factors (Stern, 1998; Degregori, 1990; 2012; Walker, 2014), my small-n step highlights the importance of the national security strategy's third factor. The preceding not only for the late response of the Peruvian armed forces against the rocketing expansion of the internal armed conflict but the challenges of a new internal and counterinsurgent war compared with the interstate conflict with Ecuador.

This little-explored factor in the history of the armed conflicts in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia is significant considering the transnational insurgent projects, i.e., the *Batallón América* (See Section 4.1) that strengthened during the border war between Ecuador and Peru. At the same time, the sovereignty effect of implementing the US national security doctrine as the only alternative for Latin American states to combat the internal insurgent enemy after events such as the Cuban revolution (See Sections 4.3 & 5.3).

A piece of evidence points to President Belaunde's statements in 1981 assuring that the PCP-SL was part of an external threat originating from the neighboring nations' armed conflicts but never from an internal insurgent phenomenon with high roots in the Peruvian peripheral regions (Stern, 1998). Meanwhile, the PCP-SL extended its domain to *Ayacucho* provinces such as *Cangallo* and *Victor Fajardo* in a broad sample of its so-called Liberated Zones

(Rojas, 2018). Likewise, a new insurgent guevarist type movement, the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amará* (MRTA), joined the internal armed conflict aligned with the dynamics of urban Latin American guerrillas such as the M-19 in Colombia or AVC in Ecuador.

The MRTA joins the armed struggle as a vanguard alternative (1982)

The *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amará* (MRTA) was born of former survivors of the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-El Militante* (MIR-EM), and the *Partido Socialista Revolucionario-Marxista Leninista* (PSR-ML). They were convinced of adopting the armed revolution as a popular alternative to electoral processes and legal partisan competition of the returned Peruvian democracy (MRTA, 1990).

As the PCP-SL, the MRTA members considered the armed violence as the axis of their political actions for opening new paths for the mass struggle and the conquest of power by the popular revolution: “The realization of the Organized violence is an important part of our conception of a party of political-military cadres, and, from a strategic perspective, it is part of the definition of prolonged, urban-rural war combining all forms of struggle in the construction of the Popular Revolutionary Army” (MRTA, 1990: 7).

The name of the armed group arises in strict reference to the Peruvian indigenous leader *Tupac Amará* (Walker, 2014), and it is part of the Latin American guerrilla’s tradition to take up the slogans of their revolutionary figures. Like *Mariátegui* in the case of the *Senderistas*, the history of the Peruvian rebel leader inspired the armed revolution of the *Emerretistas* led by Víctor Polay (Comandante Rolando). Their objectives were to promote the unity of the armed movements that made up a new but less radicalized avant-garde organization than the PCP-SL (McCormick, 1993) but equally convinced of carrying out the revolutionary war as a superior synthesis for conquering power (MRTA, 1990; 1990a).

The armed operations of the MRTA began on the night of January 22, 1984, when an armed contingent attacked a police station for rejecting the eviction of several families who had occupied private properties. With this operative, the MRTA fulfilled its founding slogans to develop urban guerrilla strategies and form a guerrilla army in the countryside (Meza, 2012: 231). Between 1984 and 1987, the increase in his armed attacks projected him as an insurgent enemy of the Peruvian State, mainly in urban centers where the PCP-SL did not have a strong presence.

In line with the armed attacks by urban guerrillas in Colombia and Ecuador, described in chapters 3 and 4, the MRTA carried out military operations of outstanding media coverage, such as the theft of a San Martín's sword replica (Meza, 2012). The preceding emulating the M-19 in Colombia and AVC Ecuador operations for stealing the Bolívar and Eloy Alfaro swords. Likewise, they appropriated and stole the armed forces' war materials, food, and supplies in large cities like Lima. However, their operations achieved the desired media coverage but never reached the war impact of integrated guerrillas like the PCP-SL.

Data on the armed operations of Peruvian armed groups (McCormick, 1993; CVR, 2003; MIMDES, 2006; 2007) show for 1984 a vast difference between the number of the MRTA

operations (26 events) compared to the PCP- SL ones (438 events). The latter made it impossible to match their armed capacity and the scope of their insurgent governance in the subnational liberated zones (See Section 5.2). This difference was maintained along years of the greatest concentration of armed operations by both insurgent groups: 1984-1990 (See Sections 5.2 & 5.3).

One of the explanatory factors of this significant difference between both armed groups points to the direction imposed by the MRTA to the armed conflict, from the Peruvian urban centers to the countryside. This trajectory of the war, as said above, radically contrasted with the rural-oriented subversive dynamics of the PCP-SL and highlighted the ideological and strategic distance between both armed groups.

By the same token, the MRTA transformed its clandestine armed strategy into a public one that explicitly removed it from any political nexus with the Peruvian Communist Party. Likewise, the *emerretistas* intensified the number of armed operations in urban centers such as *Lima*, *Huancayo*, and some cities on the Peruvian north coast in contrast with the PCP-SL expansion in the *Ayacucho* countryside. Finally, although the number of armed actions by the MRTA was consistently lower than that carried out by the PCP-SL (CVR, 2003), the former always preferred the higher level of resonance achieved by their attacks, as well as the importance and public profile of their targets and military objectives (Rodríguez, 1990).

Consequently, the insurgent threat of the MRTA for the Peruvian state never became substantive (McCormick, 1993). After the unilateral suspension of its operations between 1985 and 1986, the MRTA attempted to consolidate its rebel governance in the city of Cusco, considered by the *Emerretistas* as a strategic enclave of the peasant revolution since the time of Tupac Amará II (Int. 6). Nevertheless, the rebels' objectives were frustrated given the low capacity of their political-armed fieldwork (McCormick, 1993; Meza, 2012) and the strategic failures committed to carrying out a new stage of the popular war focusing, this time, in the countryside.

In the words of their militants, reported by the CVR (2003), the high armed capacity of the *emerretistas* in cities like Cuzco contrasted with the low levels of civilian compliance and subnational linkages necessary for the consolidation of a rural guerrilla front:

In 1987, MRTA militants organized a new front -El Pachacutec- in the valleys of San Miguel in Quillabamba, province of the Convention under the command of Andrés Corrales with teachers, students, and peasants. They lasted only six months, and the army destroyed them. A survivor would say: "There we perceived that they respected us, the people were fond of us, but we were not able to transform that feeling into the organization" (CVR, 2003: 292).

The *Emerretistas* ran the same fate when they wanted to install a new insurgent focus (Frente Nororiental) in the department of San Martín, in the northern Peruvian region, not yet intervened by the rebel governance of the PCP-SL. In this region, the insurgents reached an alliance with MIR militants, small radical left parties, and some organizations that demanded an effective State presence and essential services. However, the arrival of the PCP-SL to the region, under supposed alliances with drug trafficking (Meza, 2012), unleashed a strong-

armed confrontation that led to the expulsion and peripheralization of the MRTA's actions back to urban centers of the Metropolitan Lima.

After failures to consolidate rural fronts in the Northeast (San Martín), Oriental (Ucayali), and Central (Junín and Pasco) regions (See Section 5.2), the MRTA decided to restructure the urban armed struggle adopting urban mass agitation and the kidnapping of elite businesspeople in metropolitan regions (MRTA; 1988; CVR, 2003). This last decision was in line with the strategies of the urban avant-garde guerrillas in the Latin American region and particularly recalled the decisions of armed groups such as the kidnapping of the Ecuadorian businessman Nahím Isaías in 1985 by rebels of *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* (See Section 4.2) or the seizure of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic by the Colombian M-19 (Villamizar, 2017).

The kidnapping strategy, including the seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1996 (El Comercio, 2015 December 17), allowed the MRTA to stay alive in front of the media and public opinion despite the military operatives against them. The most critical was its leader Victor Polay's capture in the city of *Huancayo* (El País, 1992 June 19) and the murder of 58 *Emmerretistas* by the Peruvian armed forces. The latter, within the framework of one of its most crucial insurgent operations to take armed control of the city of *Tarma*, central Peru: Ucayali and the capture of four of its six national leaders inflicted blows on the MRTA that disrupted its political and military structure” (Meza, 2012: 300).

In short, the MRTA proposed an insurrectionary strategy focused on the cities that contrasted with the *senderista* rural plan based on an armed struggle to surround the main Peruvian regions from the countryside (CVR, 2003). This contrast in the sense and directionality of the armed revolution, rather than favoring the integration of the Peruvian national insurgency or the rebel inter-fighting (Pischedda, 2020), promoted the division of its armed objectives. Remarkably, the breakdown of the MRTA insurgent governance and their objectives to build a solid sub-national anchor in the Peruvian countryside failed by fighting the police, armed forces, and civilian allies.

Likewise, the legacies of violence generated by the urban military action of the MRTA were lower than those of the PCP-SL in its IRE (See Section 5.2). The preceding as experienced by vanguard insurgencies such as *Alfaro Vive Carajo!* in their attempt to build Strong Regions of Exception (IRE) in the central Ecuadorian highlands, or the M-19 in the Colombian-Ecuadorian border (See Section 4.2):

The MRTA tried to do the same as the senderistas to gain the support of the rural and peasant population, but the discourse did not work for them. In that sense, they did not get enough sympathy to develop their armed objectives, and, therefore, their footprint was smaller [...]. I think that the problem was that they had a less effective and more political discourse, more intellectual than the more messianic and libertarian language of Sendero Luminoso. The people do not understand them, and they fight alone. (Int. 3)

Militarization and escalation of the conflict (1983-1986)

Since 1982, the PCP-SL carried out military and rescue operations for its imprisoned militants in Ayacucho that outlined the capacity of its armed action and led the central government to leave the counterinsurgent combat in the hands of the armed forces, and no longer the Civil Guard. This directive aimed at the militarization of the territories of influence of the PCP-SL became one of the first strategies of the Peruvian State to regain control of the territories controlled by the insurgency and a way to dissolve the social networks of the Senderista rebellion.

Thus, the armed conflict found in the State's anti-subversive response a new ingredient that led to the escalation of violence and the victimization of a large sector of the civilian population accused of supporting and protecting the Senderista insurgency. Under these conditions, the PCP-SL strengthened its peasant recruitment strategy to consolidate its *Ejército Guerrillero Popular* (EGP) and combat the national Army troops that were present in its IRE (Martínez, 2009).

Consequently, between 1983 and 1985, the highest number of violent events in the internal armed conflict took place, mainly in the department of Ayacucho: Thirty percent of the total number of events recorded by the CVR (See Section 5.3). Their data account for murders, disappearances, forced displacements, torture, and violation of the human rights of the peasant and indigenous population living in the communal spaces that became the epicenter of armed confrontations between State agents and the PCP-SL.

The legalization of the Comités de Autodefensa Campesina and the armed violence Nationalization (1986-1989)

In 1985, Alan García assumed the presidency of Peru after intense armed pressure from the PCP-SL so that the general elections would not be held in their regions of influence. At that time, the PCP-SL contemplated the extension of its armed governance to the national level after considering that the conditions of symmetry and strategic balance with the State were fulfilled (Int. 3).

In this way, the PCP-SL consolidated its rural IREs at the subnational level and expanded to the urban centers being Lima one of its strategic objectives. In turn, the García government made decisions on national security highly contrasting: On the one hand, the *Aprista* government promised a series of policies to increase the State's capacities in insurgent governance areas with higher rebel civilian compliance. On the other hand, given the economic challenges at the national level (Pascó-Font & Saavedra, 2001), the García government lowered the national profile of insurgent conflict and granted the Armed Forces more autonomy to deal with the subnational counterinsurgent strategy.

This ambiguous but conscious security strategy of the State (Azcona & Del Prado, 2020) created a new moment of the armed conflict. The *senderistas* extended armed control to new areas of influence and, in turn, the military increased the discretion of their anti-subversive operatives. Most of them, according to reports by DESCO (1998), CVR (2003), and MIMDES (2005; 2007), were carried out outside the constitutional order and against the

civilian population. In this sense, the words of President García regarding that “we will not fight barbarism with barbarism” (El País, 1985 September 15), pronounced in connection with the grave human rights violations generated by the war, “gone the wind” (Int. 4).

At the same time, by 1985, civil self-defense measures were promoted to combat the subnational influence and armed control of the *senderistas* (Taylor, 1998). The preceding included linking the *Rondas Campesinas*, created in the 1970s (Márquez, 1994; Pérez, 1996; Degregori et al., 1996; Stern, 1998) with the State's counterinsurgency strategy. In this sense, peasant self-defense groups in Peru emerge as a resistance strategy to the risks and threats of their customs and autonomous spaces of action (Degregori et al.; 1996).

However, with the expansion of the insurgent war and the State's anti-subversive strategy, some self-defense groups progressively became actors in the conflict under the auspices and legal recognition of the Peruvian State (Degregori et al., 1996). In this way, under the influence of the Peruvian military apparatus, the peasant resistance strategy became an anti-subversive one under the label of *Rondas Campesinas antisubversivas* or *Comités de Autodefensa* (CAD) (Pérez, 1996). The preceding was radically distant from the original regional peasant self-defense objectives (Starn, 1991).

By the same token, after their turn into self-defense committees in the early 1980s, this type of *Rondas Campesinas* reached a high level of militarization, becoming *Comités de Defensa Civil Antisubversivos* (DECAS) in specific areas of exception such as the *Valle del Río Apurímac*. They were finally professionalized and legitimized by the Peruvian State in the 1990s. Thus, the Peruvian State added the performance of the *Rondas Campesinas* in the insurgents' areas of influence to its militaristic enforcement strategy.

The public opinion interpreted this legalization of the CAD in multiple ways: On the one hand, as a type of peasantry instrumentalization for the “dirty war” against the insurgency as it happened with the peasant self-defense groups and paramilitarism in Colombia during the most intense years of the *Seguridad Democrática* (See Section 4.1). On the other, as a peasantry's voluntary response against the PCP-SL governance regime in their IRE. In any way, the peasant resistance strategies at the subnational level fractured the insurgent governance of the armed groups and favored the development of the government counterinsurgent objectives, among them, the capture of the *senderista* leader Abimael Guzmán (Degregori et al. 1996)

Extreme crisis, subversive offensive and State counterinsurgency (1989-1992)

As in the case of Ecuador and Colombia, the armed conflict rocketing and the subsequent decline of the insurgency occurred with the arrival of a counterinsurgency strategy focused on the main rebels IRE (See Section 5.2). The so-called *Sinchis*, created in the 1960s by the National Civil Guard, developed in the insurgent governance enclaves the same political intelligence activities and extrajudicial execution carried out by the SIC-10 in Ecuador or the DAS in Colombia. (See Sections 3.1 & 4.1).

President Alberto Fujimori carried out the most aggressive stage of this counterinsurgency policy during its two electoral periods: 1990-1995 and 1995-2000, framing the

counterinsurgency strategy within the regional scheme of the fight against terrorism. In this vein, the armed forces' discretion was much broader, and their autonomy to carry out military operations in the rebel governance areas.

The Fujimori strategy was quite similar to the Álvaro Uribe Vélez government during the years of *Seguridad Democrática* in Colombia. Fujimori, like Uribe, justified his policy of armed enforcement as the best way to combat the insurgency and, incidentally, to promote a post-conflict that would strengthen “democracy” through the military victory of the State. Consequently, the peace negotiation alternatives were replaced by a strong-armed confrontation named by the Peruvian State as the *Plan de Campaña para la Contrasubversión* that intensified the number of military victims and, in more significant numbers, civilians left in the middle of the war. (CVR, 2003).

The outcome of this insurgent counteroffensive was overwhelming. By 1996 the MRTA would practically disappear from the scene of armed confrontation, while the PCP-SL withdrew from its IRE with a higher level of strategic protection towards areas of the rural periphery such as the Alto Huagalla and the *Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro* (VRAEM). From these peripheral enclaves (See Section 5.2), the PCP-SL could hardly maintain its objectives of armed revolution and seizure of political power, but it managed to survive the “*Mano dura*” of the Fujimori government despite the multiple announcements of the latter about the definitive end of the armed insurgency in Peru (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018).

On the other hand, the high level of civilian compliance concerning Fujimori’s counterinsurgent strategy allowed him to legitimize his authoritarian political and military actions in the name of national sovereignty. The most resounding were them against the judicial and legislative branches under the argument of their irresponsibility and lack of commitment to national public security.

In this sense, Fujimori, and several of his advisers, such as Vladimiro Montesinos, used their counterinsurgency policy to concentrate and expand the executive power, creating a high level of political instability among the branches of public administration (CVR, 2003). At the same time, he promoted a violent and exclusive treatment of organizations and human rights defenders whom Fujimorism described as “*idiotas útiles*” of the insurgency (Carrión, 2006).

With the imprisonment of Senderista leader Abimael Guzmán and several members of the PCP-SL central committee in 1992, the State's counterinsurgency strategy showed its most effective side. In turn, Fujimorism found a window of opportunity to increase its control over the branches of public power and reinforce the military operations that pointed to the insurgency-drug trafficking alliance as the new enemy for the continuation of the internal war in the peripheries of the State (Vizcarra and Heuser, 2019).

As said above, one of the most revealing acts of this *fujimorista* authoritarian regime was the so-called *self-coup* declared in 1992 based on the executive national security arguments (El Comercio, 2021 April 6). Thus, Fujimori closed the Peruvian congress and installed an Emergency and National Reconstruction Government (Decreto Ley No. 25418), later declared illegal and unconstitutional by the Peruvian Constitutional Court (Int. 6). Likewise,

a new constitution was promulgated in 1993 and popularly endorsed, inaugurating a new political and economic post-conflict cycle in Peru in which economic growth and the de-escalation of insurgent violence emerged (Soifer & Vergara; 2019):

This new institutional framework for Peruvian politics and society was followed in the new millennium by an exceptional cycle of economic growth that transformed much of the Peruvian society. This new phase has implied, in both objective and subjective terms, the onset of a post-conflict period [...] In more personal terms, although a few remnants of the shining path have survived in the Peruvian jungle, for most Peruvians, “the era of terrorism” is doubtless a matter of the past (Pag.6)

Consequently, this militaristic and reformist logic of the State Enforcement power stopped the insurgency's armed objectives after its rapid advance from the armed enclaves of Ayacucho towards the center of Peruvian political power in the city of Lima (See Section 5.2). However, the subnational legacies of violence on civil society and the national-oriented democratic transition did not necessarily connect with the Empowerment and Entitlement processes necessary to consolidate post-conflict stability (See Section 5.3).

5.1.2 End of the armed conflict and Politics after violence

De-escalation of subversive violence and the “end” of the armed conflict (1992-2000)

The de-escalation of violence was one of the first signs of the armed post-conflict declared by the Fujimori government after the capture of Abimael Guzmán and the breakdown of urban guerrillas such as the MRTA. By 1994, the number of fatalities reduced to 500 victims compared to the nearly 4000 registered by the CVR (2003) only in 1990. Even so, 40.6% of the total for 1994 were civilians still victimized by the armed forces and guerrilla groups fighting (Lynch, 1999; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

However, the decreasing dynamics of insurgent violence contrasted with the increase in the militarization of the regions declared under the State of exception due to the insurgent threat: 68 provinces and three districts for 1995 (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018). Similarly, the State's military victory over the insurgency - including the "success" of the *Chavín de Huantar* operation that ended the MRTA's seizure of the Japanese embassy in 1996 (Rospigliosi, 1998) - became a new argument for the re-election of President Alberto Fujimori and the public power branches capture by the executive.

A piece of evidence was the Fujimori regime's strategy for controlling the political opposition and the media through political intelligence agencies led by President and its advisors (Soifer & Everett, 2019). At the same time, the consolidation of the military power over the civil authorities in the regions declared regimes of exception (See Section 5.3) and the control of judicial decisions in favor of amnesty and impunity for serious violations of the human rights committed by State agents (Cantón, 2011).

In terms of the CVR (2003), the best way to describe this “pacification” process would be an “anti-subversive policy without subversion”. That is, the use of the State's anti-subversive strategies to control the social mobilization and the political opposition of Fujimori's

personalist and authoritarian regime. In this vein, extrajudicial executions (Zech, 2015), the massive imprisonment of civilians and former armed combatants (Dargent & Vergara, 2000; Valenzuela, 2019), and the criminalization of social leaders designated *terrucos* (Lerner, 2007; Lajtman & Mendoza, 2019), became the foundations of the pacification policies of the Fujimori regime until its arrest in 2005:

The problem with pacification was that it became an excuse for the government to expand its repressive apparatus to social and political sectors opposed the war against terrorists justifying abuses by the government. Even post-*Comisión de la Verdad*, one knew that many people were persecuted and marked as *terruco*. Still, it was a kind of lesson from the government for those who dared to protest against issues that were no longer only terrorism but authoritarianism and the violation of human rights of which we were victims (Int. 5).

In short, the end of the armed confrontation in Peru did not necessarily translate into a solid post-conflict stabilization process. As in the case of the Colombian southwest, regions of exception in the Peruvian rural periphery, such as the VRAEM (See Section 5.2), became zones of fragile post-conflict stability due to the military intervention of the territory as the primary strategy for the State Enforcement power after the decline of the regional insurgent governance (See Section 5.3).

The role of truth commission and politics after violence

With Fujimori's arrest and subsequent sentence of 25 years in prison for embezzlement, bribery, and crimes against humanity (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018, Reátegui, 2011), Peru entered in another moment of post-conflict. New institutions converged for the care of victims, reparation, national reconciliation, and multiple demands by civil society emerged for the restoration of victims' rights.

One of the most emblematic and decisive institutions for this post-conflict stage was the *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (CVR), created in 2000 by the government of the democratic transition headed by President Valentín Paniagua and later consolidated by the government of Alejandro Toledo in 2001. The final report of the CVR identified between 1980 and 2000, a total of 69,280 victims of the internal armed conflict, being agents of the State and the PCP-SL (54% of the total number of fatalities), the most responsible for the events of violence and their legacies in multiple Peruvian armed conflict regions (CVR, 2003; Macher, 2018).

The main objective of the CVR was to investigate and reconstruct the memory of the crimes and human rights violations carried out by the actors of the armed conflict between 1980 and 2000 (Mantilla, 2006; Azcona & Del Prado, 2020). Likewise, its function was to provide guidance to Peruvian institutions and civil society for the non-repetition of acts of armed violence, promote national reconciliation and develop justice actions for strengthening the democratic regime in the post-conflict (Decreto Supremo No. 065-2001-PCM, Article 1).

The CVR published its final report in 2003, after conducting interviews with 18,217 people and collecting 16,917 individual and collective testimonies about the armed conflict and its victims (CVR, 2003). In terms of its methodology for reconstructing the memory of the

conflict from the war territories, the CVR created five regional nodes that covered the 24 departments of the country: The regional nodes of the *South Central Zone*, the *South Andean Zone*, the *Sierra*, and *Central Jungle Zone*, and, finally, the regional offices of *Lima* and the *Northeast zones* (CVR, 2003; Querejazu, 2018). Each of these regional nodes was in charge of collecting testimonies, holding regional public hearings, and participating in the exhumations of mass graves that aimed to identify the victims and disappeared of the armed conflict (Zapata, 2010).

This subnational strategy for reconstructing a differentiated memory of the armed conflict was decisive for the CVR to become one of the central pieces of the Peruvian post-conflict Peruvian. Likewise, its legislative and institutional initiative for stabilization in the territories most affected by the war. Thus, the reconstruction of the Peruvian post-conflict memory based on CVR reports was similar to the *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición* framed in the Colombian post-conflict with a subnational and decentralized approach. (See Chapter 3). The previous, without excluding the variation in the form of termination of armed conflict in both cases.

The CVR (2003) revealed that from the first years of the violence, indigenous and peasant peoples became the specific target of the armed actions of the guerrillas. Likewise, they were in the middle of the military counteroffensive carried out by the official forces of the State. With the launch of its armed expansion project, the northeastern jungle region and the central region became targets of the guerrillas until the capture and subsequent imprisonment of the Senderista leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992 when the urban violence of the PCP-SL intensified in cities like Lima (See Section 5.2).

The CVR report also recognized Peru's cultural and regional heterogeneity as an essential characteristic to understand the dynamics of the conflict and the actions of non-repetition of violence in the post-conflict. In this way, although the insurgent governance strategies of the guerrillas were similar in most of their enclaves, the war operated as a set of regional conflicts (CVR, 2003) with differentiated impacts and violence legacies not only in men and women but in the cultures, indigenous peoples, peasants, and sub-national institutions. Thence the importance of focused and differentiated reparation measures during post-conflict implementation.

