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Still bodies:

A disability-informed approach to stasis in theatre

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But everything moves, and the fixed point along with it, if we let it
(Lecoq 2006, 81)

Introduction

What may I say about stillness? The cause/result of remaining in the same position? An outward expression of the energetic equilibrium of a system? The abstraction behind and beneath death? Is it lack of movement? Whatever I may say about stillness requires me to say something about movement. And what may I say about movement? Is it merely a change of position or location? A series of still frames animated by our perception? An outward expression of dynamic exchanges of energy between systems? The abstraction behind and beneath life? Whatever I choose to say about movement implies saying something about stillness, in a never-ending loop. We cannot say anything about stillness without referring to movement and, vice versa, we cannot say anything about movement without referring to stillness. One begets the other.

And what about stillness in theatre when that stillness is related to disability, to bodies that cannot move? Stillness has had a role in theatre but it has been realised by nondisabled, hypercontrolled bodies, to the exclusion of atypical, immobile, disabled bodies. This specific question of involuntary immobile bodies in theatre teases a more general question about the participation of diverse embodiments in theatre. This research project approaches both questions from the perspective of disability as a complexly embodied phenomenon that provides an epistemological position from which to explore whether the theatrical event, considered as an instance of participatory sense-making bounded by embodied knowledge shared between actors and spectators, may support the participation of immobile bodies and in which ways.

The methodological approach used in this project is rooted in complex embodiment and its related notion of misfit, that moment when we become aware that the harmonious flow of our experience is contingent on the dynamics between our bodies and the environments they inhabit. This project explores whether a body experiences misfit or not at any given moment, how those moments of misfit become an ongoing experience of disability, and how misfit provides a common point between disabled and nondisabled perspectives. This common point supports my explorations from the outsider location of a nondisabled person, in an attempt to develop a disability approach to research based on empathy. This approach is crystallised in a methodological loop where I locate myself on the outside, perform a series of actions to induce moments of misfit, analyse the resulting experience, reformulate the boundaries between inside and outside and start again.

Through theoretical and practical work I have explored the relationship between misfit and movement trying to tease out ways to approach the theatrical event from immobility. Focusing on movement as a characteristic of living organisms, my work has examined its relationship with stillness and what seems to be a flexible boundary between them. Intuitively, what is regarded as stillness may well be considered movement when examined at a narrower scale. Likewise, movement may turn into stillness when the scale of examination shifts to a wider scale. As a result of this exploration, I will introduce the notion of 'stasis' as a perceptual threshold, in particular, *the perceptual threshold where moving becomes not-moving*, and I will propose several applications of stasis that may yield productive insights into theatre practice and the dynamics of the theatrical event in future research projects.

In the past four years I have moved through theory and practice, in starts and stops, in search of the possibilities of stillness in theatre practice. This text is an attempt to document this research, an attempt to gather sequentially the non-linear process of inquiry I have undertaken. It is structured in six sections: an introduction that contextualises this research project and its methods; a section on situating concepts that presents the theoretical framework for the research; a section on the epistemological approach I used and the methodology developed from it for this research; a section on precedents of practice that places the project in relation to theatre and other artistic disciplines; a section on my practice during the research project describing how it was conducted and reflecting on its results; a section that introduces stasis and other supporting concepts as findings from this project and their possible applications; a section presenting a model of still theatre and how to use it; and a coda for this research endeavour. The document is interspersed with diagrams, photographs, and secondary texts that serve as counterpoint to the main text, sometimes directly, sometimes obliquely[1].

He was still, to begin with

I met Alberto Vega by chance, several years after his accident[2]. He is an actor and he has Locked-in Syndrome (LIS), a neurological condition characterised by preserved cognition, quadriplegia, inability to speak, and, in some cases, some kind of preserved voluntary ocular movement (Laureys et al. 2005). I was part of the team that developed his communication device; we started working on 2009 on the design of a tool that would enable him to write in a computer by tracking his eye movements. We approached this project as a collaborative iterative design, testing different interaction methods and writing

[1] Diagrams and photographs are mine unless explicitly stated.
[2] He has supported me as a consultant in this project and he has consented to be identified by name.

systems until we reached a point where the tool was usable. After that, he has used this system to communicate with friends and family, write a book and a play, and work in research and artistic projects.

He was still, indeed, but as time passed I realised he was always moving. Beyond his eye movements, he breathed, he heaved, he trembled, he coughed, he laughed, he fluttered. And beyond all these external movements, there were his internal travels, his journeys through himself. During several conversations he has explained to me his feeling of inner space, how it expands and contracts, how he moves in and through it. The first time he told me this I was reminded of an episode of the venerable British science fiction series, Doctor Who. The protagonist's timeship, the TARDIS, presents itself outwardly as a police telephone box that is bigger on the inside, its inside volume in the range of millions of cubic kilometres. In the episode in question, the consciousness of the TARDIS is transferred to a human body and, upon completing this transference, the human-embodied TARDIS exclaims that this new body is *bigger on the inside* (Gaiman et al. 2011). I learned that space and movement are inextricable, that inside and outside, Alberto is still moving. Better yet, he is 'still-moving'.

My relationship with Alberto confronted me with stillness[3] and made me question assumptions of normalcy regarding verbality, mobility, and synchronicity. I started questioning my own position about disability, my relationship with disabled people, and my role as a non-disabled person working in the context of disability. The seeming paradox of an actor who cannot move begged some questions: is acting movement? Are unwillingly immobile bodies capable of acting? If so, what kind of acting is it? How is it received by an audience?

I, the outsider

Before attempting to answer those questions I need to address my particular location in regards to theatre and disability. As I do not identify myself as disabled and I do not have training in theatre, I have to be careful neither to speak *for* any member of the corresponding communities nor to appropriate their experiences as mine. However, research is always personal. Our own topics of interest are always related, in some way, to ourselves. Whether it's a lack of, an issue with, or an approach to, the core of our research are questions we have had for a long time. These questions change but, at their core, they remain the same. In my case, questions are variations on being different and what it entails[4]. In the current turn, I am interested in bodies, their diversity, their potential, their dynamic configurations, their mutating and never fully determined nature, their differences and similarities and how, from them, diverse bodies manage to share worlds of meaning.

At the start of this project, I was located outside both communities and, as an outsider, I had preconceived notions about both of them, notions that I have had to actively dismantle in order to productively move forward with research. While I had previous contact with people with disabilities, I rarely worked *with* them during the design of their assistive technology; most of the time they were abstract users represented by a set of software requirements I had to fulfil. It was only during my collaboration with Alberto, then and now, that I started working with people with disabilities as embodied persons with rich lived experiences instead of abstract, interchangeable entities represented by a set of software constraints.

In the case of theatre I started with the imaginary of the traditional Western proscenium arch theatre, the dramatic narrative that unfolds towards a conclusion with actors that represent characters and project their voices towards an audience that sits passively watching; an imaginary that Tony McCaffrey calls the "phantasm of normal theatre" (2018a, 24) and that is built upon shared untrained expectations of what 'normal' theatre is and placed in contraposition to more diverse, and fluid ideas of what theatre is (or can be). Only by constant dialog with practitioners, by reading literature about theatre by theatre-makers, by going to theatre and being an informed spectator was I able to move from the phantasm to an embodied theatre rich with traditions of practice, with actors and spectators sharing a theatrical event. The role of the doctoral program and the people with whom I shared these past years—my fellow students, my teachers and my advisors—was pivotal in this process of getting inside theatre. I became aware of the tension between the ideas of theatre and performance and thus I was forced

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[3] I will be using 'immobility' and 'stillness' indistinctly for now, but in the last section I will offer distinct definitions for both terms.

[4] I grew up shy. Talking to strangers, even talking to known people, was difficult; expressing my feelings was a constant challenge (still is, sometimes). I was academically talented, and I was singled out because of it. I was not bullied, fortunately, but I felt different and isolated. As I grew up, I found people with whom I shared a link, a common thread of identification, people that turned from acquaintances to friends. In sharing something with them, I learnt to see what was similar and what was different between us, and how to use that knowledge to expand my world by building myself differently. I could be another, still being me. Since then, finding that connection, establishing bridges, and finding similarities has been a (sometimes hidden) constant in my life. Writing this, I realise that my professional endeavours have always been characterised by connecting different domains by abstracting them and finding commonalities that may be used to create those connections. Abstractions grounded the source domains, abstractions that allow me to manipulate them and find ways of translating one into another, to send messages between them, to link them. In hindsight, I am not surprised that when I started working with people with disability my first impulse was to find similarities in difference to establish a connection.

to question my inquiry and its theoretical location, beginning a fruitful dialogue between those ideas, disability and embodiment.

Now, after more than four years, my naïve-outsider condition regarding theatre shifted and split between being an informed-outsider in the context of theatrical practice, still moving in, and an insider in the context of theatre studies. This new dual location came about through the process of research and its initial emphasis on the theoretical side of the inquiry while attempting practical explorations of the subject matter in an (apparently) disconnected manner. The dialogue established between theatre and performance helped me make explicit the practical nature of my research and connect the performative aspects of disability to the theatrical question I was centring my project around. This, in turn, facilitated a productive context in which I started teasing out a methodological approach to the research that accounted for my outsiderness while providing theatrical and performative tools for moving inside both domains of inquiry.

In the case disability, being an informed-outsider means being aligned politically and culturally with an oppressed group while not identifying as part of the group; an outsider that is aware of his privileges in relation to said group and questions how those privileges can be used to destabilise the system that produces/maintains them. This informed-outsider condition hews close to the idea of 'identification *with*' elucidated by disability studies scholar Sami Schalk. In *Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification with/in Disability Studies,* she identifies as a "nondisabled, fat, black, queer, female academic" that identifies *with* crip[5] but not *as* crip and explains that

> I use identify *with* to mean having acknowledged and prioritized political and personal connections to a group with which one does not identify as a member. To identify *with* means to feel implicated by the culture and politics of another group and seek to better understand this link. While to identify *with* could be understood as analogous to being an ally, I contend that there is something more personal, sustained, and affective about it. Identifying *with* is a careful, conscious joining—a standing/sitting among rather than by or behind a group—which seeks to reduce separation while acknowledging differences in privileges and oppression. I connect identifying with to Cathy Cohen's (2005) call for a radical politics of shared resistance built on identities as they are impacted by and invested with different degrees of normative power. Identifying *with* is particularly important in the case of disability which, as many have noted, is the only identity category which one can join at any moment without intent. I use crip-identified as something different than disability ally because it is an almost-not-quite-yet identification. I am crip-identified not only because my body/mind/desire/behavior is non-normative in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and size, but also because of its precarious relationship to disability as this term is currently culturally understood (2013).

While I cannot claim that I identify *with* crip (not yet, anyway) I argue that being an informed-outsider locates me in a place where I can support the process of "reducing separation while acknowledging differences in privileges and oppression" (Schalk 2013). Through my personal experiences as an immigrant, academically talented, atheist, Latin American socially awkward male of non-normative behaviour I can relate to narratives of exclusion and share the outrage over exclusionary practices, while always being acutely aware of the privileges I enjoy as a nondisabled heterosexual cis male. It is also important to highlight that the boundaries of the inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, disabled/nondisabled binaries are not rigid but instead ebb and flow along with each individuals' situation and experiences[6].

Thinking of myself as an informed-outsider, then, allows me to use my experiences as a software engineer—and in particular a software engineer designing technology for people with disabilities—to provide me with the basis of a methodological framework for a practical inquiry into how the expectation of movement turns into an exclusionary criterion for participation in theatre practice and what are the creative possibilities of stillness, bringing together and in contrast concepts from disability and theatre through the embodied nature of both.

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[5] "Crip is shorthand for the word 'cripple' which has been (and is) used as an insult toward people with disabilities, but which has been re-appropriated as an intra-group term of empowerment and solidarity" (Schalk 2013)

[6] Case in point, as a Latin American man that has had the opportunity to travel to different countries in America, Europe and Asia, I have learned that people perceive me as white or non-white depending on the place we meet, their places of origin, and their cultural background. In Belgrade, for example, during the International Federation for Theatre Research (IFTR) 2018 Conference, I had lunch with one German person and one Thai person; during this lunch the conversation moved to the notion of 'whiteness' as representative of purity in Thailand and how people favour cosmetics and skin treatments to lighten their complexion. Imagine my surprise when I realised that the Thai person was lumping me along with the German person in the category of 'white people'. Suffice to say that I do not consider myself white.

Three titles and their implications

I started this research project convinced that it would be a theoretical research endeavour. Soon, however, the very nature of the subject matter compelled me to include practical explorations of the inquiry space. After some time experimenting with material approaches to my questions, I realised that the research project was both theoretical and practical, as both of those strands of work provided me with insights, further questions, and reformulations of the inquiry. From my initial clear location as software engineer, I drifted towards a strange, blurred epistemological location that allowed me to address the inquiry from diverse disciplinary perspectives. Art practice, in particular, offered me powerful tools in this exploration. Borgdorff summarises this power when he explains that

> experimental art practice is integral to the research, just as the active involvement of the artist is an essential component of the research strategy. Here lies the similarity of artistic research to both laboratory-based technical research and ethnographic field study. The erratic nature of creative discovery—of which unsystematic drifting, serendipity, chance inspirations and clues form an integral part—is such that methodological justification is not easy to codify. Just as in many other academic research studies, it involves doing unpredictable things, and this implies intuition and some measures of randomness. Research is more like exploration than like following a firm path (2010, 57).

Such "erratic nature of creative discovery" implies that my guiding questions were bound to mutate and the stated goals to shift as I researched and stumbled upon unexpected results. It also implies that my initial assumptions would change, more than once, during the process. This project has been both a process of inquiry and a process of dismantling my own prejudiced ideas about disability and theatre. Following through my line of questioning forced me to reconsider certain notions and pointed towards ways of contesting them, opening up new venues for exploration. In this process, I benefited from framing my inquiry in the Iterative Cyclic Web model proposed by Smith and Dean (2009, 19–25). In this model, interweaving artistic practice and academic research, the authors connect the cycles of practice-led research, research-led practice, and academic research in such a way that a process of inquiry may move from one cycle to another. The model enables us to conceptualise a process where academic research and practice are built mutually, incrementally, and iteratively; each iteration generates results that the practice-researcher analyses and informs their choice of how to proceed next.

This approach allowed me the flexibility to continually reframe my inquiry as I transitioned from naïve-outsider to informed-outsider. First, I held a medicalising position regarding Locked-in Syndrome in particular, and disability in general, reflected both in the language I used and the solutions I offered. Next, while I highlighted the creative possibilities of immobility, I instrumentalised the disability experience associated to it by framing those possibilities in terms of nondisabled experience. Finally, I realised the potential of understanding disability as a privileged epistemic position and how that position yielded insights into the relationship between movement, stillness, and theatre practice. While I currently cannot access that position, or claim to access it, what I could do was heed the calls coming from disability studies scholars and update my own posture regarding disability and its creative potential. This new perspective made me reflect and change the kind of methods and actions I used in my inquiry: I moved from an individualistic, positivistic, medicalising, and technologically-oriented approach towards a relational, humanistic, disability-informed, and experience-oriented approach.

As I moved from a disembodied mechanistic approach to one that is embodied and organic, my line of inquiry shifted towards the performative possibilities of immobile bodies, framed by paradigms that understand the body as active and situated. This shift meant that the original questions changed several times. Instead of asking if acting is movement or about the acting capabilities of unwillingly immobile bodies I began inquiring about stillness and its possibilities for theatre practice, about the consequences of conceiving of movement as always situated and always in dialog with our environment, a movement that is always rooted in ourselves and begins and ends with us. When I trace these changes in the framing of the inquiry, I can identify three major stages in the research process, roughly corresponding to the three titles this project has had during these years.

Title 1: *Cuerpos (re)conectados: una exploración de la intersección entre artes escénicas, tecnología y discapacidad*

This title corresponds to my first approach to the issue of immobility and theatre. It was contextualised by a naïve-approach to disability informed by the medical model: I focused on impairment and ignored the social construction aspect of the phenomenon. As a software engineer, I tried to solve a problem of 'lack of control' and, in my naïve view, the question 'can immobile people act?' would be answered 'yes, with technology'. I started from a model for using assistive technology to facilitate the participation of people with Locked-in Syndrome in the performing arts (Aparicio 2015). However, while this

original model might be useful to guide the design and implementation of assistive tools, this approach has a problem: it focuses on the technological trappings that could surround the body, treating the body as another interchangeable cog in a larger machine.

I was caught in a post-humanist trap that rendered the body either invisible or redundant, and idolised disembodied information. But information is always embodied, our bodies are never redundant (Hayles 2008). As I said, I tried to solve a problem when I should have been exploring possibilities; I merely considered a disembodied user defined only by their constraints, an abstract entity that failed to account for the embodied reality of an immobile actor. I realised that I had to account for the lived experience of LIS and that what I considered a "lack of control" depends upon sociocultural views of what constitutes a valid, autonomous, human subject. Furthermore, technology by itself was not going to help me answer my question. Instead, I needed to reflect on the relationship between ourselves and technology, in the many ways we narrate ourselves through technology, that is, the diverse ways technology becomes part of our embodiment and what that process implies for the construction of our identities and our abilities.

Title 2: *Still bodies: movement in the context of disability and theatre practice*

The next attempt marked a move away from my disciplinary origin towards the domains of theatre and disability studies. This move reflected the need to address the issues of my first attempt and elaborate on the social aspect of disability and understand how it intersects with theatrical practice. Part of this move included moving away from the Spanish of the research proposal towards the English of the literature I was reading. I realised later that this change of language was a mechanism to facilitate my attempts to move towards epistemological domains outside of my expertise: as a proficient English reader and writer, it provided me with a foothold on those strange, new worlds. It also provided me with an example of an operation I would repeat several times during the inquiry, a sideways epistemological move that allowed me to explore the domain of interest from several locations.

The title itself describes the change of focus away from technology and towards movement, making explicit the intersection between disability and theatre that I am interested in exploring. This new approach was characterised by a focus on the theoretical underpinnings of the phenomena I was researching, even when I was already doing practical work related to the research. This focus on the theoretical helped me move away from the naïve-outsider to informed-outsider and through this shift I came to identify the core issue of this stage: I was instrumentalising immobility in service of both theatre and my research. I realised that I was using immobility in the same way I used technology in the previous version, that is, as a tool to advance my research instead of a critical concept to contest assumptions about specific practices. Thus, the ethical problem of being outside both disability and theatre came to the foreground. I began searching for ways of addressing the issue and locate me and my research in a position that moved away from instrumentalisation towards embracing body diversity as the guiding principle.

Title 3: *Still bodies: a disability-informed approach to stasis in theatre*

This is the current title of this inquiry; choosing it marked a move away from collaborating with Alberto as he asked to stop participating in creative and research processes, including this inquiry, due to personal and family issues. As the starting point for my project was our work together, the new situation brought a renewed sense of urgency to the ethical issues raised before. As a result, I explicitly attempted to reverse my hierarchical location from the previous version: I am now informed by disability, not instrumentalising it to reach my goal. This shift applies both to the actions I undertake during research and to the methodological framing of the research itself. The current focus is placed on the possibilities of diverse embodiments and how to research those possibilities from my outsider location. During this stage of the project I have stumbled upon ways of exploring body diversity through situated, practical and playful explorations of altered embodiment that allow me to reflect on defamiliarizing experiences focused on the interaction between bodies and their environment. I have reached this point by constantly going back, reformulating, rebuilding, rewriting, redoing.

At this point, my research is firmly rooted in the complexly embodied nature of disability, and in the interaction between bodies and environment this notion implies. The key concept that supports the inquiry at this point is misfit, the moment when that interaction stops being inconspicuous and becomes salient, when we notice the conflict between bodies and unsupportive environments. Misfit underlies the experience of disability but it is a broader notion that may be used to connect different lived experiences in order to blur the boundaries between artificial binaries and provide ways to explore diversely embodied epistemological locations. Misfit, then, informs my methodological approach to this inquiry by forming the core of a loop of research actions aiming to push me towards those epistemological locations without ever reaching them. This loop, the method I have been using, may be summarised in seven basic steps: find my location outside the epistemological location, attempt to move inside that location, induce a moment of misfit due to outsiderness, explore my

experience and stumble into data, reflect on and analyse my findings, reformulate the boundary of the epistemological location, and start again.



1. Pro-eugenic policy poster from the UK in 1915 (photographed in the Museum of London)

Movement is indeed their mother tongue
(Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:223)

On bodies in, and of, theatre

At once, Alberto is and is not the body of theatre. He is because his body knows about theatre, because he is part of the history of theatre, and because his body is part of the body of Chilean theatre. Yet, he is not because he does not meet the desired and desirable standards of actor bodies, he is not because he is immobile and does not speak with his mouth, he is not because the body of Chilean theatre seemingly excludes him as a foreign body. This paradox made flesh in Alberto, the paradox of being and not being the body of theatre, is at the core of my research; this paradox is the same paradox made flesh in people with disability: being and not being bodies of the world. This paradox is realised in different ways: Alberto does attend performances as spectator but only in venues that can accommodate his needs; he has written a play and co-directed it but only because there was a group of friends and colleagues willing to support him; conceptually, people are open to the idea of Alberto acting but in practice only a handful have tried to create performances with him, the rest have had reactions ranging from disbelief to disgust. The paradox implies that there is always a *but*.

The paradox is also expressed in the language used to refer to him. A journalist characterised Alberto as "a former man of theatre from Universidad Católica" (Figueroa 2017). I venture three exclusionary readings of that sentence: (1) a person who used to be part of the professional theatre environment of said university, (2) a person who used to act, and (3) a person who is no longer a man. Each reading makes assumptions about what kind of people may participate in theatre, each reading is based upon assumptions of normalcy and ability. Each reading regards Alberto's immobility and his non-verbal mode of communication as sufficient to exclude him from theatre practice both in general, and in the particular context of Chilean professional theatre.

What follows is a review of core concepts of my research: the body and its diversity, both conceptual and material; theatre as phenomenon and how I will approach it in this project; the nature of movement and its key role in embodiment and knowledge; and disability as phenomenon, critical lens and its epistemological richness. This section also offers an analysis of the relationships between these concepts: how expectations about bodies and how they move produce exclusionary practices in theatre; how knowledge is created by and through the body, and the key role movement plays in this process; and how body diversity implies epistemologically rich approaches to research.

Body vs. bodies

The first step in attempting to understand why some bodies are included while other are excluded is asking questions about the body and about an individual body relationship to other bodies in a given context. In her review of the body in theatre, Colette Conroy explains that

> the body is necessarily abstract, but it is an abstraction based on the idea of a fleshy, palpable class of objects in the world. What happens when we use an abstract concept for the development of analysis? Is a body *part* of a person? We would think so, because we can talk about 'my body'. And yet it is not possible to separate myself from my body. These questions are important, but they will carry us only so far in our understanding. The different uses of the term 'body' are absolutely crucial, because they carry with them assumptions and theories (2009, 9–10).

The body is not merely a concept and "when you point at a body, you must always point at a specific body in a specific place, and the complexity of the body means that you are pointing at a complex system, not an object" (Conroy 2009, 16). The body is flesh, site of power, vantage point, an ideal abstraction clashing with a real physical object, "a way of organising thought about the human being", a collection of items, "an expression of coherence out of disparate elements" (Conroy 2009, 5–6; 17). *A* body is life undifferentiated from which *the* body emerges, time and again, due to our organising intent, guided by our expectation regarding what a body should be. We have organs because we train our sights at the proper level; otherwise, our differentiated tissues dissolve into interacting molecules that do not care whether they belong to the heart or the lung; otherwise, our differentiated tissues would dissolve into our exterior appearances. As we focus on one part or the other, we become aware of the fluid nature of the body and its strange relationship to ourselves, how "flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibres, their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions, have replaced the world of the subject" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 162).

Keith Ansell Pearson, reflecting about the body, follows Deleuze's view of the body as a site of affection made up of infinite particles and their dynamic relationships, and concludes that the body "operates in terms of its capacities for affecting and being affected" and that it "can be defined as literally anything: an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea, a social body, an assemblage, and so on" (1997, 227). This network of affects places the body in intrinsic relationship with its

environment and implies that it is dynamic and continually changing. This idea ties with Haraway's notion of the cyborg and its view of the body as one where the boundaries between human and animal, organic and machinic, physical and non-physical, fade. The human/organic/physical is displaced from its privileged spot by the animal/machinic/non-physical. Instead of a clean break between one and other, there is continuity, gradients, subtle differences, flow, and connection. There is no closed whole but parts that get together, connect, contradict themselves, disconnect, and support each other (2000, 292–303). Body as network, distributed, and dynamic; body as paradox, made up of parts that never quite submit to the whole; body of flesh and imagination. Bodies as complex dynamic systems inextricably enmeshed in their environment. We (attempt to) extricate them by pointing, by framing, by choosing a level of analysis, by constraining their flow of affects through our actions and, through those actions we determine which kind of bodies we will consider worthy of attention.

The particular case of living bodies, of which human bodies are a subset of, is interesting because living bodies extricate from their environments by virtue of being themselves, in a constant push of self-organisation against the pull of dissociation, in a precarious balance between being and not-being; in other words, living bodies are autonomous. Explaining the enactive approach to cognition, Di Paolo and Thompson observe that "a key attribute of the living body is its individuation, the process by which it makes itself distinct from its immediate surroundings and that enables an observer to distinguish it as an identifiable entity" (2014). To keep themselves distinct, living bodies must be able to regulate their own processes in relation to their changing environment as conditions surrounding them hinder or support their continued existence, that is, they must adapt dynamically to their context (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). To do so, living bodies must act in a way that preserves their own autonomy. The enactive notion of 'sense-making' refers to these ways of acting[7] and

> describes behavior or conduct in relation to norms of interaction that the system itself brings forth on the basis of its adaptive autonomy. An adaptive autonomous system produces and sustains its own identity in precarious conditions, registered as better or worse, and thereby establishes a perspective from which interactions with the world acquire a normative status (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014).

What 'ways of acting' are available for living bodies? The particular actions depend on each body but, in general, they depend on the fact that living bodies are animated bodies. Living bodies move and through movement they make sense of their worlds (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:118).

Finally, the human body as an ideal is constantly questioned by these living human bodies as real physical objects. As physical objects, bodies are diverse entities pulling away from all directions at the ideal body; and the ideal body, while seemingly unique, varies according to social, political and cultural contexts. The tension between these bodies, ideal and real, drives the choices we make about what bodies to include or exclude from participation in any given practice. In the case of theatre, as Conroy explains,

> bodies are elements of theatre. The shape, form, resonance and movement of the actor's body are used as creative elements within the art form. The body of the audience member is physically present in the same room as the acting body. Theatre is founded on the dynamic interplay between actor and audience, and between the two the entire set of communication strategies, mimetic games and temporal and spatial experiences that make up theatre are played out (2009, 13–14).

And, as this dynamic interplay occurs, ideal human bodies clash against real human bodies as expectations regarding which bodies may participate as actors or spectators are fulfilled or not. In this back and forth between the bodies of actor and audience, between ideal and real, we make sense of *the* body, of *some* bodies, and of *our* bodies.

Theatre as event

If we move away from the 'phantasm of normal theatre', stripping it of its physical and sociocultural trappings, we find two bodies sharing a space at the same moment. This apparent simplest of interactions is at the core of theatre but is not theatre yet. What is missing is a set of codified practices and expected actions, bounded in time, that characterise theatrical practice for at least one of those two bodies, the implications of understanding theatre as cultural phenomenon. To help contextualise the discussion about stillness in theatre, I will describe next the aspects of theatre that I want to base the discussion on. Let me start with Willmar Sauter's reflections upon the theatrical event. He argues that

[7] I am aware that using the term 'acting' in this way may be ambiguous in the context of this document.

> theatre always materializes in the form of an event. As a concept this is in strict opposition to theatre as a 'work of art', something which is produced, distributed, consumed, etc. In my eyes, theatre manifests itself as an event which includes both the presentations of actions and the reactions of the spectators, who are present at the very moment of the creation. Together the actions and reactions constitute the theatrical event (2014, 172–74 [Kindle]).

In his model, this back and forth of actions and reactions between actors and spectators occurs at three levels: (1) sensory, where an actor present themselves through "wilfully exhibitory actions" and the spectator reacts with affection, expectation, and recognition; (2) artistic, consisting of the encoded actions of performance, using a code shared by actor and spectator, actions that the spectator judges according to expected aesthetic values and derives pleasure (or not) from them; and (3) symbolic, where "meaning can be attributed to artistic actions" (Sauter 2014, 137–51 [Kindle]).

A possible reading of the model is that the sensory level is the base level from which all interpretations arise, that is, the back and forth between actor/presentation and spectator/perception occurs first and foremost at the bodily level. As both actors and spectators become aware of each other during the event, their bodies become attuned to each other and to their interactions[8]. In other words, by paying attention, the bodies of actors and spectators are coupled to each other (McConachie 2015, 124). This coupling not only depends on the specific moment the event is taking place and its context but also on the history of actors and spectators, their assumptions about a theatrical event and what to expect from it, expectations that are embodied. Speaking of spectators (but we can apply that to actors as well), Bruce McConachie argues that they

> attend all performances with the bodily knowledge they that they have coupled their awareness with performance situations in the past and they usually expect, without even knowing that they do so, to continue such coupling in the future (2015, 134).

We have already seen that living bodies make sense of their surroundings in an ongoing, dynamic flow of behaviour according to norms emerging from their interaction with their environment. As living bodies, each actor and each spectator brings their history of performances to a particular moment and both make sense of the theatrical event fundamentally through their bodies. A theatrical event may be interpreted as a process of sense-making shared between two or more living bodies, a process shared the ebb and flow of bodily coordination. Di Paolo and Thompson call this shared process of sense-making as 'participatory sense-making' and tell us that

> it happens to various degrees, from orientation of individual sense-making (someone draws our attention to an aspect of the world we have ignored) to joint sense-making (a piece of work is literally created together through a process that would not be possible by the individuals involved on their own) (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014).

Human bodies making sense together have the capability of translating their shared knowledge of their shared world, from its embodied location in each of them to externally encoded objects that become part of the environment and thus support sense-making at a later time and for different people. Encoding and externalising participatory sense-making enables the distribution of cognition, both in space and time, and the creation of massive distributed cognitive networks that provide further support for new processes of participatory sense-making; networks that, for Merlin Donald, are the context in which art is created (2006, 4). These contexts are significant for both the presentation and perception occurring in the theatrical event (Sauter 2014, 151–63 [Kindle]); it always occurs in, is affected by, is part of, and changes them. The theatrical event, interpreted as an instance of participatory sense-making that is part of a never-ending loop of distributed cognition, suggests that an analysis of the bodily characteristics of the potential participants and the ways of coupling they are afforded both by in the event and by the history of each body might shed light on the creative possibilities of immobility.

To move or not to move

The first idea we may have when faced with the word 'movement' is that of changing position: my hand going from my hip to my ear, the kicked ball slamming on the goalposts, you standing up. These processes occur in time and we can analyse them by increasingly dividing time until we decide to stop at some point to review the decomposed movement of the 'thing that moved'. In this view, immobility implies not changing position, either by staying in the same place or by keeping your posture.

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[8] This attunement is analogous to Erika Fischer-Lichte's 'autopoietic feedback loop' that arises when actors and spectators are co-present in a specific place, following a set of expected rules of play (2011).

However, as Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues in *The Primacy of Movement*, thinking of movement as "the factual displacement of an object from point A to point B" obscures that movement is a "dynamically experienced bodily happening" (2011, 82:203–4). Movement as the bodily experience of a process of dynamic energetic exchange, unfolding in space in real time, influenced by and influencing body and environment, an experience that is "fundamentally a matter of change, not of position" (2011, 82:123). Furthermore, as an experience, movement has felt qualities related to force, space, and time: as we move we feel more or less effort to do so, we feel the paths of our movement, we feel how big or small is the space through which we move, and we feel the rhythms of how our movement unfolds (2011, 82:123). In this case, immobility is related to not feeling movement, to know when movement is happening or not, because

> any creature *that moves itself*, i.e. that is not sessile, senses itself moving; by the same token, it senses when it is still. Distinguishing movement from stillness, motion from rest, is indeed a fundamental natural discrimination of living creatures that is vital to survival. The lack of constancy of the everyday world demands such discrimination (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:61).

When a body moves, it leaves rest and initiates movement "in ways appropriate to the situation in which it finds itself", following the possibilities of movement afforded by itself and its environment; possibilities that are shaped by body movement from the instant it exists as body, and that in turn shape what the body can and cannot do at any given moment. We, as living beings, "literally discover ourselves in movement" and our possibilities of movement begin with the simple operation of feeling distinctly whether we are moving or not (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:61–62). That initial distinction lies below any characterisation of movement itself. Jacques Lecoq writes that

> Movement is characterised by a displacement in relation to stillness. There is no movement without a fixed point. Everything that moves is recognised according to a chosen element referring to the immobile (2006, 80).

The fixed point, in turn, is evidenced by movement; "in what moves we see only the immobile" (Lecoq 2006, 81). Rest contains the seed of motion, and motion contains the seed of rest; the potential for one is always already in the other. Rest is 'movement-before-movement', the tautness of the bow before the arrow is released, the constant tension of our bodies being in the world. Immobility is there at the moment just before mobility, one step removed from the abyss of motion, open to possibilities; "there is the immobility which transports you and gives you wings. There is the immobility which imprisons you and makes your feet sink into the earth" (Barba 1995, 3).

We can connect this openness of immobility to Barba's notion of the 'pre-expressive' by arguing that 'expressing' something requires movement and that before that movement, before 'expression', lives immobility and its potential for movement, that is, its potential for 'expressing'. In this respect, one of Barba's anecdotes in *The Paper Canoe* is illustrative:

> For years, as an immigrant, I experienced every single day the wearing see-saw of being accepted or rejected on the basis of 'pre-expressive' communication. When I boarded a tram, I certainly did not 'express' anything, yet some people withdrew to make room for me, while others withdrew to keep me at a distance. People simply reacted to my presence, which communicated neither aggression nor sympathy, neither desire for fraternization nor challenge (1995, 4).

Barba's conception of the pre-expressive as the base that "constitutes the elementary level of organization of the theatre" (1995, 9) resonates with Sauter's sensory level of the theatrical event and, in turn, with the inherently embodied nature of the processes of participatory sense-making. As he boarded the tram, Barba and the other passengers began making sense together of that shared moment, influenced by the particular characteristics of his immigrant/outsider body interacting with those of the other passengers in the narrow context of the tram and the wider context of the culture he was living in. The available bodily couplings between the participants afforded communication to occur without explicit communicative intent from Barba's part. When he tells us that his presence—his body in presence of other bodies—did not communicate aggression, sympathy, or desire for fraternisation or challenge, what was happening is that, while he was not explicitly communicating that, he was implicitly doing so by virtue of posture, stance, looks, breathing, blinking, and many other ways. He was immobile in the sense that he boarded the tram and stayed there without interacting with the other passengers but, as I said before, immobility is always already full of movement.

A body 'just being there' is always active, its immobility constituted of layers below layers of movement, and transition through those layers is a passage from the fixed point to perceived movement going through pre-expressivity. Even when

immobile, bodies think in movement as "thinking in movement is foundational to being a body, as much an epistemological dimension of bodily life as a biological built-in that makes sense" (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:428). Thinking in movement is always happening, and the ways of acting it creates are continually sedimented in the body through life. Those are the layers of movements always there in immobility, all the possible ways of acting a body has incorporated through life, from their very beginning. Movement, as the basic action through which bodies make sense of their worlds, constitutes the basic action bodies share when making sense of the world together, from their very beginning:

> In other words, the meanings and values they find in the world will coincide with the pre-eminently kinetic meanings and values they experience first and foremost corporeally. Movement is indeed their mother tongue. The world may be unfamiliar, but there is a familiar point of origin, that is, a familiar way by which one goes about making sense of it in the beginning (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:223).

This means that as humans grow, they build a shared repertoire of movements for making shared sense of the world, a shared repertoire shaped by their contexts—including other humans—and which in turn creates a set of expectations that transform the actions human bodies may or may not do into actions they can and cannot do. In other words, because human beings are social creatures, having movement as the "familiar point of origin" for making sense of the world introduces the possibility of having the qualities of movement constrained in specific ways for particular groups of people, thus creating a divide between 'natural' and 'unnatural' movements, 'natural' and 'unnatural' ways of acting, and 'natural' and 'unnatural' ways of making sense of the world. To simplify: between what is normal and what is not.

The possibilities of disability

When a real body differs from the ideal body—an ideal that is never unique and always depends on social context—the difference is understood as impairment. Disability "appears at the moment when this particular impairment enters the value scheme of a particular society" (Kuppers 2017, 7). Disability lives in the intersection between bodies, their diversity, and the relationship with their environment. There are several models that offer explanation of disability as a phenomenon but, in general, these models fall into a spectrum between two main opposite approaches: a focus on the body or a focus on the environment. The paradigmatic examples are the medical model, focusing on bodies and their impairments, a model that places disability in the subject, as a characteristic that makes their body different and requires medical intervention to be fixed, that is, to normalise that body; and the social model, opposing the medical model and shifting focus to the environment, arguing that disability is an effect of disabling environments upon bodies, a situation that requires social intervention (Siebers 2008, 25).

Both the medical and social models of disability have been criticised for placing too much emphasis on just one aspect of a complex phenomenon. Tobin Siebers proposed understanding disability as complex embodiment, that is, understanding it in terms of both the body and its environment, in a mutual relationship. In short, Siebers argues that there are, indeed, disabling environments and they do have effects on bodies but that the bodies themselves should not be ignored as there are factors derived from the body that affect disability—chronic pain or aging, for example—and that these bodily factors "belong to the spectrum of human variation, conceived both as variability between individuals and as variability within an individual's life cycle, and they need to be considered in tandem with social forces affecting disability" (2008, 25). Both bodily and environmental factors should be taken equally into account when addressing disability, and there is a back and forth between them that allows the possibility of transforming them. Siebers explains that

> the theory of complex embodiment views the economy between social representations of the body and the body not as unidirectional as in the social model, or nonexistent as in the medical model, but as reciprocal. Complex embodiment theorizes the body and its representations as mutually transformative (2008, 25).

This possibility of mutual transformation turns disabled bodies into sites of resistance. Those 'unnatural' embodiments force a reflection on the dominant social ideologies that exclude them, revealing the ways those ideologies operate, and opening up the possibility of critiquing them (Siebers 2008, 33). Each particular disabled body incorporates knowledge about the environment they inhabit, and makes claims about that environment that may be interpreted as claims about the broader experience of disability. Siebers offers the case of *Tennessee v. Lane* as an example of how this resistance works towards creating social change. George Lane, a paraplegic wheelchair user,

> was compelled to appear on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no elevator. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. When

> Lane returned to the courthouse for a hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom; he consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear (Tennessee v. Lane 2004, 513–14).

As a result, Lane filed an action against the State of Tennessee arguing discrimination under Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). He filed this action along Beverly Jones, a certified court reporter, who "alleged that she has not been able to gain access to a number of county courthouses, and, as a result, has lost both work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process" (Tennessee v. Lane 2004, 514). Through a series of court dismissals and appeals to higher courts, the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States. After hearing the arguments from both sides, the Court decided to rule in favour of Lane and Jones arguing that their particular experiences revealed a "pattern of disability discrimination" (Tennessee v. Lane 2004, 526) that included cases like that of sign-language defendants with their hands tied during trial, and deaf and blind people excluded from jury service because of their particular impairments (Siebers 2008, 124). The ruling was also a self-critique, pointing at previous rulings that supported the pattern of discrimination, a position the Court reached because the bodies of George Lane and Beverly Jones both incorporate "a set of theoretical claims about architecture" that could be interpreted as revealing a larger pattern of discrimination (Siebers 2008, 23).

This possibility of resistance by virtue of their embodiment is related to what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson names 'misfit'. She presents 'misfit' as "as a new critical keyword that seeks to defamiliarize and to reframe dominant understandings of disability" by foregrounding the situated, dynamic, and embodied nature of the disability experience while moving away from impaired bodies in unforgiving environments (Garland-Thomson 2011, 592). Fitting and misfitting refer to encounters when a pair of things meet harmoniously or disjunctively. These encounters occur moment to moment; misfit may happen at some point int time but not in others, depending on the particularities of each embodiment and the environment it inhabits at any given moment. Misfitting also addresses a difference between expectations and reality, as

> misfits are inherently unstable rather than fixed, yet they are very real because they are material rather than linguistic constructions. The discrepancy between body and world, between that which is expected and that which is, produces fits and misfits (Garland-Thomson 2011, 593).

Lived experience is a flow, moment to moment our embodied natures negotiate our environments and we experience either fit or misfit at any given moment. When we fit, the flow is uninterrupted and barely noticed; when we misfit, the flow is interrupted and we notice the interruption. The disability experience, as lived experience, may be understood in terms of the dynamics of that flow: being disabled means experiencing misfit most of the time, it means being aware of the barriers around us, of the contingency of our bodies and how we have to navigate the diverse places we inhabit; while being nondisabled means fitting most of the time, being supported by our environments to the point of being oblivious both to those supports and to our own embodiments. Misfitting addresses both the complexly embodied nature of disability, its dynamic nature, the material knowledge of bodies, and their potential for political resistance. Garland-Thomson explains:

> Like the dominant subject positions such as male, white, or heterosexual, fitting is a comfortable and unremarkable majority experience of material anonymity, an unmarked subject position that most of us occupy at some points in life and that often goes unnoticed. When we fit harmoniously and properly into the world, we forget the truth of contingency because the world sustains us. When we experience misfitting and recognize that disjuncture for its political potential, we expose the relational component and the fragility of fitting. Any of us can fit here today and misfit there tomorrow (2011, 597).

Disabled bodies, experiencing misfit, call attention both to their own contingency, and to other bodies' contingency. They contest the environments they inhabit, and the ideologies supporting the choices behind those environments. They highlight which kind of bodies are supported or not by their environments, their presence questions assumptions and forces us to think about the implications of educational choices, architectural choices, design choices, language choices, of all choices that create and affect our environments and ourselves. In the context of theatre practice, the presence of disabled bodies operates in the same way: contesting dominant ideologies and opening up new possibilities of understanding the craft of theatre. In his discussion of mime, Jacques Lecoq presents a reading of Antonin Artaud's body and his relationship to practice that can be aligned with this reading of disabled bodies as productive sites of resistance. Lecoq explains that

> Antonin Artaud understood the mobile human body like no champion of the stadium could. His injured body, taken out of orbit because of an 'error of nature', had an acute sensitivity to the equilibrium of forces. He cried out the difference between equilibrium and

> disequilibrium that he could translate no other way than by impossible images and impossible movements; so extreme and absolute were the respective positions (2006, 85).

Artaud's body was 'unnatural' and moved in 'unnatural' ways and, as such, should have been excluded from theatre practice. Yet, his 'unnaturalness' afforded a different way of practicing theatre; a "corporal dynamics" embedded in Artaud's texts (Lecoq 2006, 85). Artaud's 'unnatural' embodiment facilitated a critique of then-dominant notions about theatre and, in turn, paved the way for a new conception of theatre, one which reclaimed the power of sensory immediacy and madness as visionary expression (Kuppers 2017, 62). These 'unnatural' bodies resist dominant ideologies; disability as experience offers new ways of understanding the world.

Neutral bodies and exclusionary practices

Asking about disabled bodies in theatre implies addressing the matter of the ideal body or, as Sandahl calls it, the 'neutral' body (2009, 259). In her essay, she argues that current approaches to acting share the assumption that actors should strip themselves of "their personal idiosyncrasies" to achieve a neutral body, that is, a body devoid of individual markers that becomes the canvas actors use to express themselves. This implies an exquisite technique of control over the body, the ability to move the body in "opposing, unnatural ways" and creates a paradox for disabled actors. In Sandahl's words:

> The body in crisis is described as appropriately represented by a symmetrical body in full, even incredible, control. Disabled bodies, whose parts often move in opposing, unnatural ways (think of the person with cerebral palsy), are excluded from representing those whose bodies might most resemble their own (2009, 260).

The idea of the 'neutral' body is present in the works of Meyerhold, Stanislavski, and Grotowski. Stanislavski even wanted actors to be as free of physical defect as possible because, in his view, imperfect bodies would signify excessively (Sandahl 2009, 261). This connects to the idea of the 'natural' body. Tracing the changes in the requirements of actor training that occurred gradually in the 20th century following the industrialisation impulses of the 19th century, Mark Evans shows how actors

> gradually ceased to require a body which was narrowly and conventionally efficient within the terms of the nineteenth century theatre and started to recognise a need instead for a body which was organically efficient, flexible and expressive—in effect more 'natural'. The concept of the 'natural' body was to provide an acceptable foundation on which architecturally to design, measure, support and construct the 'neutral' body of the new student actor (Evans 2009).

This 'natural' body was deemed to be "unfettered, undivided, uncorrupted, unurbanised and even undressed" and during the 20th century this concept of the 'natural' body was associated to movement training of several kinds (sport, dance, and exercise, for example) and this association meant that the 'natural' body rapidly came to be seen as a 'body-which-moved'. In so far as acting sought to become more 'natural', it had of necessity then to encourage the body of an actor to move, to move expressively, and to do so 'naturally' (Evans 2009).

The 'neutral' body then depends on a 'natural' body that moves, and moves in ways that are deemed natural. Underneath these notions of the 'natural' and the 'neutral' is what Siebers called the ideology of ability, a preference for able-bodiedness that "at its most radical, it defines the baseline by which humanness is determined, setting the measure of body and mind that gives or denies human status to individual persons" (2008, 8). As bodies deemed 'natural' tend to be equated to nondisabled bodies, disabled bodies are outright excluded from theatre practice or, if present, they contest the assumption of the 'neutral' at the base of several approaches to acting. Disabled bodies are unable to be 'neutral' and they will "signify excessively" because their imperfections attract attention (Sandahl 2009, 261), thus they are excluded from representing anything other than themselves. However, a focus on the 'neutral' implies that the situation is even worse because implicit in the various manifestations of the neutral metaphor is the assumption that a character cannot be built from a position of physical difference. The appropriate actor's body for any character, even a character that is literally disabled or symbolically struggling, "is not only the able body, but also the extraordinarily able body" (Sandahl 2009, 261).

Furthermore, spectator's bodies are also assumed to be 'neutral' and theatrical spaces tend to be organised around this assumption. Petra Kuppers recounts her experience attending a performance of *The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time*, "a mega-award-winning play that centres on a young man conventionally deemed to have (the outdated diagnosis of) Asperger's" and, when noticing the absence of autistic embodiments around her, asks an usher about it and he explains that there are 'relaxed' performances of the show from time to time, during which the space is adjusted so that

autistic audience members are comfortable and not disoriented (2017, 3–4). The fact that the play centres on an autistic character only serves to highlight the irony of having a space that excludes autistic persons during most showings of the play. Kuppers also recounts her own experiences as a disabled spectator who uses a wheelchair and a cane, and how they reveal patterns of discrimination:

> This is my theatre experience: buildings and the number of stairs, the width of the side corridors, the rake of plush carpeted floors, where to put my cane, speaking with the personnel, how to keep my tender knees tucked away when others wish to access the row. The theatre is an apparatus, a machine, and alternative embodiments like mine make the supportive mechanisms appear behind the curtains. If your butt is big, you'll likely think about the relative butt size and leg length of the people who designed the seat you are sitting in, and you might compare it unfavourably with seating in contemporary cinemas. If you are trying to dial into the audio-description on your hearing loop, you are aware of how far from the visual entertainment norm of theatre your sensory access is placed (2017, 2).

Thinking about theatre from a disability perspective, we start to see how the ideology of ability permeates its theory and practice. First, the concept of the actor is built upon assumptions about the body that are exclusionary, as I explained before. Second, theatrical spaces tend to be organised around assumptions of body normality (access to the stage, backstage areas, seating arrangements, light conditions for both performers and spectators, silence requirements, scenic design, set construction, etc.). Third, while stereotypical uses of disability in dramaturgical content have been challenged by disabled theatre artists (Sandahl 2002), it is still common to find disability used as a representational device, what Mitchell and Snyder call 'narrative prosthesis' (2000). Fourth, staging has not been as challenged as dramaturgical content by disability; by this I mean that the use of space, movement, time, or symmetry, for example, is usually approached from assumptions about body normality (Sandahl 2002). Fifth, during actor formation, instructions given by trainers usually depend on metaphors that exclude non-normal bodies from participating (Sandahl 2009).

The previous points illustrate how theatre may be conceived of as a disabling environment. They can also work as starting points for a discussion about how to work with disability as a creative perspective in theatre, with the added benefit of making theatre a more inclusive endeavour. If we focus on the theatrical event and the bodies of the participants, we can ask questions about theatrical practice from a disability perspective. Those questions should arise from these issues:

1. The bodies themselves, their movements, their shapes, their histories, how they look, sound, smell, or feel to the touch. In short, what are their characteristics and how we may think about those characteristics as guiding constraints or possibilities in the creative process.
2. The space where a single specific body is located, whether it supports the expression of different perspectives coming from different bodies or not, and how it should be changed to do so. In other words, how that space can be used to build scenes that do not depend upon assumptions of body normality.
3. The mutual relationship between bodies, how constraints from one body interact with constraints from another body and what kind of phenomena emerge from that interaction.
4. The mutual relationship between several bodies and space, how changes in space impact the creation process. We also need to think about interacting bodies and how space accommodates those interactions arising from body diversity.

The set of possible questions addressing the previous points constitute a domain for inquiring about body diversity and theatre. Inside this domain we may, in turn, focus on the diverse ways bodies move, including being still or immobile, and generate knowledge about the relationship between theatre and movement beyond 'neutral'. We have seen that the idea of 'neutral' is built around the notion of a 'natural' body that moves, a body that moves in ways deemed natural. Disabled bodies that do not move, or move in 'unnatural' ways, force us to revisit in detail the idea of the organic and integrated body, the actor's ability to commit directly to an intention, the connection between emotion and action, and the signification of the body, when disabled bodies so directly challenge the value and importance that is put on able-bodied interpretation of these factors (Evans 2009).

This brings me back to not-moving bodies in theatre. I have shown that bodies in theatre are expected to move, and to move 'naturally'. Movement that is considered 'natural' is associated with nondisabled bodies; in contrast to the movement of disabled bodies. This suggests that there is a conceptual divide between nondisabled and disabled bodies hinging on the idea of voluntariness: nondisabled bodies may choose whether to move or not (in 'natural' ways), while disabled bodies move in 'unnatural' ways, including not moving at all. In other words: not-moving as choice versus not-moving as condition.

A first approach

Movement, then, seems to be central to theatre practice. Actors move, even when keeping still. On stage, standing or sitting, walking or waiting, speaking or silent, they move. We might also say that they may move, because they are always expressing the potentiality of their bodies. Each movement is merely one chosen amongst many they could have executed. Eugenio Barba explains that each movement is a manifestation of energy on stage; energy that is tension from the muscles and the nerves, tension that manifests as tonic variations, tension that reflects how our inner processes progress in diverging directions; energy that is our thought made visible and made body so that it can affect the spectator (qtd Féral 2004, 124–25). Actors' bodies are always expressing potential actions; actions already there in the layers of movement that constitute immobility. André Lepecki, in his discussion of stillness in dance, writes:

> In the case of small dance, standing still engages not one specific body part, but the whole body is the target of introspective proprioception—which adds to the intensity of the perception and therefore to the increased awareness of microscopy. Moreover, introspective proprioception resulting from the small dance profoundly merges what modernity always tried to dissociate-the subject and its body. As the subject stands still, listening, sensing, smelling its own bodily vibrations, adjustments, tremors streaming through, across, within the space between core subjectivity and the surface of the body, there is nothing more than the revelation of an infinite, unlocatable space for microexploration of the multiple potential of otherwise unsensed sensitivities and corporealities one harbours. The "small dance" happens in that nowhere; the dancer must explore the unlocatable there between subjectivity and body-image.
>
> If what has been said summarises, in a simple manner, the psychology of proprioception, it is to the relationship of the latter to philosophy that one must turn now in order to probe deeper into the aesthetic, social, and existential problems brought forth by stillness: The problematics of the body's stance regarding the world and regarding the self, as the subject plunges into a microscopy of perception, a phenomenology of interiority, that there where, standing in vibratile stillness, the subject attempts to meet its body (2000, 346–48).

A "vibratile stillness" made up by layers of imperceptible movements, adding to an immobility constituted by movement and that is full of possibility. We may map its potential onto the four domains of inquiry presented in the previous section. First, we should take into account immobile bodies themselves and their primary characteristic in this context: their immobility. I think the distinction between mobility and movement is a rich starting point in this exploration as it reveals the layers of movement present in the immobile body and it forces us to recalibrate our perceptual thresholds. It may be productive to reflect on the relationship between immobility and the operation of silence; how silence turns whispering sounds we previously ignored into thunderous ones, and how "silence gives life to a gaze never seen, to gestures not yet ventured" (Lecoq 2006, 70). We may use silence, as an operation that alters perceptual thresholds, as a model for exploring immobility and its potential.

Second, we have to address the space where the immobile body is located. I propose that space can adapt to the presence of immobile bodies by either reacting to their movement or by extending them. Anna Vallgårda's *The Dress Room* is a space that responds to a performer's movements over the floor by moving the walls and collapsing or expanding itself (2014). A space responding to the movements of an immobile body may reconfigure itself by sliding walls or floors, changing lighting conditions, or extruding shapes. Instead of assigning responses to movements, the reactions may be attuned to those movements, following the rhythms of the body, in a sense extending the body beyond the skin. *Pulse Room*, by Rafael Lozano-Hemmers, is an example of such a space: it is a room with a sensor that detects the heart rate of participants and flashes lightbulbs at the same rhythm (2006).

Third, we need to think about the interaction among bodies when at least one of them is immobile. If we assume one mobile and one immobile actor, and we consider the expanded possibilities of movement offered by immobile bodies, then we may think about constructing a body dialogue between actors based upon the newly available movements. We may also think about exploring surrogacy and extended agency by mapping movements of an immobile actor to movements of a mobile actor using devices to transfer information from one body to another, rendering the mobile actor into a surrogate of the immobile actor. An example of such surrogacy is Stelarc's *Fractal Flesh*, a performance in which the artist body was remotely controlled by other people using a computer interface that activated muscle stimulators connected to different parts of his body (2009).

Fourth, these performing bodies interact in a particular space and that space should accommodate them. This goes from providing access to the physical location where interactions take place, to supporting or constraining certain interactions in favour of constructing a scene. If the space responds to an immobile body, then the other bodies are forced to respond to the dynamic nature of the space. How they respond depends, for example, on whether they are also immobile or not, on which mechanisms for reacting are available, or on the way the space responds to conflicting demands from different bodies. How space is used in Polina Zioga's *Enheduanna* offers an example of responding to multiple bodies, in this case by reacting to the brainwaves of the participants and either mixing the responses or contrasting them (2016).

These explorations of bodies, space and their interactions may be understood as explorations of how we make sense of the world as living embodied organisms situated in a particular environment at each moment, how our diverse embodiments affect that process of sense-making and produce a diversity a meaning. We ought to ask, then, whether these processes may be conceived of as an epistemological dimension of bodily life and what is the relationship between such dimension and disability understood as a complexly embodied phenomenon.

What do disabled bodies know?

We know things because we learn them, experience them, think about them, infer them, and sense them. Knowing things is a process intimately related to the fact that we are living beings adapting constantly to our worlds by making sense of them. We might say that knowledge is the result of this sense-making process and, as the process is inextricable related to our embodiments, knowledge is contingent on them. The kind of things we can know depends on the kind of bodies we have; the knowledge we acquire depends on how our bodies move through their worlds. Knowledge, however, has been understood as a disembodied concept, "an abstract quasi-entity or a fixed body of propositional claims" (Johnson 2010, 142), "an accumulation of true propositions or statements about how things are and how they work, which can be verified by past, present or future experience" (Johnson 2010, 144). In *The Meaning of the Body*, his work about aesthetics as "an investigation of everything that goes into human meaning-making" (2008, xi), Mark Johnson elaborates on what understanding knowledge as a set of propositions entails, and explains that

> our capacity to grasp meanings, and our capacity for reasoning, depends on our conscious use of symbolic representations in the mind that somehow can relate to things outside the mind. These symbolic representations (usually thought of as concepts) are organized into meaningful propositional structures via formal rules of syntax, and then the propositions are organized into thoughts and arguments via formal rules of logic. According to this objectivist semantics, neither the syntactic rules, nor the logical relations, nor even the propositions themselves have any intrinsic relation to human bodies (2008, 8)

This view of knowledge carries on, and is supported by, a dualist tradition of separating mind and body, reason and emotion, thought and feeling. Yet, evidence from recent cognitive science points towards the notion that propositions themselves do have an intrinsic relation to human bodies, and to the conclusion that mind and body are better approached as different ways of understanding the same unitary phenomenon instead of separate entities. Thus, Johnson argues, we need to move from knowledge as end result to knowing as a process of inquiry, to recognise how our bodies shape the ways in which we understand and know the world (2010, 145). Our most current framework for studying these ways of knowing the world through our bodies is called 4E cognition, a framework that encompasses several approaches that move away from the dualism-inflected and disembodied computational approach to cognition and share the idea that

> the cognitive phenomena that are studied by modern cognitive science, such as spatial navigation, action, perception, and understanding other's emotions, are in some sense all dependent on the morphological, biological, and physiological details of an agent's body, an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment, and the agent's active and embodied interaction with this environment (Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher 2018a, 5)

The 4E moniker refers to the four approaches to cognition of the framework: embodiment, embedding, extension, and enaction. The differences between them arise from the constitutive or causally dependence roles they assign to processes occurring in the brain, in the body and outside the body, and whether there is an active engagement between organism and environment. Embodiment refers to approaches that argue for a constitutive or causally dependence role of bodily process outside the brain; embedding refers to approaches that argue for a causally dependence on extrabodily process; extension refers to approaches that argue for a constitutive role of extrabodily process; and enaction refers to approaches that argue for a constitutive or causally dependence role on the active engagement of the organism with their environment (Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher 2018a, 6–7). In this project I will focus on the embodied and enactive approaches as they offer a body-

agnostic foundation to explore how our particular and diverse embodiments shape the way we know, how do we know the world through our actions, and how moments of misfit are realised as instances of knowing.

Bodies of knowledge

We have discussed how living organisms are continually making sense of their environment by adapting dynamically to their changing context, and acting in ways that preserve their autonomy. These 'ways of acting' available for any body are constrained by said context, one that includes the history of previous actions and their results. As they live, the actions organisms perform and their results become part of the expected meaning of the world in similar circumstances; as they live, they identify regularities in their experience, and form a set of expectations regarding which ways of acting are appropriate in certain circumstances. These expectations are then either reinforced or contested when the context shifts and the organism encounters a new situation: if there are 'ways of acting' available, the new situation is meaningful under existing expectations, and they are reinforced; otherwise, expectations are broken and a process of inquiry begins, as the organism strives to act in a way that preserves their autonomy, forming a new set of expectations. This ongoing process of testing expectations, acting upon them, reinforcing them or contesting them to form new ones, may be understood as a process of generating knowledge, that is, knowing as "a process of intelligent inquiry into and transformation of experience, in light of our values and purposes" (Johnson 2010, 146). Through this process, organisms make sense of their interactions with the environment and create meaning about their experience. Johnson elaborates this position in the context of living human beings and explains that

> human meaning concerns the character and significance of a person's interactions with their environments. The meaning of a specific aspect or dimension of some ongoing experience is that aspect's connections to other parts of past, present, or future (possible) experiences. Meaning is relational. It is about how one thing relates to or connects with other things. This pragmatist view of meaning says that the meaning of a thing is its consequences for experience—how it "cashes out" by way of experience, either actual or possible experience. Sometimes our meanings are conceptually and propositionally coded, but that is merely the more conscious, selective dimension of a vast, continuous process of immanent meanings that involve structures, patterns, qualities, feelings, and emotions. An embodied view is naturalistic, insofar as it situates meaning within a flow of experience that cannot exist without a biological organism engaging its environment. Meanings emerge "from the bottom up" through increasingly complex levels of organic activity; they are not the constructions of a disembodied mind (2008, 10).

Evidence from the cognitive sciences, in particular from studies that focus on the bodily basis of meaning, conceptualisation and reasoning, suggests that we must do away with the distinctions between the conceptual, perceptual, and motor dimensions of cognition and, instead, approach them as a nested structure going from sensory-motor processes to the abstract faculties of the mind (Johnson 2010, 148). This view implies that the neural networks supporting our sensory-motor processes also support conceptualisation as a "complex process of multilevel interaction of brain areas, with re-entrant connections among these levels, in an ongoing symphony of meaning-making and thought" (Johnson 2008, 175). How this process unfolds at any given moment depends on the previous history of interactions and connections encoded in the body and, in turn, modify that history to account for the experience at that given moment.

Moment to moment, what we can know depends on our bodies and their process of knowing, which in turn depends on how they have known, the experiences they have encountered, and the stable patterns of experience encoded in our embodiments. How, then, does knowledge sediment in our bodies? During the course of our lives, as we learn and encounter new situations, there are periods in which our sensorimotor experience is conflated with our subjective experience, and we constantly form associations between the two domains. These associations are realised in simultaneous neural activations that create permanent neural connections across different networks in our bodies and, even when we learn to differentiate between the sensorimotor and subjective facets of our experiences, the neural connections remain and form the neural basis for metaphorical connections between different conceptual domains, that is, embodied primary metaphors. Furthermore, under certain circumstances different primary metaphors may activate at the same time, leading to new connections between them, giving rise to more complex metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 46–47). In this way, what we learn becomes embodied knowledge. Our actions cause changes in our bodies that realise the knowledge we gain through those actions; these bodily changes, in turn, facilitate the repetition of previous actions in similar contexts and provide a foundation for expanding the set of possible actions and thus our knowledge.

What about body diversity?

Embodiment offers an explanation of knowledge that accounts for the importance of the body in the process of knowing. It places the locus of knowledge in the body and situates that body and its processes of knowing in relationship with its environment. It even provides a framework for explaining how knowledge is shared between bodies, by giving an account of how humans and other animals are connected in terms of "meaningful patterns of organism-environment interactions—patterns of sensorimotor experience shared by all organisms of a certain kind and meaningful for those organisms" (Johnson 2008, 123). Embodiment, however, lacks nuance in its approaches to body diversity. In the way it is currently argued and explained, it tends to assume body normality and marks deviation from that norm as problematic. In her critique to Lakoff and Johnson's theory of embodied metaphors, Amy Vidali argues that, beyond the question of whether metaphors work or not in the ways they describe, how the body is positioned in their theory is problematic (2010, 36). The body they refer to and base their arguments on is a 'normal', 'prototypical', and 'natural' body, that is, an able body that has a specific bodily configuration and metaphors emerge from the interactions of this able body with the world (Vidali 2010, 39). Furthermore, instead of expanding their theory to account for bodily diversity, they explicitly exclude human embodiments that deviate from normalcy when they explain that

> the concepts *front* and *back* are body-based. They make sense only for beings with fronts and backs. If all beings on this planet were uniformly stationary spheres floating in some medium and perceiving equally in all directions, they would have no concepts of *front* or *back*. But we are not like this at all. Our bodies are symmetric in some ways and not in others. We have faces and move in the direction in which we see (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 34).

They ignore that there are people who "are not like this at all", as Vidali points out, who do not see, who move with a different sense of front and back, who move in cooperation with others, and who experience the world in "different and innovative ways" (2010, 39). The implications of focusing on the able body as the core requirement for acquiring metaphors is that the experience of the disabled body is ignored, the way they know is silenced, and an ableist worldview is reinforced. Regarding this, Vidali argues that

> if an able body (or something close) is needed to acquire metaphor, then disabled people are relegated to a second-class existence where they acquire bodily metaphors from ablebodied people. While it is reasonable to assume that ablebodied people profoundly influence metaphors through their physical and cultural experiences, I am dissatisfied with an approach to metaphor that assumes that the building blocks of language are formed by able bodies and are transferred to those with disabilities by contagious contact. People with disabilities, and their bodily experiences, also inform how metaphors are created and used (2010, 39).

Vidali goes on to explore how diverse bodies impact metaphor acquisition and use, arguing that "disability interprets, challenges, and articulates metaphors". She exemplifies this approach through an analysis of the *knowing is seeing* metaphor referenced by Lakoff and Johnson, a metaphor which problematically privileges the idea that the our visual systems are the main way to gather knowledge. First, she reviews previous critiques of the metaphor that focus on the *seeing* side and contest it by presenting evidence of knowing-while-blind. Then, she flips the focus and argues that the *knowing* side of the metaphor has been less explored and that "the idea that seeing is necessary in order to know is challenged, but what it means to know is less engaged and thus normatively defined". Through her argument, she makes the case that we must interrogate how disability is approached in our academic theories and methodologies because, if we fail to do so, we may end up adopting "ableist theories to make disability-progressive arguments" (Vidali 2010, 42–46).

Circling back, the *knowing is seeing* metaphor has guided most of the research in embodied cognition. Experimental research has privileged inquiries into the visual system and its relationship to cognition, and their results are then interpreted as evidence of the primacy of visual perception in our cognitive processes; a vicious circle of ableist reinforcement. Even when researchers are aware of this bias, non-visual systems and body diversity are treated as edge cases and not part of the main argument. *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition* (Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher 2018b) offers a review of the state of research in embodied cognition and it is a good example of a visual bias. An online search in the text of the book reveals that the concept of 'blindness' is used in seventeen chapters in the following ways:

1. Six chapters refer to Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the incorporation of a blind person's white cane, an analysis that has been criticised from a disability perspective because it ignores the disability experience and privileges an able-bodied simulation of that experience (Reynolds 2017, 421).
2. Eight chapters use it as a metaphor for 'ignorance', 'unthinking behaviour', and 'mindlessness'.
3. One has a cursory reference to disability and its relationship to embodied cognition (Menary 2018, 189).
4. One explicitly deals with congenital blindness as the source of limitations in the process of knowing the world, because "congenitally blind children are at risk of seriously impoverished experience of interpersonally co-referential attitudes to a visually specified world", without reflecting on the barriers implicit in the idea of a "visually specified world" and the possibilities of other kind of world specifications (Hobson 2018, 565).
5. One that attempts to offer an alternative account of perception, shifting the focus from the vision to touch (Ratcliffe 2018).

Seventeen chapters implicitly or explicitly reinforcing the *knowing is seeing* metaphor versus one that attempts a different approach. The handbook represents an overview of the state of research in embodied cognition and, as such, it is also representative of the prevalence of the biases against body diversity. If embodiment offers an explanation of knowledge that accounts for the importance of the body in the process of knowing then an approach to embodiment that is aware of body diversity would offer accounts of knowledge that are richer and more nuanced than approaches that focus only on the visual channel. Such an approach has to be body-agnostic, avoid privileging one sensory channel, and interpret body diversity as generative and not as a deficiency.