Of the twenty-five departments making up Peruvian territory, only two, *Moquegua* and *Madre de Dios*, lack reports of fatalities from events related to political violence and the internal armed conflict (Soifer & Vergara, 2019). On the contrary, the south-central region (*Ayacucho*, *Huancavelica*, and *Apurímac*) was the first and most affected since the armed conflict began, with about 40 percent of the total victims of the armed conflict (See Section 5.2). Thus, the impact of violence on Ayacucho's indigenous and peasant population was different from that experienced by the people of urban centers such as Lima:

I think it is pertinent to see the Peruvian conflict as a set of local conflicts that grew from region to region and marked the war's trajectory. It is undeniable that this explains why the popular war from the countryside to the city. The Truth Commission understood that, and the report reconstructs the memory of the conflict by zones. But, what it also showed was the need to implement justice and reparation measures with a territorial and differentiated approach;

however, in Peru, we have seen little of that, mainly for our institutional precariousness (Int. 8)

This subnational dynamic of the insurgent governance of the PCP-SL, and other illegal armed groups, also traced the route of the counterinsurgent offensive of the Peruvian State in strategic territories such as its capital Lima and remote territories of insurgent control. Hence, the post-conflict stabilization after violence will also imply the reconstruction of the events in the manner of multiple subnational armed conflicts.

Consequently, the CVR considered it crucial to hold public hearings and regional public assemblies to reconstruct the armed conflict and promote reconciliation between the actors of the war in their territories (CVR, 2003). Thus, public case, thematic and institutional hearings - the three hearing modalities determined by the Commission - served to reconstruct emblematic cases of human rights violations. Likewise, to identify patterns of violence in specific issues and groups and analyze the role and level of involvement of national and sub-national institutions in impacts of the armed conflict.

In its final report, the CVR not only reconstructed the periods of violence, its actors, victims, and regional scenarios; but rather a broad set of representative stories of violence to make visible the repertoire of cases, crimes, and consequences of the armed conflict. Likewise, it presented 171 conclusions on the conflict dimensions and its perpetrators that served to formulate recommendations for the reconciliation and reparation of the victims (CVR, 2003a).

Neosenderismo and subnational APS under new risks

While the Peruvian government and most of the public opinion recognized the end of the *era del terrorismo* and its threats (Maldonado et al. 2019), the armed dissidents of the PCP-SL internally confronted between two strong factions: On the one hand, the so-called *línea acuerdista*; and on the other that of *Proseguir* (Díaz, 2015; 2015a; Santillán, 2017). The first, made up of Guzman followers, sought a negotiated end to the conflict despite the capture of their leader; the second, led by Óscar Ramírez Durand (Comandante Feliciano), promoted the continuity of the PCP-SL and the strategic relocation to the jungle zones of the VRAEM (Gorriti, 2010).

However, the *Proseguir* line of the PCP-SL faced great difficulties in strategically positioning itself in VRAEM territory. First, the VRAEM was one of the first regions of Peru with the presence of the *Comités de Autodefensas* o *Rondas Campesinas Antisubversivas* (CAD-DECAS), which, from the outset, represented a new risk of armed confrontation despite the announced end of the internal war. Second, the armed and ideological weakening of the PCP-SL after the capture of Guzmán imposed on the *Senderistas* a new form of financing the armed revolution as well as strategic alliances with small coca growers (Taylor, 2017), illegal coca traders, and drug trafficking (Soberón, 2008).

In this way, illegal crops and protection services for traffickers (Gorriti, 2009), became the new source of financing for the PCP-SL dissidents in the VRAEM during the armed post-conflict. This new risk of instability based on alliances between insurgency and criminal

illegality in sub-national units previously affected by the armed conflict has been identified as *Neosenderismo* (Antezana, 2009) or *Post-Senderismo* (Niño, 202). On the one hand, Peruvian scholars reduce the phenomenon to the mere expression of narco-terrorist illegality (Antezana, 2009; Soberon, 2008); on the other hand, to the insurgent violence continuity with a subnational scope (Gorriti & Rospigliosi, 2009; Díaz, 2015).

In line with my findings of the risk of post-conflict instability represented by legacies of insurgent violence at the subnational level, Gorriti & Rospigliosi (2009) recognize the political and ideological nexus between *neosenderismo* and the traditional PCP-SL. Nevertheless, they redefine the scope of their Insurgent actions in the framework of the armed post-conflict considering it a political-insurgent organization that re-established and then abandoned the bases of *Pensamiento Gonzalo* to adapt to the subversive regional struggle.

Moreover, the political and ideological objectives of *Neosenderismo* maintained even with the capture of Guzmán, but the mechanisms for its financing adjusted to the dynamics of the illegal subnational economy. As in the case of the Colombian insurgency, the *Senderistas del VRAEM* justified the collection of taxes from drug traffickers as activity-related, but not directly associated, to their insurrectional struggle (See chapter 3).


Consequently, peasants and VRAEM's native population were exposed once again to armed conflict and the stigma of being criminal actors, drug traffickers, or neoinsurgents (Díaz, 2015; Cabieses, 2008). Likewise, its territory became a scenario of new events led by armed actors despite the institutional, social, and legal mandates for increasing the Peruvian State capacities in the post-conflict: "[What] translates into the generation of parastatal dynamics still embedded in Peruvian territory" (Niño, 2020: 352)

5.2 SLAC Dynamics: From rural IRE to the Metropolitan Armed Fence (South-central to Lima Metropolitan Region)

The subnational characterization of the armed conflict presented in this section allows us to identify why the Peruvian VRAEM sub-national units that emerged from the Medium-n step analysis were selected to complete the final stage of my geo-nested between-nation comparison (See Chapter 2). My research identifies the VRAEM insurgent region of exception as the highest risk of post-conflict instability despite the de-escalation of the armed conflict in Peru since the early 2000s.

From now on, I compare the dynamics of the SLAC in each one of the regional spaces (See Map 18) and its trajectory traced from the installation and consolidation of Strong IRE from the *Espacio regional Ayacuchano* until the reactivation of insurgent instability new risks in the VRAEM (See Map 19). The preceding, as a result of the failures in the sequence of causal linkage of the APS mechanism in the Peruvian case.

Map 18. Peruvian Regions




Source: Own elaboration based on CVR (2003)

As in the case of Colombia, my research georeferenced the armed conflict events in Peru based on Sundberg & Melander (2013) and my own data (See Appendix 1). For coding the SLAC, armed groups, and IRE types, I based on methodological criteria in the line of the UCDP database. The previous is also to maintain the conditions of sample equilibrium and comparability between the subnational units of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Map 19 Peruvian VRAEM Region





Source: Own elaboration based on CVR (2003) and Own Data

As seen in section 5.1, the Peruvian armed conflict adopted a similar dynamic in its leading actors, but it was heterogeneous in its impacts and trajectories in the departments and provinces of the Peruvian geography. In this sense, the argument about the variation of the multiple territorial armed conflicts that trace the history of the insurgent armed conflict in Peru justifies downing the scale of my subnational comparative analysis.

As said above, I start from the zonal division of Peruvian territory proposed by the CVR (2003) in its final report on the armed conflict to arrive at the VRAEM (See Map 19) as the insurgent region of exception with the highest level fragility in the context of the Peruvian armed post-conflict. Thus, as in the cases of Colombia and Ecuador, the characterization of the territorial dynamics of the conflict corresponds to the IRE properties adopted as the unit of analysis of my within and between nations comparison (Sellers, 2019).

I identified the differentiated effects of the SLAC in each IRE where the insurgent violence was concentrated. Likewise, its impacts on the APS causal sequence led to the achievement of post-conflict stability but with fragile characteristics, precisely, in areas where the armed conflict between the Peruvian State, *neosenderismo*, and criminal governance imposed by illegal groups was re-established and reconfigured. Thus, this division by regions allows us to trace the moments and trajectories of the armed conflict from its beginnings in 1980 in the regional space of Ayacucho (CVR, 2003-Volume IV: 15) to the present of the post-conflict in the VRAEM insurgent region of exception composed of provinces of all the departments considered in this section: *Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cusco, Huancavelica and Junín*.

Five regional spaces constitute the subnational geography of the armed conflict in Peru (See Map. 18). First, the *south-central* region comprises the department of Ayacucho, the provinces of Andahuaylas and Chincheros (department of Apurímac), and Acobamba and Angaraes (department of Huancavelica). Second, the *central region* comprises the departments of Junín and Pasco, as well as the provinces of Huancavelica, Tayacaja, Huaytara, Churcampa, and Castrovirreyna (department of Huancavelica).

The *South-Andean* region made up of the departments of Puno and Cuzco, and the provinces of Grau and Cotabambas (department of Apurímac), as well as the *Northeast region* with the departments of Huánaco, San Martín, Ucayali, and Loreto, occupy the third and fourth place

of this regional configuration of the armed conflict. Likewise, in fifth place, the *Metropolitan Lima region* closes the set of sub-national units of the conflict, its urban composition and its highly strategic nature for the conflict actors being its greatest attribute and its main contrast concerning the rest of the rural territory of war.

Additionally, the CVR (2003) identifies two complementary spaces that it calls axes of the armed conflict, taking into account the geography of the war and the expansion routes of the insurgent governance of the PCP-SL during the years of the conflict. The first is the *Ancash-Lima axis*, made up of provinces in the north of the department of Lima such as Cajatambo and Oyón and the provinces of Bolognesi and Ocos located in the southern area of the department of Ancash. The second complementary axis is *La libertad-Cajamarca*, which formed a strategic corridor of the PCP-SL and includes the provinces of Santiago de Chuco, Huamachuco, Cajabamba and San Marcos (See Map.18).

5.2.1 Peruvian Insurgent Regions of Exception

In terms of the subnational armed conflict trajectories, the *South-central* region suffered the highest legacies of violence and victimization during the most critical period of the war. CVR (2003) data evidence in this region 12,007 cases of deaths and forced disappearance in the period 1980-2000, being the most affected provinces: *Cangallo, Victor Fajardo, Huanta, La Mar, Huamanga*, and the provinces of the *Valle del río Apurímac*.

As in the *South-West* of Colombia, the forced displacement of the peasant and indigenous population to the country's urban centers constitutes one of the significant negative impacts on the social and citizen dynamics experienced by this region during the years of the violence (See Section 5.1). In this sense, the low state strategic importance of the *South-central* region and its effect on the rebel IRE consolidation is highly comparable to the dynamics of the Colombian armed conflict in sub-national units where the levels of post-conflict stability achieved are also deficient (See Section 3.2).

One of the leading causes of the high concentration of violence and forced displacement in this region, but not the only one, lies in its condition of focus for the emergence of guerrilla organizations and the State's counterinsurgency strategy that gave rise to the escalation of violence since the early stage of the armed conflict. Similarly, its low economic specialization and industrialization diminished the strategic interest of the State and its institutional presence, thus aggravating the conditions of isolation and social vulnerability in the region (Sánchez, 2015).

This disarticulation with the national level and the asymmetric development promoted by the Peruvian State left this region out of its strategic interests and turned it into a focus of an intense process of resistance and social empowerment. Nevertheless, the bottom-up social strategy of students, peasants, and workers was co-opted by the rebels insurgent governance in the region under the argument of creating the necessary conditions for a new State:

The development of capitalism in the country prioritized certain regions to the detriment of others, including the Ayacucho region. Without any attractive resource for the foreign or national capital, any dynamic economic pole, and scarce and terrible road infrastructure, the

consequence was subordination to other more dynamic financial circuits, as well as a kind of <<disenganche>> and geographic confinement (CVR, 2003. Volume IV: 17)

As seen in Section 5.1, by 1980, the armed political propaganda of the PCP-SL announced the *Plan de desarrollo de la guerra popular* (Stern, 1998; Degregori, 2010) and extended the presence of the PCP-SL in the territory to consolidate its IRE (See Map. 20). The response of the State implied to declare the *South-central* region under a state of exception and develop a strong counterinsurgency strategy involving the armed forces, the national police, and the *Comités de Autodefensa Campesina* (CAD). Likewise, it generated changes in the war dynamics that implied the expansion of insurgent actors and their strong IRE to other regions considered strategic for the armed revolution.

Map 20 Peruvian geo-referenced IRE (1980-2000)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

One of those regions was precisely the *Central region*, where the political and military strategies of the PCP-SL, the MRTA, on the one hand, and the CAD allied with the State's, on the other, strengthened due to the geographical and economic conditions offered by departments like Junín. This region provided to the armed actors access to different strategic corridors connecting critical areas of the coast with the southern highlands and the central jungle (CVR, 2003. Volume IV: 133). Hence, since the 1960s, the central region was the focus of insurgent projects such as the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) prior to the PCP-SL and the MRTA origins.

In this region, the subnational dynamics were similar to the *south-central* one, even though the strategic importance of the department of Junín contrasted widely with the economic and productive characteristics of *Ayacucho*. Still, the region experienced high rates of armed violence in northern *Huancavelica* and *Junín* provinces, particularly since 1984 when the dynamics of insurgent governance expanded from the *south-central* region.

In this vein, the central region experienced an increase in strong IRE between 1984 and 1992 (See Map. 21) when the imprisonment of Abimael Guzmán triggered a significant decrease in insurgent violence in most of the Peruvian regions. Maps 21 & 22 show the increase in the central region's strong IRE coinciding with the presence of the PCP-SL guerrilla fronts,

specifically, the *Comité Regional Centro* (CRC), led by Oscar Ramírez Durán (Comandante Feliciano), key actor to the continuity of the *Proseguir* PCP-SL faction (See Section 5.1).

In this way, the legacies of violence in provinces and IRE of the central zone belonging to the VRAEM vary between the SLAC A and SLAC B types. This outcome was due to the changes in the levels of insurgent governance and intensity of the war before and after the imprisonment of the maximum PCP-SL leader (See Maps 21 & 26).

Map 21 Peruvian geo-referenced IRE and SLAC (1980-2000)



Source: Own elaboration based on CVR (2003), Sundberg & Melander (2013) and Own Data

Map 22 Peruvian geo-referenced IRE and Armed Groups (1980-2000)



Source: Own elaboration based on CVR (2003), Sundberg & Melander (2013) and Own Data

I observed a similar dynamic in the *South-Andean* region, contrasting the smallholder and peasant ownership of the poor provinces of *Apurimac* and the intense tourist, mining, and industrial activity of *Cuzco* and *Puno* provinces (López, 2003). Additionally, factors such as the predominance of the *Quechua-Aymara* speaking indigenous population and a specialization in the agricultural sector made it a focus of insurgent violence, with 1,388 victims of assassination and forced disappearance (CVR, 2003. Volume IV: 250). The

previous, despite the social and economic changes promoted by the 1969 agrarian reform to redistributing the large landholding property.

Before the arrival of the PCP-SL and MRTA insurgencies, the *South-Andean* region experienced the genesis of guerrilla organizations such as the *Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario* (FIR) and the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) mainly settled, between 1961 and 1963, in the department of Cuzco and some provinces of Ayacucho. However, the first subnational insurgent's projects could not consolidate Strong IRE due to their weak military actions and the low levels of civilian compliance.

With the changes promoted by the Beláunde Terry government and the agrarian reform promulgated by his military government in 1969 (Kay, 1982), the dynamics of the armed insurgency in the *South-Andean* region seemed to be finishing. However, the implementation of the agrarian reform in subsequent years had a strong negative impact on the community peasant population that saw how the gap between small and large landowners expanded: “48% of the total area of agricultural use was transferred about 20% of the rural population. The remaining 80%, the community peasants, inhabitants of the 705 partialities and communities of Puno, with an approximate population of 511,490 inhabitants, were left out of the agrarian reform” (CVR, 2003. Volume IV: 256).

Consequently, the dynamics of social and peasant organizations became a promising scenario for the revolutionary goals of the insurgency despite the arrival of the processes of transition to democracy in the late 1970s. By the 1980s, The PCP-SL managed to insert itself in the South-Andean region with different levels of territorial anchoring and civilian compliance. Hence the overlap of Strong and Weak IRE in the set of departments and provinces that make up the region, as well as the variation in the types of SLAC A and SLAC B generated by the confrontation between the civil defense committees, the Armed Forces, and the PCP-SL and MRTA armed insurgencies (See Map.23)

Map 23. Peruvian geo-referenced SLAC types and Armed Groups (1980-2000)



Source: Own elaboration based on CVR (2003), Sundberg & Melander (2013) and Own Data

In the department of *Puno* (See Map. 23), the PCP-SL created alliances with trade and popular unions for supply and develop some of its insurgent activities. However, the rebels of the PCP-SL failed to gain the civil support of the Aymara peasants. A similar situation

faced the fragmented guerrilla of the MRTA in this region. In the absence of solid associative ties with the peasant population, the *emerretistas* sought to establish alliances with leftist Bolivian political parties. Likewise, to organize new guerrilla fronts (IPS, 1996 January 3) that were quickly dismantled in the 1990s by the counterinsurgency operatives of the Peruvian State (CVR, 2003).

Maps 22 and 23 also show a significant variation in the SLAC dynamics of *Cuzco* and *Apurímac* (South-Andean Region) IRE. In those, legacies of violence correlate with the high number of deaths and forced disappearances identified by the CVR in its final report: 134 in the case of *Cuzco* and 813 in *Apurímac* (CVR, 2003). As seen in Map 23, the predominance of Strong IRE with critical legacies of violence in the provinces of *Apurímac* (SLAC B) contrasts with the presence of some weak regions of insurgent exception (SLAC A) in the urban centers of *Cuzco* and its neighboring provinces.

A primary reason for this difference is the geographic proximity of the northwestern provinces of *Apurímac* and some provinces of the department of *Ayacucho* that experienced a strong consolidation of the PCP-SL Strong IRE. The above, in contrast to the observed in the urban provinces of main strategic, economic, and tourist importance in *Cuzco* with a greater tendency to SLAC A.

In this sense, my small-n geo-nested findings confirm the trend in the appearance of SLAC A legacies of the armed conflict in areas controlled by vanguard or fragmented insurgent groups with a lower insurgent governance capacity. Likewise, in subnational areas with a higher level of centrality and strategic importance, such as the Antioquia East region in Colombia, Planning Zone 1 in Ecuador, and the urban provinces of *Cuzco* in Peru. This finding contrasts the observed in the insurgent regions of *Ayacucho* and *Apurímac* in Peru or the *southwestern border* in Colombia with a lower State strategic importance and a more significant presence of integrated and strong insurgent actors.

I also identified this trend in the *North-eastern* region, where the convergence between armed conflict actors and the illegal drug trade complexed the dynamics of the war and became one of the main obstacles to post-conflict stabilization after armed de-escalation. As seen in Maps 21 & 23, the presence of Strong IRE in the region coincides with legacies of *rebelocratic* violence (SLAC B) in departments such as *San Martín* and *Huanaco*, with the highest coca production since the 1950s. By the same token, higher indices of deaths and disappearances due to armed conflict (2,244 victims out of a total of 3,725 in the entire region), specifically in areas such as the central jungle of *Huánaco* and southern *San Martín* (CVR, 2003).

On the other hand, Strong IRE and SLAC A and B types were observed in the departments of *Ucayali* and *Loreto* in the *Center-east* and *North* of the region, with 435 and 437 reports of deaths and forced disappearances during the armed conflict (CVR, 2003). However, the *Loreto* area (See Map 23) is the only one with a Weak IRE coinciding with the report of fewer casualties from the war. The continuity of territorial disputes could explain the presence of SLAC B and Strong IRE in the *Ucayali* area during post-conflict and the drug trafficking violence that persists in the upper and lower jungle area of this department bordering *Junín*, *Cusco*, and *Madre Dios*.

It was precisely the beginning of the illegal drug trafficking economy since the 1970s that turned the north-eastern region into a scene of multiple violence. In the first place, due to the insertion of Colombian and Mexican cartels that stimulated the production and trade of cocaine through the border areas and; second, the appearance of national structures that later appropriated illicit drug trafficking and found in the PCP-SL an ally in the fight against the State's interdiction policies to combat drug trafficking:

The illicit business experiences a spectacular boom. The cycle begins in the 1970s and will last until 1995, reaching impressive levels in the production and commercialization of the drug. Shaping an economy that implies the income of millions of US dollars in a boom that dismantled any sustained development strategy, causing the fall in licit agricultural production and the increase in various forms of violence. In some cases, driven by strategies that gave priority to the interdiction of drug trafficking through multiple types of operations [...] This interdiction policy served as a breeding ground for the PCP-SL to capitalize about unrest and social instability (CVR, 2003. VOL-IV: 312).

On the other side, the *Northeastern* region became since 1976 the PCP-SL headquarter, mainly in the Alto Huallaga area, where they carried out indoctrination and armed proselytizing activities among teachers, social leaders, and students. Those joined the armed insurgency and later faced the so-called “*sinchis*” of the civil guard supported by North American intelligence organizations (McClintock, 2001; Taylor, 1998). Thus, among the list of armed-conflict actors in this region appear not only the insurgencies of the PCP-SL and the MRTA but the Peruvian army, the police, the Peruvian air force, and civilians associated with the self-defense committees (CAD) and illegal traffickers. (See Map 23)


Likewise, after the end of the war, the region was occupied by dissidents and *neosenderistas* factions that, still alive, represent a high risk of post-conflict instability at the subnational level (Gorriti, 2009; Díaz, 2015; Taylor, 2017). The preceding is due to the absence of State institutions and the *neosenderistas* insurgent governance support by the alliances with illegal drug trafficking.

Map 22 shows the type of IRE and its sub-national legacies in the *north-eastern* region that constitutes a portion of the VRAEM region, specifically, the low jungle of Ucayali adjacent to the coca-growing enclaves of *San Miguel del Ene* on the eastern side of the department of Junín. Likewise, Map 25 shows the presence of Strong IRE in this region despite the significant decrease in armed violence after 2000. The above, again, is explained by the armed conflict endurance in this insurgent enclave and the criminal violence generated by the illicit drug trade throughout the VRAEM during the post-conflict period.

At this point, it is worth highlighting how tracing the subnational dynamics of the Peruvian armed conflict confirms empirically the trajectory of insurgence violence from rural areas to the Peruvian main urban centers (See Map 24). This territorial logic of the conflict, from the countryside to the city, was not only visible in the plans of the Peruvian armed insurgency, particularly of the PCP-SL (See Section 5.1), but also in of a good number of the integrated and parochial armed groups in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Thus, the origin of the armed conflict in the Peruvian south-central and central regions, and its rapid expansion towards the south-Andean and north-eastern areas, is key to understanding the differentiated impact over the departments and provinces with the most robust levels of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence (See Map 24). Similarly, to know how the achievement of the conditions of strategic balance by the strongest integrated armed group in Peru, the PCP-SL, allowed it to militarily encircle the *Región Metropolitana de Lima* and its strategic axes (CVR, 2003).

Map 24. Peruvian IRE by Insurgent armed orders and their Paths



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

The PCP-SL developed a plan for the siege of the *Lima metropolitan region* based on the expansion of its IRE in critical rural areas of Peru. After advancing militarily through Peruvian rural territory, the PCP-SL moved its insurgent operative to the capital Lima, where the MRTA was already operating, increasing the number of subversive attacks and consolidating its presence in popular urban sectors:

The subversive actions in Lima were decisive. They were the main resonance box for these actions, constituting a vital space for the gestation and training of militants, political cadres, and combatants of the PCP-SL and later of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. While the forces of order, protected by emergency laws, contribute to exacerbating the climate of insecurity and terror. Lima was declared an emergency zone, suspending the constitutional rights of the inhabitants. A spiral of violence and death reached the beginning of the 1990s,

encompassing all city sectors, from human settlements to residential districts of Lima (CVR, 2003. VOL.4: 399).

Between 1989 and 1992, the PCP-SL and the MRTA tried to consolidate a strong IRE in the metropolitan region (See Map 23), but their advance was mainly responded to by military and civil operations that led to the capture of Abimael Guzmán in the district of *Surquillo* by the Special Intelligence Group of Peru (GEIN). The variation in the MRTA and the PCP-SL operations becomes robust and significant if we compare the regions they operated and the stark contrast between their rural and urban types of actions. Between 1984 and 1990, the MRTA attacked 66 provinces compared to the 168 where the PCP-SL acted militarily. Of this total, forty percent of the MRTA operations were concentrated in Lima, in contrast to the Thirteen percent of the PCP-SL insurgent actions (McCormick, 1993).

The legacies of this strong cycle of urban violence became visible on the civil population, mainly on the social and organizational linkages of the political leaders and popular movements of metropolitan Lima (Peru 21, 2021 June 05). Hence, the legacies of the armed conflict on the Peruvian regional politic and social leadership represent one of the vital impacts on the Empowerment step of the post-conflict stabilization mechanism in this country. (See Section 5.3).

However, the so-called "Armed siege" of Lima and the subsequent capture of the *senderista* leaders marked the beginning of a new moment of the Peruvian insurgency and the armed conflict with the State characterized by the process of insurgent peripheralization (Ríos, 2020). Likewise, the emergence of new risks to the post-conflict stabilization focused on insurgent regions of exception managed by the *neosenderismo* dissidents described above.