Enacting worlds of meaning

Embodiment implies changing from a static view of knowledge based on sets of logical propositions, verbal expression, and absolute truths to a dynamic view that accounts for the constitutive role of our bodies in the process of knowing, embracing body diversity in all its richness and following through its epistemological consequences. From the current approaches to embodied cognition, enaction offers the closest to a body-neutral framework that may provide ways of analysing how body diversity impacts the process of knowing. Enaction argues for a process of knowing based on bodies that are actively engaged in, and with, their environments, and constituted by, or dependent on, those bodies possibilities of action (Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher 2018a, 6). Enaction does not argue for knowing through a particular embodiment but, rather, for the ways of knowing emerging from any and all embodiments. Furthermore, enaction argues for processes of knowing as integral to the existence of organisms, for living bodies that continually make sense of their worlds because it is through those processes of sense-making that they keep on existing. Knowing, in the form of basic cognition,

> is not a matter of representing states of affairs but rather of establishing relevance through the need to maintain an identity that is constantly facing the possibility of disintegration. From this perspective, the body is not just the means but also an end of being a cognitive system. To put the point another way, basic cognition is more a matter of adaptive self-regulation in precarious conditions than abstract problem solving. The point here is not to deny that we can and do engage in high-level problem solving. Rather, it is to say that this kind of narrow cognition presupposes the broader and more basic cognition that we call sense-making (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014, 73).

The enactive approach has three core concepts that distinguish it from other approaches to embodiment. First, the notion of 'autonomy' refers to the notion that living bodies are self-enabling systems that interact spontaneously with their environments in order to keep on existing, against their own material precariousness. That is, living bodies are constantly constituting themselves through their actions in their environments, in a race against their material decay (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014, 72). Second, 'adaptivity' is the ability of autonomous systems to modulate their own processes in relation to the everchanging conditions of their environments, according to whether those conditions are registered as favourable or not to its continued existence (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014, 73). Third, the concept of 'sense-making' refers to behaviour in relation to norms of interaction that are brought forth by the autonomous systems as they adapt to their environment; these norms emerge as a system perspective that classifies interactions with its environment as facilitating or degrading autonomy (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014, 73).

Thus, autonomous adaptive systems are constantly making sense of their environments, enacting worlds of meaning through which their interactions are meaningful in terms of their continued existence. Certain actions have value at any given moment if they are favourable to the continued existence of the organism, but may lose that value when the environment changes and the enacted world of meaning shifts. In such situations, bodies experiment a displacement from its own emergent normative status and need to adapt to maintain their autonomy. In other words, when bodies experience misfit

actions towards fitting have to be taken, actions that will provide new knowledge and enact new worlds of meaning. Taken to the context of human beings, it is precisely those maladaptive moments that become

> an occasion for inquiry, in which we must reconfigure our habitual patterns of behaviour, in search of more constructive, expansive, and harmonious modes of action. In other words, we need to engage in forms of inquiry geared to the reduction of indeterminacy in our situation and geared to the achievement of a more constructive relation to our physical, social, and cultural surroundings (Johnson 2010, 146).

Enaction, then, offers a body-agnostic approach to analyse processes of knowing, focusing on the idea that organisms are active, embodied, and environmentally situated; and to guide inquiries where we need to centre and highlight the role of the body in those processes of knowing. Bruce McConachie proposes using it as a paradigm for inquiries about performance, transposing Peter Godfrey-Smith's justification of connecting science to philosophy, arguing that investigations should start "from the standpoint provided by our best current scientific picture of human beings and their place in the universe" and using science as a tool for settling questions about performance (2015, 19). The human being described by enactivism is a "centre of awareness and agency whose processes resonate with those of the environment", bringing forth the world in which it exists, with the consequence that reality is not pre-given but co-constructed (McConachie 2015, 19–23). This approach offers methodological tools for exploring embodied cognition from first-, second-, and third-person perspectives to phenomena that involve perception, participatory processes of meaning-making, and movement, for example, in a framework that takes into account their situated, dynamic, and historical[9] nature (Varela 1996; Froese and Fuchs 2012; De Jaegher et al. 2017; Sheets-Johnstone 2018). These characteristics of enaction enable us to explore what is common between bodies, what is universal in a sense, without losing track of the importance of diversity and falling into reductionist and essentialist views of human nature. Regarding universals, McConachie explains that

> although evolution has clearly endowed our species with these physical, behavioural, and cognitive abilities, not all humans possess them. This is primarily because evolution leads to substantial diversity in all species, not uniformity. The fact that some Homo Sapiens are born without legs, do not learn how to speak, and cannot love their children does not exclude them from our biological species, however. It simply invites us to understand these humans as atypical –but not abnormal; evolution does not generate norms– as indeed they are (2015, 14).

I have argued before that the theatrical event, as defined by Sauter, may be understood as an instance of participatory sense-making where bodies produce meaning supported by a set of shared externally encoded objects in the context of theatrical practice. As such, enaction offers a framework to inquire about the effects of considering body diversity in the creation of shared meaning during those events, to inquire about how disabled bodies may rupture the normative status of certain practices and enact new worlds of meaning in theatre, bringing forth different and diverse ways of theatre practice and of realising the theatrical event.

What disabled bodies know

My first attempt to explore the relationship between immobility and theatre failed because I was still a naïve-outsider, assuming I could approach the problem by thinking in terms of requirements to be fulfilled. I had ignored our embodied reality: we are bodies, we experience the world through the body, and each body provides a unique experience about the world. Thankfully, I found Carrie Sandahl's manifesto. The anecdote told at the beginning of that text illustrates the point:

> [My father] said he was seeing Europe through my eyes. He rifled through the stack, laying the photos side by side. He pointed out that my photographs of people and things all angled upwards. Since, he is 6'3", and I am 4'10" (on a 'good' day… with my shoes on), he was not used to seeing people's chins instead of the tops of their heads. He pointed out that some buildings and monuments seemed to tower and tilt in ways he had not seen before. He suggested that, because I walk with a swinging gait and often lean when I stand, my photos were shot from this low, off-center vantage point. Others in my family laid out more photos and began to notice these subtleties. And I did, too. My dad said simply, "This is how Carrie sees the world." In addition to feeling a powerful new connection with my father at this

[9] By 'historical' I refer to the fact that, at each moment, the specific interaction between an organism and its environment does not depend only on their current state but also on their previous states.

> moment, I also first realized that disability is a vantage point, a perspective, a way of experiencing the world. If I had known the word back then, I would have said that disability is phenomenological (2002).

Since its publication, Sandahl's manifesto has become a foundational text for the disciplinary intersection between disability and performance studies. I want to offer a new interpretation focused on the epistemological consequences of centring the experience of disability. So, I repeat: we are bodies, we experience the world through the body, and each body provides a unique experience about the world. What do disabled bodies know? They know diverse, rich, innovative, resourceful ways of being in the world. I would venture to say that the 'neutral' body, by virtue of its (idealised) homogeneity, only knows one way of being in the world. If we focus on Linda Candy's assertion that "the freedom in creativity is the ability to move between constraints or, to put it another way, the creative act is selecting the right path, from among all the possible paths defined by the constraints" (2007), then disabled bodies know how to navigate those possible paths in richer ways than those possible for the idealised 'neutral' body.

Body diversity may be understood in terms of a multiplicity of bodily configurations, that is, a set of features that characterise any given body. These configurations emerge in relation to the internal self-enabling processes of the body as adaptive autonomous system, and in relation to the conditions of the environment the body inhabits. That is, bodily configurations occur in relation to internal and external constraints that shape them and thus shape their many ways of knowing and their many enacted worlds of meaning. A multiplicity of bodily configurations, whether potential or actual, offers a context to explore creativity as the way in which bodies find all available paths, among all possible paths, that enable them to sustain themselves.

From this perspective, I argue that bodies may be conceived as unique dynamic systems represented by points in a multidimensional space of possible bodily configurations, its form influenced by internal and external constraints. Then, 'normality' can be understood in terms of attractors in this space that create clusters of body configurations around them; outlier bodies are atypical bodies. These attractors, in turn, are semi-stable and depend on the interaction between bodies, that is, they may be displaced or reshaped by agents to include or exclude certain bodily configurations. We mighty say that bodies clustered around 'normality' attractors tend to share similar meanings while outlier bodies make sense of the world in different ways. The power of diversity is that these different ways of making sense of the world is that the 'normality' attractor may be progressively shifted, thus expanding the set of possibilities for action. In a sense, outlier bodies are the edge of humanity in evolutionary space.

Both disabled and nondisabled bodies know about the world they inhabit. It just happens that the 'unnatural' ways of acting of disabled bodies are epistemological postures about their enacted individual and shared worlds that go beyond the 'naturalness' of the postures coming from nondisabled bodies. When disabled and nondisabled bodies meet, the flow between these two kinds of postures is mediated by movement itself as the possibilities of action and interaction afforded at any given moment depends on the complexly embodied possibilities of movement of the interacting bodies. Disabled bodies may use their 'unnatural' knowledge to contest the 'natural' knowledge, locating themselves outside the boundaries of 'naturalness' to permeate them.

A perspective that combines disability and enaction provides a way of thinking about living bodies, an ever-present framework for understanding them as they go about their lives, encountering situations that break the meaning guiding their actions, experiencing misfit and thus needing to find a new state of fit, opening up processes of inquiry about the normative status of their interactions with their environments and how to shift them. It also provides the texture of the inquiry, an imperative of being aware of the body, of having to be reminded constantly of the implication of following an diversely embodied approach to knowing: every action and process must be interpreted first and foremost in bodily terms, the supporting or constitutive role of the body needs to be highlighted, and we need to contrast how the different ways of knowing embrace or contest each other.

Repeat, reinforce

I have introduced the concept of disability as complex embodiment, marked it as a productive site of resistance, and presented the epistemic possibilities of 'unnatural' bodies. I want to address now the relationship between the richness of embodied knowledge available for disabled bodies and theatre practice. For this, it may be helpful to refer to different modes of thinking about this relationship and I will follow Kuppers' suggestion of four modes: (1) disability as experience, centring on the experience of people with disabilities and focusing on how different embodiments feel; (2) disability in public(s), asking questions about the clash between these differences and the social sphere, and how it relates to our conceptions of art practice; (3) disability as narrative, how it has been used as sign in theatre history; and (4) disability as spectacle, how

people—disabled and nondisabled—mobilise disability as a tool (2017, 6). I want to use the notion of 'disability as experience', as described before, to tease out the relationship between embodied knowledge, disability, and theatre.

'Disability as experience' may be interpreted as a focus on the experiences of people with disabilities, their self-narratives regarding their embodiment and how they play a fundamental role in their perspectives about the world they inhabit. In other words, how the particular embodiments of people with disabilities embody knowledge, and how they generate and transmit that knowledge; how disabled bodies make sense of their worlds through practice and how that practice can be shared in processes of participatory sense-making. Bodies enact their worlds through the ways of acting available to them. In this process, bodies are engaged in a practice that is structured by their own knowledge regarding what they can and cannot do. Spatz defines this "knowledge of the capacities of embodiment" as technique and argues that it is "a fundamental dimension of embodiment and of our lives as embodied creatures" structuring "our actions and practices by offering a range of reliably pathways through any given situation" (Spatz 2015, 26).

Key to this concept of technique is the idea of repetition implicit in the reliability of pathways: in any new situation there may be a set of actions the body has executed previously that could be repeated in response to it, and the effect of executing again one of those in the new situations either reinforces the pathway or forces a re-evaluation of the appropriateness of the selected action. If we take this process to the context of participatory sense-making, we may argue that some specific instances of these interactions are based on a pattern of repetition/reinforcement that occurs between bodies, situations when the repetition of one action by one body is reinforced by the effect and resulting action from another body. These might be characterised as training situations when one person is offering their embodied knowledge through by way of imitation and suggestion instead of direct 'objective' externally encoded statements; training as transmission of 'know-how' by bodily resonance in a process of participatory sense-making.

As we have seen, theatre training implicitly assumes a 'neutral' body. This means that the contexts of the training process—that is, externally encoded past participatory sense-making experiences and how they are embodied in the participants—contain the expectation of body 'neutrality' for all participants. Such expectation constrains the possible ways bodily resonance may be achieved to ways available for 'neutral' bodies and the presence of disabled, 'unnatural' bodies dislocates the process by breaking the expectation, revealing the assumption, and contesting it. In this way disability opens up the space of exploration of what bodies together can do, forcing us to go beyond the 'neutral' and revisit theatrical concepts built around the assumption of 'neutrality'. For example, Barba's construction of the pre-expressive level implicitly refers to 'neutral' bodies but our previous examination of the concept has shown that we may detach pre-expressivity from the assumption of 'neutrality' by understanding it as the sedimented layers of movement—the ways of acting—available for any given body, including 'unnatural' bodies. This possibility is already present in Barba's text, as a passage referring to gender roles illustrates:

> When the male student adapts himself from the beginning exclusively to male roles, and the female student exclusively to female roles, he or she undermines the exploration of her/his own energy on the pre-expressive level (1995, 62).

The pattern of repetition/reinforcement underlying such student/role adaptation may be shifted by changing the dynamic of the process, by offering different actions to follow, suggest new images to base actions on, etc. In a similar way, the pattern underlying the interaction when disabled bodies are included shifts by virtue of the new actions brought to the process by their presence. The knowledge embodied in the disability experience offers opportunities to re-signify theatrical notions of what bodies can do, broadening the scope of possible bodily resonances beyond the 'natural' pairings of 'neutral' bodies, both for actors and spectators.

Try as we may to make a silence, we cannot
(Cage 1973, 8)

On being an outsider as method of inquiry

We come now to the question(s) of how: how to break the pattern of repetition/reinforcement? How to explore the relationship between theatrical practice and the disability experience? How to explore the experience of involuntary immobility from an outsider perspective? How can I ethically and responsibly approach this process as a nondisabled person? How, indeed. I will use the epistemology of practice developed by Ben Spatz in *What a body can do: technique as knowledge, practice as research* to provide a framework for this exploration. A caveat, however. It is important to remember that processes of knowing based on what our bodies are and how they actively engage with their environment refer to embodied and enacted cognition. Thus, in the context of this research and the following discussion, we need to be aware that when Spatz refers to embodiment and knowledge the proper cognitive approaches for interpreting his assertions are embodiment and enaction. Now, to begin, we need to define technique and practice and how these concepts are connected. Spatz explains that

> technique is a kind of knowledge that moves across time and space in ways deeply influenced but not entirely determined by social power relations. It structures every aspect of human embodiment and works by indirect as well as direct means. Furthermore, embodied technique of all kinds, from the mundane to the highly specialized, interacts in and through specific bodies and moments of practice (2015, 38).

Given similar bodies and environments, technique is the knowledge of what those bodies can reliably do. Technique is repeatable and transmissible. In contrast, practice is unique, concrete, situated and personalized; when referring to practice we must always give an account of who, when and where. Each of us has individual practices that are structured by technique, by the knowledge of what we know we can do in specific contexts (Spatz 2015, 40–41). Practice is what each of us does given what we know we can do, and this knowledge is first and foremost embodied, as "the body itself is the first and most natural instrument of technique" (Spatz 2015, 32). What we know we can do is relatively reliably and related to the materiality of the world, that is, technique

> consists of discoveries about specific material possibilities that can be repeated with some degree of reliability, so that what works in one context may also work in another. It is crucial to remember that this reliability is never more than relative. Often we are wrong in our expectations about the reliability of technique. Changes in the environment, or in our own embodiment, produce unexpected results (Spatz 2015, 42).

This repeatability of possibilities is what permits both the transmission of technique and the creation of new technique, that is, training and research. Spatz defines training is "the passage of technique from one person or community to another" and research as "the development of new technique through processes of investigation and exploration". We learn technique from others by repeating their actions, testing them, fitting them to our embodiments, learning what works and what does not. As our specific embodiments are different, there is a degree of broken expectations regarding those actions, that is, a space where technique does not fit our particular context, a space where we may create new technique by testing new actions. We investigate and explore that space through our practices, developing new technique along the way. As technique is knowledge, practice is research (2015, 60–61). When our expectations regarding what we can do are broken, we find a gap between what we do and what we can do. We may explore that gap through practice, and in that exploration we learn new ways of acting, we produce knowledge about the gap and our broken expectations that will structure our future actions in similar contexts.

Beyond transmission, repeatability also implies the production of ourselves along a historical dimension. I repeat today what I learnt yesterday, my actions now are constrained by my actions before. If we move along this temporal axis, we may realize that practices structured by new technique are mostly innovate and conscious, while practices structured by old technique are mostly habitual and unconscious. This happens because as we repeat our actions what we consciously choose to do at one moment, becomes an unconscious choice later. Our agency becomes "sedimented in and as embodiment, even when we are not consciously aware of it". What we know, the embodied technique that structures our practice, becomes who we are, our sedimented agency (Spatz 2015, 50–56). Both specialized technique, such as that of dancers, musicians, athletes or actors, and everyday technique, such as walking, transforms our physical bodies over time and thus

> it is therefore no exaggeration to say that different kinds of technique produce different kinds of bodies in a literal as well as metaphorical sense. The plasticity of embodiment—the degree to which it can be shaped by technique—is not unlimited. But to whatever extent the

> anatomy of the body is shaped through technique, physiology itself can be understood as a form of sedimented agency (Spatz 2015, 61).

Given the constraints of our materialities, what we do quite literally becomes who we are. It follows that if we want to change who we are, we need to change what we do. Why is this important? If we want to contest exclusionary attitudes in some context, we need to tease out the sedimented agency that fosters exclusion in the participants of that context, and develop new technique that may alter current practices towards creating less exclusionary environments. In a way, we need to force open the gap between what we do and what we can do. If this gap appears when our expectations are broken, then we need mechanisms that break our expectations about what is possible for some bodies (including our own). I argue that body diversity plays a central role in this process because diversity may be understood as embodying a field of knowledge that could be shared and developed by a multiplicity of people without losing the richness inherent in the epistemological possibilities of each embodiment. Spatz points out that

> the concept of technique presumes no universal body or ideal body. Instead, it approaches embodiment as a field of variation, between individuals and also within the lifetime of an individual being. This field of relative reliability and variation is what affords embodied technique as an area of knowledge (Spatz 2015, 43).

This idea of embodiment as field of variation is related to the multidimensional space of possible bodily configurations I mentioned in the previous section when I explored the question of what disabled bodies know. Back there, I introduced the idea of 'normality' as an attractor that creates clusters of body configurations: bodies near the attractor are 'normal' while bodies away are 'abnormal'. If we map this idea to embodiment as a field of variation, 'normality' becomes a particular relative reliability in terms of technique, that is, technique that produces particular types of bodies in a given context and that reinforces itself through repetition. Exclusionary attitudes that focus on the 'normal' body produced by some technique may be interpreted as the closing down of the gap where new technique may be developed. Exclusionary attitudes are both a result of a scarcity of research in embodied technique and the cause of that scarcity. From this follows that a focus on body diversity, and the kinds of technique afforded by it, is central to a program of contesting exclusion in any field.

An alternative way of interpreting exclusionary attitudes, in terms of the epistemology of practice we have been exploring, is that of the transformation of relative reliabilities into misperceived absolute reliabilities. The concept of the 'neutral' in theatre is an example of this. When embodiment is not conceived as a field of variation but rather an stable object, "the substrate of embodied technique becomes an image of the ideal body against which actual bodies can then be measured and assessed" (Spatz 2015, 151). When this happens, new technique that explores possible pathways of actions is left unexplored because those pathways are inconceivable given a 'neutral' embodiment. The perspective afforded by 'neutrality' precludes their exploration. How can we explore those closed-off pathways? How can we break the expectations attached to the 'neutral' body so that the gap where new technique may be developed opens up? Is it possible to explore this gap from the perspective of embodiments different from our own? This last question in particular is of paramount importance to my research process because, as I have explained before, I am an outsider, neither a theatre practitioner nor a disabled person. How can I ethically and responsibly explore the possibilities of disabled embodiments in theatre practice from my outsider perspective?

Critically, empathically

I venture that there are two main approaches to solving that last question of how. It may be possible to use the idea of disability either critically or empathically during research, that is, we may either deploy disability as a critical tool for analysis or we may attempt to create a setting that facilitates some lived experience close to the lived experience of disability and explore it as a source of embodied knowledge. In the first case we would be alert to the 'normal' body that may underlie assumptions in our research context, we would attend to how diverse bodies impact the specific phenomena we are analysing, and we would bring concepts from disability studies to bear upon the concepts in our research, using them as tools to tease out those normality assumptions. Vidali's critique of Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor, mentioned in the previous section, is an example of this. In her text, she uses a disability perspective to inform her analysis of how diverse bodies impact metaphor acquisition and use, elucidating the normality assumptions of the theory, and applies it to interpret, challenge and articulate metaphors. Her critique shows how embracing disability as an analytical tool opens up a previously closed off territory of inquiry (2010).

The second case, a disability approach to research based on empathy, seems more complicated as it veers perilously close to appropriation and an instrumentalisation of the experience of a vulnerable group by a member of a privileged group. The typical example of this are disability simulations, a group of practical exercises aiming at raising awareness and reducing

stigma towards specific kinds of the disability experience by nondisabled people role-playing as disabled people: walking persons using wheelchairs in their workplace or university, sighted people walking around blindfolded while using a white cane, hearing people with sound supressing earmuffs to learn what it means to be Deaf. These simulations miss the point of the disability experience entirely by focusing momentarily only on the impairment, and not on the dynamic and complexly embodied nature of disability. Worse, they do not even accomplish their stated goals. After experiencing simulations, nondisabled people report increased stigma and an overall negative view of disability. It is no wonder then that the disability community frowns upon the use of simulations and have criticised them (Eames 2003; Blaser 2003; Brew-Parrish 2004; French 1992).

There are, however, some instances in which carefully deployed simulation exercises provide spaces for producing knowledge that contests stigma and exclusionary attitudes. Kuppers tells us that a wheelchair race involving politicians or university administrators may lead to a changed attitude regarding accommodations such as ramps or automatic door openers, in turn leading to implementing changes in the built environment that benefit the community. She also explains that simulations also have a component of fun related to the pleasures and possibilities of experiencing ourselves differently; they can be playful moments, understanding play as "another way of capturing what we are doing when we don weird and unfamiliar augmentation". She then offers several exercises that retain the fun and playful component of simulations but move away from the idea that these are "ways of getting close to non-normate forms of embodiment" and instead are defamiliarizing experiences focusing on the interaction with the environment (2014, 53).

She proposes exercises such as observing buildings, describing their aesthetics in terms of human bodies, and then comparing the descriptions of accessible and non-accessible buildings; moving around the city using public transportation to plan an imaginary date with a disabled person, documenting the trip using a multimedia narrative; and engaging in wellness activities (yoga, massage, meditation, games) and writing short texts about each experience and its connections to disability, health and illness (2014, 54–55). While focusing on the lived experience of the participants, I would say that those exercises are examples of the first case, an application of disability as a critical tool to analyse their experiences. However, they may work as a template for a disability approach to research. To develop this template into a working method, we need to unpack the concept of disability in the context of the epistemology of practice.

Disability and outsider knowledge

If technique is the knowledge of what bodies can reliably do, then what is the technique of disabled bodies? This is a reframing of the question I posed in the previous chapter: what do disabled bodies know? Back there I answered that they know diverse, rich, innovative, resourceful ways of being in the world and that such knowledge comes from moments of misfit that break expectations regarding what bodies can do in specific environments, thus opening up possibilities for discovering new knowledge about those environments. This new knowledge becomes incorporated in disabled bodies (Siebers 2008, 33) and guides their further actions. We can draw a parallel between this process and the process whereby our agency is sedimented in our bodies (Spatz 2015, 50–56) and argue that disabled bodies are experts in researching the possibilities of their environments and developing new technique for inhabiting them, new technique that goes beyond whatever daily technique is socially expected of bodies. Beyond the specific, unique and individual characteristics of the embodiment of any disabled person, the one thing disabled bodies reliably do is to contest dominant ideologies about what bodies can do and, therefore, what bodies are.

Spatz tells us that "embodied practice is epistemic […] structured by and productive of knowledge" (2015, 26). The lived experience of disability implies an embodied practice that is both structured by knowledge about the environment disabled bodies inhabit and the ideologies that shape those environments, and productive of that knowledge. From this follows that we may interpret disability as embodied practice and that its technique, the knowledge that structures it and is produced by it, is concerned with how bodies and environment interact, how that interaction is shaped by ideological constraints, and how that interaction constrains the possibilities of what bodies are and can do. In other words, the technique of disability allows us to explore complex embodiment as elaborated by Siebers (2008, 25).

Framing disability in epistemological terms means that we can ask questions about training and research: how disabled people transmit and share the technique of disability, and how new technique is developed through practice. Also, given that we have established the dynamic and shifting nature of the notions of 'disabled' and 'nondisabled', we can also ask questions about how the technique of disability may be shared and transmitted between disabled and nondisabled contexts, how the technique of disability may shift the social boundary between disabled and nondisabled, and how in bounded social contexts nondisabled people may approach the technique of disability. These shifts in the boundary, in turn, influence nondisabled technique, that is, the knowledge of what 'normal' bodies can do, thus reinforcing the blurring of the artificial disabled/nondisabled binary. Regarding this, it may be fruitful to reflect on another contested binary that depends on the

characteristics of embodiment and is influenced by constraining ideologies: the 'male'/'female' dichotomy. In his book, Spatz offers a detailed analysis of gender as technique that may be summarised with this quote:

> On the one hand, a realist account of gender must acknowledge the material and physiological differences that exist between bodies and the extent to which such differences may affect subjectivity and experience. This means, in my terms, recognizing that not all technique is equally available to all people; different bodies afford different technical pathways and possibilities. In the other hand, we cannot know in advance exactly which bodies are capable of which kinds of technique. Technique tells us what is possible; it does not tell us what is impossible. Because the material reliabilities with which technique deals are only ever relative, there is always a chance that technique will not work when it is expected to, or that it will work when it is not expected to. How then should we think about the relationship between the materiality of bodies and the range of possible technique? This is a central question for theories of gender, where the "materiality of bodies" has most often been understood as referring to a binary division between female and male (2015, 180).

Even a simplistic and naïve transposition of 'gender' to 'disability' in the previous quote yields insights regarding the possibilities of approaching disability epistemologically: a focus on the materiality of bodies and their technical possibilities and how the complexity and diversity of bodies is forced into discrete and artificial binaries. My research project is a contribution towards contesting these binaries by conceiving these phenomena as a continuum of embodied experiences and exploring how the technique and practice of these diverse experiences may be shared. Regarding the gender binary, Spatz goes on to elaborate how it arises out from statistical commonalities in bodies that give way to easily discovered technical pathways that are, in turn, reinforced by repetition and how that technique is "sedimented in the body to the point where it is mistaken for physiological inevitability" (2015, 180–88). In the case of disability, the binary arises out from the interaction between the materiality of bodies and their environments. Walking, for example, is a technical pathway that is easily discoverable because many human bodies may walk in most environments; the transmission of walking as technique reinforces the idea that walking is a physiological inevitability of human bodies, something that is 'natural', and not something that is contingent upon each particular embodiment and the environment it is inhabiting. We could build similar examples for different kinds of technique and reach the same conclusion: given a set of easily discoverable technical pathways, a dichotomy between 'natural' and 'unnatural' emerges and from it, as we have discussed before, the idea of bodies that belong or not. Spatz asserts that "it is precisely the technique of gender that determines which bodily differences are understood as sexual" (2015, 181) and I dare to paraphrase that assertion and claim that *it is it is precisely the technique of disability that exposes which bodily differences are understood as impairments*.

Spatz further explores gender as technique and how the diverse ways of practising gender are branches of an ongoing research project: each of them explores the space of gender as technique, explores non-normative ways of being gendered, asks what characteristics count as gendered and which do not, asks whether there may be more than two genders or none, etc. In a similar way, the technique of disability contextualises an ongoing research project regarding which bodies count as disabled and which ones do not, which bodily configurations are understood as normal or not, how are bodies excluded or included from social participation, etc. This research project hinges on the complexly embodied nature of disability, on how a body and an environment interact and how their interaction changes in time, on whether a body experiences misfit or not at any given moment, and how those moments of misfit become an ongoing experience of disability. I have already touched on research as the process that starts when technique is no longer adequate because the relative reliability of certain actions breaks. Misfit, in this context, is the quintessential moment of broken reliability: I can no longer do what I am accustomed to do and whatever technique is available to me no longer applies. If disability is an embodied practice structured by knowledge about complex embodiments, then this moment of broken reliability is the moment when research into the technique of disability may begin. Misfit, then, is an epistemic opportunity to create such new technique.

What are the possibilities of such an opportunity? When Siebers describes the ideology of ability, he explains that "because it is discriminatory and exclusionary, it creates social locations outside of and critical of its purview, most notably in this case, the perspective of disability" (2013, 273). Misfit lies at the intersection between the disabled and the nondisabled experience. It is the moment when their boundary is exposed as arbitrary and their difference is revealed as one of degree. Misfit allows us to understand this boundary as a threshold between what is considered a disabling amount of misfit in one's life and what is considered a nondisabling amount. Whether I experience disability or not depends, in part, in how frequent, common, or pervasive the experience of misfit is in my life. Misfit, then, is the shared point of the disabled and nondisabled experiences, the point at which the nondisabled experience meets the disability experience outside the boundaries of what bodies are considered abled. Misfit is a vantage point from which we can critique the ideology of ability, and it is a vantage point precisely because it is located outside the boundaries defined by that ideology. New technique emerging from

moments of misfit is an epistemological claim about the ideology of ability. As misfit is shared between disabled and nondisabled experiences, then misfit becomes a location for epistemological claims available to embodiments experiencing either. This outsider location for developing new technique afforded by misfit is the point from which I may attempt to develop a disability approach to research based on empathy. A focus on misfit, on the moment when our bodies and environments clash, will allow me to approach my original question from an responsible and ethical outsider perspective: I will not appropriate the disabled experience but, instead, I will use the experience of misfit as a research tool to explore different ways of being embodied.

Furthermore, being outside is a setup for breaking expectations because it implies either a distorted understanding of what is inside or a way of being that cannot be contained inside. In both cases there is a set of expectations that will inevitably be broken, setting us up for asking questions regarding the inside from our outsider vantage point. In other words, being outside is a misfit-prone situation because when we are outside and try to move in, we experience misfit. This displacement from outside to inside becomes the first operation of this method: locate ourselves outside, create a situation where misfit emerges, and explore our experience and bump into the data of our research. Svend Brinkmann's work on qualitative methods offers a way to frame this process as a method for inquiry suitable for the current project. First, he describes the abductive process of reasoning as concerned with the relationship between a situation and an inquiry, instead of the relationship between data and theory, and explains that abduction is a form of reasoning used in situations of uncertainty when our expectations are broken: X happens, X is unexpected and breaks down our normal understanding, but if we consider Y then X makes sense, thus we are allowed to provisionally claim Y (2014, 722). This breakdown of our understanding is akin to a moment of misfit, and the abduction process is what we do when we strive to fit. Brinkmann introduces the notion of "stumble data"

> that is, data that one stumbles upon. This is what a breakdown is: an experience of stumbling, which causes a situation (in the pragmatist sense), and where inquiry is meant to result in a regaining of one's balance. If we allow ourselves to be sensitive to the strangeness of the world, there are numerous things to stumble upon: In conversations, media, books, advertising, consumer objects, architecture, and everyday episodes and situations. Usually, these are not simply given, as "data," but, at certain times, they may cause us to stumble—and thereby *become* data. On such occasions, we should, as qualitative researchers, allow ourselves to stay unbalanced for a moment longer than what is comfortable, for this is where we may learn something new. If something is ever "given" in a human life, it is when something presses itself on us in a way that makes us stumble (2014, 724).

In the context of this research, creating situations of misfit by placing ourselves outside is an operation aiming at facilitating stumbling into data, in this case, data about bodies and their interactions with their environment. Brinkmann closes his article by arguing that "objectivity" might signify "stumbling upon objects", and that the loosest designs of qualitative research might allow for a better experience of stumbling. That is, as the methodology to collect data becomes more constrained and as we frame the data in increasingly rigid theoretical frameworks, we do not allow objects to object in ways that makes us stumble (2014, 724), and we might miss the opportunity to find ourselves in the place of broken expectations from which research starts. Instead, we need a method of inquiry that allows for a diversity of embodiments, materials, and places; a method that focuses on the qualitative dimensions of experience, facilitates introspection and reflection about embodied meaning, and enables the transformation of our experience.

Art and the epistemology of practice

In *Embodied knowing through art*, Mark Johnson argues that knowing is a process that transforms "experience to enrich meaning, open up new connections, and help us harmonize our experiences", a process that begins when what we know is not adequate and we need to reconfigure our patterns of behaviour, and that art is one such process of knowing particularly focused on the qualitative dimensions of experience, allowing us to probe the meaning of an experience and explore the way the world is and might be. He concludes that "arts research would be an inquiry into how to experience and transform the unifying quality of a given experience in search of deepened meaning, enhanced freedom, and increases of connections and relations" (2010, 146–50). Art, then, is a method of inquiry that fulfils at least two of the requirements outlined in the previous section: a focus on qualitative experience and a goal of transforming experiences.

In the context of the epistemology of practice, art may be operationally defined as technique aiming to transform the unifying quality of a given experience that structures individual artistic practices. This narrow definition of art as technique allows us to move between artistic disciplines as needed during the inquiry by thinking about them as strands of technique

sharing certain characteristics (tools and materials used, for example) with permeable boundaries between them. This permeability allows us to address the requirement for loose designs supporting diverse embodiments and materials while facilitating a focus on strands of technique that privilege the body as the primary tool and material for practice, thus addressing the final requirement, that of introspection and reflection on embodied meaning.

Given this context, how does art work as a method of inquiry? To answer this question, it might be productive to elaborate on the relationship between art and cognition, in particular the embodied approach to cognition I have discussed previously. In *Art and Cognitive Evolution*, Merlin Donald offers an overview of the cognitive principles of art, its origins and its cognitive function, framing art as an activity arising in the context of human and cognitive evolution, reflecting the complex cultural-cognitive domains that emerge from the interaction between individual human beings and their communities (2006, 3). In other words, art is a kind of participatory sense-making involving a reflection on the context in which it takes place[10]. He constrains the domain of interest by using

> the word *art* to refer to a wide class of expressive forms and media, including music, dance, theater, various multimedia categories (such as opera and cinema), painting, sculpture, aspects of the built environment, and architecture. The word can reasonably be extended to include most forms of written literature. I do not include any of the broader applications of the word art—as in, for instance, the art of mathematics, engineering, baseball, or carpentry (Donald 2006, 3).