In the case of Peru, my geo-nested analysis evidence how this process of peripheralization pointed towards the creation of Strong IRE in the rural periphery of the VRAEM region. Hence, my finding shows an express similarity between the Peruvian post-conflict and the Colombian armed post-conflict subnational dynamics (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2), notably in cases like the *south-western* border with Ecuador and *northeast* with Venezuela. In turn, it contrasts radically with the level of post-conflict stabilization reached by Ecuador after the negotiation processes with the national guerrillas and the development of formal and informal strategies for insurgent diplomacy with the foreign insurgencies in the *northern Ecuadorian* border (See Sections 4.1 and 4.2).

5.2.2 The VRAEM as a neo-insurgent Region of Exception

The VRAEM became a new rebel governance enclave due to the peripheralization of the armed post-conflict. At the same time, it is one of the most challenging areas for the APS consolidation beyond the emergency national-oriented governance decreed by the State against the *neosenderistas* and illegal traffickers.

The legacies of violence in the VRAEM as a strong region of exception (IRE) go back to the origins of the armed conflict between the PCP-SL and the Peruvian State. As seen in Section 5.1, the effects of armed and ideological recruitment allowed PCP-SL to transform into an integrated armed group (Staniland, 2017) and achieve a high level of insurgent governance

and solid local civilian compliance: “The geographic space referred here becomes relevant to understand the reasons that the Sendero Luminoso had for nesting in this space until it became the epicenter of its revolutionary proposal” (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018: 25).

On the other hand, Ríos & Sánchez (2018) consider an additional set of social and cultural factors related to the precariousness and social exclusion of indigenous and minorities sectors crucial to understand the type of linkages established between the armed insurgents and the civilian population:

The factors [presented by Degregori (2010)] added other more quotidian such as landlord exploitation, servile oppression, and ethnic discrimination. The result was a complex scenario for the indigenous populations of the department. In the same way, the accumulation of social differences established based on the ethnic-racial and economic precariousness of the indigenous became the ferment for the emergence of radical and extreme violence discourses such as practiced by the PCP-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) (Page 28).

With the peripheralization of insurgent violence, the Peruvian State initially focused its military operatives and its social policy in the VRAE region (Inter-Andean Valley of the *Apurímac* and *Ene* Rivers). This region is made up of provinces of the departments of *Ayacucho* (Provinces of Huanta and La Mar), *Junín* (provinces of Satipo and Huancayo), and *Cusco* (province of the Convention). Also, in neighboring areas to the northern side, such as the *Alto Huallaga*.

Therefore, the Peruvian State sought to attack the dissident factions of the PCP-SL that pursued their subversive actions under the command of the Quisque Palomino brothers in the central jungle of the VRAE and Florindo Flores Hala (Artemio) in *Alto Huallaga*. Likewise, to promote public policies to enforce the rule of law at the subnational level and establish close ties with the civilian population victim of illegal armed groups despite the State already speaking of post-conflict.

In 2012, the government of President Ollanta Humala included the *Valle del río Mantaro* in its regional pacification policies under the argument that it had become a strategic corridor for the coca-growing trade. Thus, the subnational policies for the State Enforcement power transformed the VRAE into the VRAEM (DS No.074-2012-PCM). In this way, the Humala government expanded the territorial axis of the State's anti-subversive policies, but in turn recognized the growth of the neo-insurgent enclaves of the VRAEM *senderistas* or the self-titled *Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú* (Zevallos, 2012 July 11), in specific provinces of the department of Huancavelica such as *Tayacaja* and surrounding areas of *Mantaro* and *Alto Huallaga*.

Thus, in military terms, the VRAEM provinces became the focus of the governments' emergency and exceptional decrees giving rise to new armed confrontations after 2000 (See Section 5.3). In this way, the strengthening of the armed forces and the radicalization of the security strategy by the executive turned the VRAEM, contrary to expectations, into one of the zones of fragile post-conflict stability in Peru by concentrating a high and varied number of illegal armed actors to dispose of territorial governance and control with the State (See Map. 25).

Map 25. VRAEM Region Armed post-conflict Dissident Groups (2000-2019)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

Map 25 shows the distribution of legal and illegal armed actors fighting for the VRAEM region governance in the Peruvian post-conflict phase from 2000 to 2019. The variation in the type of armed actors and the Strong IRE type (Circles in red) in the VRAEM region (Map 26) contrast to the low proportion of insurgent and illegal enclaves in the rest of Peruvian territory during the post-conflict.

With few exceptions in departments such as *Madre de Dios* and *Lima, Metropolitana*, the armed operations of the *neo-senderista* factions constituted Strong IRE (Circles in red) in a good number of the VRAEM provinces, particularly in the *South-central* and *North-eastern* regions. From there, they expanded between 2010 and 2012 by offering protection services to illicit drug traffickers and seeking to profit from the national strategic energy resources such as natural gas (Gorriti, DW 2014, September 3).

Map 26. VRAEM Region Armed postconflict IRE (2000-2019)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Sundberg & Melander (2013) and Own Data

Likewise, the IRE strengthening in the VRAEM periphery evidenced the increase in the armed capacity of the *neo-insurgent* and criminal focus and the decrease in the response of the region's civil self-defense committees. This low capacity to respond to the new insurgent governance led the latter to request a higher State capacity to intervene in the rebel enclaves

of a zone already decreed as a military region (Supreme Decree No. 001-2009- DE-EP). At least until the "total pacification" (Calmet & Salazar, 2013: 168) or, in our terms, a high APS level has been achieved.

Map 27 shows the contrast between the low presence of weak enclaves (weak IRE in blue) in the northern and central zone of the VRAEM compared to the high concentration of strong IRE under the control of the *neosenderista* factions. Likewise, some exceptional territories in the north of the VRAEM are highlighted (Triangles in orange) to evidence how the low resistance capacity of civilians has allowed the installation of Strong IRE and the reactivation of subnational legacies of rebelocratic violence (SLAC B):

People say that the State needs to have a presence in more areas to control drug trafficking and terrorism [...] This implies recognizing that those led by the Quispe Palomino [El Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú] have grown in their war capacity and have better territorial control of these valleys. Likewise, to accept that drug trafficking has a broader coverage and liberty to act and involve the population in its illegal activities (Zevallos, 2012 July 11).

Map 27. VRAEM Region Armed post-conflict Groups and SLAC (2000-2019)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Sundberg & Melander (2013) and Own Data

In these cases, the negative impacts on the civilian population came from the alliances between the insurgency and the illegal coca trade networks for disputing the territorial control with the State. The latter, once again, is the result of the multiple State failures to consolidate a high-level post-conflict stability beyond its pacification strategy by a military route:

This is difficult because it is not exclusively a security and crime problem that can be solved with a solid military presence. However, there is an immediate risk due to drug trafficking and those calling themselves the Militarized Communist Party of Peru, or the MPCP. Multiple factors are allowing these risks to exist. Poverty, limitations in political representation, and poor accessibility and infrastructure for economic-productive development are elements that go beyond the immediate threats to security in this area (Zevallos, 2012 July 11).

Map 28. VRAEM Region Armed postconflict IRE and SLAC (2000-2019)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

In a nutshell, this post-conflict instability panorama in the VRAEM was not only due to the continuity and worsening of the internal armed conflict. In the provinces where the State intensified its policies of emergency and exceptionality, there were multiple failures in the implementation of post-conflict social policies by national governments of the democratic transition that came after the end of the Fujimori governments (See Section 5.3).

Calmet & Salazar (2013) identify several difficulties in the inexperience of the national government to implement social policies in conflict zones and the low capacity of local governments for subnational post-conflict management. Likewise, in the simultaneous creation of Peace and Development Plans for the Peruvian regions administered from the central levels of government.

My research also identifies this disarticulation between the national and sub-national levels for territorial peace management in Section 5.3 as a critical factor explaining the progressive consolidation of strong *neosenderista* IRE in the VRAEM and the fragile post-conflict stability level achieved in this peripheral enclave. By the same token, my findings consider tensions between the transition to democracy policies that strengthened the political power centralization after Fujimori's authoritarian regime and the post-conflict initiatives to decentralize and increase the subnational institution's capacities as recommended by the CVR final report (Lerner, 2007; Cano & Ninaquispe, 2006). The latter is in line with my argument about the conditions required for triggering a higher level of post-conflict stabilization.

5.3 The 3E Sequence and the Armed postconflict outcome: Militarist State Enforcement ruled by decree armed post-conflict

This section focuses on the dynamics of the 3E APS mechanism and wartime institutions in the VRAEM's regions of Exception. At the same time, it compares the subnational variation of the militarist State enforcement power, the social agency impacts, and binding territorial conditions for showing how SLAC shaped the *Fragile APS* level evidenced in these Peruvian subnational units (See Figure 19).

My hypothesis on the dynamics of the APS mechanism in Peru considers that the transmission vectors generated by the Enforcement step concentrated the centrality of national political power to the detriment of Empowerment and Entitlement steps in the still vulnerable subnational units of the internal conflict. Likewise, the territorial autonomy and local justice processes necessary to consolidate post-conflict stabilization have been deficient compared to the emphasis on emergency decrees for the State's military presence in the rural periphery where the *neosenderistas* and illegal actors co-exist.

*5.3.1 Peruvian VRAEM Region: Fragile Armed Post-conflict Stability
Outcome: Unstable Low (Non-Sequential/ Top-Down 3E Vectors of Transmission)*

The VRAE is the only region in Peru where the armed insurrection that Sendero Luminoso unleashed in 1980 persists without interruption (Riestra & Gorriti, 2015)

National-oriented perspectives state that the military victory of the State over the PCP and MRTA insurgencies put an end to the internal armed conflict and promotes an idea about the post-conflict stabilization that diminished the importance of this matter in Peruvian public opinion (Maldonado et al., 2019). However, the in-depth analysis of subnational conditions for the APS, such as the former rebels' reintegration into society, the victims' rights restitution, and the titling of their property and rights, suggests a different panorama in terms of Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) steps of the APS mechanism.


In this sense, I traced issues related to the Enforcement step (E1) effects on subnational State capacities and conditions for avoiding returning to war, such as ex-guerrillas reintegration into civil society. I inquire about social empowerment conditions (E2) after the military victory of the State on the PCP-SL and MRTA former rebels and their process of restoration of rights and reconciliation with the victims of the war (E3) (See Figure 22).

Likewise, I analyze the legacies of violence on the indigenous, peasants, and victims' organization's empowerment engaged in the war and their impact on conditions necessary for linking the entitlement step on post-conflict stabilization. My findings show several obstacles for triggering APS vectors of transmission in *Empowerment* and *Entitlement* steps in the case of Peru. Thus, I claim about the existence of a *fragile APS level* nevertheless the impacts of the Peruvian military enforcement State on rebel groups.


The military victory over the insurgency in the 1990s did not consolidate after the emergence of *neosenderista* foci allied with criminal actors on the VRAEM (See Sections 5.1 & 5.2). This new IRE under the governance of the *Senderistas del VRAEM* dissidents and criminal drug trafficking networks represents, among others, a factor of instability starting from legacies of counterinsurgency civic-military strategy to enforce the Peruvian State rule. It also adds to the Empowerment and Entitlement fail linkages analyzed in this section.

Figure 22. Peru – VRAEM Region 3E Mechanism Causal Process

Theoretical level



Empirical Level



Source: Own Elaboration

My APS process tracing identifies at least three definitive arguments to explain the risk of instability during the post-conflict linked to the dynamics of the 3E APS mechanism: First, the national management of the post-conflict through emergency decrees and sub-national exceptions; second, the failure of the former rebels' non-return to war initiatives; and third, the tensions between the goals of national democratization and subnational post-conflict stability (See Table 21).

Enforcement: Exception, Emergency, and Pacification

In contrast to *Plan Ecuador's* social and human-oriented security policies and directly related to the militaristic security approach of *Plan Colombia*, the policies for the State Enforcement power (E1) in Peru lacked a social development component for an effective subnational State presence in Peru. As seen in Section 5.2, the subnational IRE after the military defeat of the national insurgencies became a post-conflict instability focus governed by emergency and exceptional executive decrees.

Following the Belaunde Terry counterinsurgent offensive, the *Aprista* government headed by Alan García (See Section 5.1) granted the armed forces an exceptional level of autonomy and discretion to combat the PCP-SL dissidences in its peripheral rearguard territories. The previous, despite their promises to promote a social policy in the areas of former guerrilla governance and to create peace commissions to investigate the grave human rights violations committed during the conflict (CVR, 2003).

Unlike the unilateral truces decreed by the MRTA to create a peace negotiation scenario with the *Aprista* government since the 1980s, the PCP-SL took advantage of the slow but disproportionate (Azcona & Del Prado, 2020) anti subversive response of the State to deepen in social contradictions and radicalize the insurgent governance in their IRE. The Aprista government was slow given the size of the economic problems experienced by Peru. Still, simultaneously it was disproportionate due to the repressive and openly illegal mechanisms (CVR, 2003) used by the armed forces in the insurgent regions declared by Garcia's government under the State of exception.

With Alberto Fujimori's government, the absence of an Enforcement strategy focused on social development triggered the rocketing violence and the "pacification" actions through arms and deepened the crisis and political instability. After the executive branch ordered the closure of Parliament due to its constant calls to implement a strategy with a greater social component (Ríos & Sánchez, 2018), the State ratified its armed Enforcement strategy by legalizing the *Comités de Autodefensa Campesina* Committees (Márquez, 1994; Pérez, 1996; Degregori, et al., 1996). With this decision, as in Colombia, the CAD joined the war in a "legal" way despite a vast part of their operations being carried out in "illegality" or the so-called dirty war against society (CVR, 2003; Pécaut, 2001; Mauceri, 2001).

In addition, the militaristic strategy for the State Enforcement in Peru coincided with the strategy of the Ecuadorian governments, at least during the first years of the low-intensity armed conflict with the national insurgencies. However, the most significant contrast between the Enforcement strategies of Ecuador compared with Peru and Colombia was, *inter alia*, implementing actions to stabilize the post-conflict from human security and territorial development approach that contemplated the Empowerment and Entitlement processes after the end of the national insurgent menaces. (See Chapter 4).

Implementing the post-conflict stabilization mechanism in the border areas allowed Ecuador to reduce the risk of reactivation of the internal armed conflict through foreign insurgencies that saw in this territory an enclave for the strategic protection of their rebels after the peripheralization of neighboring armed conflicts (See Section 4.3). The same cannot be said

of Peru if we consider the high risk of post-conflict instability brought by the armed conflict peripheralization towards insurgent and criminal governance enclaves such as the VRAEM after the end of the “years of violence” (Gorriti & Rospigliosi, 2009; Díaz, 2015).

Therefore, militarism and anti-subversive “pacification” became crucial strategies for the State Enforcement power during the years of the insurgent confrontation, and it continues to be so during the post-conflict (See Table 18). Most of the Peruvian public opinion accepts the success of this strategy after the imprisonment of the insurgents and the diminishing of their military operations (Boutron, 2014; Maldonado, et.al., 2019; Ríos, 2020). Nevertheless, my research claims that this Enforcement strategy (E1) failed to trigger stability's vectors of transmission to consolidate the post-conflict in the subnational territory of Peru. The preceding, as in the case of the Colombian IRE where higher levels of post-conflict instability (See Section 3.2 & 3.3) came on after the failures linking the Enforcement strategies with the Empowerment (E2) and the Entitlement (E3) steps (See Figure 22 & Table 18).

Table 18. Peruvian VRAEM Region – 3E Mechanism Process Tracing (Uniqueness & Certainty)

Note: Pieces of evidence in black (i.e., e1HE1) indicate a 3E step condition achieved. On the contrary, the red ones (i.e., e1~HE2) indicate a 3E step condition not achieved.

Mechanism Step	Hypothesis	Observations and pieces of evidence	Source
Enforcement (E1)	Increasing the State intervention in the Peruvian IRE is the primary condition to lead to stabilization in the earlier stages of the armed post-conflict pathway (HE1)	<p>e1HE1: the pacification strategy by the Police and National Armed Forces conducts to the de-escalation of internal conflict</p> <p>e2HE1: Emergency and exception State's decrees in regions controlled by rebels enforced the State's counterinsurgency strategy</p> <p>e3HE1: Formal and informal alliances of the State with civilians in rural conflict areas co-opt the <i>Comités de Autodefensas campesinas</i> for fighting against rebels.</p> <p>E4HE1: Government and National security agencies imprison and defeat the insurgent armed organization's leaders, beginning a solid de-escalation of the internal war.</p> <p>E5HE1: Rebel casualties during conflict, incarceration, and general amnesty laws become tools for managing the post-conflict scenario by an authoritarian executive branch.</p> <p>E6~HE1: Despite the success of the State's military actions, <i>neo-senderistas</i> factions reactivate the risk of post-conflict instability in peripheral regions where they install new IRE</p>	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Empowerment (E2)	Previously achieved the conditions triggered by E1, empowering subnational non-armed actors in the Peruvian IRE increasing the levels of stability in the post-conflict pathway (HE2)	<p>e1~HE2: Since the 1980s, different institutions of the Church, non-governmental organizations and associations of displaced victims responded to the impacts of the internal war and became a military objective by raising their demands in the public sphere. (Diez, 2003).</p> <p>e2~HE2: Subnational legacies of Armed conflict in the conflict zones fractured the social empowerment dynamics</p> <p>e3~HE2: Lack of identification ties between national indigenous movements and popular and political sectors of the Peruvian political and armed left in the post-conflict</p> <p>e4~HE2: A Top-down empowering strategy driven by the National State (Paredes, Interview 2019) and the new insurgent and criminal risks in peripheral IRE impede the local social empowering process in the post-conflict</p>	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews
Entitlement (E3)	Once E1 and E2 are implemented, increasing the binding force of subnational political autonomy through the Entitlement process in the Peruvian VRAEM Region IREs increases the stability level in the armed post-conflict pathway (HE3)	<p>e1HE3: Creation of the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación - CVR Final Report Publication</p> <p>e2HE3: “Waterfall of justice” Effect – Alberto Fujimori ex- President capture and trial for serious human rights violations</p> <p>e3~HE3: The repair policy made unsatisfactory progress (Macher, 2014) due to the lack of comprehensiveness in its implementation and relationship with other social policies (ICTJ and Aprobeh, 2011).</p> <p>E4~HE3: Truth, justice, and reparation by armed actors is not driven. (González, 2018, Interview 2019)</p>	Official Documents Press Articles In-depth Interviews

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

Despite policies that promised to intervene in the risks of instability (DS N ° 074-2012-PCM; DS N ° 077-2013-PCM; DS No. 102-2018-PCM) during the post-conflict, *neosenderista* factions linked to drug trafficking and criminality disputed the control of new insurgent exception regions described in Section 5.2. The issuance of these programs and emergency decrees dates back to the strategic intervention schemes for territorial control of the VRAE (later VRAEM - See Section 5.2) issued by the government of President Alan García under the title of *Una Opción de Paz y Desarrollo en Seguridad para el Valle de los Ríos Apurímac y Ene-VRAE* (DS - N ° 003-2007-DE).

The decree, among other provisions, created a Multisectoral Working Group that, although it included almost all public ministries, acted within the framework of the preferential interest of the national State for the defense of its sovereignty. The latter, precisely, in areas of intense conflict such as the VRAEM where the State of Emergency had previously been decreed and extended (DS No. 005-2007-PCM). Thus, these exceptional measures for the State Enforcement power bear a close resemblance to those enacted by the Colombian government in the *Southwestern border* region under the argument of combating the risks of post-conflict instability generated by armed dissidents of the national guerrillas and drug trafficking alliances (See Section 3.3).

Consequently, the State reduced the post-conflict initiatives related to the local development and social and population well-being in regions with a high level of armed violence legacies to its military capacities over illegal armed actors. As a result, the post-conflict army operations would have overshadowed the presence of the State in the region (Arce, 2009). Likewise, increasing the civil restrictions necessary to develop its military operations in provinces such as *Huanta, La Mar* in *Ayacucho*, *Tayacaja* in *Huancavelica*, *La Convención* *Cusco*; *Satipo, Andamarca, Santo Domingo de Acobamba* in *Junín* (Calmet & Salazar, 2013):

The issue of emergency decrees became the rule in the post-conflict. The State did it; instead, we were waiting for the social policies, justice actions, and institutional reforms recommended by the CVR o International Organisms. Several areas of Huancavelica, Junin, and Ayacucho have been declared under the State of exception again, extending it every 60 days. This situation has been unfair to these populations because it is clear that the State should operate and combat traffickers and guerrillas, but not by limiting the mobility of the people, the right to assemble or carry out arbitrary arrests (Int. 9)

In the same way, the government enacted the Supreme Decree No. 001-2009-DE-EP that created the Military Region of the VRAE. Hence, subsequent decrees were annexed because relations between insurgency and drug trafficking threatened to turn this corridor for illicit drug trafficking into a new factor of instability. In this sense, the subnational State capacities in the territories under insurgent armed control continued to be predominantly military (Arce, 2008). Furthermore, its policies and decrees to consolidate pacification appealed more than anything to the centralized army management of the post-conflict despite its decentralized administration:

Since 2012 or 2014, we have had a post-conflict that is handled mainly in a military way. Obviously, we are not discussing the post-conflict being a matter for all regions. The focus is

on the VRAEM, but it makes one confused: What do the military forces do to maintain the post-conflict? Or rather, the post-conflict should be support for the victims, justice, and proper social reconciliation. Social programs have certainly increased, but the issue has been reduced to the priority of national security (Int. 9)

The government consolidated this political-military scheme for the post-conflict State Enforcement in programs such as VRAEM 2012 (DS N ° 074-2012-PCM), which, in short, implemented emergency and exception measures inherited from the most intense years of the conflict. Therefore, the new was the "banner" of defending human rights and supporting the civilian population (La República, 2011 November 5).

In this way, with the onset of the post-conflict in Peru, my research identified a justifying tendency on the emergency rules by decree protected by national and international security reasons. This ruling by decree post-conflict setting was directly aimed at containing the risk of new insurgent threats at the subnational level, but at the same time restricting social rights of the civil population and the victims of the conflict who demanded the implementation of local measures of justice, truth, and reparation (Cabieses, 2008; Barrenechea, 2010; Macher, 2014; 2018).

Thus, the militarist Enforcement consolidated the "pacification" in urban centers and national strategical regions but triggered a type of *constitutional normalization of the emergency* (Siles, 2017; Lajtman & Mendoza, 2019; Tafur & Quesada, 2020) for the control and territorial governance of subnational units such as VRAEM. In this way, the transmission of post-conflict stabilization vectors affected the social Empowerment (E2) and the Entitlement (E3) linkages in regions where the dissidents of the PCP-SL took advantage of the weak institutional presence of the State to consolidate their illegal governance (Gorriti, 2010).

This situation gets more complex with the use of strategies of the Peruvian State in other areas of security, such as the eradication and combat of illicit crops at the subnational level. For Paredes & Pastor (2021), the negotiation strategies between the State and the coca growers of the VRAEM have implied that the national government does not apply its State enforcement power to take advantage of the benefits of what the authors call the "Accumulation of the State's symbolic capital" (Pag.169).

Consequently, tensions between the "tolerance" policy in the VRAEM (Paredes & Pastor, 2021) and an efficient State capacity for the sub-national management of the post-conflict seem to affect the fulfillment of the necessary conditions to reduce the risks of post-conflict instability. My research identified the latter in the most recent decree for the management of security conditions of the VRAEM (DS N° 102-2018-PCM), in which the national government reiterates the illegal drug trafficking and the eradication of illicit crops in the VRAEM as its frame:

The *Valle de los Rios Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro* constitutes a scene of priority attention. The problems present in this valley -associated with institutional and development precariousness- are exacerbated given the insecurity conditions derived from terrorist remnants and criminal organizations linked to illicit drug trafficking and its related crimes: hitmen, money laundering, trafficking of people, organized crime, among others. In this sense, it is necessary to program

an intervention that allows not only to overcome these security risks but also that the localities of the valley are governable contexts in which there are sustainable opportunities for citizens (DS No. 102-2018-PCM: 1)

On the other hand, the risk of instability for the return of insurgent violence was compounded by the legacies of the former rebels' imprisonment as the primary strategy for the militaristic State Enforcement power consolidation (Boutron, 2014). Although the State implemented this measure within the framework of its functions, the non-existence of measures of criminal alternative or social reintegration of ex-combatants restricted the public dissemination of the "discourses of reconciliation" (Cáceres, 2014) of the former towards their victims. (See Table 21). In contrast to the call of the *senderista* leaders who from prison asked the Peruvian president to initiate a process of dialogue and negotiation to the bilateral end of the armed conflict:

In the current circumstances, the party, and mainly its leadership, is asked to make a new and relevant decision today and, as yesterday we struggled to start the people's war, today, with equal firmness and resolution, we must fight for a peace agreement. This one is a historical decision of unavoidable necessity, even more so considering that peace has become a necessity of the people, the nation, and Peruvian society as a whole (El País, 1993 October 10)

With the renowned success of the Abimael Gúzman imprisonment and the refusal of the Peruvian governments to establish peace negotiations, the reintegration and political incorporation of the armed rebels were put on hold. On the one hand, the prison became a space of confinement and insurgent indoctrination (Renique, 2003; Valenzuela, 2019) that blocked transmission vectors for the social and political reincorporation of the insurgents (i.e., the conformation of Cooperatives and political parties). On the other hand, it affected the consolidation of transitional justice and criminal alternative processes for truth, justice, and victims' reparation essential for the APS *Entitlement* step.

The strategic use of imprisonment, in some cases, torture (Zech, 2015), also became a tool for the political radicalization of former combatants. Under the politico-military figure of the *Luminosas Trincheras del Combate*: "Acuerdistas", "emerretistas", "felicianistas", "Arrepentidos" and "Independientes" (Rénique, 2003) kept alive and dispute, in different ways, their objectives of armed revolution. The preceding, in detriment of the stabilization vectors that transmitted, on the contrary, discourses and reconciliation processes with their victims in the territories impacted by internal conflict (Cáceres, 2014; Pinedo, 2020).

Although the richness of the Peruvian post-conflict in experiences of social reconstruction of the victims' memory (CVR; 2003), my APS process tracing identifies the role of the rebels' imprisonment and the absence of alternatives for reconciliation with the victims as a factor that influenced the new risks of instability. The latter if we compare the Peruvian territories under the State emergency regime with Colombian regions, such as *Eastern Antioquia* (See Chapter 3), in which a higher level of post-conflict stabilization came from social reincorporation, reconstruction of the memory of the conflict, and reconciliation of former combatants with victims and locals.

In short, although the military victory of the Peruvian State over the rebels of the PCP-SL and the MRTA was overwhelming, the absence of a social reintegration process beyond incarceration becomes a destabilizing factor by disengaging the effect of Enforcement on the Empowerment and Entitlement steps. In this line, the post-conflict stabilization dynamics in the Peruvian subnational units with strong legacies of violence (SLAC B) contrasts with the case of the Colombian *Eastern Antioquia* but are in line with the Colombian *Southwestern* because the absence of conditions for the Empowerment (E2) and Entitlement (E3) (See Chapter 3).

In turn, the fragile APS level achieved by Peru contrasts radically with the set of 3E steps Ecuadorian APS after implementing human-oriented security policies (E1), social Empowerment (E2), and rights Entitlement of victims and civil society (E3) negatively affected by the conflict. First, with national guerrillas, then with the border threat from foreign insurgencies (See Chapter 4).

Empowerment: Truth Tellers against militarization and stigma

My APS process tracing also identifies failures in the transmission of vectors of stability from the Enforcement (E1) to the Empowerment (E2) in factors such as the weak support of the Peruvian State for the social reincorporation of ex-combatants and the obstacles to the victims' political participation in subnational-oriented post-conflict scenarios. Likewise, in their processes of social organization to restore their rights by the Peruvian State (See Table 21). About the assistance and empowerment debate, Ulfe (2013) states: "The State institutions perceived reparations as a social assistance program" (Page 17).


As in the Colombian IRE with a weak APS level, legacies of violence linked to murder, forced disappearance, gender violence, and generalized violence against the civilian population (CVR, 2003) generated a high impact on the local social agency, limiting the process of Empowerment after violence: "Alberto Fujimori's anti-subversive strategies generated systematic practices of social agency fragmentation because, in the name of his endless struggle against subversion, he committed atrocious crimes against the civilian population. Cemented, As a result, distrust towards State institutions, especially towards the regular Armed Forces" (Azcona & Del Prado, 2020: 532).

The CVR final report (2003) highlights the particularities of armed violence that affected social empowerment conditions of men and women who emerged as leaders for the end of the armed conflict at the individual and collective level. Among them, cases of gender violence against women's leaders and organizations (Mantilla, 2006; Wright, 2013) that arose in response to the armed actions of guerrillas such as the PCP-SL. Additionally, the Peruvian State armed operatives in the territories declared as regions of exception ended with the lives of civilians accused of helping the guerrillas and other illegal armed groups (Tafur & Quesada, 2020).

UCDP (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) and my own data on armed violence during the post-conflict effectively show a significant decrease in armed violence. Still, at the same time, they offer the continuity of civil victimization in sub-national units that experienced a war regression between the years 2000- 2019. In these regions, violence is still promoted by

armed confrontations between illegal groups, peasant self-defense groups, and the State armed forces State, leaving civilian victims in large parts of the territories in which the Peruvian State arrived after years of insurgent governance (See Graphic 35)


Graphic 35. Peruvian Armed Post-conflict Death Cases by Department (2000-2019)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

In the specific case of the VRAEM, data on armed and civilian fatalities are the highest in the post-conflict period (See Graphic 36). Hence, the persistence of exclusion and violence against the civilian population increased the fragility of post-conflict stabilization achieved by the Peruvian State in regions such as the VRAEM and *Alto Huallaga*: "The main criticism refers to the fact that it is intended to apply a recipe that previously has not obtained satisfactory results in the VRAE, that is: not to incorporate the local population in the strategy and not to differentiate drug trafficking from terrorism" (Arica, 2012: 13).

Graphic 36. Peruvian Armed Post-conflict Death Cases in the VRAEM (2000-2019)



Source: Own Elaboration based on Data from Sundberg & Melander (2013)

On the other hand, the legacies of the violence process tracing on the APS Empowerment step align with Mallon's (1998) and Yashar's (2005) findings on the non-existence of national

indigenous movements during the first years 2000 (See Table 21). The preceding makes sense if we compare neighboring countries' experiences such as Bolivia and Ecuador where Empowerment (E2) and social leadership processes were highly representative of their peasant and indigenous political sectors at the beginning of the XXI century.

Likewise, the fragile sequential linkage between Enforcement (E1) and Empowerment (E2) steps identified in the Peruvian APS process tracing coincides with the findings of Van Cott (2005) regarding the relationship between the long-term armed legacies of violence and the absence of robust processes of political representation by social organizations led by ethnic parties. In this way, the legacies of violence on social organizations -men and women in a different way- affected the transmission of stability vectors as theorized in the dynamics of my hypothetical causal mechanism (See Table 21).

An additional factor that I traced was the priority of the so-called Peruvian *economic miracle* of the democratic transition (Almada & Reche, 2019) over policies and institutional reforms required by the post-conflict (Barrenechea, 2010; Macher, 2014; 2018; Rubio, 2013). The path dependence triggered by the economic model of democratic transition excluded indigenous, peasants, and social actors crucial for the post-conflict at the subnational level. The argument of economic and political elites against social leaders as "enemies" of the economic growing stabilization was determinant (Wright, 2013; Lajtman & Mendoza, 2019):

This logic is reinforced in public opinion through the proliferation of the discourse of legal insecurity, placing these actors as the culprits of the backwardness of the country [...] These laws enact regulations that institutionalize discrimination against certain groups, further deepening the rupture between the legitimate subjects and the abject ones. They operate by cutting rights to that fraction - whether they are limitations on land ownership, in the development of their own economic forms, in their link with nature - and justifying the persecution of these groups and the judicialization of their protest repertoires (Lajtman & Mendoza, 2019: 4).

Finally, in line with my argument about Empowerment (E2), Soifer & Vergara (2019) highlight the similarity between the Colombian and Peruvian cases regarding the weight of the legacies of the armed conflict on the representative institutions of civil society, the political left, and the Peruvian regional elites (Pag. 7). Therefore, the weakness of Peru's subnational politics and political parties (Vergara, 2015) contrasts with the popularity of *Fujimorismo* in the capital, where the legacies of populism and the authoritarian politics of the former president during the armed conflict still gets political profits.

Macher (2008) recognizes the efforts of post-conflict institutions such as the CVR to empower the social sectors most affected by the war. However, they have been insufficient to the point that, according to the author, despite the number of organizations of victims of the war has multiplied, its connection with the Empowerment and Entitlement processes has not been decisive to generate a higher level of post-conflict stability:

The victims used this public platform [the CVR] to confront the hegemonic history of the conflict. In these testimonies, the victims were faced with the senderistas, human rights violations committed by the forces of order were denounced, and lawsuits were presented to the government. However, this initiative was not enough to open a dialogue in Peruvian society.

Once the CVR ended, that space for participation was closed with it, closing even before the victims received a response to their proposals (Macher, 2008)

The same can be said of the policies and plans to reduce the foci of post-conflict instability described above, such as the VRAEM plan and the successive decrees that ended up, for the most, stigmatizing and isolating the civilian population of the region (Cabienes, 2008; Zevallos, 2012). On the contrary, these decrees and plans designed from the national level reduced the empowerment capacity of the civilian population and local institutions for the subnational management of the post-conflict and its progressive consolidation:

The State and the Peruvians are unfair with the VRAEM population. They have been stigmatized and considered allies of drug traffickers and terrorists when the main problem is that they continue to be victims of a conflict that has not ended. Militarization is an example of why the State isolates the population of this territory and its demands for justice and social inclusion. The State must go further. And not only the State but Peruvian society also must accompany the victims and the vulnerable population. Give them tools so that they can undertake as protagonists of the post-conflict (Int.8)

In a nutshell, as in the southwestern region of Colombia (see Chapter 3), the civilian, peasant, and indigenous victims' support and their process of regional autonomy was not an outcome of the Peruvian State enforcement power. His focus on anti-subversive policies occupied the security plan of the State to the detriment of organizations and the strengthening of the social agency destroyed by the insurgent war (Int. 9). The preceding, without a doubt, meant in cases such as Peru and Colombia the existence of subnational legacies of the armed conflict that had a substantial impact on the causal chain of stabilization in different stages of the armed conflict.

Entitlement: "High profile" waterfall of justice versus "reparation without repairers"

Concerning the *Entitlement* step (See Table 21) shaping the Peruvian fragile APS level, my research identified a lack of actions to restore the rights and social justice of the victims in the sub-national territories most affected by the war (Macher, 2014; 2018; Saona, 2014; Rubio, 2013; Barrenechea, 2010; IDEHPUCP, 2007; CNDDHH, 2013; APRODEH, 2006). The previous, without ignoring, definitely, the contributions of Entitlement institutions such as the *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (CVR) and organizations for the rights and victims' restoration that emerged during the post-conflict (Laplante, 2007; IDEHPUCP, 2009)

As seen in Section 5.1, the creation of the CVR became one of the milestones for the Entitlement of the nearly 70,000 victims of the Peruvian internal armed conflict (CVR, 2003; Macher, 2018). As Laplante (2007; 2007a) states, the memory reconstruction promoted by the CVR made it possible to listen to the voice of the victims as "*Veedoras y narradoras de la verdad*" about the war. However, the work of the CVR, as in the cases of Colombia and Ecuador truth commissions, was also criticized by State agents, former rebels, and sectors of civil society that did not feel fully represented in your final report.

One early example was the omission of the demands of victims' organizations such as the *Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho* -the region most affected by the armed conflict (Barrenechea, 2010)- for the selection of their candidates in the group of CVR commissioners. Likewise, the inclusion of representatives of social organizations from other Peruvian regions who questioned whether the CVR was made up of an elite of Peruvians "distinguished" and with a high ethical commitment but not properly representative of the Andean and ethnic worldview of the victims of the armed conflict (Querejazu, 2018: 12).

Consequently, the subnational dynamics of CVR nodes (See Section 5.1) contrasted with the institutional, academic, and "centralized" profile of its commissioners. Probably, with their views on the post-conflict regarding the implementation of truth measures, justice, and reparation for victims (Int. 8). However, they highlighted issues of interest to the victims such as the gender approach and the differential impact of the war to: "Recognize the effects that political violence had on Peruvian men and women, understanding the different way in which their rights were affected" (CVR, 2002 May).

Using the Spanish language in hearings where the victims were mostly *Quechua* speakers (Int. 9), and the absence of security conditions offered by the State in some municipalities (APRODEH, 2006) became obstacles according to the victims to participate and express their opinions on justice and reparation. Testimonies of the victims collected by the CVR (2003a) about the fear that the dissident insurgent actors and State agents generated in them during the hearings in post-conflict zones are revealing:

[...] Because the commission is doing its job. We are preparing the report, but in our department, in our province, in our district, there is still a presence of Sendero. So we are making progress with the report, but the Sendero is still with its weapon in hand [...] It is vital to carry out dialogue for citizen security (CVR, 2003a)

I'm afraid. I think that suddenly those guards can come in civilian clothes and they can do something to me. Suddenly they can come into my house. I have been afraid, afraid since I gave my testimony because I spoke the name of one of those responsible (CVR, 2003a).

On the other hand, the institutional reforms recommended by the CVR were oriented to changes in the State's institutions and the design of public policies in at least four major areas: The presence of the State and its democratic authority throughout the territory; institutional and political leadership for the maintenance of security and internal order; the reform of the justice administration system and, finally, a peace education system based on respect for human rights, difference, pluralism, and cultural diversity, particularly in rural areas (CVR, 2003).

However, the emergency measures declared by the national government left dormant many of the institutional reforms at the subnational level suggested by the CVR, victims' organizations, and other international organizations (Lerner, 2013 August 29; Macher, 2018; CNDDHH, 2013). A piece of evidence, as seen above, was the increasing number of declarations of a State of emergency by the Peruvian State between 2000 and 2018 to confront armed insurgent actions in peripheral zones. However, the exceptional decrees were oriented towards social conflict events, peasant and indigenous protests with different

characteristics from those of the armed conflict (Wright, 2013; 2015; Quesada & Tafur, 2020).

The previous also contrasted with the CVR provisions regarding achieving the State's presence in all territories: "Collecting and respecting popular organization, local identities and cultural diversity, and promoting citizen participation" (CVR, 2003: 112). On the contrary, institutional reforms and the implementation of public policies continue to be poorly and unequally addressed by the State (Del Pino & Huber, 2015). Additionally, reparation measures are not recognized in the sense of the Entitlement (E3) conditions to transcend the role of subjects assisted by the State to citizens:

It is no longer possible to speak of the post-violence community in Peru without asking if the population has been registered in the RUV [Registro Único de Víctimas] or if it has already received some collective or individual compensation [...] It is necessary to develop the mechanisms to carry out a policy of transitional justice in which reparations acquire a unique value. In addition to their symbolic implications, is the official recognition by the State as citizens with equal rights and duties (Ulfe, 2013: 85).

In this sense, State Enforcement (E1), Empowerment (E2), and Entitlement (E3) were at the core of the CVR mandates. However, its implementation has not necessarily been guided by the sequential chaining of this stabilization mechanism in the case of Peruvian regions of exception (See Table 22). As an example, for coming back to the VRAEM, Barrenechea (2010) shows how the victims' reparation policies in the case of Ayacucho experienced a strong disconnection with local governments, configuring what the author calls a "*reparation scenario without repairers*": "Local reparation policies are fragmented and not very sustainable over time. In most cases, they are limited to developing actions aimed at attracting resources from the central government through the Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel or international cooperation" (Page 7).

Finally, my APS process tracing identifies a substantive contrast between the APS *Entitlement* steps and the type of transitional justice framing Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian processes of justice, recognition, and reparation of the victims. In Ecuador and Colombia, mainly in the latter, the transitional justice measures found in the negotiation processes between the State and the national insurgencies a clearly defined framework shaped by the armed post-conflict despite its variation in the APS outcome. However, in Peru, the military victory of the State, and the subsequent collapse of Alberto Fujimori's authoritarian regime, made the national democratic transition the general framework for the post-conflict justice initiatives.

In this sense, my research suggests that obstacles to achieving the Entitlement steps came from prioritizing transitional national justice measures over post-conflict requirements such as effective legal recognition and subnational policy implementation (C4) (See Table 22). Among them, the legal triumphs of the democratic transition that ended in the 25-year sentence of former President Alberto Fujimori and its advisors. However, the importance of this national "waterfall" of justice does not correspond to the deficit in the post-conflict justice mechanisms suggested by organisms as the CVR for priority victims' restoration of rights at the subnational level.

Although a few “high profile” cases, committed mainly by the Fujimori regime, have advanced and resulted in convictions, thousands of forced disappearances, massacres, rape, torture, and other types of rape are still waiting for Justice. The prosecution of the human rights violations of the thousands of victims caused by the conflict is optimal, but not the real thing (Cano & Ninaquispe, 2006: 75)

In short, the weight of the national reforms of the democratic transition was above the design of the post-conflict institutions at the subnational level. Hence the focus on the processes of national political power centralization. However, decentralization was not only a transition to democracy objective but one of the post-conflict subnational conditions for increasing State capacities, civilian agency, and social justice stabilization.

My argument is in line with Lerner's (2007) evidence that a high number of the justice measures adopted by the democratic transition led mainly to the reestablishment of electoral political representation mechanisms and political autonomy of the legislative and judicial branches. However, the core of institutional reforms for justice, truth, and restoration of rights for victims' entitlement has been insufficient. The former president of the CVR Salomón Lerner Fesbres states about it:

People who have been victims do not only expect material benefits. As moral persons, as persons with dignity, they also expect a gesture of respect. And that is what is still lacking, and in many cases, this lack expresses in the complete absence of political authorities, an absence that underscores their persistent disinterest and that deprives reparations of a State meaning (IDEHPUCP, 2020 September 1)

Thus, the State's counterinsurgent strategies made it possible to achieve the primary conditions for the declaration of the post-conflict (E1) since the early 1990s, but not for the effective intervention of legacies of violence that continued to affect the population victim of the armed conflict, the ex-combatants and the armed insurgent strongholds in regions of insurgent exception such as the VRAEM.

In there, conditions of the armed post-conflict accounted for a *Fragile APS* (See Table 19) threatened by the deficient and unequal presence of the State in the territory, armed phenomena such as *Neosenderismo*, and the new risks of civilian victimization. The latter exposes indigenous people, peasants, and local victims to post-conflict instability coming from the alliances between insurgent strongholds, drug trafficking, and organized criminal governance as I explained in this chapter (Antezana, 2009; Gorriti & Rospigliosi, 2009; Gorriti, 2009; Soberón, 2008; Cabieses, 2008; Díaz, 2015; 2015a).

Table 19. APS Process Tracing Narrative in Peruvian VRAEM Region (Activities & Entities)

Note: Activities and Evidence in black (i.e., eA1C1) indicate an APS condition achieved. On the contrary, the red ones (i.e., eA2~C2) indicates an APS condition not achieved.

Condition	Theoretical APS Narrative	Activities and Evidence	Entities
C1	After the end of the war, the post-conflict is managed nationally to take control of Insurgent Exception Regions (IRE) and to strengthen the construction of sub-national State capacities.	<p>eA1C1: Design and monitoring of State policies in the areas of Peace, Reparation, Collective and National Reconciliation (2000)</p> <p>eA2C1: Creation of the Law on Internal Displacement (2005)</p> <p>eA3C1: Creation of the Council of Repairs</p> <p>eA4C1: Creation of the Plan Integral de Reparaciones (PIR) (2005)</p> <p>eA5C1: Creation of Región Militar de los Valles de los Ríos Apurímac y Ene (2012)</p> <p>eA6C1: Issuance of supreme decrees that create the VRAEM intervention plan (2012)</p> <p>eA7C1: Approval and issuance of the VRAEM 2021 Strategy</p>	<p>eE1C1: Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel</p> <p>eE2C1: Government of Peru</p> <p>eE3C1: Congress of the Republic of Peru</p> <p>eE4C1: Congress of the Republic of Peru</p> <p>eE5C1: Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros</p> <p>eE6C1: Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros</p> <p>eE7C1: Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros</p>
C2	Armed actors surrender, demobilize or join civil organizations (i.e. Cooperatives, Social Organizations) or State Institutions (i.e. political parties), thus reducing the risk of reactivation of internal conflict.	<p>eA1C2: Disarticulation and imprisonment of Armed insurgent organizations through military State Enforcement strategy (Asensios, Interview 2020)</p> <p>eA2~C2: PCP-SL Dissident factions return to war in peripheral VRAEM enclaves</p>	<p>eE1C2: Government of Peru and Military Forces.</p> <p>eE2~C2: neo-senderistas armed groups and criminal actors</p>
C3	Civilian actors empower their territory, and post-conflict management is primarily subnationally oriented.	<p>eA1C1: Creation of the government agenda to assist victims</p> <p>eA2~C3: Lack of Civilian Empowerment and National State oriented development strategy (Mallon, 1998; Yashar, 2005; Van Cott, 2005; Paredes, Interview 2019)</p> <p>eA3~C3: Revictimization and violence against civilians increase in neo-senderistas and criminal groups enclaves</p>	<p>eE1~C3: Government of Peru and Displaced/Victims associations.</p> <p>eE2~C3: Government of Peru and indigenous, peasants and Displaced/Victims associations.</p> <p>eE3~C3: Government of Peru, neosenderistas armed groups and criminal groups</p>
C4	The post-conflict is managed and implemented subnationally, and the post-conflict territorial initiatives come for C1, C2, and C3 formalize	<p>eA1~C4: Progressive reactivation and armed conflict focused on the VRAEM Region affect the presence of the State and subnational justice institutions.</p> <p>eA2~C4: New insurgent and criminal governance block the State and social initiatives for consolidate the APS conditions</p> <p>eA3~C4: Victims' rights and legal recognition by the State is weak. Truth, justice and reparation by armed actors is not driven. (González, 2018, Gonzalez Interview 2019)</p>	<p>eE1~C4: State Military Forces, SL-VRAEM dissidences and drug traffickers</p> <p>eE2~C4: SL-VRAEM and drug traffickers</p> <p>eE3~C4: Government of Peru/ Congress of the Republic of Peru/ Council of Repairs</p>

Source: Own elaboration based on Bennet (2008); Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Rossel (2018)

Conclusion

Insurgency, Legacies, and stabilization

This research sought to explain why the subnational legacies of armed conflict shape different levels of post-conflict stability and how its sequential causal mechanism works. In this sense, I suggested a turn in the studies of armed post-conflict, from the national scale of Galtung's 3R (1998) to the 3E of subnational legacies of internal armed conflict on post-conflict stabilization. Namely, *Enforcement, Empowerment & Entitlement*. I have argued that the effective intervention of the sequential mechanism of the 3E on the subnational Legacies triggered by the Armed Conflict (SLAC): Armed order, citizen agency, and territorial strategic importance; lead to the existence of the Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS).

My research also suggested a theoretical framework for the study of the armed post-conflict combining conceptual and methodological tools from peace studies with subnational politics, armed and contentious politics. Based on these, I carried out a process of concept formation and variable's operationalization of the subnational legacies of the armed conflict (independent variable), the Armed Post-Conflict Stabilization (dependent variable), and the Insurgent Regions of Exception (Analysis Unit). Likewise, each step of the 3Es mechanism (hypothetical causal mechanism of post-conflict stabilization) was defined and operationalized.

To the empirical testing of my argument, I focused attention on Latin American's Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE) between 1958-2019. I compared subnational units within (Colombia) and between countries (Ecuador and Peru) using Geo-nested analysis techniques (Harbers & Ingram, 2017), process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013), and diverse cases strategy (Gerring, 2007). Combining these strategies helped overcome the limitations in the explanatory scope and empirical testing of the researches with an exclusively quantitative or qualitative approach.

The geo-nested analysis allowed me to identify the universe of Latin American Insurgent Exception Regions (IREs) cases to test where and how SLAC types and APS levels work. At the same time, it served for the selection of post-conflict cases, taking into account the variation in the relevant variables of the study, as well as the type of dependency or territorial nesting of the IRE in the national and sub-national post-conflict management. The analysis of diverse cases reported about the dynamics of the 3E mechanism and its sequential causal link. In this way, I covered by design the total spectrum of variation of post-conflict stability like quasi-experimental complete matching techniques.

My findings account for the universe of internal armed conflicts in the Latin American Region (sixty-two cases in total) and the number of active years by country and armed actor in the period traced. Thus, I explored several post-conflict settings in the Latin American region and compared factors related to the type of armed organizations, their rebel governance strategies, and their armed trajectories within and between subnational units. Likewise, I have shown why the Latin American insurgent regions have managed to stabilize under the conditions necessary to intervene in the subnational legacies of the armed conflict.

However, in a high proportion, stabilization after the armed conflict is *weak* and *fragile* in regions where armed dissidents or neo-insurgent groups established new sources of instability after the peripheralization of their armed struggle. To a lesser extent, stability is *partial* or *strong* in subnational units that increased their level of post-conflict stability through social empowerment and the effective recognition of rights. Excluding active armed conflicts in the period analyzed, the *medium-n* analysis identifies variations in the level of APS based on the effect of SLAC. The *weak* APS group represents thirty-five percent of the total cases (8 cases), followed by the *fragile* APS (11 cases) with forty-seven percent, while the *recurrent* APS (2 cases) and the *strong* APS (2 cases) each one with nine percent of all cases.

This finding may explain, on the one hand, the relatively early breakdown of insurgent conflicts led by *fragmented* and *vanguards* groups in most Latin American cases. On the other hand, the low proportion, but the long trajectory, of armed conflicts disputed by *integrated* and *parochial* groups. An additional reason, in line with my theoretical framework, points to the correlation between long-term internal armed conflicts and the presence of insurgent armed groups with a greater war capacity (i.e., Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Peru). Along these lines, the stronger the IRE is for the integrated and parochial armed groups, the more intense the armed conflict and its SLAC in the post-conflict period.