This conceptualisation of art maps to my previous interpretation of art as technique: each expressive form is a strand of technique characterised by certain tools and materials, all of them aiming to both transform our experience and explore how such a transformation may be achieved. Donald further constrains the notion of art by offering seven principles that characterise it: (1) art is a kind of cognitive engineering, (2) art is always created in the context of distributed cognition, (3) art is constructivist, (4) art is metacognitive, (5) art is a technology-driven aspect of cognition, (6) the role of the artist is not fixed, and (7) art is always aimed at a cognitive outcome (2006, 3–7). Each of this principles, in turn, may be mapped to aspects of the epistemology of practice and the research approach described by Brinkmann. Let us unpack these relationships:

1. *The creation of experiences*. When Donald describes art as cognitive engineering, he is referring to the idea that art is an activity purporting to influence what we know through the "deliberate construction of representations that affect how people (including the artist) view the world" (2006, 4). These kind of constructions are possible by structuring experience in ways that allow for joint and reciprocal control of attention of the participants, through performing certain operations using specific tools upon chosen materials. Art as technique is the knowledge that structures whatever practice strives to this deliberate creation of experiences aiming to influence us. In the context of research, the experiences are created with the specific goal of addressing the research question and the influence they attempt to exert is expected to drive us as researchers to stumble upon data.
2. *The here and now*. In his second principle, Donald argues that "human cultures can be regarded as massive distributed cognitive networks, involving the linking of many minds, often with large institutional structures that guide the flow of ideas, memories, and knowledge" and that artists create in this network, deriving their ideas, tools and materials from it, operating within its constraints, while changing the network itself by modifying its images, symbols, and other expressive forms through their actions (2006, 4). We have already discussed that technique is transmissible and that practice is situated. Transmission occurs through repetition of actions and messages encoding those actions in whatever codes are available to do so. Practice depends both on the interpretation of those messages and how actions are repeated and, in turn, this depends on the specific situation in space in time where practice occurs. Those distributed cognitive networks are both the substrate through which the transmission of technique happens and part of the environment that situates practice.
3. *The moment of misfit*. Due to the situatedness of practice, the technique that structures it may become inadequate; our expectations regarding the possibilities of technique are broken and we begin to search for ways to modify existing technique to account for the novel situation. This process is always constructivist, that is, it depends on the situation in which knowing occurs, it builds on previous knowledge and integrates it with the novel situation, generating new knowledge. This process occurs both at the individual and group levels: individually, sensations are integrated into increasingly abstract constructs that, in turn, interact with the shared constructs available in distributed cognitive networks and modify them. Art, according to Donald, is constructive in this sense, it

[10] In this discussion, cognition refers to the broader bodily-dependent process by which an organism interacts with their environment and enacts a particular world of meaning.

elaborates and refines mental models and worldviews (2006, 4); it is this constructive nature that makes it a suitable tool to support abduction in inquiries dealing with uncertainty.

4. *The feedback loop*. Donald's fourth principle asserts that art is metacognitive both at the individual and group levels. Processes of artistic creation and their results make us reflect on themselves, that is, both on its creator and the distributed cognitive network that supported its creation. Because of this, art plays a "crucial role as a collective vehicle for self-reflection and as a shared source of cultural identity" (2006, 5). Practice, by virtue of situated nature, is always testing the limits of the technique that structures it, forcing a constant reflection on that knowledge. The transformation of experience afforded by moments of misfit depends on the capacity of practice to critique its technique, expand its boundaries and change it. Art as technique is continually contested by individual artistic practices and the situation in which they occur. Regarding research, this implies that the process of inquiry itself can be an object of reflection through the vehicle of art.
5. *The tools of the trade*. Art is a technology-driven aspect of cognition, argues Donald, because technology affects what can be represented and how it can be represented, thus affecting the possibilities of artistic expression and "the kinds of cognitive networks artists can construct, in part by setting limits on the kinds of ideas and images that can be represented and created" (2006, 5). As I have discussed before, knowledge is first and foremost embodied and bodies are the primary tools of knowing. Because of this, I would move away from the notion of technology and its implicit non-bodily nature and reframe this principle to say that art is a materially-driven aspect of cognition, and that this materiality includes our own bodies as both tools and materials for artistic creation. In this way, we include body diversity as a factor that affects artistic expression and extend Donald's assertion that "technology can actually alter the properties of the distributed cognitive systems of society and change the nature of the cognitive work being done" (2006, 5) to say that the materials of practice, including our bodies, alter those properties and modify the nature of the cognitive work. Bodies, then, may be the primary tools and materials of research.
6. *The malleability of art*. The sixth principle asserts that the role of the artist is not fixed. Instead, the characteristics of the distributed cognitive network, in particular those of network memory, become relevant in determining the parameters of any artistic process. These parameters include the role of the artist in that process, because the artist is never working in isolation but immersed in the network. Technological innovations such as "writing systems, new graphic media, and external memory systems can change the kind of art, and the range of worldviews, that are possible because they influence memory itself, through both the media of storage and the pathways of retrieval" (Donald 2006, 6–7). The properties of the network define a set of affordances and constraints upon artistic endeavours and, as the networks changes, so do the possibilities for the kind of reflective participatory sense-making we are considering art. In other words, art as technique changes because what we can reliably do as art is modified. Thus, those changes affect what is considered art and, by implication, who is an artist. This opens up two possibilities for artistic research: to use this form of inquiry in domains outside traditional art, and to allow non-artists to research using art as technique.
7. *The transformation of experience*. Finally, Donald argues that conceiving of art as a kind of cognitive engineering means that it is always aimed at a cognitive outcome. Artworks, he says, "are specific kinds of cognitive machines. Their major social functions are cognitive: they influence memory, shape public behavior, set social norms, and modify the experience of life in their audiences" (2006, 7). Beyond the artwork as concrete, objectual manifestation of an artistic process, I would argue that the artistic process itself is a kind of cognitive machine for transforming our experience that, in turn, facilitates the kind of transformation that produces new technique. In the case of research, the cognitive outcome of the artistic process should be oriented to the aims of the inquiry and address the breakdown of expectations that originated it.

We have discussed how given a practice of interest, there is a context in which the technique that structures said practice becomes inadequate and we need to develop new technique adequate for that context. To develop new technique, we require methods that allow for exploring and testing new technique through practice in the context of interest, methods that both refer to the breakdown of expectations and the subject matter. In the case of this research project, the practice of interest is professional theatre and the context in which its technique becomes inadequate is the context that emerges when we consider diverse embodiments. Old technique, in this case, is built around the assumptions of body normality and neutrality we have already discussed. New technique needs to account for body diversity and the method of inquiry we require should account for it too, being flexible in terms of who can participate in practice and who can research, of where and when both practice and research occurs, of how results should be discussed and reported, and of what materials are available for the inquiry. The relationships described above encapsulate how art may work as a method of inquiry in this research: not as a specific discipline but rather as this materially-driven knowing process that strives to transform our experience through reflecting upon our broken expectations in a given situation. The openness of such a process in terms of embodiments and practical pathways for research may facilitate the disability-based approach to research I have been discussing.

Outsiderness

The question of how to move through or shift a (supposedly clear-cut) boundary between two social categories underlies this research. In this case, there are two boundaries that need to be considered: between the domain defined by the ideology of ability and the perspective of disability; and between the domain of theatre and its practitioners, and everyday practice and lay people. These boundaries also intersect and define more constrained domains: theatrical practice by nondisabled performers meeting the expectation of body 'neutrality'; theatrical practice by disabled performers excluded from traditional spaces; everyday practice by lay people conforming to body 'normality'; and everyday practice by people with non-conforming embodiments. The inside/outside comes from the interaction between the location of a person and the boundaries, that is, where the person is located in these domains: the domain where one is located as the inside and the other domains as the outside. This is further complicated by the fact that researchers and their research questions may be located in different domains. For example, I consider myself a nondisabled, lay person regarding theatrical practice, interested as a researcher in the creative possibilities of the domain of non-conforming embodiments in theatre. As such, I am located outside my domain of interest and I need to either move in or blur the boundaries in order to conduct my inquiry. I cannot simply move in because I would be both appropriating the experience of disability and feigning practical expertise in a disciplinary context where I have none. Instead, I may attempt to move towards those domains, without ever moving in, trying to blur the boundaries so I can explore the foggy epistemological interstitial spaces.



2. My location as researcher in the domains defined by the ability/disability and everyday/theatre boundaries

Misfit, both as a notion and as lived experience, offers the possibility of blurring these boundaries. Moments of misfit may occur during an attempt to move inside from the outside because an outsider will always have distorted expectations of the inside and, inevitably, they will experience misfit. A reflection and analysis of each experience should bring the researcher either closer to the domain of interest or question the boundary they are attempting to cross; in any case, the boundary will become blurred for the researcher during the process. Figure 2 depicts a map of the domains created by the disability/ability and theatre/everyday boundaries, and their intersection. It also shows my location as researcher and the possible exploratory movements I can attempt during my inquiry: move towards the context of theatrical practice and 'neutral' bodies, move

towards the everyday lived experience of disability, or move towards theatrical practice by disabled performers. Each of this attempts would blur aspects of each boundary. I may try to contest what we understand by ability by modifying the environment and showing how 'normal' bodies may stop conforming at any given moment; or I may try to find the theatrical in everyday settings by exploring the performative aspects of diverse embodiment. In general, this operation of moving in, reflecting and blurring is the core of the methodology I use in this research, a process of knowing characterised by these general steps:

1. Locate ourselves on the outside
2. Attempt to move towards the inside
3. Induce a moment of misfit
4. Explore our experience, stumbling into data
5. Reflect and analyse
6. Reformulate the boundary between inside and outside
7. Repeat

Following Oxman's antidisciplinary hypothesis stating that "knowledge can no longer be ascribed to, or produced within, disciplinary boundaries, but is entirely entangled" (2016), I would argue that this kind of research can be characterised as antidisciplinary. Due to the nature of the research topic and my location relative to it, my process of inquiry is not constrained to a specific knowledge domain but rather it should flow freely between several of them. According to the antidisciplinary position, as knowledge changes in one domain, it causes changes both abrupt and subtle in other domains, and a single person may reside in multiple domains at the same time, gaining expertise in epistemological flexibility while losing expertise in a particular domain. Antidisciplinarity is characterised by the randomness, fluidity, situatedness and materiality of its processes. In this case, the steps I outlined previously are a guiding template for my practice as researcher, a practice that, I venture, will unfold in several knowledge domains at the same time. At the beginning of this research process, the first step is a given as I am firmly located outside my domain of interest. I am originally a computer scientist and software engineer and thus I bring my original knowledge domain and its methods to bear unto the inquiry. As needed, I have to incorporate methods from other disciplines, matching and mixing then to provide me with the new tools I require to succeed in my attempt of blurring the boundaries, both those between epistemological locations and those between disciplinary methods.

As I have written before, self-reflection is an important part of the research process and the consolidation of these steps as a template is an example of this. We, software engineers, love to think we are quite structured in our approaches to design and develop software. And, while it is true that we have formal methodologies in place and we tend to use them, it is also true that sometimes we feel a rush to dive in into the problem, to start probing the solution space with small snippets of code. This rush caused my first approach to immobility and theatre to fail: I devised a solution from my perspective as naïve-outsider and skipped the methodological guidance offered by my own discipline. I realised my mistake only when I stopped and reflected about the process I had followed to devise that solution. I concluded that the way forward was to go back and support my inquiry in the methodological frameworks from my discipline. In other words, my practice as software engineer—that is, the set of actions I could perform in search of a solution, chosen from the domain of actions available for me in the context of my discipline—should be informed by a constant reflection upon those actions and their effects on the inquiry.

That first act of self-reflection was later informed by theoretical readings about research methods in art and the first blurring occurred: the software design methods I am familiar with could be mapped to the more abstract model of research offered by the Iterative Cyclic Web model proposed by Smith and Dean (2009, 19–25) to guide research processes involving artistic practice. Devising, implementing, testing and modifying software became devising, implementing, testing and modifying experiences using technological tools. That was my first attempt of moving towards the inside of my domain of interest and the first blurring of the epistemological and methodological boundaries. The rest of the research process has been a repeat of this operation, as structured by the steps outlined above. Being outside offers me the advantage of not knowing anything beforehand and liberates me from the constraints of old technique in each context. As I need to learn about them as I attempt to move inside, I explore their territories through my actions as outsider, refining at each step the tools I can use in, and how I leave traces of, the inquiry. This process of self-reflection, supported by the traces of the inquiry, must be constant to avoid falling in three major traps: ignoring disciplinary-relevant language and concepts, ignoring potential methods of approaching the inquiry; and appropriating insider concepts as my own.

How to move towards not-moving

The epistemological space of research depicted in Figure 2 is further complicated by the specificity of immobility as an impairment, and the resulting disability experience. This means that there is another boundary that has to be addressed in my research, that between moving/not-moving. In the case of that boundary, I am located outside the not-moving domain as I have no movement or mobility constraints, yet I am interested precisely in that domain. So, I need to account for this boundary and perform exploratory movements towards it. Figure 3 shows the extended research space, including the new boundary and the eight domains that emerge from the intersections of the boundaries: (1) everyday moving ability, (2) everyday not-moving ability, (3) everyday moving disability, (4) everyday not-moving disability, (5) theatre moving ability, (6) theatre not-moving ability, (7) theatre moving disability, and (8) theatre not-moving disability. In this new model, I am located at domain (1) and want to explore domain (8). Just as with the previous model, I may attempt to move to adjacent domains to explore and blur different aspects of the boundary. For example, from (1) to (2) to explore how not-moving embodiments may fit during everyday practice; or from (1) to (4) to explore how not-moving embodiments experience misfit and what kind of everyday practice emerges from that condition. In all cases, there is at least one boundary that has to be blurred as I explore each inside domain, so it might be useful to elaborate on the operations available to perform this blurring.



3. My location as researcher in the domains defined by the ability/disability, everyday/theatre and moving/not-moving boundaries

Boundary 1: ability/disability

In the case of this boundary, we can refer back to the notion of disability as complex embodiment, that is, the ongoing interaction between bodies, their environments and how they affect each other mutually. As this interaction unfolds, there are moments of fit and misfit, and whether one body experiences misfit or not depends both on their characteristics and the characteristics of their environment. Then, we can imagine fit as a function of body and environment: changes in either of them will modify the experience of fit. That implies that to explore this boundary, we might perform operations that change our embodiments, change our environments or both. The goal of these operations would be to contest the simple binary of the boundary and explore its dynamics, and how to navigate from fit to misfit and back.

Boundary 2: everyday/theatre

I am outside the domain of professional theatre practice because I have not been professionally trained in theatre. This means that the technique that structures my professional practice is not theatrical and, from the perspective of the domain of theatre, we may count it as part of everyday technique. Yet, the boundary between everyday and theatrical technique is not necessarily clear and their knowledge is transferred between them. Spatz argues that, as technique is embodied, whatever theatrical technique a professional performer acquires ends up affecting their everyday practice and thus their everyday technique; and vice versa (2015, 151–52). If we frame this boundary in terms of Sauter's model of the theatrical event, we might say that whether an action is considered as structured by everyday technique and theatrical technique depends on the context that action is performed in and whether such action is part of a shared coded between actor and spectator. To blur this boundary, we have to modify the context in which actions occur, change the shared code, or both. We might attempt to move performances out of traditional theatrical spaces and into everyday spaces, develop repeated performances where everyday actions are imbued of extra-daily meaning, or change the way actors and spectators interact.

Boundary 3: moving/not-moving

Following Sheets-Johnstone, I have introduced movement as a process of energetic exchange that unfolds in space and time, an ever-present negotiation between body and environment (2011, 82:123) and that movement is an epistemological dimension of living bodies, the primary way in which organism make sense of their worlds (2011, 82:428). Then, if all living bodies move, what does this boundary separate? What is not-moving? These are core questions of this research because, in this case, I have to map the simple, naïve boundary between moving and not-moving and find ways to blur it. This implies that the first exploratory operations that come to mind will be probably wrong: sitting still for hours, devising contraptions to constrain my movements, and locking myself down in an empty room are merely addressing the surface of a complex phenomenon. In this case, I would separate the operations required for working in this boundary in two: those that trace the boundary and those that contest it.

Intersections

Finally, blurring all boundaries should enable the more complex attempt, that of moving towards the domain of performing non-normative bodies in theatre, in particular immobile bodies. In this case, the data we stumble upon during those previous explorations should facilitate devising new operations that blur more than one boundary at the same time. This blurring of boundaries should help me move closer to the epistemic location of interest while keeping me outside to avoid claiming a position that is not mine to claim. The frameworks offered by Sieber's complex embodiment and Sauter's theatrical event should provide a guide to probe the moving/not-moving boundary with these merged operations. We may, for example, modify our embodiments to create a new shared code of theatrical actions performed in everyday settings to explore how moving becomes not-moving and vice versa.

Tracing the inquiry process

The loop of research described above is only possible through the reflection and analysis step. Without it, there would be no way to reformulate the boundaries and devise new operations for exploring the epistemological domains we are interested in. The reflection and analysis step, in turn, depends on the tools we use to leave traces of the inquiry process. While undertaking this research, I have used several tools to map my exploration of both the theory and practice of theatre, the concept and the experience of disability, and the dynamics of moving and not-moving: seven work journals, since I started my doctoral studies, trace my attempts to approach the domain of theatre from my initial outsider location; one doctoral dissertation journal traces my efforts to grasp the malleability of the notion of movement in the contexts of theatre and disability; several photographic series materialise my exploration of the relationship between stillness and mobility, and how our expectations shape our perception; audio recordings of non-verbal singsong and of conversations and their transcripts,

provide traces of attempts to communicate experiences of misfit; this document itself is the final trace of the process and its goal is to materialise the inquiry process as a whole, following the hybrid text technique of combining first- and third-person accounts of the research, as proposed by Jillian Hamilton in her Connective Thesis model (2014, 371). These traces offer a haphazard historical map of the research and I constantly referred back to journals, photographs, audio recordings and this document. I built upon the knowledge encoded in them, used them to clarify concepts and reformulate the boundaries of my own research practice. It was through them that I realised my initial theoretical approach would be inadequate to address the question I had posed, that I had already begun a practical process of inquiry that needed to be merged with the theoretical exploration.

LEMMA 1: MOVEMENT IMPLIES SPACE



Figure 1. Emergence of space due to the movements of the agents during development. If one agent is beyond the reach of the other, it does not exist for that agent. (Arrows represent movements)

4. Lemma 1: movement implies space

LEMMA 2: SPACE AND MEANING ARE INEXTRICABLY RELATED



Figure 2. Relationship between the movements of an agent and their coupling with their environment. Black arrows are agent movements, green arrows are external stimuli caused either by the agent movement or other causes.

5. Lemma 2: space and meaning are inextricably related



6. Lemma 3: experiential space is part of meaning

LEMMA 4: NORMALITY IS SHARED MEANING



Figure 4. Normality as shared meaning. (a) shows the body configuration space and how the normality threshold and the reference body define a reference group. (b) shows the interaction of meanings of bodies from that group.

7. Lemma 4: normality is shared meaning

Monkeys and apes solve the world alone; we do not
(Donald 2006, 14)

On artistic influences

Our practice is always embedded in, and interacts with, a specific context and it is important to acknowledge such context when explaining our actions. In the case of this research, my practice has been influenced by artists working in theatre, photography, music, sculpture and design. Their work has informed both my theoretical approach and my practical explorations; it has contested the boundaries of what I felt comfortable doing and, as a result, it has expanded the epistemological spaces in which I operate. This section is an attempt to frame my work in the context of previous artistic practice and to trace the conceptual threads that pull my references together that provide the foundation of my research.

Samuel Beckett: *Krapp's Last Tape (performed by Robert Wilson)*

In January 2018, I had just finished the first half of my doctoral formation and was about to embark on the actual research project when my advisor suggested I should attend Robert Wilson's performance of this play[11]. I had seen some of his work on video and I was aware of his interest in movement and how he slowed down actions to create a particular aesthetic, I was not prepared for the experience. At one point, the younger Krapp's voice floats from the tape and says "extraordinary silence this evening, I strain my ears and do not hear a sound" (Beckett 2006, XX). In my case, I noticed an extraordinary stillness, I strained my attention and caught no movement. Yet, Wilson was moving.

8. Robert Wilson as Krapp, about to eat a banana ("Krapp's Last Tape — Robert Wilson" n.d.)

Krapp's Last Tape is a one-act play written by Samuel Beckett in 1958 and performed for the first time that same year. It is a monodrama where one actor has two main voices: the current old Krapp, and an earlier 39 years old Krapp. The play handles the interplay between these voices using a tape recorder as a device that summons the younger voice when the older man puts on a tape and starts playing it. The setting is sparse, an illuminated area with a table where the tape recorder waits, a chair, and beyond the light, barely visible, shapes that suggest an archival cabinet. The initial action sequence is wordless and shows Krapp wandering around his den, almost mindlessly pacing around while eating bananas. The written text describes pauses, repetitions and, knowing Krapp is old, we can imagine slow movements:

[11] Robert Wilson is "among the world's foremost theater and visual artists. His works for the stage unconventionally integrate a wide variety of artistic media, including dance, movement, lighting, sculpture, music and text. His images are aesthetically striking and emotionally charged, and his productions have earned the acclaim of audiences and critics worldwide" ("About — Robert Wilson" n.d.).

> Krapp remains a moment motionless, heaves a great sigh, looks at his watch, fumbles in his pockets, takes out an envelope, puts it back, fumbles, takes out a small bunch of keys, raises it to his eyes, chooses a key, gets up and moves to front of table. He stoops, unlocks first drawer, peers into it, feels about inside it, takes out a reel of tape, peers at it, puts it back, locks drawer, unlocks second drawer peers into it, feels about inside it, takes out a large banana, peers at it, locks drawer, puts keys back in his pocket. He turns, advances to edge of stage, halts, strokes banana, peels it, drops skin at his feet, puts end of banana in his mouth and remains motionless, staring vacuously before him. Finally he bites off the end, turns aside and begins pacing to and fro at edge of stage, in the light, i.e. not more than four or five paces either way, meditatively eating banana. He treads on skin, slips, nearly falls, recovers himself, stoops and peers at skin and finally pushes it, still stooping, with his foot over the edge of the stage into pit. He resumes his pacing, finishes banana, returns to table, sits down, remains a moment motionless, heaves a great sigh, takes keys from his pockets, raises them to his eyes, chooses key, gets up and moves to front of table, unlocks second drawer, takes out a second large banana, peers at it, locks drawer, puts back his keys in his pocket, turns, advances to the edge of stage, halts, strokes banana, peels it, tosses skin into pit, puts an end of banana in his mouth and remains motionless, staring vacuously before him. Finally he has an idea, puts banana in his waistcoat pocket, the end emerging, and goes with all the speed he can muster backstage into darkness. Ten seconds. Loud pop of cork. Fifteen seconds. He comes back into light carrying an old ledger and sits down at table. He lays ledger on table, wipes his mouth, wipes his hands on the front of his waistcoat, brings them smartly together and rubs them (Beckett 2006, XX).

Wilson stretches this initial action for minutes. Taking out the banana is a long drawn affair, slow to the point of distraction. I drifted away from watching his arm and started paying attention to the light on the table. One or two seconds passed and then I heard a scream. It was Wilson, pulling me back to his body, the banana held high above his head. I was not paying attention directly to his arm but I was peripherally aware that he had not moved quickly. Thus, it was impossible one or two seconds had passed. Given the speed he was moving when I drifted off, I estimate that I had been distracted for almost a minute. During the rest of the initial sequence this phenomenon repeated on several occasions. Wilson's actions were extremely slow and my attention drifted, only to be pulled back to his body by some sudden action that made me realise my internal time and the external time were out of sync. Later, when Krapp starts playing his tapes and listening to his younger self, actions are not as slow as in the initial sequence, but the sense of time dislocation remains and permeates all the dialogue between old and young Krapp. When the play finished, I was unsure of how much time it had elapsed since it began. I was not even sure of being aware of every action that happened on stage; I felt that my perception was a malleable material in Wilson's performance.

On my way home I realised that Wilson was never still yet I saw him motionless. His trained body, master of his muscles, was capable of slowing the flow of an arm away from his chest to the point of apparent immobility[12]. At several points during the performance, I was surprised by how far he had moved because I was not aware of his movement. The slowness of his actions was pushing my attention away from his body and, as a result, I perceived those actions as stillness. I felt this phenomenon was related to Lepecki's microdance but there was something else at play: my perception of the microdance was not fixed at some discrete level of attention but it flowed, and its fluidity was contingent on the actions of the performer. Whether I perceived specific actions as movement or not depended on the qualities of those actions and how they interacted with my perception. Sometimes, the qualities pulled me into the movement and became aware of minuscule translations. Sometimes, the qualities of the action pushed me away and I became oblivious to anything but the most coarse, big displacements. The focus of my attention shifted back and forth between Wilson's actions and the stage, influenced by the qualities of the movement associated to those actions.

Besides bringing forth stillness or motion, another consequence of the shifting focus of attention was an increasing sense of confusion regarding time. Its usual flow was altered: in some occasions several minutes felt condensed in seconds, while in other occasions a couple of seconds felt like minutes. When Wilson slowed down his movements to the point where I lost track of it and focused my attention elsewhere, the time I perceived as related to those movements condensed while the time

[12] This was possible because Wilson has exquisite control over his movements. There he was, and old man playing an older man that was supposed to be frail and slow yet the body playing him was quite the opposite. And there, in the flesh, was the paradox described by Sandahl, the exclusion of disabled bodies from performing themselves (2009, 260).

I perceived as related to sounds expanded, for example. Inner time and external time became dissociated. About this, Wilson explains that

> Time in the theatre is special . . . We can stretch it out until it becomes the time of the mind, the time of a pine tree moving gently, or a cloud floating across the sky and slowly becoming a camel, then a bird . . . The time of my theatre is the time of interior reflection (qtd Innes and Shevtsova 2013, 161)

Wilson's performance played with my awareness of what constitutes motion or stillness at any given moment. It altered my chronotopical experience by toying with my sense of time and its relationship to movement. My experience of time became dissociated between an internal flow that moved at a familiar rate and an external flow with a variable rate that slowed and accelerated and sometimes matched the inner rate. This dissociation affected my perception of Wilson's movements and I became aware of his actions in those moments when the rates matched, only to lose track of them again. The careful control of his actions on stage made me aware of a kind of perceptual threshold that I traversed back and forth; on one side, movement, in the other, stillness. It is obvious that we are aware of the movement of others if we perceive it but less obvious is the idea that our perception of that movement is contingent to its qualities and the level and focus of our attention upon it. My experience attending Wilson's performance of *Krapp's Last Tape* helped me realise that contingency and the existence of a fluid perceptual threshold between motion and stillness.

Danielle Wilde: *Swing That Thing*

The first time I entertained the possibility of exploring the intersection between disability, art and technology came while working on the first eye-tracking assistive communication device with Alberto Vega. We were in the middle of the design phase, testing different screen layouts and pushing the boundaries of what the device built-in software could manage. We had reached a dead end and I started writing small pieces of software to test different approaches to interpret the device raw data. One of those tests was a crude generative painting tool that produced inkblots that followed Alberto's gaze. Around that time, I had the opportunity to attend the International Conference on Disability, Virtual Reality & Associated Technologies 2010 in Viña del Mar, Chile. There, I went to a keynote by Danielle Wilde about a research project on the poetic possibilities of extending the body using technology[13]. I was moved to talk to Danielle about our project. She later visited our lab and offered suggestions about our approach to the issues we were facing. Her keynote and those conversations were illuminating.

Her keynote centred on *Swing That Thing: moving to move*, a practice-based research project that examined "how extending the body with technology might extend our 'poetic' and 'expressive' potential" (Wilde 2010, 164). From that project resulted four systems for exploring and experimenting with that potential:

1. *hipDisk* is "a wearable self-contained sonic output system for performance and play that exploits changing relationships between hip and torso to actuate simple tones" (Wilde 2010, 183). It consists of two disk placed just above and below the waist with sensors on each disk that produce crude poor quality tones when they touch. The sensors are located on the outer rim of the disk, equally spaced and the only way to touch two sensors is to move hips and torso to bring the disks together. Playing several tones implies a bizarre sequence of unfamiliar movements.
2. *gesture≈sound* are experiments that "extend the body with sound to mesh physical with sonic composition. The aim was to support a kind of kinaesthetic-auditory synchresis, where sound production becomes an inherent and unavoidable consequence of moving the body" (Wilde 2010, 185). It is a system similar to *hipDisk* but in this case the sensors were smaller, discreet and did not constrain the usual motion of the body, allowing for freedom of movement. The sound quality of the output was also higher, using complex algorithmically generated sounds.
3. *Light Arrays* is a "modular system that supports a range of gestural explorations. They are not interactive per se, they simply extrude from the body to provide a visible and seemingly tangible extension that doesn't interfere with movement" (Wilde 2010, 187). This extension is possible with a set of lasers worn on the body, thus extending the wearer's body with light and amplifying their gestures. Small movements of the spine become wide sweeps of light across space, reaching further that our usual tangible space.
4. *hipDrawing* is "a body-worn system that includes a garment and projection wall that combine to turn the wearer into a 'human Etch A Sketch'" (Wilde 2010, 188). The wearer has to move their hips through space to draw on the

[13] Danielle Wilde is Associate Professor of Embodied Design at the University of Southern Denmark, Kolding (SDU). Her research "aims to understand how designing with, for and through the full sensorial richness of the human body might transform how design and living unfold in a more-than-human world, positing human embodiment, the climate crisis and the 6th mass extinction as interdependent material issues" ("About | Danielle Wilde" n.d.).

wall and shake their body up and down to erase the drawing board and start a new drawing. Like *hipDisk*, it forces bodies to move in unconventional, strange and unfamiliar ways to translate their intentions to concrete drawings on the wall.

9. People using the hipDisk and enjoying the experience ("HipDisk — Danielle Wilde" n.d.)

A common characteristic of these devices is that they produce situations where the wearers cede some control over what results from their actions and, in turn, increase the unpredictability of the experience. They facilitate this by moving the focus of attention of our bodily actions away from our fingers and hands, the typical body parts that act to compose music or draw, to our core bodies. Wilde explains that as the control we have of it is coarser and clumsier than that of the fingers, for example, the wearer has to focus more on their body that their actions and this causes the wearer's attention to shift between their body, their gestures and the affects of physical engagement (Wilde 2010, 178). This lack of control and refocusing of attention on our bodies produces an altered sense of embodiment that brings awareness to the changing ways our bodies and space interact and

> engage wearer and observer in an ongoing, evolving process of creation, reflection and construction, as a direct result of interaction between body movement and the effects of technology (Wilde 2010, 175)

Beyond exploring the poetic and expressive potential of technologically extending the body, *Swing That Thing* also brings to the fore questions about which are the boundaries of our bodies, about what constitutes a body, and about what a body can and cannot do. While the devices seem designed around nondisabled typical bodies, they demonstrate an approach on how to build systems that amplify the details of movement and help us attend to its qualities regardless of the particularities of embodiment. A *hipDisk* requires moving hips and torso but its concept may be transferred to bodies that may only move their heads by placing the disks on the head and the neck; or the *gesture≈sound* experiments may be implemented by using only the eyes as the source of movement. I think that this transferability of the ideas underlying each device is possible because they are designed to create moments of misfit for the wearer and, as I have argued before, misfit is a connecting point between the disabled and nondisabled experiences. Furthermore, by facilitating an experience of misfit and allowing for playfully exploring it, the devices set wearers and observes up for surprising moments of broken expectations regarding

how we move and what happens when we move. We might say that they break our old technique of moving and force us to create new technique by playfully exploring our altered embodiment.

10. Stills from a Light Arrays video ("Light Arrays I — Danielle Wilde" n.d.)

Teatro de Chile: *Rey Planta*

When I tell people in the Chilean theatre community about my research, most of them ask if I am aware of the play *Rey Planta* by Teatro de Chile[14]. Thanks to their suggestions, I am aware of the play but unfortunately, I have not attended any performance. I am basing my observations on a video recording made during its first run on September 4th, 2006, the traces of the creative process available in the company's archive[15], and several conversations with its director, Juan Pablo Peragallo. First staged in 2006, the play "is a monologue whose protagonist is a king in 'vegetative state'. He cannot move or speak, he is trapped in his body, and we can only hear his voice" (Teatro de Chile n.d.). People feel that, because the connection to Alberto's situation seems obvious, it should help me answer my research question. It does help but not by the reasons assumed by my interlocutors. The play is an interesting counterpoint to this research project as an example of the opposite approach to immobility in theatre: instead of exploring the possibilities of immobility from a disability perspective, it uses the disability related to immobility as a symbol for something else, a narrative prosthesis. Nevertheless, the play offers a productive approach the question.

The king is played by two actors, Cristián Carvajal as the Body and María Jose Parga as the Voice. Carvajal is inside a glass case, sitting in a chair during the whole performance, motionless and almost still with only small movements of this mouth and eyes. Parga voices the monologue from a separate room while watching Carvajal on a TV screen. Similar to the case of Wilson-as-Krapp, this is an instance of Sandahl's paradox. In this case, however, the paradox is more evident: the mobile Carvajal requires a high level of bodily control to perform the immobile Body. It was such a feat that Carvajal won an award for his performance in the play[16]. Why not a disabled actor? The participation of an immobile actor in this play might have provided a richness to the performance directly related to their embodiment, opening up lines of inquiry regarding the

[14] Teatro de Chile is a Chilean theatre company formed in 2001 "motivated by the need to generate creative processes focused on experimentation and scenic research" (Teatro de Chile n.d.).

[15] In a commendable effort, the company documents their creative processes and archives all those traces in a publicly available website.