In a nutshell, the results demonstrate the potential use of the *3E Model* as an explanatory mechanism for the variation of subnational post-conflict stability. My findings suggest that the more fulfilled the sequential chaining of the 3E mechanism, the higher the level of post-armed conflict achieved. The preceding was empirically evidenced by comparing diverse APS cases, including The *strong APS* level achieved by the Ecuadorian northern border Planning Zone 1, the *partial APS* identified in the Colombian Eastern of Antioquia region, the *fragile APS* level observed in the Peruvian VRAEM, and, last but not least, the *weak APS* level of the Colombian southwest region.

Subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict (SLAC)

My theoretical framework defined the *Subnational Legacies of the Armed Conflict (SLAC)* as the inherited conditions of the conflict on three specific subnational dimensions: First, the type of pre-existing armed order (D1); second, the agency conditions of the unarmed civilian population (D2); and third, the strategic importance of the territory disputed by the armed insurgency (D3). As a consequence, my SLAC concept formation distanced itself from theories assuming that the causal factors of armed conflict are usually the same as those of the post-conflict: i.e., Economic underdevelopment (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004) or "Greed and grievances" (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) approaches. Likewise, the SLAC concept differed from other explanatory variables of the post-conflict by focusing on identifying subnational factors that trigger the causal sequence of the APS mechanism.

Through the SLAC variable, I reoriented the focus of post-conflict studies to the hypothetical factors determining the risk of recurrence of war in post-conflict environments. In addition, the SLAC results from operationalizing (adding) in a single concept the most relevant findings on the armed post-conflict determinants dispersed in the theoretical background of my research. This aggregation rule allowed me to establish subnational theoretical and

empirical connections and facilitate the empirical testing of my hypothesis about the existence of a causal link between the subnational legacies of the armed conflict and the level of post-conflict stability.

The comparison of the pre-existing armed institutions of the SLAC **(D1)** evidenced how the structural (Quinn et al., 2007; Arjona, 2016) and performative (Staniland, 2017) conditions of war institutions in the Latin American regions of exception configured strong subnational legacies of violence of the *rebelocratic* type. The preceding, mainly in the territories led by integrated and parochial armed groups with higher levels of insurgent governance and a high territorial anchoring (i.e., Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Peru). The most visible effect of this type of inheritance of the conflict was observed in the weak and fragile APS levels achieved by the *Colombian southwest* and the *Peruvian VRAEM* regions. In there, the dynamics of the stabilization mechanism failed to trigger vectors for the transmission of stability between militaristic State's Enforcement strategies and the Empowerment and Entitlement steps.

On the contrary, the higher APS levels observed in the *Colombian Eastern of Antioquia* and the *Ecuadorian Planning Zone 1* may suggest how *alliocratic* rebel structures performed. Vanguard and fragmented armed groups shaped legacies of violence over regions of exception that managed to stabilize thanks to the leverage offered by vectors of transmission between the Empowerment and the Entitlement steps. In the former, the core of the stabilization mechanism was in the Empowerment capacities of civilians and victims against rebel governance and militaristic State enforcement during the war. In the latter, the linkages between Ecuadorian State social policies, the ethnic and peasant empowerment processes, and legacies of legal recognition of victims illustrated how Strong APS sequential mechanism works.

Regarding armed violence impacts on agency conditions **(D2)**, my findings have empirically tested the logical correlation of my framework about how powerful wartime institutions and higher levels of rebel governance coexist as the impacts of war diminish the resistance and civilian organization capacities. In the Latin American region, the long-term armed conflicts and the highest levels of post-conflict instability (i.e., Colombia, Peru, and Nicaragua) resulted of solid insurgent governance and, in turn, deteriorated collective action dynamics of the civilian population. This outcome was mainly identified through forced experiences of displacement, disappearance, selective assassinations, and other serious human rights violations.

My within-Colombia comparison results are illustrative of the differences in the levels of post-conflict stabilization achieved by subnational units with a significant variation in the impacts of violence on the civilian agency conditions. The *Colombian Eastern of Antioquia* is, by far, one of the most emblematic Colombian regions with a high civilian and organizational capacity for collectively resisting and recovering from the impacts of the war. The legacies of social mobilization against the strategic projects of the national State and the remarkable capacity to resist non-violently the war events essentially explained the causes of the early post-conflict stabilization of this Colombian region. The preceding, despite the threats and new risks of instability in primary conditions of the Entitlement not implemented during the armed post-conflict periods.

In contrast, the low levels of post-conflict stability identified in peripheral Colombian regions such as the Pacific Southwest were fundamentally explained by the absence of vectors for the transmission of stability from the low capacity social agency left by the war on the civilian's Empowerment. Additionally, the continuity of war events during periods of recurrent post-conflict has prevented the achievement of conditions for stabilization directly related to the capacity of citizen agency, such as their effective incorporation into local institutions and their political participation at the subnational level.

Moreover, my findings concerning the strategic importance of war territories (**D3**) empirically revealed the effect on stabilizing a dimension scarce explored in post-conflict studies. Concretely, the variation in the legacies of armed violence when they are inherited in regions with higher levels of State strategic importance compared to those peripheral regions with little presence and strategic State interest. At this point, the use of a geo-nested methodological strategy accounting for the levels of dependence and territorial anchoring of the sub-national legacies of war within and between countries was decisive.

A fundamental contribution of my research regarding this dimension points to the possibility of differentiating between armed conflicts with legacies of violence capable of installing post-conflict settings and those that failed to produce them. The latter is mainly due to its low levels of nesting, territorial anchoring, and civilian compliance. Thus, my research identified two types of legacies of the armed conflict, which I theoretically call SLAC A and SLAC B. Additionally, I called Non-SLAC cases those that, fulfilling any of the aggregate dimensions of the SLAC, did not generate significant legacies of violence to configure post-conflict settings.

In that sense, my results showed that SLAC A and SLAC B align with previous research on the impact of end-of-conflict strategies on stabilization. SLAC A may exist in cases where the end of the conflict is based on military victories and dissolved insurgencies. On the contrary, SLAC B can be inherited in a peace agreement and recurring armed hostile environments. Therefore, SLAC B may promote instability, while SLAC A would be prone to more stable post-conflict settings (after military victories or low activity and armed organizations dissolved).

The post-conflict settings inherited SLAC A mainly include armed groups with fragmented and vanguard characteristics. Insurgent armed groups such as AVC (Ecuador) and M-19 (Colombia); share similar properties to inherit SLAC A on insurgent regions of Latin America. Likewise, ERPI and FARP (Mexico) and MIR (Peru and Chile) are similar armed groups belonging to SLAC A in different countries. On the other hand, EGP (Guatemala), FSLN (Nicaragua), FARC-EP (Colombia), and PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Peru), among others, belong to the Integrated and Parochial insurgencies with the similar condition of providing SLAC B.

My research also analyzed the impacts of social agency and the dimensions of strategic territories of the IRE, which could modify the effect of the war legacies on post-conflict levels. Armed conflicts with a low impact of social agency are correlated in a higher proportion with Non-SLAC (25 cases) and SLAC A (23 cases). On the other hand, the *medium-n* analysis identified a strong correspondence between a high impact on the social

agency of local civilians and the SLAC B (16 cases). The previous could explain why the increased effects of social agency presented in SLAC B would represent an extra factor of instability in the post-conflict compared to the low social impact of armed conflicts with SLAC A.

The same can be applied to the dimension of the SLAC that measures the strategic importance of the territories where the Latin American internal armed conflicts began. In a higher proportion, armed conflicts in strategic subnational regions represent almost seventy percent (48 cases) compared to armed conflicts in non-strategic (peripheral) conflict areas (16 cases). Also, approximately forty percent of armed conflicts in strategic regions did not inherit SLAC. For this reason, only armed conflicts that inherited one of the two types of SLAC and configured post-conflict settings were selected to the *small-n* geo-nested step of my research.

Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE)

My research also designed a subnational unit of analysis for the empirical study of the APS based on the formal and informal characteristics of the so-called *Regions of Exception* (Pepinsky, 2017). In my case, given the emphasis on the internal armed conflict, I named these units as *Insurgent Regions of Exception (IRE)*. Thus, my research contrasts with *large-n* studies adopting units of analysis based on the duration of post-conflict, the form of its termination, or the number of armed actors that survived after the war (Fortna, 2004; 2008; Caplan et al., 2015)

My findings have shown why the IRE are insurgent governance enclaves where the armed conflict took place and, in turn, where the legacies of violence must be intervened to achieve post-conflict stabilization. My framework suggested the existence of two types of IRE empirically observed in the universe of Latin American armed conflicts included in my *medium-n* geo-nested research design.

As a result, I identified, on the one hand, *strong IRE* in subnational units with a higher level of rebel governance and civilian compliance. These SLACB type rebel enclaves are configured mainly in Colombia (FARC-EP regions), Peru (PCP-SL regions), Guatemala (ORPA, EGP), and Mexico (Caracoles EZLN). On the other hand, the *Weak IRE* cases included low-intensity internal armed conflicts such as Ecuador (AVC's regions), Chile (MIR's regions), Panama (MLN 29's regions), and Uruguay (Tupamaros's regions). In there, rebel armed capacity was insufficient to configure a post-conflict setting (Non-SLAC cases) or inherited a SLAC A type with a lower impact in the armed post-conflict stabilization process.

In line with my general hypothesis, the armed groups with better capacities to maintain themselves over time were integrated and parochial types (Staniland, 2017). They could establish strong IRE, in contrast to the Fragmented and Vanguard insurgent groups primarily identified in the weak IRE cases. The former had a greater capacity for building armed orders due to their internal and military coordination and their higher levels of sub-national anchoring and civilian compliance. In this way, the number of fragmented groups (32 in total) corresponds to fifty-two percent of all cases, followed by vanguard (11 cases) with eighteen

percent, parochial with sixteen percent (9 in whole), and finally, integrated with fourteen percent (9 in total).

Regarding the type of insurgent region (IRE), my research evidenced the existence of weak IRE in armed orders with fragmented and vanguard insurgencies such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, or Ecuador. In contrast, the cases of Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru; were included among the armed conflicts with a more significant number of strong IRE (Subnational Units with higher levels of rebel governance). These results may suggest why the existence of a strong IRE in the armed conflict may be correlated with the long-term trajectory of the conflict and more significant risks of instability in the post-conflict.

Also, the small-n step findings of my research empirically confirmed these results. The insurgent regions of exception within Colombia have been primarily strong and produced a complex mix of type A and B legacies that made the post-conflict a recurrent scenario with a higher level of subnational variation. I identified a significant difference between subnational units with a high level of territorial strategic importance for the State (i.e., Colombia Eastern of Antioquia) and peripheral regions (i.e., Colombian Southwest and Eastern borders) where post-conflict stabilization levels are pretty weak.

On the other hand, the Peruvian governance enclaves traced in my between-nations comparison strategy revealed the predominance of strong IRE in most subnational units under the PCP-SL rebel governance. The latter compared with a lower proportion of weak IRE established by vanguard armed groups such as the MRTA. In this regard, my findings confirm why the predominance of strong IRE in internal armed conflicts with SLAC B type explained the fragile APS level achieved by Peru.

In contrast, subnational units in Uruguay and Ecuador were emblematic cases of a stable post-conflict setting due to the predominance of weak IRE that inherited SLAC A from low-intensity armed conflicts. In effect, these subnational units with weak IRE evidenced how the dynamics of the 3E sequential mechanisms works and how strong APS levels achieve.

Armed Post-conflict Stabilization (APS)

Medium-n geo-nested data and causal process observations on the *small-n* step of my research allowed me to empirically test the use of SLAC as an explanatory factor for post-conflict stability in Latin America. Thus, the effect of SLAC in the *Armed Post-conflict Stabilization* (APS) is empirically substantive. Fifty-two percent (15 cases) account for internal armed post-conflicts with SLAC type A, while Forty-eight percent (14 cases) belong to armed conflicts that inherited SLAC B in insurgent regions of exception with higher levels of rebel governance.

Colombia has the highest number of post-conflict armed conflicts (11 cases) compared to the total cases in Latin America between 1958 and 2019. The post-conflict cases in Colombia (including active and recurring conflicts of war in its multiple post-conflict periods) correspond to thirty-seven percent of the universe of Latin American cases. Furthermore, Colombia is also the case with the highest subnational variation in SLAC type. On the

contrary, the SLAC A in the Ecuadorian and Uruguayan armed post-conflicts favor the achievement of strong APS conditions after military victories by the State and the low progressive activity of the armed insurgencies dissolution.

In this sense, I traced the variation in the Armed Post-conflict Stability (APS) levels from diverse cases where SLAC A and SLAC B had a differential impact on each of the post-conflict necessary conditions: First, strengthening of subnational state institutions (C1); second, the former rebels demobilization and political incorporation (C2); third, the protection of the civilians (C3); and fourth, the implementation of public local policies responses after violence (C4).

In the post-conflict cases that I examined, the strengthening of subnational institutions (C1) was primarily militaristic. Regardless of the strategy implemented to end the armed conflict, the national governments focused on increasing their armed capacity to combat the rebels in their armed governance enclaves. For example, the Colombian governments managed to contain the advance of national insurgencies displacing them towards rural peripheries where the parts must negotiate the conditions for the end of the conflict. A similar strategy used the Peruvian State against the PCP-SL. Still, the latter achieved a military victory that contrasted with the Colombian case's multiple negotiation processes traced by my research.

Thus, fulfilling the first APS condition was necessary for achieving a post-conflict setting in all the cases I analyzed. However, my findings suggest, in contrast to the arguments of negative peace approaches (Fortna, 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie; 2003; Caplan et al., 2015), that the strengthening of subnational institutions to reach the end of the conflict (C1) is not enough to obtain a strong post-conflict environment. Furthermore, I showed why the achievement of this condition through a militaristic State enforcement power affects the transmission of stabilization vectors to the rest of the necessary conditions for increasing the APS level.

Pieces of evidence about this issue were identified in the *Colombian southwest region* and the *Peruvian VRAEM*. In the first case, increasing the military capacity of sub-national institutions led to a significant decrease in the intensity of violence during the early post-conflict stages. Still, it led to a subsequent rise in violence when stabilization was affected by the number of armed dissidents and the lack of effective processes for the political incorporation of former rebels (C2). In the second case, the focus of the State was in increasing the operational capacity of prison institutions and issuing exceptional decrees to govern the insurgent enclaves militarily. In this way, civilian and former rebels' mass imprisonment became the functionally equivalent of the processes of political incorporation of ex-combatants despite the increase in the peripheralization of the *neo-senderista* armed factions.

Concerning the protection of civilians condition (C3), significant pieces of evidence were identified in the cases triggering vectors of transmission of stability from the Enforcement to the Entitlement. That is the *Ecuadorian Planning Zone 1* and the *Colombian Eastern of Antioquia*. In both cases, my findings revealed how the protection of civilians and their processes of political participation after violence is necessary for increasing the stability levels.

In the Colombian subnational units compared, victims' organizations and social leaders were crucial after the end of the conflict in regions such as the *Eastern of Antioquia*. Their active participation in subnational political and social institutions added a component of stabilization from below that allowed them to transit from *fragile* to a *partial* level of post-conflict stabilization. On the contrary, the high number of social leaders assassinated by dissidents and parastatal armed actors in the *Colombian Southwest*, as well as the new phenomena of violence, disappearance, and forced displacement, explained to a greater extent the reason for the *weak* APS level experienced by Colombian rural and peripheral subnational units.

The comparison between subnational units also suggested why the strong APS level achieved by the Ecuadorian regions of exception came from national and foreign civilian victims' protection after peace negotiations with the national insurgencies. At the same time, by the effect of subnational human-oriented policies for dealing with the northern border foreign armed groups. Causal process observations of my research showed why protections of civilians linked with effective and accountable policy responses (C4) were crucial for ending with the new risks of armed conflict in Ecuadorian's "island of peace" enclave.

Additionally, the absence of effective and accountable policy responses in the *Colombian Southwest* and the *Peruvian VRAEM* showed the effect of legacies of violence on civilians and territories of war under low national and subnational States' capacities for protecting the civilians (C3). Likewise, the gap of stability vectors links the bottom-up political process of local participation with subnational-oriented policies (C4) for the titling and political recognition of former combatants and war victims leading local post-conflict management.

In sum, excluding active armed conflicts in the period traced, my *medium-n* analysis identifies variations in the APS level based on the effect of SLAC. The *weak APS* group represented thirty-five percent of the total (8 cases), followed by the *fragile APS* (11 cases) with forty-seven percent, while the *recurrent APS* (2 cases) and the *strong APS* (2 cases) each one with nine percent. Thus, my post-conflict pathways process tracing in the geo-nested small-n step yielded evidence on the variation in APS levels and the dynamics of its sequential mechanisms in the four sub-national diverse cases selected for my within and between nations comparison.

The 3E sequential Mechanism of APS

Regarding the APS causal mechanism absent in the peace studies theoretical background, my research defined each 3E step configuring the sequential links of stabilization in the subnational regions of exception. I operationalized them as transmission vectors triggered between each of the conditions necessary to obtain higher levels of post-conflict stability begging with the *Enforcement* (E1) to the *Empowerment* (E2) and the *Entitlement* (E3) steps.

Thus, my research defined *Enforcement* as the application of the formal rules of the State on the armed orders inherited from the war (Knight, 1992; Arjona, 2016). *Empowerment* involved the civilians and social processes (Wood, 2008) after the parts ended the war. And last but not least, *Entitlement* referred to the effective recognition of the civilians' rights as victims of war and the binding nature of justice and policy responses in the post-conflict.

The within APS process tracing of the *Colombian Southwest* and the *Eastern Antioquia* regions showed the contrast of the legacies of violence over the armed conflict in a country with recurrent post-conflict processes. On the one hand, the border territory of the *Southwestern region* illustrates the weight of the State's military action for *Enforcement* (E1), but at the same time, its partial effects when post-conflict management focuses on the military presence and not on social *Empowerment* (E2). In terms of the 3E Mechanism, the military intervention on the legacies of violence limits the transmission of stability going from the Empowerment to the civilian *Entitlement* (E3).

On the other hand, the *Eastern Antioquia* region represents how *Enforcement* (E1) may operate to transmit post-conflict stability for the citizens' local *Empowerment* (E2). In this region, the post-conflict stabilization mechanism was set in motion through the armed control of the State but found a key vector for stabilization in the inheritances of civilian movements and the resistance practices against the war institutions. However, the conditions for the consolidation of the APS were at risk when the *Entitlement* (E3) initiatives were weakly supported or carried out in a scenario lacking State prioritization. Likewise, the menaces of military regression in neighboring provinces represent a risk in the emergence of new armed enclaves.

In the Ecuadorian insurgent regions, the national and sub-national governments on the northern border consolidated a stabilization policy to contain the risk of “contagion” (Torres et al., 2018) by the foreign armed groups. The preceding was nourished by the State *Enforcement* (E1) legacies against the Ecuadorian insurgencies of the 80s and 90s. Likewise, the consolidation of indigenous and social organizations through the Empowerment (E2) found in contentious collective action and the culture of peace a strategy to turn away from insurgent violence.

After designing a cross-border security policy and implementing an *Entitlement* (E3) strategy, Ecuador recognized the victims of its State and foreign insurgent violence on both sides of its border with Colombia. At the same time, it became a region of exception (Pepinsky, 2017) called for years the "Island of Peace", while its neighboring states, Colombia and Peru, waged an internal war against the armed rebels in their subnational insurgent regions.

In the Peruvian case, the State *Enforcement* law (E1, by way of a military victory against the insurgencies, found in the rebel imprisonment (Renique, 2003) and the peripheralization of the PCP-SL armed dissidents the condition to avoid the reincorporation and reintegration processes experienced in insurgent armed conflicts such as the Colombian one. However, the legacies of violence against the civilian population in regions such as the *VRAEM* and *Alto Huallaga* were so harmful despite the State's efforts to intervene in the victim's return, justice, and reparation programs. There, the victims continue to demand better conditions to the *Empowerment* (E2) and the effective titling of their rights (E3). The preceding was in sharp contrast to the emergency and exception measures for post-conflict management adopted by the national government, the State's vision of assistance towards the victims, and the criminalization of their protests as a threat to the Peruvian economy and democratic development.

Scope Conditions and contributions to post-conflict policy responses

The specialized literature on post-conflict from a national scale (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; UN, 2008; Caplan & Hoeffler, 2017; Hoddie & Hartzell 2005; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Collier et al. 2008; UNDP, 2008) states that the way the conflict ends is decisive for the level of post-conflict stability achieved. In that line, cases of a State military victory lead to higher levels of pacification, while negotiation processes decrease the probability of consolidating post-conflict settings. I claim that, from a sub-national perspective, the way in conflict ends matters, but it's not determinant for explaining the variation in the APS levels achieved.

My research has shown that the peace agreements adopting actions for post-conflict stabilization with a territorial approach (i.e., Colombia's Eastern of Antioquia; Ecuadorian Planning Zone 1) lead to a higher level of stability. This subnational management of the armed post-conflict already triggers transmission vectors absent in cases where the unilateral military victory hinders the sequential chain of Empowerment and Entitlement processes (i.e., Peruvian Alto Huallaga and VRAEM Regions). Likewise, the post-conflict settings from unilateral military victories may stabilize, but they did not correctly accomplish strong APS levels.

I suggested a possible reason for this diminished APS outcome in the absence of necessary and sufficient conditions such as the subnational State capacities increasing, the civilian and former rebels' incorporation to local politics, and the effective and accountable subnational policies for a *bottom-up* oriented post-conflict management. In that line, my findings contribute to the study of armed post-conflict determinants less explored in national-oriented and negative peace *large-n* studies. To better understand the variation in the APS level, my research considered positive peace and processual explanatory factors to explain how post-conflict stabilization's causal mechanism works.

Likewise, my mixed-methods strategy aligns with Hoeffler's (2019) suggestions about the importance of research designs with a higher capacity to disaggregate and analyze information for in-depth armed conflict cases. At the same time, to use qualitative tools for causal inference about the APS determinants. In this regard, political scientists following my mixed-methods strategies could bring an in-depth understanding of post-conflict settings where the subnational linkages, territorial dependency, and rebel enclave governance are crucial for explaining the contemporary after-violence environments.

Additionally, my geo-nested research design offers an alternative to reduce the selection *bias* in comparing exceptional subnational units such as the Latin American post-conflict ones. Consequently, the SLAC and APS empirical testing on diverse insurgent regions of exception may increase the external validity of my findings. Following Harbers & Ingram (2017), this type of strategy is crucial to understand the dynamics of phenomena that vary significantly due to their high levels of dependency and territorial nesting. The post-armed conflict is undoubtedly one of them.

My 3E post-conflict stabilization theory may be applied to internal armed conflicts with legacies of violence that require the participation of the State and civil society for the non-

repetition of war. In that sense, the scope conditions of my research mainly apply to post-conflict settings coming from State military victories, rebel groups disintegration, and peace agreements cases. My findings may less account for cases such as the rebel-armed takeovers (i.e., Cuba, Nicaragua). The previous because armed revolution objectives are regularly oriented to a new State building or regime change process distant from the armed post-conflict stabilization conditions.

Likewise, my results demonstrate the potential use of the 3E Model as an alternative mechanism to explain the variation of subnational post-conflict stability in cases different from those I compared (i.e., *Chilean Macro zona Sur*; *Paraguayan Northeastern Region or Northeastern Colombian border*). It is also noted that the scope conditions of my 3E Model include internal armed post-conflicts, given its emphasis on the dynamics of actors, institutions, and political processes at the subnational level. In this sense, my results do not explicitly consider the dynamics of post-conflict stabilization in international armed conflicts. Still, my 3E mechanism could be tested in future research agendas about the matter.

In this regard, scholars who follow my APS subnational approach could increase its causal leverage and scope conditions comparing subnational IRE in geopolitical areas outside the Latin American Region. African, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe's insurgent regions could be analyzed in futures armed post-conflict research agendas based on within and between nations SLAC comparisons (Sellers, 2019; Pepinsky, 2017). Furthermore, subnational politics and Internal relations scholars could explore the potential relationships between the 3R and 3E models from an applied perspective to contemporary issues such as the networked and multilevel post-conflict management (Leonard, 2013) and security governance in post-conflict peacebuilding (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005).

On the other hand, current policy approaches for dealing with post-conflict settings may consider the negative impact of the militaristic State enforcement law on revictimization events. During my research, I observed a clear example of the preceding in the revictimization events of forced displacement and murder of social leaders in the Colombian southwest region. There, the predominance of a military strategy for the post-conflict stabilization transformed the rebel dissidents' prosecution into a new risk for the locals and social organizations interested in contributing to the subnational post-conflict management.