[16] Best Actor of the Year 2006 (Art Critics La Segunda newspaper)

materiality of immobile bodies on stage, a research project aligned with the company's stated motivation (Teatro de Chile n.d.).

While immobile characters have been part of other plays[17], what is interesting about *Rey Planta* is that the king is explicitly coded as disabled and the scenic operations used are an attempt to present, from the outside, his particular experience of disability. From the play's approach to immobility we might tease out operations that could support theatrical explorations of how immobile bodies may perform. Using the recorded performance as reference, I identify the following operations of interest: (1) amplification of small motions by focusing light on certain body parts, thus pushing our attention towards them; (2) suggestion of motion by lighting changes and the resulting play of shadows; (3) addition another layer of separation between the Body and spectators by adding the glass enclosure, thus suggesting several levels of confinement and motionlessness; (4) dissociation of body and voice to translate the inner space of the king to the external space of the stage.

11. A mobile actor playing an immobile character (Teatro de Chile n.d.)

In some cases, the light-based operations play with our perception by producing a series of static frames that replace each other with enough speed to suggest motion. At one moment, for example, the light shines on the left of the face and in the next it shines on the right side, and the rapid change creates a sense of motion of the face or the head. In other cases, shining light on specific body parts amplifies the small movements they perform by providing a frame that helps us notice them and their richness. The expectation of movement we have in Western theatrical performances is broken by the king's motionless body and his glass enclosure, and we are exposed to a different kind of movement provided by the changes in lighting. The separation of Body and Voice introduces us to another type of motion, one that occurs in the inner space inhabited by the king and made external by that separation. The Voice refers to actions that are not performed by the Body on stage but are nonetheless occurring somewhere, actions that imply motion in some space not readily accessible by ourselves as spectators yet open to us through the testimony of the Voice. For example, when the Voice says "and I inside, in the faces I make, smile to him" (Teatro de Chile n.d., 13)[18] we are presented with the possibility of an inside location where some being resides and acts. The detachment of Voice from Body becomes an starting point for exploring this inner space but the

[17] Fernando Pessoa's *O Marinheiro* and Samuel Beckett's *Play* come to mind.
[18] "Y yo por dentro, en las caras que pongo en mí le sonrío" (Spanish original)

operation falls short as it relies on the verbal narrative of Voice to provide references to the actions but not the actions themselves. It occurred to me that what I needed were similar operations to externalise the inner space but focused on facilitating a non-verbal, embodied access to the experience of locked-in embodiment from the outside in order to explore the possibilities of immobility.

Mowry Baden: *Seat Belt* devices

Sieber's notion of complex embodiment was central to a 2015 art exhibition called *The Flesh of the World*. The exhibition was curated by Amanda Cachia in Toronto and presented works by twenty-four artists, works that elaborated on the idea of art and diverse embodiments. Cachia's goals were "to draw the viewer into a new understanding of adaptation, in the hopes that the primitive idea that disabilities must be overcome can slowly be erased" (Cachia 2017, 68) and to disrupt the ideals of ostensibly correct form, shape, and movement ingrained in art history, both through audience interaction and observation at the level of horizontality" (Cachia 2017, 73). From the description offered by Cachia and the archival material, I became interested in the *Seat Belt* devices, three sculptures by Canadian-based artist Mowry Baden[19]: *Seat Belt, Three Points*; *Seat Belt with Concrete Block*; and *Seat Belt with Pole and Two Straps*. These sculptures are designed as seatbelts anchored to different centre points that rotate around each centre while operated by the audience, sometimes with an obstacle placed on the floor in the path of the person using the device. About these devices, Baden explains that they shift perception away from the primacy of vision towards non-visual senses that allow the person to experience a complex sensory challenge to the way they move (qtd Cachia 2017, 73–74).

12. A person using one of the Seat Belt devices ("Seat Belt, Three Points — Mowry Baden" n.d.)

[19] Mowry Baden is an sculptor interested in the internal awareness of movement. He has developed "various methods of decentering vision and interfering with habitual human gestures. He has built harnesses, furniture, rooms, pathways and catwalks, all with the goal of impinging upon the viewer's movements and awakening a physical self-awareness that was previously unconscious" ("About — Mowry Baden" n.d.)

The *Seat Belt* devices provide an experience of altered embodiment by subtly constraining the movements of the person strapped to them, step by step rendering the familiar experience of moving around quite strange and then familiar again, as people grow accustomed to the shifting constraints. These altered circumstances open epistemological spaces about embodiment; people using the *Seat Belt* devices generate new knowledge about their bodies and how they move. Cachia argues that using the devices turns people attention towards an experience of complex embodiment and that

> the sense-motion of traveling in a circle while strapped into a device that modifies movement offers new knowledge. The adaptations the body makes under these new ambulatory circumstances are necessarily creative and inventive, for one must learn how to navigate space differently: physically, cognitively, and multisensorially. One may come to appreciate newly discovered bodily skill, form, shape, and gesture, or revel in the choreographic possibilities under this new corporeal regime that blends together objects, bodies, and space in a dynamic, evolving environment (Cachia 2017, 74)

A compelling characteristic of the *Seat Belt* devices is their simplicity: some seat belts anchored to a primary central point on the ground or a pole, with secondary anchors that forming a triangle, and another seatbelt extending further from the centre to provide a connection point for the user. In the case of *Seat Belt with Concrete Block*, there is another constraint in the form of a grey block of concrete lying on the floor at one point along the circular path, thus creating an uneven surface. This simple design produces moments of misfit by altering the embodiment of the user and foregrounding the experience of moving around the block, shifting their attention to the surprise at the modified motions, to the control lost to the device, and to the dynamic nature of space and its relationship to the movement of our bodies. These sculptures are playful defamiliarization devices that create moments of misfit and provide insight into the experience of complex embodiment.

They also offer an example of (almost) body-agnostic devices for establishing a specific experience of misfit as a common reference point for sharing experiences among diverse embodiments[20]. When a walking person repeatedly encounters the obstacle during their experience with *Seat Belt with Concrete Block*, their heightened attention to their embodiment while facing the block and being forced to find a different way of moving becomes a moment of misfit that may be shared with a wheelchair user that faces similar experiences in their daily life. This opens up possible lines of dialogue between the walking person and the wheelchair user that are anchored in embodied knowledge provided by the experience of misfit facilitated by the device. These devices illustrate one way to implement the methodological approach of this research; they facilitate processes of embodied knowing that blur the boundary between the disabled and nondisabled experiences by enabling defamiliarization and foregrounding the contingency of the relationship between our bodies and our environment.

John Cage: *Silence*

Silence is a collection of essays and lectures written between 1939 and 1961 by John Cage[21]. The book works both as an information source on the topics Cage wrote about and as a guide to the performance of reading it. There are instructions about how to read passages, the expected duration of passages, unfamiliar typesetting and layout options to provide a frame for experimentation, repetition of words and sentences to create rhythm, and blank spaces for silent pauses. In several places the content itself becomes self-referential and creates a sense of mirror-on-mirror infinite reflection. Furthermore, much like Cage's *4:43*, the book provides a frame for potential meaning to be found in interstitial spaces, in this case between words, in the blank spaces of the page and in the things not written.

Printed words are static, motionless ink on paper. Yet, by reading them, aloud or silently, they move. Cage's instructions and the layout of the book are devices that create the conditions for experiencing the potential of movement inherent in the written text. The alterations to the typical typesetting structure of a book makes us focus on the details, amplifying the effect of white space and orthographic signs. The repetition of a word renders it meaningless and lets the contours of its written form or its spoken sound emerge. Repetition works to blur familiar signs and highlight the potential hidden in their form and their surroundings.

> In Zen they say: If something is boring after two minutes, try it for four. If still boring, try it for eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and so on. Eventually one discovers that it's not boring at all but very interesting (Cage 1973, 93)

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[20] I write "almost" because the sculptures are built on certain assumptions about mobility and bodily configuration. While they may be modified to accommodate other kind of bodies, they were designed to be used by upright walking bodies.

[21] John Cage was a composer, artist and philosopher; he is considered to be one of the most influential musicians of the 20th century.

Silence, as a book, presents a manipulation of the material substrate of the printed word to reveal meaning beyond the words themselves and makes us reconsider what a book is and is for. It is, in book form, the result of the same operation performed in *4:43*, an alteration of the materiality of expression that foregrounds the interstices in order to break our expectations about the form of expression itself and forces us to reflect on it. If we consider stillness as an interstice between movements, *Silence* offers a guide for attempting operations that alter the material substrate of the theatrical event in order to explore the relationship between immobility and acting. I venture that both Wilson's *Krapp* and *Rey Planta* are examples of such alterations. In *Krapp*'s case, Wilson's slowness is akin to the broken sentence structures filled with blank spaces found *Silence* and their effect is similar: a dissociation between the flow of the action and our sense of time. In the case of *Rey Planta*, separating Voice and Body is analogous to interspersing a thread of coherent text among contextually irrelevant sentences and blanks in the book. These examples raise further questions about what kind of material alterations may be impinged upon the theatrical event to explore immobility.

Hiroshi Sugimoto: *Theaters*

Long exposures are a characteristic of Japanese photographer Hiroshi Sugimoto's early work; his photographs reflect an interest in the nature of time and the relationship of its fluidity to the static quality of photographs. He began his *Theaters* series in 1978 after asking himself what would happen if you shot a whole movie in a single frame. He imagined a shining screen as the answer (Sugimoto 2016a). Each photograph in the series was taken in a movie theatre in a single exposure while the movie played; each shining screen contains the whole motion picture in a single frame. The white rectangle that dominates the picture is filled, at the same time, with the promise and the memory of a motion picture. We might say that the whole movie is happening in one instant, a fixed point brimming with possibility.

13. Sugimoto's "U.A. Play House, 1978" (Sugimoto 2016b)

I found Sugimoto's theatre photographs around the same time I found Cage's *4:43* and it was inevitable to connect both. In one case, the silence helps us shift our perception and amplifies otherwise unheard sounds while, in the other case, the long exposure of each shot blurs the traces of all the images in the movie. One reveals, the other hides. Yet, they create a similar effect: where the musical piece used the seeming emptiness of silence to provide a substrate for any and all sounds to emerge, the photographs offer the uniform white rectangle as the substrate where any and all images are possible.

> To watch a two-hour movie is simply to look at 172.800 photographic afterimages. Through sheer excess, the dead afterimages seem to come alive again. Since ancient Egyptian times—no, since the birth of civilization itself—the human race has been fascinated by the idea of resurrection. I wanted to photograph a movie, with all its appearance of life and motion, in order to stop it again (Sugimoto 2016a)

Theaters showcase an approach to immobility that is the opposite of amplification. Instead of directing our attention to specific micromotions, Sugimoto accumulates movement in a photographic palimpsest that produces stasis out of motion or, maybe better, forces motion back into stasis. These photographs literally depict Lecoq's fixed point and, in them, we see the immobile in what moves.

Samuel Beckett: *Not I (performed by Billie Whitelaw)*

This play is a short monologue written by Beckett in 1972. The text is full of repetitions, pauses, broken sentences and it is intended to be performed as fast as possible. The stage is mostly empty darkness except for a minuscule spot of light shining on an almost disembodied floating Mouth and, sometimes, a barely visible figure clad in black, the Auditor. As the curtain opens Mouth is speaking, almost inaudibly at first and gradually raising her volume. The Auditor, if present, remains still except for some motion of the arms when indicated. The staging usually follows Beckett's directions from the original performances but the written text leaves open much to interpretation.

> *Stage in darkness but for MOUTH, upstage audience right, about 8 feet above stage level, faintly lit from close-up and below, rest of face in shadow. Invisible microphone.*
>
> *AUDITOR, downstage audience left, tall standing figure, sex undeterminable, enveloped from head to foot in loose black djellaba, with hood, fully faintly lit, standing on invisible podium about 4 feet high shown by attitude alone to be facing diagonally across stage intent on MOUTH, dead still throughout but for four brief movements where indicated. See Note.*
>
> *As house lights down MOUTH's voice unintelligible behind curtain. House lights out. Voice continues unintelligible behind curtain, 10 seconds. With rise of curtain ad-libbing from text as required leading when curtain fully up and attention sufficient into:* (Beckett 2006, 376)

The play was first performed in November 1972 with Jessica Tandy in the role of Mouth. She wore a hood and was dressed in black. She was enclosed in a box and her head strapped in place to keep it from moving and shoving Mouth out from the spotlight. She describes her experience as terrifying (Bair 1978, XX). Beckett was not satisfied with the performance as he wanted the text delivered even faster than she did. He explained to Tandy: "I am not unduly concerned with intelligibility. I hope the piece may work on the nerves of the audience not its intellect" (qtd Brater 1974, 200). The next version was performed in January 1973 with Billie Whitelaw in the role of Mouth. Whitelaw had already worked with Beckett and she managed to achieve what he intended, delivering the text as a barrage of sounds, words blurred into aural shapes that suggest meaning beyond content. This version introduced a chair where the actress was strapped and her head fastened between two pieces of rubber to keep Mouth illuminated. Whitelaw was entirely dressed in black, with her face covered in fabric, and blackout makeup around her mouth. There is a video recording of this performance, with Mouth filling the frame and giving a more visceral and raw visual sense of the unstoppable speaking Mouth, in contrast to the small Mouth floating on the big dark stage (BBC Two 1973).

14. Still from a film recording of Billie Whitelaw performing "Not I" (BBC Two 1973)

There are operations of amplification and accumulation in *Not I*. In some ways, the blurring of the spoken words approaches the accumulation of traces in Sugimoto's theatre photographs; we hear a buzz that ebbs and flows and seems to contain all words in it. In other ways, the blurring is offset by the repetition of words and then their shape and meaning come to the fore of our attention, surrounded by pauses that both frame them and are framed by them, pauses that are then filled with potential. The characteristics of each word are amplified beyond their meaning, as the performance makes us focus on the aural qualities of the spoken word. As a result, meaning almost becomes an off-hand matter that is a present but not quite perceived menace. There is also amplification of motion, either by closing up on Mouth in the video version or by the choice of spot lighting on the Mouth, a choice that "enlarges the illusion of movement autokinetic phenomenon created when concentrating on a bright object darkened room" (Brater 1974, 190). This amplification of motion is also produced by the still dark emptiness surrounding Mouth by simple contrast; and also by contrast to the almost still Auditor when they are present.

A further important characteristic of typical stagings of this play that is not readily perceived by the audience is the constraining and enclosing of the actor playing Mouth. The straps, the chair, the fixed head, the forced position to comply with the unforgiving demands of the spotlight all work to create an embodied experience of immobility that is reflected on the performance and felt by the audience. Whitelaw refers to this empathic connection to the play when she says that "many writers can write a play about a state of mind but [Beckett] actually put that state of mind on the stage in front of your eyes" (BBC Two 1973). Along with the delivery of the text, this creates a situation of immobility in both inner and external space: Mouth cannot move away from its place and she cannot move away from its emotional state.

> When I first read it at home I just burst into tears because I recognised the inner scream, perhaps that's not what it is, I don't know but for me, that's what I recognised—an inner scream in there and no escaping it (Whitelaw in BBC Two 1973)

I argue that the technical requirements of the spotlight generate a disabling situation for the performer. The environment imposes obstacles to movement, it demands compliance with a posture and thus it is only satisfied with a particular way of being in the world. There is a body suggested beyond Mouth but the staging does not care for it, we are left to wonder about what kind of body is it and about the possible ways it interacts with the world; the only clues come from Mouth, both in the things she says and how she says them. We are also left to ponder the relationship between agency and the body. Is Mouth someone? Is Mouth speaking for someone? Is Mouth human? The play alters our expectations of what constitutes a subject and what subjects have voice. It also alters our expectations of movement on stage by restricting every motion to a body part and hiding the rest. It is also a performance that requires high levels of control, once again, to play what may be described as

a disabled character. Unlike *Rey Planta*, however, *Not I* places concrete constraints on the body of the performer and forces them to focus all their energy in controlling the torrent of words coming out from Mouth.

Samuel Beckett: *Not I (performed by Jess Thom)*

Jess Thom is a disability activist and theatre-maker with a double life as a superhero whose only power is Tourettes[22]. She established Touretteshero as an alter ego and a project that aims "to celebrate and share the creativity and humour of Tourettes in an accessible way, with the widest possible audience" ("FAQ | Touretteshero" n.d.). Her artistic work springs from her conviction that Tourettes is a source of imaginative creativity and a way for prying open spaces where disabled people are excluded from. For her, the turning point came when attending a show by comedian Mark Thomas. She alerted Thomas and the theatre and they were prepared for her verbal tics, they introduced her to the audience but other people complained and threatened to leave. During the intermission she was asked to move to a sound booth, separated from the rest of the audience by a glass wall. She describes the experience as humiliating and she felt that she "didn't have the right to be there in the same way as other people" (Thom qtd Greiving 2016). The experience, however, became the catalyst for her work as a performer. In an interview recorded during the 2016 Dublin Theatre Festival, she states:

> In terms of performance and theatre, and taking to the stage, that was a direct result of having an experience of exclusion and discrimination which made me almost self-select away from theatre totally and turn away from theatre and feel that wasn't a place for me. It felt like an experience I could not or should not access, because it was damaging to me. It didn't just speak about theatre, it was about everything. (biscuit) But the slightly rebellious side of me and the creative side of me and the fact that I was supported by collaborators, and friends and family to see that there was a different way that I could respond, creative ways I could respond, was to occupy that space as an artist , and make a show that revealed (biscuit) some of those invisible barriers within our cultural spaces ("Jess Thom on Accessibility and Dublin Theatre Festival 2016 (Audio Described) - YouTube" n.d.)

15. Still from a video recording of Jess Thom performing "Not I" (British Council Arts 2017)

[22] Tourette Syndrome or, colloquially Tourettes, is one of the neurological conditions knows as Tic Disorders, all of them characterised by involuntary repetitive movements and vocalisations. Tourette, in particular, is developmental in nature, not related to use of substances or other medical conditions and is characterised by the presence of both motor and vocal tics. The tics may wax and wane in frequency ("What Is Tourette - Tourette Association of America" n.d.).

In 2017 she performed *Not I*. Her version was "an hour long theatrical experience that explores neurodiversity and asks who is allowed to perform what, and who gets the final say" ("Not I at BAC | Touretteshero" n.d.). Her performance explicitly brought to the fore the disabled dimension of Mouth. Gone was the speed requirement, replaced by the raw materiality of a voice with Tourettes, adding another layer of repetition and blurring to the text. Gone were the bodily constraints as they affected Thom negatively, generating a vicious circle of stress and tic production. Gone was the huge dark emptiness surrounding mouth, replaced by closeness. Gone was the almost absent Auditor replaced by fully visible Auditor signing in British Sign Language, providing both another layer of text and access to Deaf people. Also gone: the traditional constraints imposed on the audience, as all performances were relaxed performances where "people who find it difficult to follow the usual conventions of theatre behaviour" are welcome ("FAQ | Touretteshero" n.d.).

The challenge of this version was to remain faithful to Beckett's vision (as determined by his estate) while breaking the expectations of who may perform the piece. Thom stayed true to Beckett's stage directions in a way that worked for her body (British Council Arts 2017). Her deceptively simple decision subverted the implicit bias about which bodies that could perform this particular play. Instead of forcing compliance from the performer, as was typical of previous performances of the play, she managed to find the interstices of the stage directions from her creative perspective as a person with Tourettes and create from there. Let us examine how Mouth is lit, for example. The stage directions state that Mouth is to be "faintly lit from close-up and below, rest of face in shadow" (Beckett 2006, 376) but they never state that the performer must be still. We may say that the stillness required of the performer was a result of the technical problem of illuminating Mouth to follow the stage directions at the moment the play was premiered, not a stage direction in itself. This was revealed by Thom's specific embodiment and the creative way the issue was solved: using a black hoodie to cover her face and a LED lamp placed inside the hoodie so that Mouth was always lit.

The hoodie lamp solution also removed the need for constraining the body of the performer, eliminating a source of stress and anxiety for Thom, and freeing her to connect her condition to the text and its delivery. Asked about what her tics feel like, she explains that

> different tics have different sensations. Some feel like I'm being yanked from the inside, others are more like a pressure building up that needs to be released, like a sneeze. Both of these feel like they're happening in a particular part of my body. The worst ones affect the whole of my body and feel like all of my insides are itching and can't be scratched ("FAQ | Touretteshero" n.d.)

Thom's performance is Sandahl's paradox solved, a disabled body performing a disabled body, not merely by being inserted passively into a character but by enriching the theatrical experience with their presence and their performance. This is evident in the relaxed nature of her performances, in the turn of the Auditor into a signer and solving Beckett's issues with the character, in the exploration of theatrical devices respectful of Thom's embodiment and the stage directions and, in particular, in the richness emerging from the congruence of Mouth as character and Thom's Tourettes. There is an inherent lack of control in the condition that goes against the typical idea of the neutral body of the performer but that meshes with Mouth as a character "struggling to recognise her own speech" (British Council Arts 2017). In the play, Mouth babbles

> what? .. the buzzing? .. yes... all the time the buzzing... so-called... in the ears... though of course actually... not in the ears at all... in the skull... dull roar in the skull... and all the time this ray or beam... like moonbeam... but probably not... certainly not... always the same spot... now bright... now shrouded... but always the same spot... as no moon could... no... no moon... just all part of the same wish to... torment... though actually in point of fact... not in the least... not a twinge... so far... ha!.. so far... this other thought then... oh long after... sudden flash... (Beckett 2006, 378)

A sudden flash, in the skull, not in the ears at all, a pressure building up, an internal itch that cannot be scratched, a flash, dull roar in the skull. Tourettes brings lack of control on top of the control required to perform, Thom's performance shows that they are not mutually exclusive but, rather, complement each other and provide support for a richer, more inclusive way of making theatre. Her solution to the question of how different bodies may perform a classic piece of theatre forces us to consider the missing opportunities of past attempts and the potential of applying a disability perspective to the whole theatrical experience.

Playfulness, embodiment and the potential for knowing

After selecting the previous works, I started looking for common threads between them and with my research. The first step of this process was assigning keywords related to my theoretical framework to each work (Table 1). Afterwards, I played grouping the keywords to get a feeling of overarching concepts that were related to the research. I repeated this process several times until I found a set of few concepts that were diverse enough to cover different aspects of the works and to provide a foundation for my practical explorations. Table 2 presents the list of keywords and the emergent concepts they are connected to.

Work	Keywords
Samuel Beckett: *Krapp's Last Tape (performed by Robert Wilson)*	alteration, physical demand, atypical, space, control, potential, amplification, movement, slowness, perception threshold, stillness, awareness, immobility, expectation
Danielle Wilde: *Swing That Thing*	alteration, physical demand, atypical, space, control, potential, amplification, movement, defamiliarisation, lack of control, experience, awareness, body part, trace, body extension, surprise, body in space, action, pre-verbal, expectation, fast, embodiment, body-worn device
Teatro de Chile: *Rey Planta*	alteration, physical demand, atypical, space, control, potential, amplification, movement, slowness, lack of control, stillness, immobility, static, inner space, symbol
Mowry Baden: *Seat Belt* devices	alteration, physical demand, atypical, space, potential, amplification, movement, slowness, perception threshold, defamiliarisation, lack of control, experience, awareness, accumulation, trace, body extension, surprise, shift, body in space, action, pre-verbal, embodiment, body-worn device
John Cage: *Silence*	alteration, atypical, potential, amplification, slowness, perception threshold, defamiliarisation, experience, awareness, emptiness, shift, pre-verbal, expectation, inner space, silence
Hiroshi Sugimoto: *Theaters*	alteration, atypical, space, control, potential, perception threshold, defamiliarisation, stillness, experience, accumulation, trace, surprise, shift, static
Samuel Beckett: *Not I (performed by Billie Whitelaw)*	alteration, physical demand, space, control, defamiliarisation, immobility, body part, fast
Samuel Beckett: *Not I (performed by Jess Thom)*	alteration, physical demand, atypical, movement, lack of control, body part, emptiness, accumulation, body extension, action

Table 1. Keywords associated with the artistic referents

Keyword	Concepts
Defamiliarisation	Play, Knowledge, Potential, Difference
Expectation	Play, Knowledge, Potential, Difference
Lack of control	Play, Embodiment, Potential
Stillness	Movement, Potential
Experience	Play, Embodiment, Knowledge
Awareness	Play, Embodiment, Knowledge
Immobility	Movement, Potential
Surprise	Play, Knowledge, Difference
Action	Play, Embodiment, Movement

Static	Movement, Potential
Symbol	Knowledge
Shift	Play, Knowledge, Potential
Alteration	Play, Difference
Physical demand	Embodiment
Atypical	Play, Difference
Space	Embodiment
Control	Play, Embodiment
Movement	Movement
Slowness	Movement
Perception threshold	Play, Knowledge
Body part	Embodiment
Emptiness	Potential
Accumulation	Knowledge
Trace	Play, Knowledge
Body extension	Embodiment
Body in space	Embodiment
Pre-verbal	Embodiment, Movement
Fast	Movement
Embodiment	Embodiment
Body-worn device	Embodiment
Silence	Potential
Potential	Potential
Amplification	Play, Potential
Inner space	Potential

Table 2. Concepts woven through the artistic referents

From this process I found six underlying concepts that connect the referenced works: (1) *Play* refers to the free exploration of unfamiliar experiences, to the ludic aspect of embodiment, to seeking out semi-controlled moments of misfit; (2) *Potential* is about the possibilities inherent in seemingly empty aspects of experience, it is about expectations and how they are built and maintained, it is also about what could be that currently it is not; (3) *Embodiment* refers to our bodies here and now, to their diversity and how it moulds our experiences, and to the ways we inhabit our environments; (4) *Knowledge* covers what we know and thus what we can do, epistemic processes based on our bodies, symbols and how they are fixed in some material and how are they circulated; (5) *Movement* refers to physical actions and to the felt qualities of those actions, to the dynamic exchange of energy; it also refers to stillness and immobility, to the fixed point; and (6) *Difference* encompasses diversity, distinction, contrast, dissimilarity, dissidence and misfit. These concepts may be merged into a foundation for the practical inquiries required in this research. I propose that we can inquire about the experience of diverse embodiments through playful exploration of their differences and, in the context of the methodology, these explorations become operations of moving-towards the domain of interest that are setting up situations of misfit that allow for the creation of new knowledge.



16. Embodied knowing through play from moments of misfit

As bodies inhabiting their environments, we live and act and, sometimes, we experience misfit. That is, sometimes there is a difference between bodies, environments or both that renders what we know, and thus what we do, inapplicable to our current situation. A gap is created, a gap of uncertainty, of ignorance, a gap full of potential, a space that may be filled by new actions, and thus new knowledge. Play offers a framework that facilitates exploring misfit due to its open-ended, dynamic and exploratory nature. As we play during/about misfit we produce new knowledge in, and from, the gap about the difference that caused the misfit. This new knowledge, as action, becomes part of our technique and we can harness this new technique to keep going on with our inquiries, closing the loop of research.

17. Alberto's Microdance



18. Space Travels: Onward

19. Eyes of Cajal: 1693

Now, here*, you see, it takes all the running* you *can do, to keep in the same place*
(Carroll 1887, chap. II)

On moving around to find the fixed point

My condition as double outsider, from theatre and disability, is also my location as researcher. As I have explained before, being an outsider is my method of inquiry and a unique opportunity from which to start my research. My lack of formal artistic training has facilitated an exploration of the domain of inquiry without following a path dictated by tradition but, rather, an exploration guided by the process of theoretical and practical research itself. There is an openness to the kind of influences, devices, and disciplines I can follow (have followed) during my inquiry that is, I believe, a reflection of the openness inherent in body diversity that lies at the core of my questions. Becoming aware of this location was also part of the research process and I arrived to it after coming to terms with the fact that the things I was calling experiments were not subordinated to the theoretical analysis but instead the practice side of a richer kind of research.

When I started my doctoral studies I approached the research project with a scientific mindset, framing the inquiry in terms of controlled experiments designed following theoretical guidelines, experiments that would yield information I could then analyse and interpret to build a theory of immobility in theatre. In that first approach, I wanted to control for body variation, location, training, and several variables using a perfectly balanced experimental design that (supposedly) would allow me to separate different threads of the theatrical experience of disability and wove them into a narrative of immobility and acting. However, as I attended and worked through the courses offered, I drifted away from this position. I realised the experimental design could not be as clear cut as I thought, that the experiments had to be flexible, open to modifications during their implementation.

Those courses offered me an opportunity to playfully engage in practice and to explore bodies in space, how they move or stay still, and what we expect and perceive of them, through different mediums: theatre, performance, dance, music, and photography. At some point, a virtuous feedback loop emerged between my theoretical work and my practical work; discoveries made through one medium were explored through another, interpreted through theory, and fed back to practice. I began to locate my research inside a tradition of artistic research by identifying the precedents of practice I wrote about in the previous section. And the unstated unifying goal of the practice emerged: to explore the dynamics of the disability experience from an outsider perspective. I tried to accomplish this goal by making artefacts and structuring that practice around several strands of art-as-technique, moving between them as the needs of the inquiry suggested. Candy and Edmonds summarise the overall dynamics of this practical research process and its relationship to theoretical explorations stating that

> through making artefacts, practitioners are able to generate questions and also to explore the answers to those questions through future making. The role of practice in relation to the research began with the generating of questions carried out in two distinct ways: in one, the starting point was to explore the literature of the field and, in parallel, to generate questions relating to practice; in the other, the questions came directly out of the basics of practice without reference to theoretical knowledge, at least in the first instance (2010, 123).

In this section I will present three experiments selected from those I undertook in my practice during the research process. I refer to these practical instances of exploration as experiments for two reasons: to keep a connecting thread from the naïve beginnings of the project to the final version; and to express the change from controlled scientific experiment to the fluid, open nature of my practical explorations highlighting the notions of experimenting, experiencing, and experience by drawing on the richness of the word *experiment* itself[23]. The selected experiments explore different facets of the disability experience and showcase the methods I have used in this research project. Table 3 presents a timeline to contextualise the selected experiments and give a summary account of the rest. The remainder of this section presents the three selected experiments in chronological order, followed by a summary of findings.

Year	Name	Description	Concepts explored
2016	*Disability Transducer**	Performance designed to translate the experiential inner space of a person with motor disability to an externally located space experienced by another person without motor disability [version 1]	Embodiment, empathy, disabling environments

[23] I am playing with several layers of meaning here, all related to testing, attempting, having experience of, and directly perceiving; to practical knowledge derived from participation, set of events making up an individual or community life, and the fact of being affected or gained knowledge through direct observation (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2019b; 2019a). Both experiment and experience, as nouns and verbs, point beyond gathering data empirically towards generating knowledge through practice.

2016	*LIZ*	Theatrical adaptation of one scene from a Chilean play using a human actor and a robot actor	Diversity, expectation, surrogate acting
2016	*Vapr*	Implementation of a software application that deletes itself after installation.	Expectation, potential
2016	*Expectation of Nothing*	Implementation of a software application that asks the user to select one of two squares (white or black), listen a sound (the same in both cases), and leave a written record about their experience of hearing	Expectation, perception, potential
2017	*Disabling Lecture 1*	Performance/lecture about disability; half the lecture was given in gibberish, some of the slides were written in fake scripts, some of the slides had not images but the lecture referenced images in them	Disabling environments, expectation
2017	*Alberto's Microdance*	Series of long exposure photographs exploring the always present micromovements of Alberto's body	Perception, stillness, movement, perceptual shifts
2017	*Disability Transducer**	Disability Transducer: Performance designed to translate the experiential inner space of a person with motor disability to an externally located space experienced by another person without motor disability [version 2]	Embodiment, empathy, disabling environments, spectatorship
2017	*Disabling Lecture 2*	Theatrical scene portraying a lecturer giving a class on evolution using fake sign language; there were no Deaf spectators	Disabling environments, embodiment, expectation
2017	*I*	Theatrical scene using a toy eye, a synthetic voice, and a movable light source depicting a disembodied entity acting	Embodiment, diversity, surrogate acting
2017-2018	*Space Travels*	Series of black and white photographs framing building details as science fiction images	Expectation, perceptual shifts
2018-ongoing	*Eyes of Cajal*	Series of black and white photographs framing trees as the neuron drawings of Santiago Ramón y Cajal	Perceptual shifts
2019	*Disability Transducer**	Performance designed to translate the experiential inner space of a person with motor disability to an externally located space experienced by another person without motor disability [versions 3 and 4]	Embodiment, empathy, disabling environments, spectatorship, participation
2019	*Misfitting Resistor**	An experiment where the subject tied one end of thread to their body and the spool at the other end was left on the ground while they went about their daily routine	Embodiment, disabling environments, misfit, resistance, expectation
2019	*Misfit Tree**	An experiment where the subject was asked to find the tree that did not fit in a well-kept public park	Expectation, diversity, difference

Table 3. Timeline of experiments

Experiment 1: *Disability Transducer*

Back in my first year I had already begun to wonder about building an empathic understanding of the experience of immobility that characterises Locked-in Syndrome; I considered using immobilisation devices but discarded the idea because I felt it was, ironically, too restrictive. My intuition was later reinforced when I found the concept of disability simulation and its detrimental effect on empathic understanding of the disability experience. A disability simulation is a performance of impairment by a person without that impairment, with the goal of experiencing what a person with that impairment experiences. The issue with these simulations is that they leave out the socially constructed side of disability experience, focusing only on the impairment, and facilitating an anxiety-filled situation where the participant is relieved to finish their simulation and thankful for not having the impairment. As I have explained before, the disability community tends to frown upon the use of simulations and have criticised them (Eames 2003; Blaser 2003; Brew-Parrish 2004; French 1992).

I was in the midst of searching for a possible solution to this particular problem when I took a course called *Scenic materialities and technologies of space*[24]. The course topic was space in theatre: how it has been understood and defined; its relationship to bodies, movement, and perception; and how it is instrumentalised in scenic devices. The course had a practical component: we had to design a scenic device that focused on the dramaturgical or performative possibilities of space and present it to our fellow students at the end of the year. I decided my work would focus on setting up a performance space that provided some empathic understanding of the experience of living with Locked-in Syndrome.

Can lived disability experience be shared?

Experience is an inherently individual and subjective affair and we might say that it is unshareable; moment to moment it is unique to a particular body in a particular location. However, how we narrate our experience to ourselves, or what our experience means to us, is based on shared cultural constructs and devices. Meaning emerges from both our experience and our embodied culturally location; meaning may also emerge through a process of participatory sense-making involving more than one body. Each one of us enacts a particular, individual world of meaning that may be shared to another person by enacting a shared world of meaning. As my interest was to build empathic embodied understanding of another person experience, I reframed the question: instead of finding a way of sharing the lived disability experience, I would search for a way to enact a shared world of meaning related to a specific lived disability experience.

How do we enact shared worlds of meaning? We have already seen that meaning is contingent on embodiment and how primary metaphors are realised in our sensorimotor systems. These metaphors may be used to construct others in successive layers of abstraction and removal from their embodied origin; each layer expanding the possibilities of interpretation and opening up space for sociocultural shared constructions of meaning based on shared corporeal characteristics (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).

In a sense, that is what is occurring here and now while you read this. While I write, I am making the assumption that we share some set of metaphors and that, when you read this, the way I wrote will elicit a response from you that enable you to make sense of the text through those metaphors, understanding it in such a way that it is close to whatever meaning I was trying to share. I have already written about participatory sense-making; reading and writing are, in a way, an asynchronous and non-local instance of participatory sense-making. We share meaning without being in the same place at the same time, through a set of metaphors built from our assumed shared corporeal characteristics.

The disability experience may, in part, be understood as an instance of sense-making in a situation of misfit. Sharing the worlds of meaning related to this experience requires considering the ways misfit is produced and through which kind of metaphors a body experiencing misfit makes sense of the situation. Given two different bodies, we need to consider which metaphors are afforded by each embodiment and how they can be mapped from one to the other. If two bodies are similar enough in terms of material and historical characteristics, then metaphors from more abstract levels may be used to create shared meaning. However, the greater the difference between bodies, we need to find the deeper embodied metaphors and figure out how to connect them in meaningful ways.

As most of the literature I have read regarding embodied knowledge glosses over diverse corporealities and seems to assume a uniform body for all human beings[25], sharing the disability experience implies moving beyond the idea of shared corporeal characteristics as the basis of shared meaning and understanding. It is not enough to assume that primary metaphors are realised in similar ways in our sensorimotor systems; instead we need to consider that there are some primary metaphors that, while realised diversely in our bodies, make sense of the same lived experiences. As the sensorimotor domain is the domain of movement, I can refer back to Sheets-Johnstone's argument regarding movement as the "familiar point of origin" of embodied meaning (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:223) and venture that primary metaphors that make sense of similar movements are the key to building shared worlds of meaning that account for body diversity.

How do we enact worlds of meaning shared between disabled and nondisabled people? My working hypothesis was that mapping the embodied metaphors through which the disabled person makes sense of their experience to the embodied metaphors of the nondisabled person and designing a participatory exercise based upon them would yield an instance of shared meaning and empathic understanding of the original experience. My intuition was that the mapping process was key.

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[24] Spanish original: *Materialidades escénicas y tecnologías del espacio* (author translation)

[25] Even in cases where diversity is mentioned, like McConachie's comments about the atypicality of certain bodies, the implications for sharing meaning when body diversity is accounted for are left unexplored.

The metaphor of transduction

Given my background in engineering, this mapping process reminded me of the concept of transduction, changing from one kind of energy to another. In general, to transduce is "to convert (something, such as energy or a message) into another form" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2019d). The process of mapping one set of embodied metaphors to another may be understood as a process of transduction: we are transducing one lived experience into another. And, as a device used to transduce is called a transducer, I named my hypothetical participatory exercise a *disability transducer*, that is, a device for transducing a lived disability experience.

Transduction as a metaphor allows for a productive inquiry about the creation of shared meaning, beyond the negative aspects of simulation. While simulation may be understood as a mapping between metaphorical domains, it is not the same mapping of transduction. In a simulation, the mapping goes to the embodied metaphors of the nondisabled body from the abstract metaphors that nondisabled bodies employs to imagine the disability experience; no shared meaning can be built through a simulation because there is no *other* body involved. In a transduction, we start from the embodied metaphors of the disabled body and map them to embodied metaphors of the nondisabled body; in this case, the metaphors Alberto uses to describe his lived experience. Furthermore, and this is something I realised after observing several versions of the disability transducer, inherent in transduction is the idea of dynamic and situated exchanges: energy changes from one form to another but that change depends on the specific conditions it takes place in.

How to transduce the Locked-In Syndrome experience

The name given to this neurological condition primes us to think about closed rooms, prisoners, constraints, and boundaries. It implies a life hidden from view, a life lived in seclusion, away from prying eyes. It is a name given from an abled-bodied perspective and carries ableist assumptions regarding the lived experience of people with the condition. I used it as a starting point for the transduction process because, beyond being the common name of the condition, I surmised that it opened up a space for contesting the assumptions in the name itself. That is, from that perspective, if we think of the mind as embodied, of the bodymind, of mind and body as different ways of understanding the same phenomenon, the locked-in condition forces us to think in terms of minds locked in bodies, as almost separate entities, one secreted away in the other, even if metaphorically. The image was too powerful to ignore so this was my starting point.

Through my contact with Alberto, I was aware that he had an active, rich, inner life; a life from which I got glimpses now and then during our conversations. Sometimes it was through his explicit comments, other times it was implied in his words or his pauses. At some point I started imagining his inner life as inner movement in contrast to his outer immobility. Once, I asked him about this and told him the story about the TARDIS being bigger on the inside. He told me that he felt an inner space, that expanded and contracted depending on his emotions, on how tired he was. He also told me that there was movement in that space, and that the size of the inner space was directly related to the sense of freedom of movement in it. He explained that there was a relationship between music and inner space; music helped expand inner space. In contrast, panic constrained the space and thus his inner freedom. Through fear, the inner and the outer began to match; through music, they separated.

Movement and space are intrinsically related; even metaphorical movement and metaphorical spaces. We make sense of the world through movement, and this implies there is a space of where we make sense. Back when I was designing the transducer, I latched onto the idea of buildings (and thus space) as an extension of the body:

> buildings are not constructions lacking meaning or aesthetic compositions; they are extensions and shelters of our bodies, our memories, our identities, and our minds… we are occupants of this world with its physical realities and its mental mysteries, and not external observers theorising the world[26] (Pallasmaa 2012, 130)

From there I found the basic operation of the transducer: transform inner movement into outer movement constrained to a space that worked as an extension of the participant's body. The next step was to characterise the locked-in experience spatially by abstracting the metaphorical relationships between mind, body and environment: the mind is locked inside the body, moving freely inside but unable to control the body; the body is located in the environment but cannot move freely, as the mind cannot control it to do so; and in the environment there are other bodies than can move freely. These relationships

[26] Spanish in the consulted edition: *"los edificios no son construcciones carentes de significado o composiciones estéticas; son extensiones y refugios de nuestros cuerpos, de nuestros recuerdos, de nuestras identidades y de nuestras mentes… somos ocupantes de este mundo con sus realidades físicas y sus misterios mentales, y no observadores externos o teóricos del mundo*" (author translation)

can be mapped to a freely moving body inside a closed space, from which it cannot escape. This, however, is not enough for a transduction as we would be merely simulating the enclosure. What is missing is the social aspect of the experience, the interaction with other people.

Alberto's main mode of communication are eye movements. He has voluntary eye control for vertical upward movements, and uses them in a dialogue with his interlocutor. The basic pattern of conversation usually is a question with a binary answer formulated by the other person, followed by Alberto either moving his eyes upwards or not. In the first case, he is answering the question affirmatively, in the second case he is answering in the negative. He can also use cards with printed letters on them, his interlocutor points to each of them in sequence; when the finger is pointing to a letter he wants to use, he moves his eyes up and the other person writes the letter down. In this way, letter by letter, a message is written. Finally, the same mechanism is used in an assistive electronic device that shows a menu showing letters in three second intervals in a computer screen and reads Alberto's eye movements. When the letter he wants is presented on screen, he moves his eyes up and the computer writes the letter in a different portion of the screen.

After his communication device was implemented and he started using it at his home, we had conversations about his experience using it as part of the follow-up process (Riveros et al. 2014). In these conversations, he referred to the process of adjusting his eye movement to the writing process. At first, he felt those new movements were 'unnatural', in the sense that they were not the usual movements of the seeing eye. Instead, the eye was moving intentionally to control a computer and this caused exertion and fatigue after prolonged use. He also referred to the difficulty of writing in this way, and how the longer he used the device, the lower his accuracy in selecting options. As time passed and he became more experienced in the use of the communication device, his reports shifted: he grew accustomed to eye movements required for writing and started feeling them as 'natural'. The threshold of exertion and fatigue also shifted, and he began spending several hours writing on the computer. Furthermore, his accuracy in selecting commands also improved over time, and he reported feeling more comfortable using the device.

All Alberto's inner activity is condensed in his voluntary vertical upward eye movement. His communication with other people is condensed in that one movement. This was the missing piece of the spatial abstraction of the transducer. The freely moving body inside the external space needed to interact with other people, in a way that explored both the richness of the inner life and its condensation in one specific external movement. My solution was to map the writing process on top of the spatial abstraction: the participant would have to write using the same tool Alberto uses but, instead of using their eyes, they had to move around the enclosed space like Alberto's eyes on the screen. This implied setting up the space in such a way to 1) place the activation switch of the writing system far away from the initial position of the participant to map the voluntary upward eye movement; 2) force the participant to go back to the initial position after activating the switch, to map the involuntary downward eye movement occurring after the upward movement; and 3) put obstacles in the path between the initial position and the activation switch, to map the fact that eyes never move in a straight line but are constantly shifting around in involuntary movements called saccades, saccades that are wider and more erratic in people with Locked-in Syndrome.

The transducer was designed as an extension of the body in space through mapping the inner space to an external enclosed space, and mapping the relationship between inner movement and eye movement to the movements of the participant inside the enclosed space while writing a text for the spectators, thus turning inside out the experience of the inner space. It has the following components:

1. A software application that presents options, one each three seconds. An option is selected by pressing a mouse button for more than five seconds.
2. A laptop computer displaying the interface of the software application.
3. A Bluetooth mouse, paired with the computer.
4. A laser-based motion detector, connected to the computer.

The transducer may be set up in any room if these conditions are met: (1) the room is big enough to place the mouse several meters away from the laptop computer and (2) the room is big enough to place obstacles between the mouse and the motion detector—people, chairs, desks, garbage cans, etc. —while restricting movement around the obstacles to reach the mouse or the motion detector. The current version of the transducer works as follows:

1. People enter the room.
2. The system is setup while people wait.
3. Once everything is in place, I ask them to write an answer to the question *What is movement?* in a piece of paper.
4. I collect the written answers.

5. I read some of the answers.
6. I ask for one participant.
7. When the participant volunteers, I ask them to come forward.
8. I show them that the mouse only works after the motion-detector has sensed movement.
9. I show them that when the mouse is active, an option is selected after pressing the mouse button for more than five seconds.
10. I place the obstacles: this can be either by moving chairs around, or by asking some people in the room to stand around in random spots between the mouse and the motion detector, and instructing them to change positions while the participant presses the mouse button.
11. I instruct everybody to be silent.
12. I tell the participant, in secret, the word they have write.
13. They start writing.
14. They may choose to quit before finishing.
15. After the participant finishes, either by writing the word or quitting, I ask everybody to go back to their places.
16. I read some of the answers.
17. I explain what is Locked-in Syndrome
18. I show a video of the eye-tracking system.
19. We discuss the experience.
20. People leave the room.

20. Nine photographs depicting a writing process with the first version of the disability transducer

Four versions

I have implemented the disability transducer four times (with one or two writers each time) in different settings. After the first version, I started incorporating changes to the transducer following my experience with each one. I modified the way

instructions were given, started giving the spectators a more active role, and stopped giving context about Locked-in Syndrome before starting the transduction process. The following tables describe each version:

Version 1

Participants	Fellow students from the *Scenic materialities and technologies of space* course and the lecturer. Two persons volunteered to write.
Location	Rectangular room used as a classroom. In the centre it has a table and chairs to accommodate about 12 persons. The furniture can be moved.
Setup	The table was placed in the middle of the room, along the short side of the rectangle. Two chairs to support each part of the motion sensor (one for the laser, other for the light sensor), the computer was connected to the sensor and to a projector placed on one side of the table. The image was projected onto the far wall, the wireless mouse was placed near this projection. Chairs were placed on the opposite wall for the spectators. The remaining chairs were placed randomly in the empty space between the table and the mouse. I did this with help from some volunteers, without explaining why at first.
Prologue	I offered some context about the transducer and the idea behind it; including a video about Alberto and his communication device.
Epilogue	We had a short Q&A session.
Instructions to the writer	Verbal step-by-step directions to the first writer on how to use the device. When these didn't work, I wrote two letters as an example of the process.
Instructions to the spectators	None.
Documentation	Video of each writer.

The participants were familiar with Alberto's story; some of them had met him before either as colleague or teacher. They knew about Locked-in Syndrome because of this and were primed to catch the metaphors I was deploying on the transducer. Because of this, while the writers reported fatigue after the process was completed and exhilaration about writing a whole word, the transduction experience they reported focused less on the embodied experience and more on abstract conceptual connections to Alberto's story and their beliefs about it. Because of this, in subsequent versions I moved the context about Locked-in Syndrome after the transduction. During the Q&A session, spectators reported anxiety about the process and the need to speak out the word being written when they guessed; this happened at least twice.

Version 2

Participants	Undergrad Psychology students from the *Clinical Neuropsychology* course at Universidad de los Andes. Two persons volunteered to write.
Location	Rectangular classroom with desks accommodating two persons each. There are about 40 desks in three columns. There is a space between the first row of desks and desk of the teacher. The furniture can be moved.
Setup	I was introduced to the class while I was silently setting up the transducer. I connected the computer to a fixed projector, placed the sensor on a chair nearby and the laser on top of the closest desk. I placed the mouse in the other side of the front space, on top of the farthest desk. I grabbed some chairs and placed them randomly across the space; I also turned around a trash can filled with paper in the middle of the space. I offered no explanation about the transducer during this process.
Prologue	None.
Epilogue	Five questions about the experience; a video about Alberto and his communication device was shown in the middle of the interview as context for some questions. Afterwards we had a short Q&A session.
Instructions to the writer	Verbal step-by-step directions to the first writer on how to use the device. When these didn't work, I wrote two letters as an example of the process.
Instructions to the spectators	I asked them to refrain from saying out loud the word being written before the writer ended or gave up.
Documentation	Video of the setting during the writing process and the Q&A session; one written interview for each participant.

The participants were not familiar with Alberto's story or Locked-in Syndrome; they had some information about motor disorders from previous classes but none reported a connection about this information and the transducer before the contextualisation at the end of the writing process. I gave the instructions verbally as in Version 1 and, just like then, this did not work as expected. I had assumed it was an issue of how they were written and explained but in this version I realised that the process was too complex to explain merely with words so I improvised a practical example. The first writer was affected by this problem and their experience was negative, they chose to abandon the writing process as they were feeling overwhelmed by the confusion. As a result of this, the experience of the second writer was better and they reported that the instruction by example was a clearer way of explaining the transduction process. Spectators reported anxiety, particularly during the first writer's turn, and some blurted out the word being written. This created a vicious cycle that did not contribute to the experience of the first writer. Afterwards, I asked them not to talk during the second writer's turn.

At the end, I presented five questions regarding the experience and their knowledge of Locked-in Syndrome, with a video shown in the middle to contextualise the last questions. They wrote their answers individually in sheets of paper that I collected for later reading. During the Q&A session, one particular exchange was illuminating to me in terms of how people were perceiving the experience of transduction and relating that to their experience of movement. One spectator was trying to explain why they thought writing by walking required a lot of work, and they described the effortlessness of sending a text message using their cell phone. I asked them to describe to me the process of sending the text message. At first, they just said that "I write the message and send it" but I pressed for a more detailed description and, as the description became more and more complex, they suddenly realised that the effortlessness was just a matter of expectation and perception. When focused on how they were sending the text message, that writing process became unwieldy, full of steps, difficult to fully grasp and explain verbally. This led me to add a new contextualising activity before the transduction, to facilitate reflection about movement and its centrality in how we experience the world.

Version 3

Participants	Undergrad Psychology students from the *Clinical Neuropsychology* course at Universidad de los Andes. Two persons volunteered to write.
Location	Rectangular lecture hall with rows of desks accommodating several people each placed on steps. There hall can accommodate around 90 people. There are narrow transit spaces between the columns of desks. There is a space between the first row of desks and desk of the teacher. The furniture cannot be moved.
Setup	I was introduced to the class while I was silently setting up the transducer. I connected the computer to a fixed projector, placed the sensor on a chair nearby and the laser on top of the closest desk. I placed the mouse in the other side of the front space, on top of the farthest desk. I grabbed some chairs and placed them randomly across the space but then I realised there were not enough chairs to create a broken path.
Prologue	Written individual reflection about movement. I collected them and read some aloud before starting.
Epilogue	I presented a video about Alberto and his communication device. Afterwards we had a short Q&A session contextualised by re-reading some of the reflections about movement.
Instructions to the writer	I wrote two letters as an example of the writing process with the device while verbalising my actions.
Instructions to the spectators	I asked them to remain silent and to close their computers, phones, etc. and pay attention to the writer. I asked some of them to fill the space among the chairs and stand in the same place.
Documentation	Scraps of paper with notes about movement collected from the prologue activity.

The participants were not familiar with Alberto's story or Locked-in Syndrome; they had some information about motor disorders from previous classes but none reported a connection about this information and the transducer before the contextualisation at the end of the writing process. In this version the change in the way instructions were given improved the experience for both the writers and the spectators. The immovability of the furniture and the lack of chairs was a happy productive accident that allowed me to modify the transducer to account for a lack of control in the environment and facilitated the participation of the spectators in a more actively embodied way. The introduction of the new contextualising activity of reflecting about movement also created a mental space in the participants that facilitated a more nuanced perception of the transduction. While the Q&A sessions of the previous versions were characterised by a focus on negative aspects of the locked-in experience, from this version the Q&A sessions were focused more on how the writer moved and negotiated the space to write. The new design also facilitated a conversation about the experience of being an interlocutor of

a person with Locked-in Syndrome, the ethical aspects of dialogue in such situations, and how people can be respectful and mindful of the time people with motor disorders need to communicate.

Version 4

Participants	Students from the *Motor Disorders* class of the Paediatric Neuropsychology Master at Universidad de los Andes. One person volunteered to write.
Location	Semi-circular lecture hall arranged like an amphitheatre, with rows of desks accommodating around 120 people. There are narrow transit spaces between the columns of desks. There is a semi-circular deep space between the first row of desks and the dais. The furniture cannot be moved.
Setup	I was introduced to the class while I was silently setting up the transducer. I connected the computer to a fixed projector and placed it on the dais, put the sensor on a desk on the left side and the laser on a desk on the right side. I placed the mouse on one of the desk from the highest row other side of the front space, on top of the farthest desk. I put some chairs on the space before the dais.
Prologue	Written individual reflection about movement. I collected them and read some aloud before starting.
Epilogue	I presented a video about Alberto and his communication device. Afterwards we had a short Q&A session contextualised by re-reading some of the reflections about movement.
Instructions to the writer	I wrote two letters as an example of the writing process with the device while verbalising my actions.
Instructions to the spectators	I asked them to remain silent and to close their computers, phones, etc. and pay attention to the writer. I also asked all of them to stand in the space before the dais, and to block the transit spaces between the desks. They were free to move around while the writer was trying to write as long as they interfered with the process.
Documentation	Scraps of paper with notes about movement collected from the prologue activity.

The participants were not familiar with Alberto's story or Locked-in Syndrome; they had some information about motor disorders from previous classes but none reported a connection about this information and the transducer before the contextualisation at the end of the writing process. The experience from this version was similar to that of Version 3 with regards to ease of instruction, positive attitudes regarding the writing process and the locked-in experience, and the role of the interlocutor in a dialogue with a person with Locked-in Syndrome. The differences between this version and the previous ones were mostly in terms of previous knowledge about disability and more nuanced discussions regarding the same topics. This was also the version were I realised I did not required a specific space, nor specific furniture to create the transduction experience and started reflecting on the how to create transducers with the minimum possible set of requirements.

Transduced experience

When I reviewed the four versions of the disability transducer, I noticed a pattern in the writers and the spectators. At first, the writer usually believes it will be easy to write the word but then, when the writing process begins, they realise it is not easy and they have to focus on how they move, where they walk, and how best to use their energy. They get tired and frustrated but, at some point, they fall into a rhythm and the later part of the writing process becomes easier. At the end, most are enjoying the process and feel a sense of accomplishment when they manage to write the whole word. While this happens, the spectators move from boredom as the process begins, to anxiety as they connect with the struggle of the writer, and then to anxiety because they have thought they have guessed the word and they want to scream it but they cannot, to a feeling of relief when the process ends.

Afterwards, when I explain what Locked-in Syndrome is and show the eye-tracking writing system, there is an audible gasp as they connect their recent experience to the situation I am introducing them to. The writers explain that their first reaction to the situation would have been despair but that their shifting expectations regarding the writing process help them imagine that being locked-in is not necessarily the end of the world[27]. This matches with Alberto's reports about how his experience of writing with his eyes changed as he used the communication device. The experience of the spectators, in turn, matches the experience of people who have not had previous contact with people with mobility impairments and meet one of them for the first time: the anxiety of contact followed by the anxiety produced by the change in the time scale of the interaction.

[27] As some people have expressed to me when I explain my research.

In both the writer and the spectator cases, the disability transducer played with expectation and scale, and their relationship to fit and misfit. What we expect is intimately connected to what we consider normal. In the context of movement, our expectations about what constitutes motion or not, impact what we think of as 'natural' or 'unnatural' movement. Furthermore, what we expect affects what we perceive, and when those expectations are broken we are forced to recalibrate our perception. This transducer points to a particular operation that breaks expectations about movement: the change of scale. We expect movement to occur at specific ranges of distance, interactions to unfold at a certain pace, and when those parameters change, our expectation is broken, and we become aware of aspects of our experience that are usually obscured by familiarity. We might argue that Alberto's report of his inner space is an expression of this shift in perception: as external movement subsides, the focus is placed on inner movement and the perceived expansion on the inner space could be merely the raised awareness of an inner space that was already there.

I consider that the transducer, in its later versions, created an empathic understanding of the locked-in experience for the writer. In the case of the spectators, I did not originally think about the implications of the transduction process in them, and I was surprised that their experience was a transduction of the experience of people interacting with Alberto. To me, this is further evidence that the transducer facilitated the asynchronous and non-local sharing of a world of meaning between Alberto and each writer. Beyond the pedagogical instrumentalisation of the transducer that occurred in the later versions, mostly due to the context in which they were being set up, I would also argue that the transductor opens up a way to explore almost theatrically the experience of being locked-in by setting up a situation which could be understood as a theatrical event in Sauter's terms. That is, a situation characterised by simultaneous activities of performers and spectators, unified in place and time, where and when performers and spectators are dynamically interconnected at the sensory, artistic, and symbolic levels. In this case, what is missing from this experience to constitute a theatrical event is the set of expressive strategies encoded in common actions (2014, 31–33). What remains to be done is to explore how the transductor accounts for, or how it should be modified to account for, each of these levels.

Experiment 2: *Misfitting Resistor*

The design of the disability transducer hinges on a strict boundary between the 'disabled' body as the source of the experience of interest and the 'nondisabled' body as the target of the transduction. While it avoids most negative aspects of simulation, the transducer still reinforces the 'disabled/'nondisabled' binary. Worse, it reinforces the privileged position of abled bodies as it places the lived experience of a disabled person in service of a nondisabled person. The issue is that even when framing disability as a complexly embodied phenomenon, there is a tendency to think of the boundaries between 'disabled' and 'nondisabled' as either fixed or discontinuous. Those boundaries, however, are fluid.

While searching for a new approach to this fluidity, I visited Danielle Wilde's design lab in the University of Southern Denmark (SDU) at Kolding. The purpose of this visit was to learn about embodied research methods and, hopefully, perform some experiments exploring the dynamic and situated nature of disability. During our initial conversation there, I explained my then current needs regarding methods, the concept of misfit and how I considered it the guiding idea of further exploration. She, in turn, offered advice about how to approach the problem through an embodied, practical, and playful stance. In particular, she shared the insights obtained in the Poetic Kinaesthetic Interface project (PKI), a project "that aims to challenge and enrich the constrained norm of body-typical to include hypermobility, physical disability, and the evolving abilities of the mature or ageing body" ("PKI | Danielle Wilde" n.d.), and a methodological tool from that project called *Lab in the Wild*, a tool that

> transplants the research in process—including the research and the researchers—into a public setting as a constantly evolving participatory exhibit. The intention is to fruitfully disrupt participant, as well as researcher expectations ("PKI Lab in the Wild | Danielle Wilde" n.d.)

As I had used an engineering metaphor for the transduction, she also suggested using my disciplinary background as an advantage and look for a new metaphor to the experience of misfit. After this conversation, she gave me access to her lab and left me to play with all the objects there; the idea was to engage materially with the concept and experience of misfit. The lab consists of two rooms, one larger than the other. In the main room, going rightwards for the entrance, I found a high desktop alongside the wall, with high stools available for sitting there; after the corner some glass panes that could be opened into an external walkway and that let the daylight in; next to them, a wall with a whiteboard and more glass panes; after the next corner several shelves occupying the wall opposite the entrance; then another corner and an indentation with more shelves, and the entrance to the other room. In the middle of the main room there are several tables of about one by two meters, with a height of about a meter and a half; these tables are rectangular, with a wooden flat surface; they have wheels and can be moved around the lab; they also have containers from top to bottom and serve as movable shelves. The

available shelves, including the tables, were filled with fabrics, threads, electronic components, wooden objects, rubber bands, pencils, pens, wires, and much more. The second room has shelves in all the walls, with working space alongside them; a big table in the middle resembling the table-shelves in the main room; a small alcove, accessed through a plastic curtain, where food research is handled. The materials in this room are mostly fabrics and food.

21. SKU Design Lab at Kolding

I chose to use the main room, as it provided me with a broad array of material options and also allowed me to reconfigure the space by moving the tables around. I had no specific goal when I started working there, instead allowing the objects I found and the space itself guide my exploration. I looked through the containers, selecting objects that I found interesting, laid them on the floor, touched them, pinched them, grouped them, pushed them around. At first, the tables were all placed together in the middle of the room, some of their sides hidden and inaccessible. I had to push them to reach the hidden shelves; this action was difficult as the tables were heavier than I expected, even with the wheels and the polished floor it was difficult moving them. I exerted myself, and had to pause several times while I explored the contents of the containers. At some point I found myself walking around the room, navigating the tables, looking for objects I had left on the floor that were now hidden in the spaces between the tables. As I pushed the tables, I had the sensation that the space was pushing back. I stopped and realised that my exertion was a trace of the path I traversed and the actions I had undertaken, that my exertion was making explicit the moment when my body in that space was starting to experience misfit. The initial playful, freewheeling exploration suddenly turned into a stressful, difficult navigation in search of objects. I went to the whiteboard and started scribbling.

What changed as I moved around the space of the lab? My body changed as the actions I performed depleted my energy, I became sluggish, started moving slowly and uncertainly. The location of objects also changed, rearranged by my actions, turning from things of interest to obstacles to be navigated. As a result, the spatiality of the lab changed: it felt constricted, my reach was shortened, I had to spend more energy than before to traverse the room. Resting while scribbling in the whiteboard, I drew small tight squiggles that became progressively larger and looser as I relaxed. My hand movements went from controlled, tiny, narrow to uncontrolled, large, broad. As I checked the whiteboard, I realised that I could interpret my experience playing in the lab as a growing impediment to my movement until it reached a point where I had to stop.

From impediment, I moved to obstruction, opposition, and reached resistance. Merriam-Webster defines it as “an opposing or retarding force” or, more in line with my need for a new metaphor, “the opposition offered by a body or substance to the passage through it of a steady electric current” (2019c). The electrical resistance of an object depends on the material it is made of, its size and shape, but also on the environment the object is situated. If we map the flow of electrical current to the flow of experience, resistance metaphorically becomes a measure of misfit. Going back to Garland-Thomson, “when we fit harmoniously and properly into the world, we forget the truth of contingency because the world sustains us” (2011, 597), that is, our experience is unimpeded and free. When we experience misfitting, this flow is interrupted.

The metaphor of resistance

I realised that resistance, as a metaphor for misfitting, provides a rich ground for thinking about the disability experience. Why? We have explained that fitting and misfitting are embodied, situated and dynamic experiences arising from the interaction between bodies and the environments they find themselves at any given moment. The value of resistance at any moment, in turn, emerges as a property of a specific object in a specific environment and it is contingent on the material characteristics of the object and the environment it is located in. Resistance in wires, for example, depends on the length of the wire, the area of its cross-section, the material it is made of and its temperature, which in turn depends on both the environment and the wire itself.[28]. We may say that resistance is also embodied, situated, and dynamic. If we think of the flow of experience as having degrees of fit or misfit that change as time passes and bodies negotiate different environments, we may map resistance as a measure of the degree of misfit a body experiences at any given moment.

Resistance also captures the dynamics of fitting and misfitting when we account for the interaction between different bodies. One effect of electrical resistance is heating due to the energy dissipated when the flow of electric current pushes against the opposition it encounters. If the resistance of the object depends on temperature, this heating causes a change in resistance; if we imagine other objects nearby, this heating will also affect them, changing their resistance. The experience of misfit of a one body may be perceived by other bodies and, in turn, affect their own experience of fitting. Imagine, for instance, the awkwardness some pedestrians experience when encountering a wheelchair user facing a street intersection without curb cuts.

We have a metaphor for misfitting that captures embodiment, situatedness, dynamics, and interaction between bodies. The notion of electrical resistance offers clues regarding the kind of operations we may perform to manipulate the flow experience towards fit or misfit. Given one environment, we could, in principle, change the material characteristics of an object and change its electrical resistance. Likewise, given one object, we could, in principle, modify environmental characteristics and change the electrical resistance of said object; a set of environmental changes would increase resistance, while other set of changes would decrease it. These environmental change include adding or removing objects from it. In the case of human bodies, we could modify the space they are inhabiting; we could modify their particular embodiments with clothing, extensions, weights, or other devices; and we could bring a diverse group of bodies to interact between them.

I feel that the metaphor of resistance seems to avoid the pitfalls of the transduction metaphor, as it focuses on the dynamics of the lived experience of fit and misfit instead of the static ‘disabled’/‘nondisabled’ binary; it opens up the participation of diverse bodies at the same level instead of placing the disabled experience in service of the nondisabled experience; and it offers a guideline for bodily and environmental modifications to explore the experience of misfitting. I wanted to test this notion, so I set out to design an experiment based on this metaphor.

How to manipulate resistance

Back to the lab. I left the whiteboard and started walking around the tables, slowly, trying to recapture the feeling of impediment I experienced before. The space felt wide again and I moved freely until one of the front pockets of my trousers got caught in a corner of a table. I felt a jolt, my step was cut short, and I wheeled around a bit. I stopped, freed the pocket, moved back, and kept walking, even more slowly. I circled the table and tested the distance between its corners and my pockets, I tried bumping my leg against them. I tried to replicate the misfit I experienced while moving around by making things protrude from my body; either by walking around with my arms extended, or by placing long objects on me. I tried both options but they became tiresome after a bit, my arms got tired of being up or keeping things in place upon my body.

I looked around the lab for something else and I found a spool of thread I had left on the high desk. This spool was about thirty centimetres high, ten centimetres diameter at its base, and the thread was a bit over one millimetre wide. It weighed about half a kilogram. On a whim, I tied the end of the thread to one of the belt loops of my trousers and let the spool fall on the floor. Afterwards, I continued walking around, checking other objects, going back to the whiteboard to take some notes, while the thread unspooled. Soon, the thread got tangled in several places and started pulling back, making my walk more difficult. I tried moving back, retracing my steps, avoiding the use of my hands to untangle the thread, navigating the space in different ways, attempting to find which paths hindered or facilitated my movement. The spatiality of the lab

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[28] The mathematical formula for electrical resistance expresses these relationships. For example, the resistance of a wire of uniform cross-section is expressed by $R = \rho\, L/A$, where R is resistance, L is the length, A is the area of the cross-section, and ρ is the resistivity or specific electrical resistance of the material. This last term expresses the relationship between materiality and environment by connecting the material properties of the object and its temperature at the moment of interest using this formula: $\rho = \rho_0[1 - \alpha(T - T_0)]$, where T_0 is the a fixed reference temperature, ρ_0 is the resistivity at that reference temperature, α is an empirical parameter obtained by direct measurement, and T is the temperature at the moment of interest.

progressively felt more constricted, my reach was again shortened. I became aware of the turns I took, the pieces of equipment that hung out and turned into potential hooks into which the thread might get caught. I untangled the thread and repeated the experiment two more times and, at the end, I also noticed that each step of the path I took was a choice, and that each choice had different consequences.