A similar circumstance was identified in the VRAEM region, where the high number of exceptional measures and decrees to control neo-insurgent armed dissidents led to the criminalization of the legitimate social protest of local organizations. Furthermore, it has impeded the implementation of restoration policies with human-security approaches suggested by the CVR and the international community. In short, the post-conflict policy responses could consider the importance of implementing APS subnational conditions so that the stability transmission vectors are effectively triggered between each of the 3E steps configuring its causal sequence.

In effect, my findings have shown a vast difference in the stabilization observed, on the one hand, the post-conflict national management in the Peruvian VRAEM and Colombian southwest regions. On the other hand, the subnationally-oriented management of the Colombian Eastern of Antioquia and the Ecuadorian northern border post-conflicts. The

latter does not imply the absence of national-oriented policies and programs identified in my State enforcement step process tracing. Nevertheless, the State's commitment is crucial to implementing initiatives for the Empowerment and Entitlement of victims, ex-combatants, and the civilian population affected by the legacies of war in the most affected subnational territories.

Finally, concerning the viability of a higher APS level, my findings suggest the convenience of a post-conflict setting subnationally managed. The previous means an institutional settlement where the State, Society, and Law institutions focus on *bottom-up* territorial policies for dealing with the subnational conditions necessary for a stable post-conflict scenario. Likewise, strengthen the subnational state capacities for implementing post-conflict requirements such as the former rebels' incorporation, civilian political participation, and the design of local justice institutions.

Appendix

Appendix 1 – Latin America Armed Conflict Data [[Click here](#)]

Appendix 2-3 - Colombian Data [[Click here](#)]

Appendix 4 – List of Interviews [[Click here](#)]

Appendix 5 - Ecuadorian Data [[Click here](#)]

Appendix 6 - Peruvian Data [[Click here](#)]

References

- ACNUR (2015) El trabajo de ACNUR en la Frontera Norte. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/r2dpl>
- Agencia Prensa Rural (2009, December 1). Nariño: Esquina suroccidental del conflicto. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/2nbqw>
- Agencia Prensa Rural IPC (2008, November 5) El General Mario Montoya Uribe dejó huellas nefastas en Antioquia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/vy0u6>
- Aguilar-Gómez, Danna, et. al. (2016), Nuevas formas de resistencia transnacional: la lucha Awá, 2009-2014, 29 International Law, Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, 9-56 (2016). <http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.il.14-29.nfrt>
- Aguilera, Mario (2010). Las FARC: La guerrilla campesina 1949-2010. Bogotá. Arfo.
- Aguilera, Mario (2013). Claves y Distorsiones del Régimen Disciplinario Guerrillero. In: análisis político n° 78, Bogotá, mayo-agosto, 2013: págs. 45 – 62
- Aguilera, Mario (2014). Guerrilla y población civil. Trayectoria de las FARC 1949-2013. Bogotá. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica.
- Almada, Julieta & Reche, Federico (2019) ¿Crecimiento, desarrollo o «milagro»? Aportes para un análisis histórico-estructural de la realidad peruana. In: Economía y Desarrollo, vol. 162, núm. 2, e5, 2019.
- Allen, J. 2003. Lost geographies of power. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Ansari, Emad, et.al (2012) Historical Memory in Colombia The Work of the Grupo de Memoria Historica. An International Economic Development Program 2012 Report. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/z8m10>
- Antezana, Jaime. (2009). De Sendero Luminoso a Neosenderismo articulado al Narcotráfico. Lima. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Arce, Gerardo (2008). Los riesgos de militarizar la lucha contra el narcotráfico: Algunos apuntes sobre el Plan VRAE. In: Coyuntura. Análisis Económico y Social de Actualidad. Año.4.No.17. Marzo-Abril 2008.
- Arce, Gerardo. (2009) A dos Años del VRAE. Lima: IDEELE.
- Arce, Luis (Comp.) (1989). Guerra popular en el Perú. Bruselas. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/93bm8>
- Archivo Virtual de los Derechos Humanos ADHH (2016, July 19). In: Conflicto armado en el Oriente Antioqueño. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/k8o0j>
- Arcos, C.; Carrión, F. & Palomeque E. (2003). Ecuador: informe de seguridad ciudadana y violencia 1990-1999. Quito. FLACSO
- Arenas, Jacobo (1990). Vicisitudes del proceso de paz: notas, documentos, comentarios. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/eiju2>
- Arenas, Juan Carlos y Escobar, Juan Carlos. (2003). Un balance de los estudios sobre partidos políticos en Colombia. Estudios Políticos, 23, pp. 81-100.
- Árias, Gerson (2008). Una mirada atrás: procesos de paz y dispositivos de negociación del gobierno colombiano. Working Paper. FIP. 4.
- Arica, P. (2012). Plan Vraem: sin dinero ni objetivos claros, el fracaso podría repetirse. La Revista Agraria, (142), 13+. <https://n9.cl/j7kr1>
- Arjona, Ana (2014). Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 2014, Vol. 58(8) 1360-1389.

- Arjona, Ana (2016). *Rebelocracy. Social order in the Colombian Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Arjona, Ana; Kasfir, Nelson; Mampilly, Zachariah (2017) *Rebel Governance in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) (2006). *Reparaciones En La Transición Peruana. Memorias De Un Proceso Inacabado*. Lima. APRODEH.
- Asuntoslegales (2018, December 22). Ecuador agradeció a Colombia por operación que abatió a alias 'Guacho'. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/azu4w>
- Ávila, Ariel (2012) *La frontera caliente entre Colombia y Venezuela*. Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris. Medellín, Colombia.
- Ávila, Ariel (2019) *Detrás de la Guerra en Colombia*. Bogotá. Planeta.
- Ávila, Ariel & Nuñez Magda (2010). *Las dinámicas territoriales del Ejército de Liberación Nacional- Arauca, Cauca y Nariño*. In: *Revista Arcanos* 15 abril. Bogotá. Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris.
- Azcona, José & Del Prado, Cristina (2020). *Crisis institucional en el Perú del posconflicto: 1992-2018*. In: *Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales*, Vol. 22, N° 43, Págs. 513-535.
- Balcells, Laia (2017). *Rivalry and Revenge*. Cambridge University Press.
- Banguero, Harold; et. al (2019) *La reestructuración unilateral del acuerdo de paz: A dos años de la firma del Teatro Colón*. Cali - Colombia. Sello Editorial Unicatólica.
- Barón, Juan David (2002) *Las regiones económicas de Colombia: Un análisis de clusters*. Serie Documentos de Trabajo Sobre Economía Regional. No. 23. Colombia. Banco de la República.
- Barrenechea, Rodrigo (2010) *Políticas locales de reparación en Ayacucho. ¿Reparaciones sin reparadores?* Lima, IEP, 2010. (Documento de Trabajo, 157; Serie Sociología y Política, 45)
- BBC News (2009, August 5) *¿El eterno retorno de Sendero Luminoso?*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/uy062>
- Barron, P. 2010. "CDD in Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Areas: Experiences from East Asia." *World Development Report Background Paper*, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Basset, Yann. (2018). *Claves del rechazo del plebiscito para la paz en Colombia*. *Estudios Políticos (Universidad de Antioquia)*, 52, pp. 241-265. <http://doi.org/10.17533/udea.espo.n52a12>
- BBC Monitoring Latin America (2005, June 30). *Bolivarian-Alfarista Alliance Established in Ecuador*. Retrieved from: *El Comercio*, Ecuador. 30 de Junio de 2005)
- Beach, D. and Pedersen, R.B. (2013) *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press
- Beach, Derek & Pedersen, Rasmus. (2016). *Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms*. *Sociological Methods & Research*. 47. 10.1177/0049124115622510.
- Bennet, A. & Checkel, J. (2015) "Introduction", In: Bennett, A. & Checkel, J. (eds) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bermeo, Francisco (2017) *Gobiernos Intermedios. Entre lo local y lo nacional*. Quito. Abyayala. Congope.
- Berry, Albert (2002) *¿Colombia encontró por fin una reforma agraria que funcione?*, In: *Economía Institucional*, V. 4, No. 6, Bogotá
- Bonilla, Heraclio (2003) *Sendero Luminoso en la encrucijada política del Perú*. In: *Nómadas (Col)*, núm. 19, 2003, pp. 58-65 Bogotá, Colombia Universidad Central

- Borda, Sandra (2009). The internationalization of domestic conflicts: a comparative study of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala. Phd Dissertation. University of Minnesota. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/8056x2>
- Borja, Raúl (2011) Los movimientos sociales en los 80 y 90 : la incidencia de las ONG, la Iglesia y la Izquierda. Quito. Centro de Investigaciones CIUDAD - Observatorio de la Cooperación al Desarrollo en el Ecuador
- Boutron, Camille (2104) El uso estratégico del espacio carcelario como elemento referencial de la construcción de identidades en conflicto en el Perú. Bulletin de l'Institut français d'études andines, 43 (1) | 2014, 31-51.
- Bryden, A. & Hänggi, H. (eds). (2005). 'Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding', DCAF Yearbook 3, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- Buhaug, H., & Gates, s. (2002). The Geography of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), 417–433. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004003>
- Buhaug, H., and K. S. Gleditsch. (2008). Contagion or confusion? Why conflicts cluster in space. International Studies Quarterly 52:215–33.
- Bushnell, David. (1994). Colombia. Una nación a pesar de si misma. De los tiempos precolombinos a nuestros días. Bogotá, D. C.: Planeta.
- Cabieses, Hugo (2008) En Defensa del VRAE y sus Gentes. In: Revista Quehacer, n°172, Oct-Dic. Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo (DESCO). Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/p143>
- Cáceres, Cristina (2014). Discursos Sobre Reconciliación: El Caso De Los Presos Desvinculados De Sendero Luminoso Y MRTA. Lima: IDEHPUCP. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/z0gr2>
- Cadena, Juan Pablo (2011). Plan Colombia y dinámicas de seguridad Ecuador-Colombia. In: Comentario Internacional. Revista del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales 11. Año 2011.
- Calderón, Jonathan. (2016). Etapas del conflicto armado en Colombia: hacia el posconflicto. Latinoamérica. Revista de estudios Latinoamericanos, (62), 227-257. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/cc419>
- Call, C. (2012). Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Retrieved July 3, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2tt300
- Calmet, Yasmín & Salazar, Diego (2013) VRAEM: Políticas de Seguridad Pública en Zona de conflicto. In: Cuadernos de Marte - Año 4, Nro. 5, julio-diciembre 2013.
- Cann J.P. (2006) Low-intensity conflict, insurgency, terrorism and revolutionary war. In: Hughes M., Philpott W.J. (eds) Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History. Palgrave Advances. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625372_7
- Cano, G. & Ninaquispe, K. (2006) “El papel de la sociedad civil en la demanda y promoción de la justicia”. In: Guillerot, J. & Magarrell, L. Reparaciones en la Transición Peruana. Memorias de un Proceso Inacabado, Asociación Pro – Derechos Humanos. International Center for Transitional Justice. Perú.
- Cantón, Santiago (2011). Leyes de Amnistía. In: Reátegui, Felix (Ed.) 2011. Justicia Transicional. Brasil. Comisión de Amnistía del Ministerio de Justicia de Brasil.
- Caplan, et. al (2015) An analysis of post-conflict stabilization. Working Paper. REPORT September 2015.

Cardona, Jorge (2013) *Diario del Conflicto: De las Delicias a la Habana (1996-2013)*. Bogotá. Universidad de los Andes.

Carranza-Franco, Francy (2014) A sub-national approach to state-building and security: the role of municipal institutions in Colombia's DDR process, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 14:3, 245-274, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2014.923149

Carrion, F. & Villaronga (2008) *Descentralizar: un derrotero a seguir*. Quito. FLACSO. Inwent. SENPLADES.

Carrión, Fernando (Comp) (2013) *Asimetrías en la frontera Ecuador – Colombia : entre la complementariedad y el sistema*. Quito. FLACSO, Sede Ecuador.

Carrión, Julio (2006) *The Fujimori Legacy: The rise of electoral authoritarianism in Perú*. University Park, Pennsylvania. Penn State University Press. doi:10.5325/j.ctt7v107.

Castro-Gómez, Santiago (2008) *Genealogías de la colombianidad: Formaciones discursivas y tecnologías de gobierno en los siglos XIX y XX*. Bogotá. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Cedema (2010) Entrevista Al “Compañero Antonio”, Ex Militante De Montoneras Patria Libre (MPL). Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/uxvnk>

Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo (DESCO) (1998) *Violencia Política en el Perú 1980-1988*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/cfv02>

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH) (2016) *Tomas y Ataques Guerrilleros (1965-2013)*. Bogotá. CNMH. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/5lh6>

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH) y Otros (2017). *Medellín, Memorias de una guerra urbana*. Bogotá.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica CNMH (2015). *Listado de acciones e iniciativas de memoria histórica identificadas y registradas por el CNMH*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/9ozy>

Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN) (2012). *Plan Integral Territorial Vraem: 2012-2016*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/z117h>

Chinkin, C., & Kaldor, M. (2017). *International Law and New Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316759868

Christia, F. (2019). *Decentralization in Post-Conflict Settings: Assessing Community-Driven Development in the Wake of Violence*. In J. Rodden & E. Wibbels (Eds.), *Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming* (pp. 205-228). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108615594.009

Cliffe, S., S. Guggenheim, and M. Kostner (2003). *Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions*. Washington, DC: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank.

CNRR - Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011). *San Carlos: Memorias del Éxodo en la guerra*. Bogotá. Ediciones Semana. Taurus.

Coggins, Bridget (2015) «Rebel diplomacy: Theorizing violent non-state actors' Strategic use of talk». In: Arjona, Ana; Kasfir, Nelson y Mampilly Zachariah (eds.). *Rebel governance in civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Colin Flint, Paul Diehl, Juergen Scheffran, John Vasquez & Sang-hyun Chi (2009) *Conceptualizing Conflict Space: Toward a Geography of Relational Power and Embeddedness in the Analysis of Interstate Conflict*, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 99(4), 745-768.

Collier, D., & Mahon, J. (1993). Conceptual “Stretching” Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 87(4), 845-855. doi:10.2307/2938818

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) (2002, May). Acuerdo de Comisionados. Incorporación de la perspectiva de género en el trabajo de la comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/yule4>

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) (2003). Informe final de la Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación en el Perú. Retrieved from: <https://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/>

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) (2003a). Conclusiones Generales del Informe Final de la CVR. Lima. Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) (2003b). El impacto de las audiencias públicas en los participantes. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/zlufb>

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-Conflict Risks. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(4), 461–478. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308091356>

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 563–595.

Comisión de la Verdad Ecuador (CVE) (2010). Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad. Sin Verdad no hay Justicia. Tomes 1-5. Quito. Comisión de la Verdad.

Comision de Transparencia y Verdad Angostura (2009). Informe Comisión De Transparencia Y Verdad Angostura. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/syz5l>

Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas (CHCV) (2015). Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia. <https://n9.cl/lo91y>

Consejería Presidencial para la Estabilización y la Consolidación (2021, March 10) Normativa. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ebzz6>

Consejería Presidencial para la Estabilización y la Consolidación (2017, November 27) El municipio de San Carlos, Antioquia, constituye su propio Sistema Local de Justicia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/sigqq>

Consejo privado de Competitividad (2018) Índice Departamental de competitividad 2018. Bogotá.

Constitución de la República del Ecuador (2008). Registro Oficial 449 de 20 de octubre de 2008.

Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) (2007). En los límites del Plan Ecuador. Bogotá. CODHES.

Cox, Joseph. (2019). Negotiating justice: Ceasefires, peace agreements, and post-conflict justice. *Journal of Peace Research*. 002234331987948. 10.1177/0022343319879485.

Culbertson, H. et. al (2007) Reflective Peacebuilding. A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit. Mindanao: The Joan B, Kroc Institute por International Peace Studies.

DataRepublica (2020, August 20) Desarrollo y Conflicto: Brechas entre los Municipios PDET y No PDET de Antioquia. Retrieved from: <https://datarepublica.org/publica/36>

Day, A. C., & Hunt, C. T. (2020). UN Stabilisation Operations and the Problem of Non-Linear Change: A Relational Approach to Intervening in Governance Ecosystems. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 9(1), 2. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.727>

Dargent, Eduardo & Vergara, Ernesto (2000) La batalla de los días primeros : Sendero y sus consecuencias en dos ensayos jóvenes. Lima, Perú : Ediciones El Virrey.

De La Torre, Patricia (2013) Los Constructores del Estado Nacional 1830-2010. En el Cerebro Político del Ecuador. Quito. Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, Senplades.

Decreto 1995 de 2016. Por el cual se crea la Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del Acuerdo Final, suscrito entre el Gobierno Nacional y las FARC-EP el 24 de noviembre de 2016. Diciembre 7 de 2016.

Decreto Ley No. 25418. Ley de Bases del Gobierno de Emergencia y Reconstrucción Nacional. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/a2vj6>

Decreto Supremo N°001-2009-DE-EP. Crean la Región Militar de los Valles de los Ríos Apurímac y Ene. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/vv38g>

Decreto Supremo N°003- 2007-DE. Declaran de necesidad pública y preferente interés nacional el esquema de intervención estratégica integral denominado “Una Opción de Paz y Desarrollo en Seguridad para el Valle de los Ríos Apurímac y Ene - Plan VRAE”. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/vnuox>

Decreto Supremo N°074-2012-PCM Declaran de prioridad nacional el desarrollo económico social y la pacificación del Valle de los ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro y crean Comisión Multisectorial. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/hke6n>

Decreto Supremo N°077-2013-PCM. Aprobación de la intervención en el VRAEM denominado "Programa de Intervención multisectorial del Gobierno Central en los Valles de los ríos Apurímac, Ene y mantaro (VRAEM) 2013 - 2016. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/9wavo>

Decreto Supremo N° 005-2007-PCM

Decreto Supremo N° 011-2014-MINAGRI Decreto Supremo que crea el “Proyecto Especial de Desarrollo del Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro” - PROVRAEM, en el ámbito del Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego – MINAGRI. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/fg8xu>

Decreto Supremo N° 102-2018-PCM. Decreto Supremo que aprueba el Plan Multisectorial denominado “Estrategia de Intervención para el Desarrollo del Valle de los ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro Estrategia VRAEM 2021” y establece otras disposiciones. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/r6scl>

Decreto Supremo No. 065-2001. Crean Comisión de la Verdad. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/it1ri>

Decreto Supremo No. 066-69/EP. Por el cual se elimina la gratuidad de la enseñanza en los colegios. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/29p1p>

Defensoría del Pueblo (2019) Alerta Temprana N° 045-19, October 31. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/a5qbn>

Degregori, Carlos (1990) El Surgimiento De Sendero Luminoso. Ayacucho 1969 – 1979 del movimiento por la gratuidad de la enseñanza al inicio de la lucha armada. Lima. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Degregori, Carlos (2010). El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso: Ayacucho 1969-1979. Del movimiento por la gratuidad de la enseñanza al inicio de la lucha armada. 3a. ed. Lima, IEP.

Degregori, Carlos (2012) How Difficult It Is to Be God. Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press.

Degregori, Carlos (2016). Sobre la Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación en el Perú. In: Degregori, Carlos et. al. (2016a) No hay mañana sin ayer. Batallas por la Memoria y consolidación democrática en el Perú. Lima. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Degregori, Carlos et. al. (1996) Las Rondas Campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos – IEP and Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga.

DeJusticia (2020) El daño que nos hacen: glifosato y guerra en Caquetá/ Cruz Olivera, Luis Felipe, Ana María Malagón P., Camilo Castiblanco S. -- Bogotá : Editorial Dejusticia

Deler, Jean-Paul (2007) Ecuador: del espacio al Estado Nacional. Quito. Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar / Corporación Editora Nacional / Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos.

Del Pino, Ponciano & Huber, Ludwig (2015) Políticas en justicia transicional. Miradas comparativas sobre el legado de la CVR. Lima. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2020) Departamento de Nariño. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/etw6j>

Diario Hoy (1995, February 12). Nahim Isaias Murio Hace Diez Años. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/b3ci2>

Díaz, Fernanda (2015) Por El Camino Del Neosenderismo...Crimen Organizado en el Perú: Neosenderismo en la Región del Valle del Río Apurímac y Ene. Tesis de Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/swn6k>

Díaz, Fernanda (2015a) El Perú y sus múltiples Sendero Luminoso. Relaciones Internacionales, 24(49). Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/6gso>

Doyle, Michael & Sambanis, Nicholas. (2006). Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Foreign Affairs. 85. 163. 10.2307/20032164.

Echandía, Camilo (2004) Panorama Actual del Oriente Antioqueño. Working Paper. Bogotá. Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH.

Echandía, Camilo. (1999). Geografía del conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de la violencia en Colombia. Bogotá. Universidad de Los Andes.

Echandía, Camilo. (2006). Dos décadas de escalamiento del conflicto armado en Colombia 1986-2006. Bogotá. Universidad Externado.

Echandía, Camilo. (2013). Auge y declive del ELN. Análisis de la evolución militar y territorial de cara a la negociación. Informes de la Fundación Ideas para la Paz, (21). Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qgzp4>

EFE News Services (2000, July 19). Las FARC advierten a Ecuador “Debe Guardar Estricta Neutralidad”. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/7c9u>

Eje 21 (2021, March 3). Pizarro: Bombardeo a Raúl Reyes en Ecuador partió en dos historia de las FARC. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ay1uy>

El Comercio (2012 December 21) ¿Qué son los Combatientes Populares? Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pzrb>

El Comercio (2012) Los Últimos Días de Alfaro. Documentos para el Debate. Quito. Grupo el Comercio.

El Comercio (2014) El bombardeo de Angostura provocó el impase más grave entre Ecuador y Colombia en 35 años. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/9pvd>

El Comercio.pe (2015, December 17) Así Ocurrió: En 1996 terroristas toman la embajada del Japón. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/6md82>

El Comercio (2018, December 22) Francotiradores mataron a 'Guacho' y 'Pitufin'; así fue la 'Operación David'. Retrieved From: <https://n9.cl/nseub>

El Comercio (2018, May 4) La delegación del ELN abandonó Quito pero aún ignora nuevo destino de negociaciones. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/q88s>

El Comercio (2018). El pulso de la frontera norte. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/rnf9w>

El Comercio (2019 January 29) Ecuador, advertido sobre posible ataque fronterizo del ELN. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/9ak4>

El Comercio.pe (2021, April 6) ¿Qué sucedió el 5 de abril de 1992 en el Perú?. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/304vy>

El Espectador (2020, December 15) Antioquia silenciada: el mapa de riesgos de los liderazgos sociales. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/xd3qg>

El Mundo (2017, June 18) Las cuatro circunscripciones de paz que podría obtener Antioquia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qrdta>

El Mundo.es (2018, September 16) Guacho, el hombre más buscado por Colombia y Ecuador, herido en una operación militar. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/g07md>

El País (1992, June 19) La policía peruana captura al jefe del grupo guerrillero Tupac Amaru. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/lkm80>

El País (1993, October 10) El Jefe de Sendero Luminoso admite su derrota y pide la paz al presidente de Perú. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/8kgwu>

El País (2008, March 11). Las FARC hallan refugio en Ecuador. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/efle>

El Telégrafo (2015, January 25) El Comité del Pueblo, 40 años de historia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/4j2dn>

El Telégrafo (2017, August 27). La invención de la “Isla de Paz”. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qwlo0>

El Tiempo (1991, October 22) Alfaro Vive , Ahora Con Partido de Borja. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/h0w69>

El Tiempo (1993, December 28). Detenidos 11 guerrilleros que emboscaron a Patrulla. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pj6d9>

El Tiempo (2007 November 12) Ecuador no limita con Colombia sino con la guerrilla, dijo Ministro de Defensa de ese país. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/sblgi>

El Tiempo (2010, February 26). La Corte Constitucional le dijo 'no' al referendo reeleccionista: Era Uribe terminará el 7 de agosto. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/6pq6j>

El Tiempo (2016, February 21) Razones por las que Antioquia debe ser piloto del posconflicto. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/5t0ys>

El Tiempo (2018, October 24) Detalles del secuestro y asesinato de los 3 periodistas ecuatorianos. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/zcf8>

El Universo (2002 November 28) Gutiérrez llevará plan de paz a Colombia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/sql0>

El Universo (2005, January 12) Gutierrez no descartó haber conversado con algún miembro de las FARC. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/wnmeq>

El Universo (2010, December 12). \$ 6,3 millones a Plan Ecuador para proyectos en la frontera. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/4wilm>

El Universo (2010, June 20) Un capítulo de la historia del país con dos visiones opuestas. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qga2f>

El Universo (2010, June 20a) M-19 capacitó a alfaristas y participó en sus asaltos. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/4ap52>

El Universo (2011, January 6) Ecuador dismanteló 416 campamentos de las FARC en tres años, según Vallejo. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/62qus>

Estrada, Jairo (2019) De FARC-EP a FARC. Documentos. Bogotá. Gentes del Común. Centro de Pensamiento y Diálogo Político.