The interaction between my body, the thread, and the lab captured the dynamics of the misfit experience. The history of my choices was materialised in the thread and I had to physically contend with it at every moment as I progressed. As the thread unspooled, it reflected my path and the choices I made while moving around the lab, it became a trace left by my body and it accumulated a history of interactions in space. The shape the unspooled thread formed was contingent on where and how I walked, the objects I encountered, and the spatial configuration of the lab. I could circle back and meet the thread again, facing my past choices, entangling them with my present. As history accumulated, the physical properties of the thread manifested this accumulation as an opposing force and pulled me back, imposing paths, forbidding others. Going back to Garland-Thomson, she explains that

> embodiment—our particular "shape" in the broadest sense—is always dynamic as it interacts with world. As such, embodied life has a narrative, storied quality; the shifting of our shapes knits one moment to the next and one place to another. Bynum's concept of shape carrying story introduces temporality into encounters between body and world, in a narrative that by definition connects moments in space into a coherent form we call story. The idea that shape carries story suggests, then, that material bodies are not only in the spaces of the world but that they are entwined with temporality as well (2011, 595–96).

The thread helped me materialise the metaphorical resistance, this interaction between body, space and time that lies beneath the experience of fit and misfit. Furthermore, the thread helped me foreground the dynamics of the misfitting, facilitating a focus on the changing shape of experience as I moved around the lab. Trying to move ahead against the pushback from the thread immediately increase the felt resistance, while tracing back my steps and trying another route decreased it. Nevertheless, in all my trials there was always a moment where some threshold was crossed and I was unable to decrease resistance below it. In some cases, I was even blocked from moving further and forced to stop and handle the thread. The thread was a tool to manipulate resistance by changing my embodiment, thus affecting interactions with my environment, while making explicit those interactions.



22. Resistance and the flow of lived experience

Building a resistor

Following my experience in the lab, I designed a new experiment based on the spool of thread as a tool to manipulate resistance and the experience of misfitting. To name it, I used the concept of resistor, an electrical component that implements electrical resistance, and chose *misfitting resistor*. This experiment was designed as an embodiment change to be realised in a public space by one participant and documented by another; its goal was to explore the dynamics of misfitting in a daily life setting when the contingency of fitting was foregrounded by the altered embodiment. From my experience in the lab I expected the resistance to increase progressively until forward movement became impossible, and I hypothesised that the thread would disrupt other people in the environment and cause shifts of resistance in them and the participant. I also hypothesised that the attitudes of people around the participant would mirror some negative attitudes towards people with disabilities: stigma, paternalism, or discrimination.



23. Whiteboard notes about the design process of the misfitting resistor

A misfitting resistor requires two voluntary participants: the Researcher, a person who will perform the role of researcher, guide and document the experiment; and the Unspooler, a person who will tie the thread to themselves and drag the spool around while moving around a selected location performing context-appropriate actions. The experiment requires the following components:

1. A spool of thread weighing about half a kilogram; big enough to bump against things in the ground but small enough to be dragged behind with little force.
2. A lab coat or some garment that identifies the Researcher as such and helps them performer their role.
3. Tools to document the experiment as it is performed and its debriefing; these may be notebooks, photographs, sound recordings, sketches, etc.

The resistor may be set up in any location as long as both Unspooler and Researcher agree on it. Ideally, the experiment has to be performed for as long as possible to allow the flow of experience to be affected by the movement in space and the changing conditions of the environment. However, the experiment may be cut short any time if any the participants chooses to or the experiment has led to a situation that is dangerous to them. The current version of the resistor works as follows:

1. The Researcher and Unspooler agree on the two documentation methods: one to be used during the experiment, other to be used in the debriefing.
2. The Researcher proposes a location to the Unspooler.
3. The Unspooler agrees or proposes a different location.
4. They discuss until a location is agreed upon.
5. The participants move to the selected location.
6. The participants agrees upon an expected duration for the experiment.
7. The Unspooler ties the thread to some part of their bodies, garments, or mobility devices.
8. The spool is dropped to the ground.
9. The Researcher moves away from the Unspooler and observes from a distance.
10. The Unspooler goes around performing context-appropriate actions. That is, if they go to a supermarket, they may try to buy groceries; if they go to a library, they may browse the shelves, fetch books and read them; if they walk on the street, they may enter buildings, etc.
11. The thread may not be cut.
12. The thread may cross over itself.
13. The thread may not be handled unless it becomes unavoidable to handle it.
14. The Unspooler may retrace their path.
15. The Researcher documents the experiment.
16. If someone approaches the Unspooler, they may interact with the newcomers but the Researcher needs to be close enough to understand and document the interaction.
17. If necessary, the Researcher may intervene and explain the purpose of the experiment.
18. When either the time ends or any participants wants to stop, the experiment ends.
19. The participants gather and choose a spot to have the debriefing session.
20. They move to the selected debriefing spot.
21. The Researcher debriefs the Unspooler and documents the session.

After I sketched the experiment, I discussed the design with Danielle and we decided to perform it on a public space in Kolding. We agreed that she would perform the role of Unspooler and I would perform the role of Researcher. We conducted two versions of the experiment in the same morning, one in a supermarket and the other in a commercial pedestrian street. For both versions, I will present a table describing each one and offer my recollection of them as I recall them now. Afterwards, I will present a transcription of the combined debriefing session, followed by some conclusions regarding the missing resistor experiments.

Version 1

Participants	Danielle Wilde as Thread Unspooler; the author as The Researcher.
Location	Netto, a supermarket in Kolding.
Setup	I wore a white lab coat marked with the SDU logo, I carried a small notebook and pen to take notes and I had a photographic camera hanging from my neck. The Unspooler tied the spool to her bag. I told her the rules of the experiment, then she let the spool fall to the ground after we entered the supermarket. We proceeded to buy some groceries.
Prologue	None.
Epilogue	Brief conversation about the experience, the interaction with customers and employees, and whether or not to try the experiment on the street.
Instructions to the Unspooler	List of rules.
Instructions to the spectators	None.
Documentation	Notes and photographs taken during the experiment, sound recordings of the discussion. Also, sound recordings of the Unspooler as she used her voice to map her experience, and the sketches she made during as I recorded her.

I remember that

> navigating the aisles of the supermarket was easier than we expected. The nature of the task we were performing—buying groceries—meant that we followed a simple path through

them, guided by the layout of the supermarket and, while the thread got tangled a few times, it never got stuck. I expected a supermarket to be full of protruding objects ready to oppose the thread but, instead, the thread sort of ebbed and flowed. I lost sight of the spool of thread while we kept on walking. Customers either smiled as we went along, or ignored us. When we reached the till to pay for the groceries, an employee caught up with us, handed the spool of thread to Danielle and, smiling helpfully, told us that "you dropped this". When we thanked her and told her it was an experiment, her attitude changed, she frowned and told us that we could not do that there. We smiled, paid and left the premises. Outside the supermarket we wondered about the change in attitude and how it may have been affected by her perception of us as customers first, then trespassers. We discussed if we should try the experiment again; we decided to go to the main commercial pedestrian street which was nearby.

Version 2

Participants	Danielle Wilde as Thread Unspooler; the author as The Researcher.
Location	The pedestrian portion of Jernbanegade, a commercial street in Kolding with restaurants, stores, supermarkets, and other assorted businesses.
Setup	I wore a white lab coat marked with the SDU logo, I carried a small notebook and pen to take notes and I had a photographic camera hanging from my neck. I also used a measuring tape to measure some distances during the experiment. The Unspooler tied the spool to her bag. We reviewed the rules of the experiment, then she let the spool fall near the start of the pedestrian street. We proceeded to walk around.
Prologue	None.
Epilogue	We went to a café to discuss the experiment and document the results.
Instructions to the Unspooler	Verbal delivery of the rules.
Instructions to the spectators	None.
Documentation	Notes and photographs taken during the experiment, sound recordings of the discussion. Also, sound recordings of the Unspooler as she used her voice to map her experience, and the sketches she made during as I recorded her.

I remember that

the pedestrian portion of Jernbanegade is three blocks long, and goes East-West. We stood at the eastern end, Danielle dropped the spool and we started walking westward. As we walked, I stopped occasionally to measure the distance from Danielle to the nearest point of thread entanglement, or to measure the distance from her position to the nearest obstacle. She wanted to show me a bookstore located in south corner at the end of the beginning of the second block. The street has benches, bollards, rubbish bin, and trees placed alongside it; people were walking around, sitting in the benches, browsing the shop windows, and standing. Also, restaurants had already placed tables and chairs outside and people were coming in and out those spaces. It was a busy street. The thread got tangled almost immediately and by the time we reached the bookstore, Danielle could not get in. She pushed forward, reached the door but could not move inside; the thread was taut and hanging at about ten centimetres from the ground. We stood at the door of the bookstore and watched as people walked over the thread and we got some mildly disapproving looks.

24. Hanging thread from the misfitting resistor on a supermarket aisle, next to a customer

25. Hanging thread on the ground next to the Unspooler in Jernbanegad

The street that forms the corner of the bookstore is not pedestrian, and cars may occasionally enter the pedestrian portion from there. As we stood on the door, a car approached the corner and attempted to enter Jernbanegade but realised that the thread was there. It stopped, the driver side door opened, a man exited the car and walked towards us. He identified as a police officer off duty and asked what we were doing. Danielle explained that we were from SDU and performing a design experiment, the cop told us that it was ok but that he needed to access the street in the car. We moved so that the thread was not taut anymore, he returned to his car and went on.

As the bookstore was inaccessible, Danielle retraced her steps and chose a different path. We kept walking westward, talking about the encounter with the cop and the increasingly disapproving looks from the other pedestrians. Some people started to follow the thread and stopped when they realised it was attached to a person, others playfully stood on the thread while it was sliding on the ground, then let it go. At some point Danielle met a friend and they stopped to chat; the thread was a bit taut and hanging at about three centimetres from the ground. I moved away from them to observe the pedestrians. On a whim, I started measuring the distance between Danielle and the people staring. Most just stared, others watched us disapprovingly. Danielle's friend left and, as we were about to resume our walk, an elderly woman reached us. She held the thread in her hands and demanded to know who we were and what we were doing. She was aggressive and confrontational. Danielle explained that we were from SDU and performing a design experiment; the woman started demanding us to either leave or cut the thread. She demanded us to produce some scissors, repeatedly telling us that "we do not this in Denmark". At this point, Danielle explained that she was a professor at SDU, that she lives in Denmark, and that she has every right to be on the street. The woman argues that the thread is dangerous, that her husband is a wheelchair user and that he may trip on the thread; as she says this she points to her husband, who is rolling through the street, passing over the thread unimpeded, in a motorised power wheelchair. The husband rolls along, passes us, ignores us, and goes about his day. The

> woman keeps telling us that "we do not this in Denmark", she threatens us with calling the police. At this point we tell her that the police is aware of our experiment and the we have permission. She relents, and leaves. We started going back, moving eastward towards the place we expected the spool to be, when we reached it we stopped. Some children approached us and smiled, they seemed curious, but their mothers pulled them back and stared at us like we were sick. A little girl came by and interacted freely with us, she was open and curious. We chose the stop the experiment as we considered we had gathered enough information.

Debriefing

After we decided to stop the experiment, we went back spooling the thread, picked it up and stored it away. It took off the lab coat and put it in my backpack, then we headed to café Danielle recommended to have our debriefing session. We sat down on the terrace and I explained that I wanted to record a voice performance of her experience, not a verbal narrative of it, but instead I wanted her to use the sound of her voice to describe the experience, whether by changes in pitch, speed, intensity, etc. She agreed and asked if she could sketch on a notepad while she was voicing, as it would help her focus. I agreed, she took out a small notebook and pen while I prepared my cell phone to record. She voiced and sketched her experience, one time for each version of experiment. Afterwards we had a conversation about the whole experience, while I recorded it[29].

While she was singing, as Danielle calls it, I was looking at how the sketches progressed. One aspect not captured in the photographs is the speed at which she drew the line, and how sometimes she held the pen at some point while making a harsh sound, similar to moaning. As I watched her, I wondered whether the pauses and moaning corresponded to places she felt stuck; I tried to trace our path together in both locations as she drew and I thought I recognised the moment when the supermarket employee addressed us, and the moment when the senior lady accosted us on the street. After she finished, I asked Danielle to describe the what she had just done:

> DW: I kind of walked through it in my brain, singing and remembering my physical feeling and sometimes I was singing and remembering the emotional feeling of what was going on, at one point, there's the scribbly bit, that's when the girl gave the string back, and in the second one, one of the scribbly bits was with the policeman, and the other scribbly bits, the big one here, was with the, um, a combination of with people just standing on it, and that was like a nice interaction, and then, you know, with that woman, and that was a combination of what that woman was like and what I was like, so sometimes it was like what it felt like on the receiving end of her, and sometimes it was like being me who was responding, and the scribble at the end, so the scribbles seem to be the interactions, and the others are the movement through space and encountering objects, but the scribbles are people, you know, at the end, it was like being looked at, with that accusatory tone, by those women, it was like "how dare you, what the hell are you doing" but kind of it was like also the interaction with the little girl who was so open and friendly […] it's funny to see the shape of them, I mean, the first one doesn't resemble the spatial thing at all, the second one does resemble it a bit…

Two things of note here. First, the act of 'walking through it in the brain' feels close to Alberto's description of how he moves through inner space. This led me to think of the relationship between the sound and the sketch, and how the harsh moaning bits could be understood as a contraction of inner space, much in the way music is related to the expansion and contraction of Alberto's inner space. It also points in the direction of common embodied metaphors to express lived experience in terms of flow and stoppage. Second, these contractions of inner space seem to reflect moments of interaction with other people. In this case, most of these interactions were negative, thus it might be worth exploring whether the contractions are related to the negativity of the interaction, or just the interaction itself.

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[29] This audio recording is transcribed in Appendix 1: Transcription of debriefing from Experiment 2.



26. Journal records of the misfitting resistor with relative positions of the Unspooler and Researcher and distance measurements to points of interest



27. Non-verbal descriptions of the misfitting resistor from Netto: sketch of the lived experience (top), spectrogram of the voice recording made during the sketching (bottom)



28. Non-verbal descriptions of the misfitting resistor from Jernbanegade: sketch of the lived experience (top), spectrogram of the voice recording made during the sketching (bottom)

We then spoke about the shape of the sketches and the fact that both of them show a U-turn at some point. I asked her if that was an expression of the space we were traversing or of the experience:

> AA: what would you say, what it is, sort of go and go back shapes turn you, what do you think about that, because I think it's interesting that you stopped, in both cases, your drawing reaches a point and then either you turn around because you want or because you can't
>
> DW: yeah but I think it's a mistake to compare them like that because Jernbanegade I went forward then I went into the shop, then I came out, and looked around, then I went up the street, then I went back and then there was that little interaction, so the Jernbanegade one is spatially coherent, but the Netto one is not spatially coherent at all, and it was more, the unfolding journey that I was on, rather than how it was spatially
>
> AA: but the experience is second in Jernbanegade, did it mirror or mimic in some way the experience at Netto? Or were they different, the feeling was different?
>
> DW: the feeling was quite different because in the first one I was negotiating structures, and it turns out the structures were sticky, the first time I went around an aisle I got caught in milk cartons, and things, so I went around the corner and got stuck around in the corner, stuck in the structure of the building, of the space, whereas the second one it was the people that I was getting stuck with, stuck on and stuck with, like a little bit with, um, you know, a little bit with the space like I got stuck with the post box and so that stopped me for going further into the shop, and then I had to come back, so I didn't, so the that car didn't go through and I had to let the cars go pass, so it prompted a very different kind of negotiation with the space, it was like, in Netto I was negotiation with the furniture, in Jernbanegade I was negotiating with architecture, like the scale was different, it was the interior architecture in the first one that dominated, and I mean, it was also very interesting because, um, it was kind of like nothing I am just tied up and walking around doing whatever and it didn't really affect what I did, but it prompted things anyway, like it, because it was nothing, it enabled what did happen, to be very present somehow, because is like tie this piece of string around you and and you know walk, go for a wander, it's like I am going for a wander, why I am walking around here, well I might as well buy you know, some lentils, and, something else, I cannot remember, some avocados, and walking in the street, is well, we're just like the eponymous flaneur, just like, flaneuring, it's not a word but you know what I mean, um, but, um, and I think, you know, in the first one it was the shelves, the stock, the products that was getting in my way, but in the second one as I was negotiating the architecture it was the people that would get in my way, it's a bit hot here

As we have discussed, we experience misfit when our bodies and our environments have a disharmonious encounter. It is interesting that the focus of disharmony is different in Netto and Jernbanegade. Netto is a supermarket, a semi-public, enclosed space with a structure that constrains the path one can use to traverse it. Jernbanegade is a pedestrian street, a public, open space with an open-ended structure that allows for many different paths to be used to traverse it. The characteristics of each space seem to shift the focus of disharmony from built structure in Netto, to people in Jernbanegade. Several questions arise from this: do built structures hide or override the effect of people on the experience of misfit in closed spaces? Do open spaces facilitate the emergence of misfit related to social interaction? In other words, how does the spatial configuration of a location affect the import of built structure or social interaction in the experience of misfit?

There was one interaction at each place that may offer insights into that relationship. In Netto, as we reached the paying till, a supermarket employee approached us and handed us the spool of thread. She helpfully told us that we had dropped it and, after we thanked her and told her that we did not drop it by accident, her attitude changed and she seemed upset. In Jernbanegade, at some point a senior lady approached us quite angrily and demanded to know what we were doing and why. Her argument was that his husband was disabled, a wheelchair-user, and that the thread would impede his movement. A sensible argument until we saw her husband, moving quite fast in a motorised, all-terrain wheelchair, ploughing through the street, oblivious to the thread and his wife having such a conversation with us. He kept going on towards their destination while she kept accosting us, glancing towards him, her outrage growing moment by moment. She wanted us to cut it, both literally and figuratively:

> DW: so in the first one, people were curious and laughed, and the girl on the shop got a bit pissed off
>
> AA: she was pissed off?
>
> DW: no…
>
> AA: not like the lady on the street…
>
> DW: no, not emotionally pissed off, she said 'this thing is caught up, you can't do that, in here'
>
> AA: she was more like 'you're gonna throw things on the floor and I'll have to pick them up'…
>
> DW: yeah, it's like 'you did this on purpose, you are giving me shit', so, whereas in the second one, which was in public space, so there is certain amount of public space associated with a supermarket, but it's a private business, whereas in the second one I was in public space, and so in the first one people said 'what are you doing', it's a design experiment, oh, laughed, stepped over, and said ok, but in the second one I was someone violating public space and I felt like, people were confused and offended, in the first one they weren't offended, you know, the girl got a bit pissed off when she realised we did it on purpose, cause she was like 'oh common, give a me break', but in the second one people got pissed off as they were outraged, there was outrage, that woman was outraged, and the two women who just looked with an accusatory tone I would guess that they were outraged too but they didn't know how to respond, it's like the first woman had a framework for responding, she could make everything, she has the moral imperative of her disabled husband, which, you know, is interesting in and of itself, this is an inquiry into disability, and and um disability action and activism and the theatricality of it, so it's interesting that, the most vocal, who intruded, who said 'cut it', and I said 'ok, so do you have scissors', and she said 'no' and [laughter] like she was absolutely outraged, she thought she had not only the right but the power to force me to conform to her understanding of what was appropriate behaviour, and I think that is very interesting when you start thinking about disability because there is this question of conforming or not confirming, what constitutes disabled or normative, or outside of the norm…

In the first case, the built structure emerged as the main focus of blockage and interruption. It was only when we reached the end of our path and interacted with the employee that the social aspect of misfit appeared, and only after we told her that we had done it on purpose. Even then, her reaction was related more to how our actions might compromise her ability to perform her duties, than to an expectation of behaviour directed towards us. Misfit in the second case, in contrast, was markedly focused on our misbehaving, that is, on our non-conformance to the expectation of normality held by other pedestrians. The senior lady, in particular, was outraged that we stepped outside conventions and used his husband as an argument to push us to conform. When we did not, it was only the argument that the police had already given permission to us and the fact that her husband had moved away, that allowed her to move on and leave us.

I would argue that the rigid structure of the supermarket, both in terms of how aisles are located and the set of rules employees need to contend with, overrode the social component of misfit and elevated the effect of the built structure. On the other side, the open structure of the street, its lack of spatial constraints allowed for the social component to emerge front and centre, and the experience of misfit was focused on it. As I said, something worth to explore further.

The encounter with the senior lady and her husband also made us discuss the issue of expectations of normality regarding disability. A thread that emerged during this conversation and others I had with Danielle, was that Danish society values uniformity. Their expectation of normality is closely tied to sameness in appearance and behaviour. If you look like us and behave like us, you are good. How, then, does this apply to disabled people?

> AA: how how how can you be a good disabled person, the social… because, I am gonna reference places like this, where some of the fights have been already won, but they have

> been won, uh, in a way that forces disabled people to conform to certain expectations about what disabled people should look…
>
> DW: yeah, you will be looked after very well so long as you behave like this… and if you behave like this, we are on your side
>
> AA: I am just imagining things, about, where, let's think about people with mobility issues that don't use a wheelchair, but instead I don't know uses a bike, and pedals with their hands, and move quite quickly, that wouldn't conform to what people look at, and…
>
> DW: it would confuse people, and people don't like things that don't conform, here, in this society, in this culture, so you don't see a lot of radical youth here
>
> AA: no I haven't seen them
>
> DW: but you also don't see homeless people, you don't see beggars, you know, it's like Kolding is like the drug capital of Denmark because it's a direct line to Germany to Sweden and to Norway, um, but you don't see it because heroin addiction is treated like an illness rather than a crime, and so heroin addicts are given money to pay for their heroine because it's seen as an illness so it doesn't play out in society in the same way because the society sees it as very different, but, I think, while that all sounds very reasonable, I think it fits with this kind of, conform, ok, well, you're sick, we will need you what you need to conform
>
> AA: so you don't disturb

This was further confirmed by a conversation I had in the following days with one of Danielle's students, a wheelchair-user himself, although not a motorised one. He is Danish, young, and exercises; he was a high-performance athlete before an accident left him paraplegic. During our conversation I asked him about how Danish society expects people to behave and look the same, even disabled people, and he answered by telling me why he was not motorised-wheelchair user. The government had deemed him fit enough for a manual wheelchair, so he does not fit the criteria for the motorised version; basically, he is expected to avoid using public resources that he is not expected to need. Even when it would allow him a better experience of moving around the city, there is an expectation regarding the kind of wheelchair user he has to be. He told me that he is designing and building his own motorised-wheelchair, and that he plans to make it affordable enough so that people can build it themselves or convince the government to fund them. Expectations of normality then, seem applicable not only to 'normal' people but to 'non-normal' people; that is, there are proper and improper ways of being different. Unexpectedly, the experiment highlighted this by providing a different embodied experience that could be latched on by other people as non-conformant and, thus, stigmatisable and excludable.

I feel that the experiment facilitated experiences of misfit in daily life settings, and allowed us to explore misfit as a "contingent and fundamental fact of human embodiment" (Garland-Thomson 2011, 598). As we go through our lives and encounter different environments, we may or may not experience misfit in them. Some bodies experience misfit in a few environment, other bodies experience misfit in most environments. Metaphorically, resistance is a function of the body, the environment, and time. Changes in our embodiment may increase resistance, while others decrease it; likewise with changes in our environment; and, as time passes, the relationship changes, we may become used to certain bodily configurations in certain environments and resistance changes for those combinations. We all experience misfit but not everybody experiences disability. In other words, disability implies misfit, but misfit does not imply disability. How, then, can we map their relationship?

To answer the question, let us imagine one person, with a stable embodiment in time, encountering different environments as they live. Let us also imagine that resistance shifts from infinite resistance to zero resistance, that is, an experience of absolute misfit and an experience of absolute fit. Our imaginary person, at any given moment, is experiencing a resistance at some point in that scale. As they live, given the stable embodiment, this resistance increases or decreases depending on the environments they encounter and how frequently they encounter those environments. In some environments, the resistance will cross a threshold and be experienced as misfit. This threshold may be crossed in few environments or in many. I would argue that how often this threshold is crossed determines whether or not our imaginary person experiences disability or not. When someone experiences misfit in most environments, we may say that they are experiencing disability. This interpretation of the disability experience links the dynamics of misfitting to disability as complex embodiment and maps it

to the metaphor of resistance. In this metaphorical context, the disability experience is also a threshold, one that applies to the dynamics of resistance.

Experiment 3: *Misfit Tree*

After Danielle and I discussed the resistors, I committed to design a new experiment for the next day. As the experience with the resistors had been productive, I felt that walking would be a good tool to reflect on the results and think about how to move forward with the next experiment. My goal was to attend to the experience walking through different parts of the city, think about what had happened in the morning, and tease out a new experiment from this. As I wanted to walk, Danielle recommended a park called Legeparken. It is located about one and a half kilometres from the place we were at that moment, so a walk there would provide enough time and environments for my purpose. She also told me that next to Legeparken, I could find further green areas that gave way to the Marielundskoven, one of the national forests of Denmark, in case I wanted to stroll through the forest. I took her advice, grabbed my camera, my backpack, and my hat and started walking.

The way to the park was uneventful, the walk was easy although the sun was already high and the heat was starting to bother me. I moved from the pedestrian streets surrounding Jernbanegade, walked northwards along the side of Slotsø, the lake in the middle of Kolding, and then followed a road towards the park. Legeparken is a big park for children and adults, with playground equipment, grill sites, toilets, activity buildings, and a five thousand square metres artificial lake. The first thing I noticed when I arrived was how well-manicured it seemed; everything felt just placed right. There are several gravelly paths that meander through the park; some of them finish at the artificial lake, others in the built structures housing facilities, and still others move below big trees and connect several shaded and somewhat isolated clearings. As it was summer, the park was full of families having fun in the playgrounds and the water games. It was a busy place, full of noise, and I gravitated towards the cooler, quieter places beneath the trees.

While I wandered, I stopped now and then to photograph trees. I love photographing trees, their shapes, the interplay of light in their trunks, how light is filtered by their leaves. I shoot from wide angle frames to capture the whole tree, to macro details of the small hidden landscapes living in their barks. Legeparken is full of trees, so it was a lovely place to wander around and take pictures of trees. Most of them were big, tall, old; there were some younger and smaller, but had the same structure of the big trees: all had almost vertical trunks, with branches stemming radially on their upper two-thirds. In the more transited areas, the trees were carefully placed to provide shade for people wanting to have a picnic on the grass. There was also enough space between them to cover with shade while leaving room for transit, sitting, and playing. The bulk of the trees were located at the north side of the park, where the terrain sloped slightly upwards. These trees were placed more haphazardly, and they were probably older and just trimmed and groomed from the ancient forest.

After about thirty minutes of wandering and taking photographs, I decided to stop. I was getting hungry and most of trees looked alike, even up close. I decided to find a cool clearing, sit down, eat something, and rest. The clearing I chose was a bit more secluded, partly hidden from the path by a big tree and some bushes. There were flat stones were I could sit, and the trunk of the big tree provided support for my back. I sat there, ate, and drowsed. The sun was high but the clearing was mostly shaded thanks to the interlocking canopies of the trees. There were patches of light here and there, and its play on the trunks of the trees was interesting, so I started taking pictures again. This led me to yet another clearing, even more secluded that the one I was sitting on, also cooler and darker. I stood there for several minutes and then went out. As I was coming out from the clearing, I noticed a small tree next to the big tree I was sitting against before. I had seen other small trees during my walk but something drew me to this particular tree. It was twisted, gnarly, and its leaves sprouted out from broad branches in slender, green stems. To me, the tree was different from the rest: its shape was not the same, it looked out of place, it seemed defiant. As I said, most of the trees I had seen, both small and big, had almost vertical trunks, with big branches stemming radially on their upper two-thirds. This tree, however, was all over the place, with branches going off in several directions, twisting and turning.

I kept looking at the tree, laying on the ground trying to photograph it from below, moving around it, following its trunk and branches. I spent about fifteen minutes playing with the tree, all the time thinking about what was it that made it different, about why it was there in that well-manicured park. I realised that, after wandering around and seeing how Legeparken was built, structured, and kept, I was not expecting to find such a tree there. I got bored of basically photographing the same tree over and over, gave up and stopped trying to find interesting things to photograph. As I ate and rested, I cleared my head. Afterwards, I did not mind the sameness and freely looked at what was in front of me. Suddenly, I found a different tree. While I was focusing on walking through the park, noticing the heat, the pebbles on the path, the weight of my backpack, my rising hunger, the act of photographing was providing me with a different means to reflect on the results of the resistors. Walking, and its difficulties, felt like the obvious continuation to the morning experiments but led me nowhere.

Photographing the trees, however, was an implicit exploration of one of the topics we discussed with Danielle, that of expectations about the norm and how differences break them and contest the norm. The seeming repetition, my hunger, and the heat, conspired to change my expectations regarding what I was considering an interesting tree. I blurred all difference because I did not expect a difference. Only when I rested, focused again on the light and not on the trees, the expectation changed and I was open to notice a different tree.

Now, I thought that if I kept on looking explicitly for different trees in my current state, I would find many trees I could categorise as different. As a test, I left the clearing and wandered for a bit around the crowded area. Sure enough, I saw trees with different bark shades, some smoother than others, and leaves of varying shades of green. I realised that big and small



29. My misfit tree, photographed from below

were also categories of difference that I ignored the first time, even when acknowledging that there were trees of different sizes. What had happened? My expectations changed, yes, but specifically my threshold of determining difference changed. Furthermore, I realised I could probably change this threshold by performing certain actions. I started wondering what kind of different tree another person would choose in the same park under similar circumstances, and how they would explain their choice. I went on with my walk that afternoon, reaching the edge of the forest, but I knew I had found the core of my next experiment.

A machine for setting expectations

The next morning I went back to the lab with the goal of finding ways to adjust expectations during a walk in the park. My goal was to improvise a device to help me manipulate expectations about difference regarding trees. This would, I imagined, help me find means for manipulating expectation away from normative constructs in other domains. I fumbled around the storage boxes, taking out assorted objects and littering the floor with them: pieces of string, wire, and wood; cardboard shapes; small plastic boxes. I stood over them, watched them from my height, walked around, pushed them with my feet, trying to form groups; then I moved away, squinted, trying to find common shapes and patterns. I repeated this several times

and afterwards I sat, cross-legged, on the floor, in the middle of the objects. I started handling them, checking their shape, texture, weight, comparing them. Something felt off. Yes, it was easy to find differences and similarities, but I reflected that two things worked against my goal: I already expected to find them, and the objects themselves were too dissimilar at first glance. Then, I separated them by kind: wires with wires, strings with strings, boxes with boxes. I further refined those groups by colour, texture, size, and weight. I ended up with a set of objects that felt promising: a group of cardboard circles of about one inch in diameter, all the same colour, seemingly cut from the same cardboard sheet.

I cleaned the lab, stored the rest of the objects, put the cardboard circles on top of a table, and sat on a chair. There were nineteen circles, lying there in random positions. I started playing with them, stacking them, forming shapes with them, grouping them and placing the groups in some sort of spatial structure, turning them around, moving them from one group to another. The circles felt almost identical in terms of colour, shape, size, weight, and texture and I wondered if I could find a difference between them without resorting to measuring their exact diameter, or counting the number of surface stripes produced by the inner structure of the cardboard, or some similar method of extracting difference from minute characteristics. I wondered if I could conjure an object-level difference just by asking about it. So, I uttered this question loudly: *which circle is different?* My first answer was that they all felt the same, that no circle was different. Then, I remembered the source of this morning work, my experience with the trees of the previous day. I was not asking that question, I merely reacted to sameness by stepping back, found the difference and then asked what made this tree different. I realised my first question was missing something. So, I uttered another question: *which one is the different circle?*

As soon as I uttered the question, I saw its potential. Instead of leaving open the possibility of difference, the question itself sets the expectation of difference; according to it, there is indeed a different circle, and to answer the question you have to find it. The cardboard circles, themselves, were not necessary for the task on the park. The device was the question. I went back to the idea of normative constructs and how difference from them is related to exclusionary practices. In the case of the trees in Legeparken, the normative construct emerges from the choices of the park designers and the kind of trees they planted or used from the old forest. The different tree I found was secluded, hidden from view, excluded. I was not interested in whether this exclusion was a result of conscious choice by the designers or an accidental consequence of those choices, but rather in how the question asked about the trees could uncover more excluded trees. I wanted the experiment to explore how setting the expectation for difference creates conditions for exclusion; after some attempts I settled on an instruction, rather than a question: *find the tree that does not fit*. The wording of the instruction implies that there is a tree that is different, that may be excluded, and that the task is to identify it. The choice of *fit* also connects this experiment to the previous one.

I was also interested in how the choice was made. Asking someone to *find the tree that does not fit* does not give them any clues about the conditions under which any tree could be considered different so, even while setting the expectation of difference, the question leaves open which framework one can use to account for that difference. Following the experience of documenting the resistors, I decided to document the explanation of the choice both verbally and using objects. I recovered the cardboard circles and chose them as the objects to be used for describing the chosen tree; my guess was that their own sameness would provide a blank canvas upon which someone could project their framework for categorising difference and that the way they used the circles would provide insights into their process.

Wandering around (and aloud)

The new experiment was based on the notion that the instruction itself was a tool to manipulate the expectations of difference. As the superficial goal of the experiment was to find the misfit tree, I used again the idea of misfit in name of the experiment. It was designed as an expectation shift facilitated by one participant to another; its goal was to explore the ways an expectation shift regarding difference affected the perception of difference in a set of similar objects. I hypothesised that the implicit constraint contained in the instruction would force the participant to find difference even in the absence of an obvious framework for categorising the objects.