Europa Press (2016 September 10) Ecuador se ofrece como sede para las negociaciones entre el Gobierno colombiano y el ELN. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/mnd8>

Fajardo, Darío (2015). Estudio sobre los orígenes del conflicto social armado, razones para su persistencia y sus efectos más profundos en la sociedad colombiana. In: Comisión

Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas (CHCV) (2015). Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia. <https://n9.cl/1o91y>

Falleti, T. (2010). Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511777813

Falleti, T. G., & Mahoney, J. (2015). The comparative sequential method. In J. Mahoney, & K. Thelen (Eds.), *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis (Strategies for Social Inquiry)* (1st edition ed., pp. 211-239). Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February), pp. 75–90.

Felstiner, W. et.al. (1981) The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claming. *Law & Society Review*. Vol. 15. No.3/4. Pp. 631-654.

Fernández, J. M., & Pazzona, M. (2017). Evaluating the Spillover Effects of the Colombian Conflict in Ecuador. *Defense and Peace Economics*, 1–25. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1328562

FLACSO (2011) Refugiados urbanos en Ecuador. Estudio sobre los procesos de inserción urbana de la población colombiana refugiada, el caso de Quito y Guayaquil. Quito. FLACSO-ACNUR, Ecuador.

Forau, Luke & Chand, Satish (2016) Measuring peace using household-level data from post-conflict Solomon Islands, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16:5, 423-441, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2016.1219512

Fortna, Virginia (2008). Does peacekeeping work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. *Geographers*, 99:5, 827-835, DOI: 10.1080/00045600903253312

Fortna, Virginia (2015). Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes. *International Organization*, 69, pp 519-556 doi:10.1017/S0020818315000089

Franco, Giraldo (2012) el Moec 7 de enero, origen de la guerrilla revolucionaria en Colombia. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Departamento de Historia. <https://n9.cl/4iloc>

Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) (2018) Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial: Cambiar el rumbo para evitar el naufragio. Balance bajo la metodología de observación y medición “El Siriri”. Notas Estratégicas 05. Bogotá. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pi9yy>

Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) (2018a) Trayectorias y dinámicas territoriales de las disidencias de las FARC. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/omz82>

Fundación Ideas para la Paz (s.f) Casos de Capital Social y Desarrollo Institucional PRODEPAZ- Oriente Antioqueño. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/jlqzh>

Fundación Paz y Reconciliación – PARES (2017) Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz CTEP. Democracia y Gobernabilidad. Fundación Pares. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ix6k3>

Galtung, J (2007) “Introduction: peace by peaceful conflict transformation- The TRANSEND approach” in: Charles Webel & Johan Galtung *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (Routledge: Abingdon) pp 14-32.

Galtung, Johan (1998). Tras la violencia 3R: reconstrucción, reconciliación, resolución. Afrontando los efectos visibles e invisibles de guerra y la violencia. Red Gernika 6. Bakeaz y Gernika Gogoratuz.

Galtung, Johan (2010). *A Theory of Conflict. Overcoming Direct Violence*. Oslo: Kolofon Press.

- Galtung, Johan (2012). A TRANSCEND Reconciliation Approach. In D. Perlman, J. Santa Bárbara and J. Galtung (Eds.), *Reconciliation. Clearing the Past-Building a Future*. Oslo: Kolofon Press.
- Gambetta, J.; Rodriguez, F.; Velásquez, G. (2018) *Lecciones aprendidas en el conflicto de la cordillera del Cóndor y Relaciones Diplomáticas entre Perú y Ecuador. Año 1981*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/9nsbk>
- García-Durán, Mauricio (Ed.) (2004). *Alternatives to War. Colombia's Peace Processes*. In: Accord Issue 14. London. Conciliation Resources in Collaboration with CINEP.
- García-Peña, Daniel (2009). *Las experiencias pasadas permiten retomar el sendero de la salida política*. In Villarraga, Álvaro (ed). *Biblioteca para la paz.IV. Gobierno del presidente Ernesto Samper 1994-1998. En ausencia de un proceso de paz: Acuerdos parciales y mandato ciudadano por la paz*. Bogotá. Fundación Cultura Democrática.
- García, Bertha (2002) *Ecuador, Plan Colombia Y Seguridad: Una Impredecible Vecindad*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/zfe88>
- García, Clara Inés (2007) *Conflicto, discursos y reconfiguración regional. El oriente antioqueño: de la Violencia de los cincuenta al Laboratorio de Paz*. In: *En: Controversia no. 189*. (diciembre 2007). Bogotá: IPC, FNC, CINEP, CR, ENS, 2007.
- García, H. A. (2008). *Análisis de los efectos diplomáticos, sociales y políticos del Plan Colombia en las relaciones fronterizas entre Colombia y Ecuador durante el periodo 2002-2007*. Retrieved from: <http://hdl.handle.net/10554/7834>.
- García, Laura (2019). «La diplomacia rebelde de las FARC-EP en el proceso de paz de Colombia». *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, n.º 121 (abril 2019). DOI: doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2019.121.1.19
- García, Martha (2017). *Una Mirada a la trayectoria de las luchas sociales en tres subregiones nariñenses*. Bogotá. Cinep/ Programa por la Paz.
- García, Mauricio (1992) *de La Uribe a Tlaxcala: Procesos de paz*. Bogotá. CINEP.
- García, Mauricio (2011). *Los Estados del País: Instituciones municipales y realidades locales*. Bogotá. Dejusticia.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803123
- Giraldo, Jorge (2015). *Política y guerra sin compasión. In Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas. Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/1o91y>
- Giraudy, A. (2012). *Conceptualizing state strength: moving beyond strong and weak states*. *Revista De Ciencia Política*, 32(3), 599-611. doi:10.4067/S0718-090X2012000300005
- Giraudy, A., Moncada, E., & Snyder, R. (Eds.). (2019). *Inside Countries: Subnational Research in Comparative Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108678384
- Giusti, M. & Sánchez-Concha, R. (2013) *Universidad y Nación*. Lima. Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002) *Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset*. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5).
- Gobierno Nacional – FARC-EP (2018) *Acuerdo Final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera*. Bogotá, 24 de noviembre de 2016. Bogotá. Gentes del Común.

- Goertz, G., & Mahoney, J. (2012). Concepts and measurement: Ontology and epistemology. *Social Science Information*, 51(2), 205–216. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018412437108>
- Goertz, Gary (2006). *Social Science Concepts. A User's Guide*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Gómez, Andrés (2013) Análisis Comparado de las Políticas de Seguridad en Ecuador y Colombia respecto a su zona de Frontera. In: Carrión, Fernando (Comp) (2013) *Asimetrías en la frontera Ecuador – Colombia: entre la complementariedad y el sistema*. Quito. FLACSO, Sede Ecuador.
- González, Raúl (1984) ¿Y ahora qué? Colección de Ensayos sobre Sendero Luminoso. In: *Quéhacer*. Revista bimestral del Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo. Fondo Editorial. Lima – Peru.
- González Gil, Adriana. (2013). Pobladores Sitiados Entre La Violencia Y La Re-Configuración Territorial: Migración Trans-Fronteriza Colombia-Ecuador. *Si Somos Americanos*, 13(1), 199-216. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0719-09482013000100009>
- González, F. et al (2001). *Violencia Política en Colombia. De la nación fragmentada a la construcción del Estado*. Bogotá. CINEP.
- González, Fernán (2021) Una mirada estructural para entender al ELN: un federalismo insurgente. Bogotá. CINEP. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/on40>
- González, Fernán. (2003). Alcances y limitaciones del Frente Nacional como pacto de paz. Un acuerdo basado en la desconfianza mutua. En: Medina, Medófilo y Sánchez, Efraín (eds.). *Tiempos de paz. Acuerdos en Colombia, 1902-1994* (pp. 211-227). Bogotá, D. C.: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá.
- González, Fernán. (2014). *Poder y violencia en Colombia*. Bogotá, D. C.: Odecofi-Cinep.
- González, Sindy (2018) Migración indígena en la frontera Colombia-Ecuador: del conflicto armado a la Agenda de Seguridad Binacional. In: *Revista Opera*, N°. 23, 2018 (July-December), págs. 7-26
- Gorriti, Gustavo (2009) *Escrita en Sangre. La Historia del VRAE*. In: *Revista Caretas*, N° 2334. Noviembre, Lima. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/sln6c>
- Gorriti, Gustavo (2010) SL-VRAE: los intentos de expansión, los primeros contrastes. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/tdmol>
- Gorriti, Gustavo (DW 2014, September 3). *Redoblada lucha contra Sendero Luminoso*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/2xaue>
- Gorriti, Gustavo & Rospigliosi, Fernando (2009). ¿Cómo recuperar al Vrae? In: *Revista Poder*. Lima. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/gckyi>
- Gorur, Aditi (2016) *Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions*. Stimson Center. Survey of Practice: MONUSCO Stabilization. Support Unit and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. MONUSCO.
- Grajales, Jacobo (2017). *Gobernar en Medio de la Violencia. Estado y paramilitarismo en Colombia*. Bogotá. Ediciones UR. Universidad del Rosario.
- Granados, M. (1981) *La conducta política: Un caso particular*. Tesis de Bachillerato en Antropología. Universidad de Huamanga. Perú
- Grasa, R. (2017). El fin del conflicto armado y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera en Colombia. *Analecta Política*, 7(12), 7-17.
- Grenfell, L. (2013). *Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139206945

- Grupo de Memoria Histórica (GMH) (2013) Basta Ya. Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pis45>
- Guerra, Gustavo (2011) Análisis De Los Discursos Del Poder En El Gobierno De León Febres Cordero: El Caso De Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC). Período abril – octubre de 1985 a través de Diario Hoy. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/jfgjy>
- Gutiérrez Sanín, F. & Wood, E. (2014). Ideology in Civil War Instrumental Adoption and Beyond. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2). pp. 213–226.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, F. et. al (2006) Nuestra Guerra Sin Nombre: Transformaciones del Conflicto en Colombia. Bogotá. Norma.
- Gutierrez, Omar (2016) Dinámicas de los Conflictos Sociales y Políticos en el Macizo Andino Nariñense. Bogotá. CINEP. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/7yrtv>
- Guzmán, Germán (1968) La Violencia en Colombia. Cali. Ed. Progreso.
- Guzmán, Germán; Fals Borda, Orlando y Umaña, Eduardo. (2005). *La violencia en Colombia*. Bogotá, D. C.: Taurus.
- Harbers, I., & Ingram, M. (2017). Geo-Nested Analysis: Mixed-Methods Research with Spatially Dependent Data. *Political Analysis*, 25(3), 289-307. doi:10.1017/pan.2017.4
- Harbom, Lotta & Högladh, Stina & Wallensteen, Peter. (2006). Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements. *Journal of Peace Research*. 43. 617-631. 10.1177/0022343306067613.
- Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2), 318-332. doi:10.2307/3186141
- Heilman, Jaymie (2010) Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980. Stanford University Press.
- Helmke, G. & Levitsky, S. (2004) Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, Perspectives on Politics, Vol/Issue 04, pp 725-740.
- Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds.) (2008) The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 702-721.
- Herrera, Jimmy (2005). La memoria como escenario: la cárcel y el movimiento insurgente Alfaro Vive Carajo. Quito, 2005, 110 p. Tesis (Maestría en Estudios de la Cultura. Mención en Políticas Culturales). Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador. Área de Letras.
- Hoeffler, Anke (2019), Post-Conflict Stabilization in Africa. *Review of Development Economics*, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 1238-1259, 2019. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3618480> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rode.12601>
- Holland, A. (2016). Insurgent Successor Parties. In S. Levitsky, J. Loxton, B. Van Dyck, & J. Domínguez (Eds.), *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America* (pp. 273-304). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316550564.010
- Holland, A. (2017). *Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316795613
- Homza, Joseph (2004) Special Operators: A Key Ingredient for Successful Peacekeeping Operations Management, *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, 12:1, 91-110, DOI: 10.1080/0966284042000306749
- Hunt, Charles (2016) “All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the ‘Robust Turn’ in UN Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping*.
- Idler, Annette (2019) *Borderland Battles. Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia’s War*. Oxford University Press.
- Indepaz (2009, February 12). Del Mandato del 97 al 2007. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/37ro>

Indepaz (2018) Conflictos Armados Focalizados. Informe Sobre Grupos Armados Ilegales Colombia 2017-2018. In: Revista Punto de Encuentro No. 74. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/6lh39>

Indepaz (2018a) Informe Especial Cauca Y Nariño. Crisis De Seguridad En El Posacuerdo. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/whg4t>

Indepaz (2020, July 15) Informe Especial. Registro de líderes y personas defensoras de DDHH asesinadas desde la firma del Acuerdo de Paz. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/2k31j>

InSightCrime (2011, January 7) Ecuador Dismantled 125 FARC Camps During 2010. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/8tn6>

Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IDEHPUCP) (2009) Las organizaciones sociales durante el proceso de violencia. Colección Cuadernos para la Memoria Histórica No. 3. Lima. PUCP.

Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IDEHPUCP) (2007) Realidades de posguerra en el Perú: omisiones, negaciones y sus consecuencias. Colección Documentos de Trabajo | Serie Democracia y Sociedad No. 2. Lima. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IDEHPUCP) (2020, September 01) Reflexiones sobre los avances a partir de las conclusiones y recomendaciones del Informe Final de la CVR. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pi4hz>

Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi IGAC (September, 2020). Ordenamiento Territorial. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/cx9jw>

Instituto Geográfico Militar (IGM) & Senplades (2010) Atlas Geográfico de la República del Ecuador. Contextos Históricos y Políticos Generales. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/gtfx3>

International Crisis Group (2003). Colombia and its Neighbors: The Tentacles of Instability. Latin America N°3. Bogotá/Brussels. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/o59sa>

International Crisis Group (2007) “Ecuador: overcoming instability?”. In: Latin America Report, No. 22, Bogotá/Bruselas. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ff5p1>

International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) (2011). Los Documentos de las FARC: Venezuela, Ecuador y el archivo secreto de 'Raul Reyes'. Londres: IISS.

Inter Press Service – IPS (1996, January 3). Bolivia: Desarticulan grupo guerrillero peruano. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pqh63>

Jameson, K. P. (2011). The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador: The Struggle for a Plurinational State. *Latin American Perspectives*, 38(1), 63–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X10384210>

Jaramillo Uribe, Jaime. (1987). Las ideas políticas en Colombia en los años treinta. *Revista Universidad Nacional*, 3 (14-15), pp. 25-30.

Jaramillo, Olga (2013) Memorias de la guerra. Participación de jóvenes rurales en procesos de memoria desde una perspectiva intergeneracional en la región del Oriente. Final Report. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/npwx>

Jaramillo, Sergio (2014) Todo lo que debería saber sobre el proceso de paz. Visión, realidades y avances en las conversaciones que adelanta el Gobierno Nacional en la Habana. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ywso>

Kalyvas, S. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511818462

Kay, Cristobal (1982) Achievements and contradictions of the Peruvian agrarian reform, *The Journal of Development Studies*, 18:2, 141-170, DOI: 10.1080/00220388208421824

- Kingsley, María (2014) Ungoverned space? Examining the FARC's interactions with local populations in Northern Ecuador, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25:5-6, 1017-1038, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.945677
- Kinnto, Lucas (2000) Plan Colombia. La Paz Armada. Quito. Planeta
- Knight, J. (1992). *Institutions and Social Conflict (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511528170
- Kroc Institute (2020). Report 4 Point by Point: The Status of Peace Agreement Implementation in Colombia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/aeocn>
- La FM (2019, October 11) ¿Disidencias de las Farc infiltraron protestas en Ecuador? Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ptdi7>
- La FM (2021, February 1) Relaciones de Ecuador y ELN son hechos conocidos, no son nuevos: Arturo Torres. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/39pb>
- Langer, A., & Brown, G. (Eds.) (2016). *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding*.: Oxford University Press
- La República (2011, August 7). Presidente ofrece más recursos para el VRAE pero exige resultados. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/uefya>
- La República (2011, November 5). Gobierno prorroga estado de emergencia en el VRAE. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/fxw9t>
- La Serna, Miguel (2020) *With masses and arms: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement*. The University of North Carolina Press.
- Lajtman, Tamara & Mendoza, Marina (2019) La utilización del estado de emergencia como herramienta represiva en el Perú contemporáneo: los casos del VRAEM y el Proyecto minero Conga. *Revista electrónica de estudios latinoamericanos*. Vol. 17, num. 67, Buenos Aires, abril-junio 2019.
- Laplante, Lisa (2007). The Peruvian truth commission's historical memory Project: empowering truth-tellers to confront truth deniers. In: *Journal of Human Rights*, vol.6, issue 4, 2007.
- Laplante, Lisa (2007a). Después de la verdad: demandas para reparaciones en el Perú post-Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. In: *Antípoda: Revista de Antropología y Arqueología*, ISSN 1900-1407, N°. 4, 2007, pags. 119-145. 10.7440/antipoda4.2007.06.
- Lee, Melissa (2020) *Crippling Leviathan. How Foreign Subversion Weakens the State*. New York. Cornell University Press.
- Leonard, David (2013) Piecing it Together: Post-Conflict Security in an Africa of Networked, Multilevel Governance. In: *IDS Bulletin*. Volume 44 Number1. London. Institute of Development Studies.
- Lerner, Salomón (2007). Justicia y reparación para las víctimas de la violencia política, *Revista Páginas*, Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, Vol. 32, No.207, October, 2007.
- Lerner, Salomón (2013, August 29). Entrevista a Salomón Lerner. A diez años del informe final: Entrevista al presidente de la CVR del Perú. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/6ieqj>
- Liberación Nacional-Tupamaro (1982-2017). In: *Historia y Memoria*, N°. 21.2020, pp. 235 – 268.
- Lister, S. and Wilder, A. (2005) 'Strengthening Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform or State-building?', *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 25, no 1., pp. 39-48
- López, Claudia (2007). La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y la transformación política en Antioquia. In: *Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris. Parapolítica. La Ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos*. Bogotá. Intermedio Editores

- López, Claudia (2016) *¿Adiós a las Farc? ¿Y ahora qué?* Bogotá. Penguin Random House.
- López Mas, J. (2003). Globalización Y Economías Regionales Del Perú. *Gestión*. In: El Tercer Milenio, 6(11), 29–49. <https://doi.org/10.15381/gtm.v6i11.10482>
- Löwy, Michael (2006, January 20). La mística revolucionaria de José Carlos Mariátegui *Revista Actual Marx*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/1weal>
- Lynch, N. (1999) *Una tragedia sin héroes. La derrota de los partidos y el origen de los independientes. Perú 1980-1992*. Lima. Fondo Editorial Universidad Nacional de San Marcos.
- MacLean, Lauren (2010). *Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and Reciprocity in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Macher, Sofía (2014) *¿Hemos avanzado?: A 10 años de las recomendaciones de la Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación*. Lima. IEP. 2014.
- Macher, Sofía (2018) *Reflexiones sobre la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú*. Documentos de Trabajo CEIPAZ. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qtps>
- Mallon, Florencia (1998) *Chronicle of a Path Foretold? Velasco's Revolution, Vanguardia Revolucionaria, and "Shining Omens" in the Indigenous Communities of Andahuaylas*. In: *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*, edited by Steve J. Stern, New York, USA: Duke University Press, 1998, pp. 84-118.
- Manrique, Nelson (2007). *Pensamiento, acción y base política del movimiento Sendero Luminoso. La guerra y las primeras respuestas de los comuneros (1964-1983)*. In. Pérotin-Dumon, A. (dir.). *Historizar el pasado vivo en América Latina*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/20ilz>
- Mantilla, Julissa (2006) *La Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación en el Perú y la perspectiva de género*. In: *Revista IIDH*. No. 43. Págs. 323-365. Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos.
- Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian (2015). *Rebel Rulers Insurgent. Governance and Civilian Life during War* Cornell
- Mani, Rama (2005). *Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War*. In: *Security Dialogue* vol. 36, no. 4, December 2005.
- Márquez, Jaime (1994). *Conociendo desde adentro las Rondas Campesinas*. In: *Ronderos: los ojos de la noche. Manual para promotores de Rondas Campesinas*. Lima. Instituto de Defensa Legal.
- Marshall, Michael & Ishiyama, Jhon (2016). *Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?* In: *Democratization*, 23:6, 1009-1025, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2016.1192606
- Mason, T., Gurses, M., Brandt, P., & Quinn, J. (2011). *When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars*. *International Studies Perspectives*, 12(2), 171-189. Retrieved May 19, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/44218657
- Martínez, I. (2009). *Acciones del sendero luminoso en el Perú durante la década de 1980-1990*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/olagw>
- Mather, L. & Yngvesson, B. (1981) *Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes*. *Law & Society Review*. Volume 15, Number 3-4.
- Maucerí, P. (2001). *Estado, Elite y Contrainsurgencia: una comparación preliminar entre Colombia y Perú*. *Colombia Internacional*, (52), 44-64.
- McClintock, C. (2001). *Perú's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory*. California. University of California Press.

McCormick, Gordon (1993) *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/lbcf>

Melo, Jorge Orlando (2017). *Historia Mínima de Colombia*. Madrid. Turner Publicaciones

Mendoza-Tolosa, Henry Antonio, & Campo-Robledo, Jacobo. (2017). Localización y especialización productiva regional en Colombia. *Revista Finanzas y Política Económica*, 9(1), 113-134. <https://dx.doi.org/10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.2017.9.1.7>

Meza, Mario (2012) *El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) y las fuentes de la revolución en América Latina*. Ph.D. diss., El Colegio de México. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/f6a3g>

Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad Interna y Externa (2008). “Agenda nacional de seguridad interna y externa. Hacia una nueva política de seguridad interna y externa”. Quito.

Ministerio de Justicia (2019, October 4) En Nariño, el Ministerio de Justicia presentó proyecto piloto de justicia local y rural para el municipio de El Charco. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/4j2jx>

Ministerio de Justicia (2019) *Sistemas Locales de Justicia*. Retrieved from <https://n9.cl/qygo9>

Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social MIMDES (2006) *Censo por la Paz 2001-2003. Relación preliminar de personas muertas en el conflicto armado interno de acuerdo con el Censo por la Paz 1980-2000*. Dirección General de Desplazados y Cultura de Paz. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/5yves>

Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social MIMDES (2007) *Censo Por la Paz 2006. Resultados Generales / Dirección de Promoción de Cultura de Paz: Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/w5ofi>

Misión de Observación Electoral MOE (2017). *Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz para la Cámara de Representantes 2018-2022 y 2022-2026*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/8mbd>

MOE-CERAC (2016) *Mapas de Riesgo Electoral 2016*. <https://n9.cl/u0yfo>

Molina, Gerardo. (1989). *Las ideas liberales en Colombia 1915-1934*. Tomo II. Bogotá, D. C.: Tercer Mundo.

Moreano, Hernán (2005) *Colombia y sus vecinos frente al conflicto armado*. Quito. Ediciones Abya-Yala

Morffe, Miguel (2016) *La violencia y el fin del conflicto colombiano en la frontera colombo-venezolana. Oportunidades y retos para el desarrollo*. In: *Aldea Mundo*, vol.21, número. 41, 2016. Bogotá. Universidad de los Andes.

MRTA (1988) *El Camino de la Revolución Peruana*. Documentos del II Comité Central del MRTA. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/k6tpu>

MRTA (1990) *Historia Del Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Mrta)*. Documento aprobado por el III Comité Central del Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, en septiembre de 1990. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qgnx>

MRTA (1990a) *Conquistando el porvenir: Con las masas y las armas*. Notas sobre la historia del MRTA. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/pzbew>

Muggah, Robert (2014) “The United Nations Turns to Stabilization,” IPI Global Observatory, December 5, 2014, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-stabilization/>

Muñoz, Pabel (2008) *Estado regional autónomo para el Ecuador*. In Carrion, F. & Villaronga (2008) *Descentralizar: un derrotero a seguir*. Quito. FLACSO. Inwent. SENPLADES.

Murillo, Amparo. (2011). La modernización y las violencias (1930-1957). In: Rodríguez, Luis et al. *Historia de Colombia. Todo lo que hay que saber*. Bogotá, D. C.: Punto de Lectura.

Nieto, Jaime & Robledo, Luis (2001) *Guerra y Paz en Colombia 1998-2001*. Medellín. Universidad Autónoma Latinoamericana.

Niño, César (2020). Post-senderismo, meta-seguridad y meta-violencia peruana en el caso VRAEM. In: Araucaria. *Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades*, vol. 22, núm. 43, 2020. Universidad de Sevilla, Spain.

Observatorio de Paz y Conflicto (2016). *Organizaciones Guerrilleras en Colombia desde la década de los sesenta*. Bogotá. Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Observatorio de Paz y Reconciliación del Oriente Antioqueño (2007) *Estudio de diagnóstico y contextualización de los 23 municipios del oriente antioqueño sobre la situación del conflicto armado, los derechos humanos, el derecho internacional humanitario, las organizaciones sociales y la gobernabilidad democrática*. Medellín. Observatorio de Paz y Reconciliación del Oriente Antioqueño

Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR) (2011). *El DDR en el Plan de Desarrollo “Adelante Nariño”*. Bogotá. Universidad Nacional de Colombia – Unicef.

Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria (2021). *Forced Eradication: A Policy That Kills*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/4sjna>

Olaya, Carlos Hernando (2017) *El exterminio del Movimiento Cívico del Oriente de Antioquia*. In: *El Ágora USB*, Vol. 17, N°. 1, 2017.

Oquist, Pauñ (1978) *Violencia, Conflicto y Política en Colombia*, Bogotá. Biblioteca Banco Popular.

Ortega, Elsy (2010) *Colombianos En Ecuador: Obstáculos Y Posibilidades Políticas Y Culturales Para Incidir En La Política Migratoria Colombiana*. Quito, 2010, 100 p. Tesis (Maestría en Estudios de la Cultura. Mención en Políticas Culturales). Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador. Área de Letras.

Ostos, María del Pilar (2010) *Vecindad y conflicto: Una perspectiva de las relaciones entre Colombia y Ecuador*. In *Latinoamérica. Revista de estudios Latinoamericanos*, (50), 39-57.

Otero, D. (2010). *El papel de los Estados Unidos en el conflicto armado colombiano*. Bogotá. Aurora.

Pacheco, Nicolás (2006). *AVC. Alfaro Vive, Carajo! Democracia Ecuatoriana en Armas*. Rosario (Argentina). Ediciones Estrategia.

Palacios, Marco. (2003) *Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875–1994*. Bogotá. Editorial Norma.

Palacios & Safford (2002) *Colombia: país fragmentado, sociedad dividida: su historia*. Bogotá. Editorial Norma.

Palacios, Marco. (2002). *La Regeneración ante el espejo liberal y su importancia en el siglo XX*. In: Sierra Mejía, Rubén (ed.). *En: Miguel Antonio Caro y la cultura de su época* (pp. 261-278). Bogotá, D. C.: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Palacios, M. (2003) *Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875–1994*. Bogotá. Editorial Norma.

Palma, Maritza (2017). *Refugiados. Relatos de vida de Colombianos en el Ecuador*. Pereira -Colombia. Universidad Católica de Pereira.

Palmer, David. (2003). 9. *Citizen Responses to Conflict and Political Crisis in Peru: Informal Politics in Ayacucho*. In: S. Eckstein & T. Wickham-Crowley (Ed.), *What Justice? Whose Justice?: Fighting for Fairness in Latin America* (pp. 233-254). Berkeley: University of California Press. <https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520936980-011>

Paredes, Maritza, & Pastor, Alvaro. (2021). Erradicación en suspenso: La dimensión simbólica de la pacificación negociada en el VRAEM. *Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)*, 41(1), 163-186. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2021005000106>

Pascó-Font, Alberto & Saavedra, Jaime (2001). *Reformas estructurales y bienestar: Una mirada al Perú de los noventa*. Lima. Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE).

Pécaut, Daniel (2001) *Guerra contra la sociedad*. Bogotá. Espasa.

Pécaut, Daniel. (2006) *Crónica de cuatro décadas de política colombiana*. Bogotá. Norma.

Pécaut, Daniel. (2008) *Las FARC, ¿una guerrilla sin fin o sin fines?* Bogotá. Norma.

Pepinsky (2017) *Regions of Exception. Perspectives on Politics*. December 2017 | Vol. 15. No. 4

Pérez, José (1996). *Rondas Campesinas. Poder, violencia y autodefensa en Cajamarca central*. Lima. IEP Ediciones.

Perú 21 (2021, June 5). Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/r3dv5>

Pettersson, T. & Magnus, Ö. (2020) *Organized violence, 1989-2019*. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(4).

Pinedo, Miriam (2020) *La memoria carcelaria en Sendero Luminoso y en el Movimiento de Pishedda*, Constantino (2020). *Conflict Among Rebels. Why Insurgent Groups Fight Each Other*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Pizarro-Leongomez, Eduardo (2021) *Las fronteras y la guerra*. Bogotá. Grupo Planeta.

Pizarro, Eduardo. (2011). *Las FARC (1949-2011). De guerrilla campesina a máquina de guerra*. Bogotá. Norma

Planv (2021) *Grupos armados, legales e ilegales, en frontera colombo-ecuatoriana*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/upvi4>

PNUD (2010b) *Tres miradas a los retornos de la población desplazada*. In: *Hechos del Callejón*. No. 54. Bogotá. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/2314x>

Posner, D. N. (2004). *The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi*. *American Political Science Review*, 98(04), 529–545. doi:10.1017/s0003055404041334

Presidencia de La República de Colombia (2018) *Peace with Legality*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/c951d>

Primicias (2021, March 21). *La guerrilla del ELN y su silenciosa expansión en Ecuador*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/wf4t1>

Primicias (2021) *97% de casos de la Comisión de la Verdad sin sentencia*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/wom4z>

Prodepaz (2017, Septiembre 22) *El municipio de Nariño, Antioquia, constituye su Sistema Local de Justicia*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/9ba0w>

Prodepaz (2017) *La Justicia Local en la Región del Oriente Antioqueño*. Bogotá. RedProdepaz.

Prodepaz (2018, May 28) *Justicia Local: logros y retos*. Retrieved from <https://n9.cl/n6mf7r>

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PNUD (2010). *Nariño. Análisis de la conflictividad*. Colombia. Área de Paz, Desarrollo y Reconciliación PNUD.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PNUD (2010a). *Oriente antioqueño: Análisis de la conflictividad*. Colombia. Área de Paz, Desarrollo y Reconciliación PNUD.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PNUD (2013). *Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo* - PNUD (2013). Bogotá. Retrieved From: www.pnud.org.co

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PNUD (2014). Nariño: Análisis de conflictividades y Construcción de paz. Colombia. Área de Paz, Desarrollo y Reconciliación PNUD.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PNUD (2019). Nariño. Retos y Desafíos para el Desarrollo Sostenible. Colombia. PNUD.

Querejazu, Igarki (2018) La Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación en el Perú: una introducción a su elaboración, su informe final y a su recepción. Retrieved from: <http://n9.cl/mg15s>

Quesada Nicoli, D., & Tafur Sialer, A. (2020). El estado de emergencia en el Perú democrático posconflicto: Un estudio preliminar de las normas de emergencia. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, 16(2), 205-234

Quinn, J. M., T. David Mason & Mehmet Gurses (2007). "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence." International Interactions 33 (2): 167-193.

Ramírez, Luis (2015) Revisión A La Implementación De Los Programas De Retorno. Una Mirada A Partir De Tres Estudios De Caso En El Oriente Antioqueño. In: AGO.USB Medellín-Colombia V. 15 No 2 PP. 325- 585 Julio - Diciembre 2015 ISSN: 1657-8031

Ramírez Zapata, Ivan & Nureña, César R. (2012). El pensamiento Gonzalo: la violencia hecha dogma político. 10.13140/RG.2.2.24836.53122.

Ramos, Mario (2009) Política de seguridad del Estado, Aparatos y Estrategias contrainsurgentes 1984 – 2006. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/xgf1w>

Razón Pública (2013, October 21) El acuerdo entre Colombia y Ecuador: glifosato, secretos y contradicciones. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/59g8u>

Reátegui, Felix (Ed.) 2011. Justicia Transicional. Brasil. Comisión de Amnistía del Ministerio de Justicia de Brasil.

Rebellón, M. A. (2019). Voces constructoras de paz desde los jóvenes en el exilio. Estudio de caso de la experiencia de jóvenes colombianos refugiados construyendo cultura de paz en Lago Agrio, Ecuador. Recuperado de: <http://hdl.handle.net/10554/45244>.

Rénique, José (2003) La voluntad encarcelada: Las 'luminosas trincheras de combate' de Sendero Luminoso en el Perú. Serie Ideología y Política 18. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Resdal (2007) Plan Ecuador. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/zegy0>

Revista Crisis (2019, February 1) Alfaro Vive Carajo: la guerrilla que conmocionó a Ecuador. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/b2ner>

Reyes, C., Grondona, G., & Rodríguez, M. (2015). Evaluación del Impacto de la Comisión de la Verdad en Ecuador: aportes psicosociales en la actual discusión sobre la reparación a las víctimas. Revista Psicología Política, 15(32), 119-136.

Reyes, Jaime (2013) Ejército de Liberación Nacional colombiano: Desde la renovación política a la corriente de Renovación Socialista, 1978-1994. In: Revista Divergencia ISSN: 0719-2398. N°3 / Año 2 / enero - julio 2013 / pp 71-88.

Riestra, E.V. & Gorriti, G. (2015). Métricas de guerra. In: IDL Reporteros. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/6z10c>

Ríos, J. (2016). La periferalización del conflicto armado colombiano, 2002-2014. Geopolítica(s). Revista de Estudios sobre Espacio y Poder, 7(2), 251-275

Ríos, J. (2017b). Determinantes geográfico-políticos de la acción violenta guerrillera: Un análisis de la concurrencia regional de guerrillas y paramilitares en el conflicto colombiano. In: Revista Española de Ciencia Política, (44), 121-149

- Ríos, Jerónimo & Sánchez, Martí (2018) *Breve Historia de Sendero Luminoso*. Madrid. Catarata.
- Ríos, J., y Zapata, J. (2019). “Democratic Security Policy in Colombia: Approaches to an enemy-centric counterinsurgency model”. *Revista de Humanidades*, (36), 129-154
- Ríos, José (2013) *La paz en la administración del presidente Ernesto Samper*. In: Villarraga, Álvaro (ed). *Biblioteca para la paz.IV. Gobierno del presidente Ernesto Samper 1994-1998. En ausencia de un proceso de paz: Acuerdos parciales y mandato ciudadano por la paz*. Bogotá. Fundación Cultura Democrática.
- Ríos Sierra, J. (2020). Una mirada territorial de la lucha armada: las FARC-EP y Sendero Luminoso. *Geopolítica(s). Revista De Estudios Sobre Espacio Y Poder*, 11(1), 119-143. <https://doi.org/10.5209/geop.63321>
- Rivera, Fredy (2018) *Plan Ecuador: Oportunidad perdida, Oportunidad Posible*. In: Torres, Arturo; et. al (2018) *El Contagio. Fin de la Isla de Paz*. Quito. Mediato
- Rivera, Fredy; Barreiro, Katalina & Guerrero, Gilda (2018) *¿Dónde Está el Pesquisa? Una historia de la inteligencia política en Ecuador*. Quito. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador.
- Rodas, Germán (2000) *La Izquierda Ecuatoriana en el Siglo XX*. Quito, AbyaYala.
- Rodríguez, Antonio (2014) *Memoria de las Espadas. Alfaro Vive Carajo. Los argumentos de la Historia*. Quito: Editorial IAEN/Editorial Abya-Yala.
- Rodríguez, Ignacio (1961). *Geografía económica de Nariño*. Pasto: Editorial Surcolombiana
- Rodríguez, José (1990) *La crisis de las izquierdas en América Latina*. Nueva Sociedad. Madrid.
- Rodríguez, José Darío (2015) *Génesis, actores y dinámicas de la violencia política en el Pacífico nariñense*. Bogotá. Odecofi-Cinep. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
- Rojas, Lucía. (2018). *Memorias de la vida cotidiana en las “zonas liberadas” de Sendero Luminoso. El caso de las retiradas de Chungui y Oreja de Perro*. In: *Revista Antropología. Cuadernos de Investigación*, 20, 12-27.
- Ron, James (2001) *Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation*. In: *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 38, No. 5: 569-592. September 2001.
- Ronderos, T. (2014). *Guerras recicladas: Una historia periodística del paramilitarismo en Colombia*. Bogotá. Aguilar.
- Rospigliosi, Fernando (1998) *La operación Chavín de Huántar: un caso ilustrativo de cómo funcionan las relaciones cívico militares en el Perú a las puertas del siglo XXI*. Lima. Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL).
- Rubin, Donald (1973). “Matching to Remove Bias in Observational Studies.” *Biometrics* 29(1): 159–83.
- Rubio, Sinthya (2013) *La reparación a las víctimas del conflicto armado en Perú: La voz de las víctimas*. Lima. Instituto de Defensa Legal.
- Salas, Luis, et. al. (2018). *Dinámicas territoriales de la violencia y del conflicto armado antes y después del Acuerdo de Paz con las FARC*. Bogotá. Instituto Alemán para la Paz – CAPAZ.
- Salas, Luis. (2010) *Corredores y territorios del conflicto armado colombiano: una prioridad en la geopolítica de los actores armados*. *Perspectiva Geográfica*, (15), 9-36.
- Salas, Luis. (2015). *Lógicas territoriales y relaciones de poder en el espacio de los actores armados: un aporte desde la geografía política al estudio de la violencia y el conflicto armado en Colombia, 1990-2012*. *Cuadernos de Geografía*, 24(1), 157-172.
- Saleth, R. (1991). *Land Reform under Military: Agrarian Reform in Peru, 1969-78*. In: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26(30).

- Saleyhan, I. (2009) *Rebels without Borders: State Boundaries, Transnational Opposition and Civil Conflict*. Nueva York: Cornell University Press.
- Sambanis, Nicholas (2004). "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 814–858.
- Sánchez, Gonzalo. (2009 [1987]) *Colombia: violencia y democracia*. Comisión de Estudios para la Violencia. Bogotá. La Carreta.
- Sánchez, Martí. (2015) *El horror olvidado. Memoria e Historia de la violencia política en Ayacucho, Perú (1980-2000)*. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/tl8a>
- Sanchez, W. & Illingworth, E. (2017) Can Governments Negotiate with Insurgents? The Latin American Experience, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 1014-1036, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2017.1374607
- Santillán, A.; Pontón, J.; Pontón, D. (2007). *Ciudad Segura. Debates sobre seguridad ciudadana*. Quito. FLACSO-Ecuador.
- Santillán, P. (2017) *Sendero Luminoso: evolución histórica y relevancia actual*. In: *Revista Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, 34, 1-17.
- Saona, Margarita (2014) *Memory Matters in Transitional Peru*. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Saul, M. (2014). *Popular Governance of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of International Law (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107295216
- Saul, M. (2014a). The process of post-conflict reconstruction. In *Popular Governance of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of International Law (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law*, pp. 15-31). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107295216.003
- Schuster, Sven (2010) *Colombia: ¿País sin memoria? Pasado y presente de una guerra sin nombre*", In: *Revista de Estudios Colombianos*, v. 36, 2010.
- Sellers, J. (2019). From Within to Between Nations: Subnational Comparison across Borders. *Perspectives on Politics*, 17(1), 85-105. doi:10.1017/S1537592718002104
- Siles, Abraham (2017) *Problemática Constitucional Del Estado De Emergencia En Perú: Algunas Cuestiones Fundamentales*. *Estudios Constitucionales*, 15(2),123-165. ISSN: 0718-0195.
- Slater, Dan. (2010). *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511760891
- Snyder, Jack, and Robert Jervis (1999). "Civil War and the Security Dilemma." In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, ed. Barbara F Walter and Jack Snyder. New York: Columbia University Press, 15-37.
- Snyder, R. (2001) *Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method*. *St Comp Int Dev* 36, 93–110. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687586>
- Soberon, Ricardo (2008) *Situación del Narcotráfico en el Perú, las Políticas Antidrogas y la Geopolítica Regional*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/91962>
- Soifer, Hillel & Everett A. Vieira III (2019) *The Internal Armed Conflict and State Capacity: Institutional Reforms and Effective Exercise of Authority*. In: *Politics After Violence: Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru*, eds. Hillel David Soifer and Alberto Vergara. Austin: University of Texas Press, 109-31.

- Soifer, Hillel & Vergara, Ernesto (2019) *Politics After Violence: Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru*. University of Texas Press.
- Soifer, H. (2015). *State Building in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316257289
- Soifer, H. (2019). Units of Analysis in Subnational Research. In: A. Giraudy, E. Moncada, & R. Snyder (Eds.), *Inside Countries: Subnational Research in Comparative Politics* (pp. 92-112). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108678384.003
- Solomon Islands, Conflict, Security & Development, 16:5, 423-441, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2016.1219512
- Solís, María (2018) Reparación a víctimas de violación de derechos humanos y crímenes de lesa humanidad en Ecuador. In: *Íconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*. Num. 62, Quito, septiembre 2018, pp. 183-201.
- Sotomayor, José (2009) ¿Leninismo o Maoísmo? Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/3le4r>
- Spencer, David (1998) Peru-Ecuador 1995: The evolution of military tactics from the conflict of 1981, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 9:3, 129-151, DOI: 10.1080/09592319808423222
- Sriram, Chandra Lekha (2011) “(Re)building the rule of law in Sierra Leone: Beyond the formal sector?” In: *Peacebuilding and rule of law in Africa: Just peace?* edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega and Johanna Herman. London: Routledge.
- Staniland, Paul (2017) Armed politics and the study of intrastate conflict. In: *Journal of Peace Research* 2017, Vol. 54(4) 459–467.
- Staniland, Paul. (2014). *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*. Cornell University Press.
- Starn, Orin (1991). *Reflexiones sobre Rondas Campesinas, protesta rural y Nuevos Movimientos sociales*. Perú: IEP ediciones.
- Stern, Steve (1998) *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*. Duke University Press.
- Struggill, Claude (1993) *Low Intensity Conflict in American History*, Westport, Connecticut.
- Sundberg, R. & Erik Melander (2013) Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4).
- Tamayo, Hugo de Jesús (2019) *Desde el Salón del Nunca Más*. Medellín. La Carreta Social
- Tafur, Andrea & Quesada, Diego (2020) El estado de emergencia en el Perú democrático posconflicto: Un estudio preliminar de las normas de emergencia. In: *Anuario de Derechos Humanos*. Vol. 16 No. 2. Pags. 205-234 • DOI 10.5354/0718-2279.2020.57432
- Taylor, Lewis (1998) Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980-1996. In: *Bulletin of Latin American Research*. Vol. 17, No. 1: 35-58. January. 1998.
- Taylor, Lewis. (2017). Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium: Comrades, Cocaine and Counter-Insurgency on the Peruvian Frontier. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 17(1), 106-121.
- Terán, Juan Fernando (1994) AVC: revelaciones y reflexiones sobre una guerrilla inconclusa? Quito. Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana.
- Terán, Fernando (2006) Alfaro Vive Carajo y la lucha por el Olvido. In: *Revista Ecuador Debate* 67. Abril 2006. Quito.
- Terpstra, Niels & Frerksa, Georg (2017) Rebel Governance and Legitimacy: Understanding the Impact of Rebel Legitimation on Civilian Compliance with the LTTE Rule. *Civil Wars*, 2017 VOL. 19, NO. 3, 279–307 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2017.1393265>
- Theidon, Kimberly (2004). *Entre prójimos: El conflicto armado interno y la política de la reconciliación en el Perú*. Lima. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Tilly, Charles (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

Torres, Arturo; et. al (2018) *El Contagio. Fin de la Isla de Paz*. Quito. Mediato

Trujillo Currea, A. M. (2013). La internacionalización del conflicto colombiano hacia el Ecuador en la primera década del siglo XXI. *Papel Político*, 17(2), 577-620. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/7xdy>

Ulfe, María Eugenia (2013) *Y después de la violencia que queda? víctimas, ciudadanos y reparaciones en el contexto post-CVR en el Perú*. - 1a ed. - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. CLACSO.

U.S Department of State (2010) *Andean Regional Initiative*. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/ot5km>

Unidad para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (2017 November 25) En Nariño, víctimas reiteran que Acuerdo de Paz debe cumplirse. Retrieved From: <https://n9.cl/y8ofl>

Unidad para la Atención y Reparación integral a las Víctimas (2019, October 24). Aprobado en Nariño el primer plan de retorno de víctimas del conflicto armado. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/v671e>

Unidad para la Atención y Reparación integral a las Víctimas (2020 May 1) Así avanza la atención y reparación a las víctimas en Nariño. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/f2wbf>

Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral de las Víctimas (2019 July 9). Estrategia Entrelazando continúa fortaleciendo Planes de Reparación Colectiva en Antioquia. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/784m3>

Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (UASB) (2002). Diagnóstico de la frontera Ecuador-Colombia. In: *Comentario Internacional: Revista del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales*. 4 (II semestre, 2002): 189-240.

Uprimny, Rodrigo, et.al. (2014) *Justicia para la paz. Crímenes atroces, derecho a la justicia y paz negociada*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad Dejusticia.

Valencia, Alejandro (2011). “Memorias compartidas, las comisiones de la verdad de Paraguay y Ecuador”. In: *Contribución de las políticas de verdad, justicia y reparación a las democracias de América Latina*. Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH)

Valencia, Germán (2019). *Organizarse para negociar la paz. Gobernanza de la paz negociada en Colombia 1981-2016*. Medellín. Universidad de Antioquia – Colombia.

Valenzuela, Manuel (2019) *Cárcel Dominio: Una etnografía sobre los senderistas presos en el establecimiento penitenciario Miguel Castro Castro 2008-2010*. Lima. Revuelta editores.

Van Cott, Donna. (2005). *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Vasquez, John A. (1995). ‘Why Do Neighbors Fight: Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality’, *Journal of Peace Research* 32(3): 277–293.

Vélez, María Alejandra (2001). "FARC – ELN: evolución y expansión territorial". In: *Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad*, n.º 47 (2001): 151-225. <https://doi.org/10.13043/dys.47.4>

Verdad Abierta (2011, October 12). El difícil retorno de los desplazados del oriente antioqueño. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/wa9r2>

Verdad Abierta (2014, February 8) Las Farc cosecharon odios en el Oriente antioqueño. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/flt2u>

- VerdadAbierta (2017, February 8) Negociación con el Eln, en su fase pública. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/qkfx>
- Vergara, Alberto (2015). La danza hostil: poderes subnacionales y estado central en Bolivia y Perú (1952-2012). Lima. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Villamizar, Darío (1990) Ecuador 1960-1990 Insurgencia, Democracia y Dictadura. Quito. El Conejo Editores.
- Villamizar, Dario (1997) Un adiós a la guerra. Memoria histórica de los procesos de paz en Colombia. Bogotá. Editorial Planeta.
- Villamizar, Darío. (2017). Las guerrillas en Colombia. Una historia desde los orígenes hasta los confines. Bogotá, D. C.: Debate.
- Villarraga, Álvaro (Comp.) (2015). Los procesos de paz en Colombia, 1982-2014. Bogotá. Fundación Cultura Democrática.
- Villaverde, Xabier (2018) Una frontera caliente y abandonada. Breve informe sobre los conflictos de la frontera norte. Quito. Comité Ecuménico de Proyectos.
- Viloria, Joaquín (2007). Economía del Departamento de Nariño: Ruralidad y aislamiento geográfico. Documentos de Trabajo sobre Economía Regional. No. 87. Banco de la República. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/f0n9n>
- Vizcarra, Sofia & Heuser, Christoph (2019) Los Estados en los márgenes: soberanía y gubernamentalidad en el principal valle cocalero peruano. In: Sociologías [online]. 2019, v. 21, n. 52, pp. 164-190. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/b5ex>
- Walker, Charles (2014) The Tupac Amaru Rebellion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Weller, N., & Barnes, J. (2014). Finding Pathways: Mixed-Method Research for Studying Causal Mechanisms (Strategies for Social Inquiry). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139644501
- Wood, Elisabeth (2003). Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511808685
- Wood, Elisabeth (2008) The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks. In: The Annual Review of Political Science 2008. 11:539–61.
- Wood, Elisabeth (2010). Los procesos sociales de la guerra civil: la transformación de redes sociales en tiempos de guerra. Análisis Político, [S.l.], v. 23, n. 68, p. 101-124, ene. 2010. ISSN 0121-4705. Disponible en: <https://n9.cl/m4z8x>
- Wright, Claire (2013). Perú: El estado de emergencia como mecanismo de represión de la protesta indígena en el contexto de conflictos sobre recursos naturales». In: Salvador Martí i Puig, et.al. (editors). Entre el desarrollo y el buen vivir: Recursos naturales y conflictos en los territorios indígenas. Madrid. Ediciones la Catarata.
- Wright, Claire (2015). Emergency politics in the third wave of democracy: A study of regimes of exception in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Londres: Lewington Books
- Yashar, Deborah (2005) Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511790966
- Zapata, Antonio (2010) La Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación y los medios de comunicación. Ayacucho y Lima. Lima. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Zech, Steven (2015): Counter-Terrorizing: The Use of Torture in Peru's Counterterrorism Campaign, Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI:10.1080/09546553.2015.1031374

Zeledón, Guillermo (1995). Contradicciones en la sociedad peruana. El caso de Sendero Luminoso. In: Revista Reflexiones. Vol 39. No. 1. Universidad de Costa Rica.

Zelik, Raul (2015). Paramilitarismo: Violencia y transformación social, política y económica en Colombia. Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores.

Zevallos, Nicolás (2012). “Al Estado le toca reconquistar la confianza de los pobladores del Vraem”. Retrieved from: <https://n9.cl/kpag2>