An misfit tree experiment requires two voluntary participants: the Finder, a person who will wander around searching for the tree that does not fit; and the Researcher, a person who will perform the role of researcher, guide and document the experiment. In this experiment, as the focus is not on social interaction but rather on the Finder's expectations, the Researcher is not required to wear a lab coat to call attention upon their role. Furthermore, during the execution of the experiment there is no need for tools or props. The only tools required are a set of almost identical documentation objects (the cardboard circles in the first version) and a sound recorder to be used during the discussion and documentation phase after the tree has been found. The experiment may take place in any location where there are enough trees of the same type and traversable by a person. Ideally, the experiment should go on until a different tree is identified but the participants may

agree on a specified duration beforehand or it may stop at any time if they deem it necessary. The current version of the misfit tree works as follows:

1. The Researcher proposes a location to the Finder.
2. The Finder agrees or proposes a different location.
3. They discuss until a location is agreed upon.
4. The participants move to the selected location.
5. The Researcher tells the Finder to *find the tree that does not fit*.
6. The Researcher tells the Finder the experiment will go on until they find the tree, but that they may stop at any time or agree on a predetermined duration.
7. The Finder wanders around the location gauging the trees as they deem. They may talk while they wander or they may be silent.
8. The Researcher accompanies the Finder, answers any questions they have unless it is about confirming a specific tree, or a specific strategy of categorisation.
9. The Finder may go back to places they have already been.
10. If someone approaches the Finder, they may interact with them.
11. When a tree was chosen, time ends or any participants wants to stop, the experiment ends.
12. The participants gather and choose a spot to have the debriefing session.
13. They move to the selected debriefing spot.
14. The Researcher debriefs the Finder and documents the session.

I met Danielle and told her I had the experiment for the day, telling her that we needed to go to a place with trees. I proposed Legeparken and she agreed. We went there during the morning, she was the Finder and I was Researcher. I gave her the instruction and we started strolling around, having a conversation until she chose a tree. We conducted the experiment once, for this version I will present a table describing it and offer my recollection of the experience as I recall it now. Afterwards, I will present a transcription of the debriefing session, followed by some conclusions regarding the experiment.

Version 1

Participants	Danielle Wilde as Finder
Location	Legeparken, a public park in Kolding.
Setup	A park big enough to allow for wandering around, with enough trees to be analysed. There are no constraints in terms of time, duration, clothing, or method of traversing the park. The only constraint comes from the instruction. We entered the park and, after reaching a clear spot I gave the instruction to the Finder and she started her process.
Prologue	None.
Epilogue	We sat on a picnic table in the park to document the experiment, and discuss the experience.
Instructions to the Finder	Delivered verbally: *find the tree that does not fit*.
Documentation	Sound recordings of the discussion, photographs of the location of the cardboard circles after they were used by the Finder. The instruction for documenting with the objects was *use these circles to describe the tree you chose*; there were no constraints regarding how the objects were supposed to be used.

I remember that

> the Sun was high when we reached the park and I was feeling hot. The park was lit with a harsh light, there were strong shadows everywhere. It was different from the day before, when I was there later in the day and the Sun was lower in the sky. After I gave Danielle the instruction, she started walking around the paths nearby the lake and the picnic tables. I felt the impulse of goading her towards the section of the park I had been the day before, but kept myself from doing it. I wanted to know which tree would she choose and why, not try to force my choice upon her. I felt uneasy at first but then I realised that finding the same tree as myself would provide a sense of validation. We kept going, having a conversation about other things, not the tree task at hand. Now and then, Danielle stopped, looked around, focused on something, and then we kept going. Suddenly, she said something like ‘I have it’

and pointed to a tree in the distance. I could not see anything different about it. We went to a picnic table and sat down to discuss the experiment.

30. Relational description of the misfit tree chosen by the Finder

Debriefing

We sat down to discuss the experiment. First, we had a conversation and I started the cell phone recorder. Danielle explained why she had chosen that tree and then I asked her to describe the tree using the cardboard circles; I mishandled the cell phone at this point and missed some minutes of audio while she arranged the objects, when she finished that I started recording again[30]. At the beginning, Danielle described the tree in this way:

> DW: ok, so this tree, it's doesn't fit, it's very big, and it's standing alone, and it's standing alone, in a way that is different, you know, there are other trees that you can say are separate, but they're all, they all seem to be touching each other, you could argue that this one is touching the trees behind, but they are so much smaller than, they seem inconsequential that they are close, that there's this big space around, whereas if you look at the other trees, their placement is as a piece of architecture if they are on their own within the little huts and barbecues and stuff… or, in a stand-up trees, whereas this one is just completely different, it's so much bigger, that suggests it's probably older, but it's a different kind of tree, this tree doesn't exist anywhere else in here… that's it

Afterwards, when I asked her to describe the tree using the cardboard circles, she placed one in the centre of the table with the rest surrounding it in a semicircle. At this point we realised she was not describing the tree but the relationship of the chosen tree with the rest of them. In her verbal description, while she gave information about the characteristics of the tree itself (bigger, older, a different kind), the focus of her description was also on that relationship. I found interesting that the framework she chose to categorise difference was based on how a particular tree stood in relationship to the others, especially as our conversation from the previous day had highlighted how fitting and misfitting seemed dependent on how

[30] These audio recordings are transcribed in Appendix 2: Transcription of debriefing from Experiment 3.

other people reacted to and interacted with us. Back then, the expectation of normality, as realised by other people interacting with us, affected our sensation of fit.

We might say that the expectation of normality is the flipside of the expectation of difference, so manipulating the expectation of difference would also be a manipulation of the expectation of normality. In this experiment, the act of choosing a tree created a framework for categorising difference and implicitly created a framework for categorising normality. As the experiment was an attempt to manipulate the expectation of difference, I was interested in how the instruction was received and how it shaped Danielle's actions during the experiment:

> AA: what did you expect to find? When I asked you to find the tree that doesn't fit
>
> DW: I didn't have an expectation, I was just looking for what stood out as different, um…
>
> AA: so, my question, didn't put you in a frame of mind in respect to a specific kind of tree, just difference
>
> DW: no, it put me in a frame of mind of being inquisitive, of being kind of like hyperalert, I mean, I am generally a very good observer of details, generally, um, but it made that observation of details very conscious, and so I also tried to step back and blur, so I that I don't go too deep into detail, so it's like a look into this and I say 'it's so interesting' and go 'there's another one'… there's any like, I haven't seen any like this before, and I'll just keep it my head, I mean, I could stand here and say that one is the one that stands out, the one that has the, it's not a great mystery, here, I'll take a photo and show you [shows me], because the way is lit up is completely different to everything around it, so it feels a little bit like wherever you are you would probably will find something that doesn't fit because it depends on your perspective

Her account of trying to step back and blur mirrors my own experience during my previous visit to Legeparken. Being aware of difference, or rather, being aware of trying to find difference, may put us in a frame of mind that exaggerates characteristics and relationships to the point of difference appearing everywhere, every time. A sort of paranoiac state of mind where every*thing*, every*one*, every*body*, has some characteristic or relates to us in some way that renders them suspect and prone to exclusion. If we are to explore difference productively, we must be aware of this state of mind and we need to account for it, stepping back and blurring as Danielle expressed it. In other words, we should be able to shift our thresholds for difference so that we may productively explore it.

In our discussion, and related to the matter of exclusion, there was another issue of interest regarding the language we were using to describe the trees. In the case of the tree, just like in the case of people, misfitting is not only a matter of physical characteristics but also of relationships and the expectations we have about them; and those expectations are connected to our perspectives, in terms of space, time, and culture. They affect how we perceive and assign difference, and the language we use to explain that difference:

> AA: and your perspective on how you its placed on the environment, because, that light…
>
> DW: well, that's what I mean it depends on your perspective, so if you think, culturally your perspective comes from your background and your experiences, physically your perspective comes from your position in space, your viewpoint, and so your viewpoint can be seen as a physical thing, or a cultural thing, a sociocultural thing, um, so when looking for the tree that doesn't fit, because I am not Danish I don't really know which trees are native, you know, I haven't been here long enough and haven't had enough of an interest to
>
> AA: that's a good point…
>
> DW: to be able to look at them and go 'well, that doesn't belong here' but I imagine, uh, so, if I was in Australia and we were wandering around and we saw all of these fir trees, even though there are so many, I would still say that's the one that doesn't fit because it's an introduced tree, it's not a native tree, it's introduced, so while they are everywhere they don't fit, they don't belong
>
> AA: this works here with you because you are not a native

> DW: yeah, so, I can can tell you very clearly Australia has very particular flora and fauna so we can do that very easily, I mean, curiously apparently the flora and fauna in Australia is quite similar to that in Peru,
>
> AA: ok… how weird
>
> DW: so maybe in other parts of South America, as well, because I just had a Peruvian friend who went to Australia and just said 'oh my god, it's the same'… so I said 'oh my god, really', she said 'yes, same colours, same topography, same… it's so similar, I never encountered it before', so, but there is something, it's like if you listen to the language I am using when, as I explain how my brain is kind of categorising of trying to work its way towards a categorisation of difference, of what doesn't fit, it's what constitutes 'what doesn't fit', and I get, the same language could be used in someone who didn't realise that they were discriminating against difference, it's just that we don't think about it in those terms when we are thinking about trees, if I was to use the same tones for people, you know, it's like looking at people, well, you know, all of these people are Danish and this one is not so they don't fit, and it's like well that's a criteria, you know all of these people walking and this guy is in a wheelchair, or all of these people identify either male or female, and these three kids say they have no gender, all, of you know, all of these things, uh, the way of saying what doesn't fit it's actually a way of making visible discrimination, whether, making visible bias, whether is spoken or acted upon or not, it's a little bit like, um, you know, it's interesting if we come to the, we were talking yesterday about, because I am white the police would let me get away with a caution or something, um… we can't pretend that we don't see differences in skin colour and yet I don't see a difference between your skin colour and mine, whereas Frank who we went past yesterday, Frank is from Ghana, he's one of the students, he's very very black, in his skin colouring, and so there's obviously a difference in melatonin, um, I mean, it happens to also go along with, um, very very cultural differences, but… you know, it's like how do we navigate these things, because we can't pretend we don't see difference and yet you identify yourself as black and I identify myself as white but I can't see the difference between us

Beyond the concept of political potential of the concept of misfit, as explained by Garland-Thomson, it seems that explicitly branding somebody a fit or a misfit in a specific situation might be a way of uncovering biases. The move of the language from trees to people might be fraught with difficulty but it may be worth exploring as a tool for activism and advocacy. As an example, almost at the end of our conversation, I pointed out to Danielle that

> AA: the way you described the tree, the tall one, that stands out, that is different, that is alone, it's the same description you used yesterday to describe what people, the Danish people don't like

In a sense, through the experiment we had found a means to address Danish people attitudes regarding difference, their expectations of normality and how they confronted whomever or whatever broke them. I think that it may be worth repeating the experiment in several sociocultural contexts to explore if and how the manipulation of expectation works and whether or not the experiment may be used to uncover biases.

The fixed point

Besides the specific characteristics and findings from each experiment, upon later reflection I realised there are elements shared by all of them that provide further insight into the dynamics of movement when we focus on immobility. There is a common structure in the way the experiments were set up: they all happen in a closed or bounded setting (classroom, lecture hall, supermarket, street blocks, a park); they depend on motion around the space determined by the boundaries of the setting; the path of motion is not predetermined but, instead, is freely chosen by the person moving; and this motion is hindered by constraints specific to each setting (rules, people, desks, chairs, bollards, chains, a thread, trees, hedges). While *Disability Transducer* was an attempt to transduce the experience of Locked-In Syndrome by making external the inner movement described by Alberto and retaining the spatial quality of the inner space by transposing it into a concrete closed space, *Misfitting Resistor* and *Misfit Tree* were elaborations of that scheme aiming to move away from the instrumentalisation aspects of the disability transducer. If *Disability Transducer* was a displacement from personal embodied experience to movement in a specific space, then what happens when we apply the inverse operation to the other two

experiments? What interpretations of the movement in each specific space in terms of embodied experience are possible? I have worked on four interpretations summarised in Table 4.

Interpretation frame	Experiment 1 *Disability Transducer*	Experiment 2 *Misfitting Resistor*	Experiment 3 *Misfit Tree*
Externalisation of inner space	Dynamics of writing	Effects of emotional states	Self-reflection processes
Relational nature of difference	Expectations about writing	Expectations about bodies in social spaces	Self-examination of expectations
Amplification	Mechanics of writing	Dynamics of social spaces as influenced by the movement of bodies	Expanded instant examination of social categorisation
Experience as function of body and environment	Environmental modification	Bodily modification	Interaction between body and environment

Table 4. Summary of interpretations of the experiments

The first interpretation emerges when we consider *Misfitting Resistor* and *Misfit Tree* in terms of the space that was externalised in *Disability Transducer*, that is, the inner space of Locked-in Syndrome. In the case of the *Misfitting Resistor*, the unspooling of the thread has a constraining effect on movement that ends up constraining the space available for motion, effectively reducing it. This constraint may only be relaxed by tracing back the steps and pulling the thread, recovering it from the places it ended up stuck. There seems to be a relationship between the effect of the thread on the external space where *Misfitting Resistor* takes place and the effect of fear and fatigue on inner space as described by Alberto: the unspooling of the thread is analogous to an increase in fatigue or fear, and the recovery of the thread is analogous to the effect of music or rest on Alberto's inner space and his feeling of inner freedom. In the case of *Misfit Tree*, we may interpret what happens as a process of focusing attention inward in a reflective stance upon inner space as we traverse it in search of difference. The Finder's quest for the tree that does not fit may be transposed to a search for something inside inner space that does not fit. Inside, we might be exploring our feelings to find an emotional issue, we might be verifying the construction of an argument, or we might be testing our beliefs to check whether they match with what we learn from the world. The external movement around the park is analogous to a process of self-reflection.

The second interpretation arises from framing *Misfit Tree* as the externalisation of that process of self-reflection and considering Danielle's first attempt to describe the tree using the cardboard circles. That attempt highlighted the relational nature of difference, that is, how difference is constituted by the relationship between objects and our expectations of difference. In this interpretation, *Misfit Tree* is an externalisation of the process of determining difference given our beliefs, by moving around objects and exploring their spatial relationship and physical characteristics according to our expectations. What, then, of *Disability Transducer* and *Misfitting Resistor*? In the case of the *Misfitting Resistor,* we are providing the difference by altering the embodiment of the Unspooler and moving around a public space, and through this process we prod other people to reveal their expectations. Instead of externalising our beliefs regarding difference, *Misfitting Resistor* externalises the beliefs of other people regarding difference and creates a tension between those beliefs and the altered embodiment of the Unspooler; setting up a conflict between the set of actions and movements that are expected, and thus allowed, in public spaces, and those performed by the Unspooler. In this interpretation, *Disability Transducer* is similar to *Misfitting Resistor* but it is focused on the process of writing. Because the Writer writes by moving around the room and negotiating their path among the obstacles, the spectators are forced to confront their expectations about writing and the complex nature of the process becomes explicit. The spatiotemporal frame of writing is altered in the *Disability Transducer* and this alteration produces an amplification of the actions performed by shifting the focus of attention to the motion in the inner space through its externalisation

The third interpretation comes from focusing on the relationships between participants in the experiments and how they map to inner space and its externalisation. In *Disability Transducer*, the inner actions of writing are amplified in external space through the actions performed by the writer, and perceived by the spectators. The setting of the experiment provides a focus on an internal context; what is being externalised in this experiment is movement occurring in the inner space and movement occurring inside the body to produce the actions required for writing. The focus on this inner context has the effect of amplifying movement that occurs at a scale we usually do not attend to. In the case of *Misfitting Resistor*, the scale changes to the whole body and the focus is placed on the relationship between space and movement. The presence of both Researcher and Unspooler in the experiment tensions the production of space through movement by contrasting expected and unexpected embodiments and the resulting possibilities of motion for each participant. *Misfitting Resistor* also explores

the relationship between diverse embodiments and the production of social spaces in terms of the interacting movement of different bodies. At one level, the Unspooler is moving alone and experimenting the effect of their altered embodiment on the production of space. At another level, the Unspooler and the Researcher are moving together and teasing out how their shared space is influenced by their differing embodiments. At yet another level, they are moving along with other people and the interaction between the movement of Unspooler, Researcher and other people makes explicit the dependence of social space on shared expectations of embodiment. In this interpretation, *Misfit Tree* is an attempt to explore the effect of observer expectations on how relationships between bodies are perceived by removing the human element and focusing on how the physical characteristics of objects interact with expectations to set up the potential for misfit. In *Misfit Tree*, the shared expectation of embodiment from *Misfitting Resistor* becomes the Finder's expectation of a tree, and the Finder's movement around the park is an exploration of the relationships between trees against the backdrop of their immobility. In a way, *Misfit Tree* freezes the motion present in *Misfitting Resistor* to expand an instant of perception and make explicit the operation of an implicit and automatic process of social categorisation based on how bodies interact in a specific environment.

The fourth interpretation flows from reading the experiments in terms of experience as a function of body and environment. This implies that if we want to change experience, then we should modify body, environment, or both; and that if we want to approach an experience from an outside perspective, we should analyse how bodies and environment interact while being aware of what our own embodiment brings to the analysis. In *Disability Transducer*, the environment is modified to create a situation where a typical body cannot perform an action in a typical way, thus setting up an experience of misfit both for the writer and the spectators. The writer has to write in an unfamiliar way that makes them engage with the usually hidden minutiae of the process, while the spectators become aware of that minutiae and their perception of time is altered. In *Misfitting Resistor*, a body is modified by adding the hanging spool of thread thus altering the way the Unspooler body moves in space and their relationships with other people. In turn, the experience of all participants, willing or not, becomes estranged as the parameters of movement in public spaces are disrupted by the altered embodiment now calling attention to itself. In *Misfit Tree*, neither body nor environment is altered but the focus is placed on the role the Finder's expectations play in the production of fit and the emergence of difference from the interaction between bodies and environment. This focus, in turn, changes the experience of the Finder as they become aware of their own biases through a sense of hyper-attentivity to details framed by already-constructed models of difference based on their beliefs.

In general, these experiments supported explorations about the situated, historical nature of experience and its relationship with misfit, and how those moment of misfit are connected to our expectations and the role they play in shaping our perception. These explorations were based on devices that attempted to produce misfit by focusing on the nature of experience and facilitated actions that modified or broke expectations in order to shift what is and is not perceived. These experiments highlight the possibilities of exploring movement starting from the experience of immobility. They show how expectations about movement may be contested by setting up situations that focus on different levels of motion in the body, both directly and indirectly. They also show the role these expectations, from ourselves and others, play in the experience of misfit and what kind of actions may be performed to either exacerbate or reduce that misfit. They reaffirm attention as an important concept to explain whether we consider certain aspects or not when differentiating between movement or stillness, and offer a way to externalise and explore the mechanics of a shifting focus of attention and its impact on the production of movement. In other words, the experiments point out to an intricate relationship between misfit, expectation, perception and stillness. In the next section I will elaborate on this relationship to provide a foundation for my attempt to answer the question of immobile bodies in theatrical practice.



31. Three levels of movement from the experiments

Tongue tied and twisted just an earth bound misfit, I
(Pink Floyd 1995)

On conceptual outcomes

I began this research asking whether immobile bodies could act in theatre and how technology might support their acting. I soon realised that my original question had to be pierced apart and, from its pieces, weave several lines of inquiry about movement, stillness, disability and theatre. I also realised that my position as a nondisabled researcher required me to devise research methods that would be appropriate for approaching ethically and empathically the topic of my inquiries. Since then, I have framed my research process in the notions of theatrical event and complex embodiment, and rooted my practical explorations in the idea of misfit. I have created several exploratory devices that play with our familiar embodiments and displace them towards unfamiliar territories, in order to explore the epistemological potential of the gap between different experiences. These explorations foregrounded the intricate relationship between performer and spectator in terms of misfit, expectation, perception and stillness. Now, what does this perspective offer to the discussion about immobile bodies in theatre? How do these concepts mesh to form a possible foundation for the participation of immobile bodies in theatre? What do they offer in terms of framing the creative possibilities of immobility in theatre?

These questions point to political and aesthetical aspects of immobility in theatre. On one side, we have expectations regarding how bodies should move and which bodies may participate or not in theatre; on the other, our perception plays with our expectations to determine what is felt as movement or not. This section is an attempt to productively engage with those aspects by playing with the ideas presented in the previous section. I will introduce *stasis* and *dissidence* as theoretical notions arising from the relationship between those four concepts; I contend that misfit, expectation and stillness may be grouped to produce *dissidence* as a misfit-inducing action that may realise the political potential of immobility; and that expectation, perception and stillness may be grouped to produce *stasis* as a movement-related perceptual threshold that underpins the aesthetic potential of immobility. What follows is a reflection through writing to build these concepts, elaborate them and use them to revisit the theatrical event. This will provide a theoretical foundation for the next section where I will present a model of theatre in which stasis and dissidence are applied to the theatrical event to centre immobility as a potential answer to the original question of the inquiry and offer several examples to illustrate its possibilities.



32. Relationship between misfit, expectation, perception and stillness

Stasis

Bodies are sites of knowledge and movement is the primary way they make sense of their worlds. Given that, what is 'not-moving'? What does it imply? I contend that 'not-moving' is a matter of perception, attention, and level of analysis. If we attend to one body, the movement we perceive in them depends on which level we are attending to, and the range of its characteristics we are attending to. We may focused on small, quick movements of the hands but miss the slow, small motion of the eyes. Not-moving is a function of our perception and our expectations about movement. We expect human bodies to be a certain way, we expect them to behave in specific ways, and we expect movement to occur within particular parameters. When everything proceeds according to our expectations, phenomena tend to fade to the background: we pay no attention to bodies unless they are different, we pay no attention to behaviour unless it breaks norms, and we pay no attention to movement unless it is strange. This 'expectation' is at the core of our ideas of normality: what we expect is normal and the unexpected is abnormal. 'Expectation' is built from past experiences, shared between us, reinforced each time it is fulfilled. 'Expectation' is one manifestation of our history as living organisms continually making sense of their environment; we expect what we know and the unexpected forces us to recalibrate our worlds.

Any living organism continually enacts a particular world of meaning by adapting dynamically to their context, a context that includes both the environment and the organism whole history of previous interactions with/within its environment. Expectations are part of an organism perspective regarding the environment and the 'ways of acting' available at any given moment. Expectations are contingent on the bodily configuration of the organism and they are continually reinforced or weakened depending on the process of sense-making the organism is always immersed in. As the environment contains other organisms, each with their own set of expectations, we may say that any given environment has a set of expectations regarding the organisms that are part of it and there is tension between each individual organism and that set of environmental expectations.

We may interpret the experience of disability as the experience of a human body when environmental expectations are broken by the specific bodily configuration of that body. We expect human bodies to move around and our environment expects them to move around. Our typical social interactions are built on the expectation of a dialog of based on the motion of the eyes, the hands, the mouth, the tongue. Our environment is built with the assumption that bodies change location voluntarily, and that their motion is constrained within a particular set of parameters. Involuntary immobility, the starting point of this inquiry, can be interpreted as a radical action that breaks all those expectations. When we are confronted by it, we might think at first that there is no interaction possible, no space for social participation, and no hope of communication. Yet, as we focus on the immobile body, our perception shifts and we start to notice motion, patterns, intent. Our broken expectations are restructured by our new experience and we see movement where there was immobility. In this section I will introduce the first conceptual outcome of my inquiry: the idea of *stasis* as a conceptualisation of this perceptual shift, this restructuring of expectations, regarding what we consider movement or not. To begin, I need to go back to movement.

To move and not to move

Since they come into existence, organisms make sense of their worlds by being in motion or staying at rest, by reaching and grabbing, by moving from here to there, by turning sensory organs towards or away stimuli. That is, organisms know through action and through action they build their worlds. In other words, living beings make sense of their worlds first and foremost through movement. We may imagine that movement as forever sliding on a scale between absolute activity and absolute rest, never quite reaching those extremes, as long as the organism lives. As organisms are not only conceptual abstractions but material bodies with particular configurations immersed in environments with certain characteristics, the set of possible actions an organism can perform is constrained both by their own body and the environment they live in. This entails that when the set of possible actions is void, there is no movement, no meaning, no world, and no life. Not-moving is death and not-moving as action is suicide.



33. Levels of movement

However, this version of not-moving rests on the idea that movement (in the sense of energetic change) occurs equally at every part of the organism. While the extreme case is true indeed in the case of death, living organisms may be conceived as always being part at rest and part in motion. By this I mean that you can analyse movement at different levels within and without the organism, and such analysis affords different interpretations regarding moving and not-moving at each level. I propose to use three major levels for this initial description: ‘intra-corporeal, that is, movement that occurs inside the boundaries of the organism; ‘corporeal’, that is, external movement involving the whole organism or some parts of it; and ‘inter-corporeal’, that is, movement that unfolds as the interaction between two or more organisms. Regarding the relationship between the levels, we can say that corporeal movement builds on intra-corporeal movement, that is, the organism does not move unless there is movement at the intra-corporeal level coordinated in such a way as to produce external movement, while inter-corporeal movement builds on the concerted external movements of several organisms. The relationship also occurs in the other way: inter-corporeal movement has an effect on individual corporeal movement, which in turn has an effect on the intra-corporeal movement of each organism.

In terms of the possible interpretations of movement at each level, I propose to follow three senses of the verb ‘to move’ as a guide: to move is to show marked activity; to move is to go or pass to another place; and to move is to stir emotions,

feelings, or passions. In this way, the intra-corporeal level is related to ‘activity’, the state of being active; the corporeal is related to ‘mobility’, the state of being mobile; and the inter-corporeal is related to ‘affection’, both the action of affecting and the state of being affected. Each interpretation, in turn, provides a clue to the characteristics of the not-moving state in each level: ‘stillness’, in opposition to activity; ‘immobility’, in opposition to mobility; and ‘apathy’, in opposition to affection.

Stasis as threshold

Let me focus now on the threshold where movement tends to cease; a threshold beyond which all descriptors of movement decrease towards absolute rest: lower frequencies, smaller amplitudes, lower energy expenditures, smaller paths. Combining this to the idea of analysing movement at different levels, we may realise that each level has its own particular scale for those descriptors and that not-moving at one level does not necessarily implies lack of movement at the other levels. This entails that movement that falls beneath such threshold is considered not-moving. Sheets-Johnstone explains that

> any movement has a certain felt tensional quality, linear quality, amplitudinal quality, and projectional quality. In a very general sense, the felt tensional quality has to do with our sense of effort; the linear quality with both the linear contour of our moving body and the linear paths we sense ourselves describing in the process of moving; the amplitudinal quality with both the felt expansiveness or contractiveness of our moving body and the spatial extensiveness or constrictedness of our movement; the felt projectional quality with the way in which we release force or energy (2011, 82:123).

This means that thresholds may be applied to the qualities of movement to find ‘not-moving’: less energy, smaller spaces, contracted bodies, less force. As movement is the “preeminent reference point for making sense of the world” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:223), beyond feeling its qualities we can also resonate with them in others. Implicit in the idea of this threshold is a perceiving subject, a subject whose perception depends on their particular body immersed in a particular environment. This means that, beyond the level of analysis, not-moving depends on the interaction between the organism of interest and the subject perceiving that organism. In other words, the threshold between moving and not-moving is always a perceptual threshold. This implies that body diversity has an impact on how movement is perceived (depending on the perceptual thresholds available for a particular body) and what kinds of not-moving can be performed by a particular body (depending on the specific level of not-moving at each level that the body can achieve).



34. Stasis as threshold

Perception can be understood as a bidirectional process of inference supported by previous knowledge flowing from the signals received by sensory systems and the signals the organism expects to receive. Assumptions regarding mobility, previous contact with phenomena of interest, environmental noise of any kind, affect the threshold of perceived movement for the perceiving organism. Then, I will define stasis as *the perceptual threshold where moving becomes not-moving*. For example, Lepecki’s idea of microdance and the recalibration of perceptual thresholds he describes as requirement to perceive the layers of movement beneath stillness (2000) implies the shifting of stasis at the corporeal and intra-corporeal levels by shifts in the thresholds of each quality: short paths, slow rhythms, small amplitudes, narrower spaces are now perceived above the threshold and thus the microdance emerges from stillness.

Stasis, then, exists for an organism perceiving another organism as it performs actions; some of those actions will be interpreted as movement, while others will be interpreted as not-movement. Let us call ‘perceiver’ the organism that is perceiving the actions of the another organism, ‘performer’ the organism that is performing those actions, and ‘action’ an activity realised by the ‘performer’. Actions are executed by the whole organism but they can be decomposed in sub-actions occurring at the intra-corporeal, corporeal, and inter-corporeal levels of movement. Depending on the state of stasis at each level, the perceiver focuses on certain actions while discarding others. An action may reinforce or shift stasis at any level and, in certain contexts, a performer may deliberately choose some actions to cause shifts in stasis. In general, this shifts affect the perception of movement; the perceiver experiences certain actions as being in the foreground, while other actions fade into the background and the perceiver stops experiencing of them.

Shifting stasis also has an effect on the perception of the time associated with movement: if the qualities of a particular movement are not felt, then the movement does not occur, and time does not pass. This is what I experienced as I attended to Robert Wilson’s actions during his performance. It is also what the spectator I mentioned in the section about disability transducers experienced: when she made her initial comparison between the actions required to write in her cell phone and the performer writing process in the transducer, she perceived her own actions as immediate in contrast to the drawn out process of the performer. For her, her actions were timeless in the sense that they did not require time. Her attention was not focused on her movements as she wrote; for her the performer moved to write, while she did not. By asking her to focus upon her actions, stasis shifted and she became aware of the many movements she had to make in order to write and, for her, the process of writing took time.



35. Observer-dependent stasis

Disability and stasis

I have briefly touched on the relationship between disability and broken expectations. We can enrich this relationship by noting that broken expectations may be considered as phenomena that fall outside the boundaries of appropriate behaviour; in other words, they are 'unnatural'. This brings us back to the notions of the 'neutral' and the 'natural' as described in the section about excluded bodies in theatre. If we focus on expectations of movement and immobility-related experiences of disability, then the threshold that separates the 'natural' from the 'unnatural' is also the threshold between moving and not-moving: the 'natural' body is the 'body-which-moves' while the 'unnatural' is the 'body-which-does-not-move'. Stasis, then, may be connected to certain experiences of disability allowing us to explore the fluidity of the boundary between 'natural' and 'unnatural'.

I have to point now that the notions of 'neutral' and 'natural', as described before, refer to the corporeal level; this begs the question of what is 'natural' at the other levels. It may be helpful to remember that the 'natural' body is usually considered to be graceful, capable of effortless efficiency during performance "due to the correct use of human anatomy and physiology" (Evans 2009). The idea of 'correct use' indicates there is a set of assumptions regarding the proper ways to move and that those assumptions imply a particular set of anatomical and physiological characteristics that allow them to occur. If we extend this idea, each level may have several types of movement that we can consider 'natural', depending on the characteristics of the entities that move and the assumptions regarding their movement.

Two examples: at the intra-corporeal level, typical brain activity is non-synchronous, that is, the electrical activity of different neurons does not move in concert. However, under certain conditions, the activity of neurons may become hypersynchronised. This kind of intra-corporeal movement may be considered 'unnatural' in the sense that it does not follow the typical pattern of electrical activity in the brain. At the inter-corporeal level, in Western cultures, maintaining eye contact during verbal exchanges is privileged as a sign of interest in the conversation and respect for the interlocutor. This requires a set of inter-corporeal movements that, as long as they help the participants keep eye contact, are considered 'natural'. Because of this, when the inter-corporeal movements hinder or do not support eye contact, the interaction is felt as 'unnatural'.

What I find interesting about the 'natural'/'unnatural' binary regarding movement is how the idea of stasis plays with it. As an example, let me recount my own experiences during my interactions with Alberto. At the corporeal level, my first impression was that of immobility and lack of control; stasis placed him in an 'unnatural' state for me. This changed as I spent time with him and stasis now placed him in a 'natural' state: his eye movements and slight arching of the eyebrows to convey some meaning were movements correctly performed according to the characteristics of his body. Later, I was shocked the first time I heard a guttural sound I had not heard before and realised he was laughing. In hindsight, I quickly moved from 'natural' to 'unnatural' and back to 'natural', as my perceptual threshold regarding his movements was updated to include his laughter in the array of possible movements. Each time stasis moved, it forced me to change my feelings of what was 'natural' or 'unnatural'; and stasis was constantly moving as a consequence of being in contact with him.

The constant change of stasis during my meetings with Alberto suggests a possible way of structuring instances of participatory sense-making as sequences of stasis shifts caused by the actions of the participants. When there are disabled and nondisabled participants, this approach may be productive due to the relationship between disability and stasis I described before. An analysis of the interactions occurring in any such instance, that goes beyond expectations of body normality by focusing on stasis shifts may yield insights into the diversely embodied nature of those interactions and how those diverse bodies create meaning together. Stasis provides a common way to analyse movement at all levels while taking into account the richness of experiences brought about by diversity.

Beyond movement

As 'thinking of movement' is a foundational epistemological dimension of being a body, we can consider movement itself is a source of metaphors (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 82:430–39). This means we can, and do, use language associated to movement to describe processes in other domains: we *reach* conclusions and *grasp* ideas; lawyers *advance* arguments and *rest* their cases, there are people *immovable* in their faith and others have *erratic* beliefs. It follows that the notion of stasis may be applied productively to other domains, and these applications may enrich interpretations in those domains. In the next sections I will explore two such applications of stasis: one in the domain of attitudes regarding which bodies are allowed to participate in theatre, the other in the domain of theatrical actions. My goal is to illustrate the possibilities of applying the concept of stasis to theatre practice.

Attitudinal stasis

What happens, then, when I apply stasis to the attitudes regarding which bodies are allowed to participate in theatre? The 'natural'/'unnatural' binary described before implies a preference for controlled, voluntary, fluid movement at the corporeal level; a preference that excludes bodies that cannot perform according to its assumptions. We can picture attitudes as something that can be changed (moved) or not; attitudinal stasis, then, *is the threshold beyond which we consider attitudes unchangeable (unmovable)*. In this discussion, attitudinal stasis is related to attitudes regarding which kind of movements are considered appropriate for theatre practice. Attitudinal stasis, then, is related to the 'natural'/'unnatural' binary by a connection to the dynamic boundary between both sides. We may therefore attempt to trace the relationship between attitudinal stasis and stasis at each level of movement.

First, we analyse attitudes at the corporeal level, as the original focus of the 'natural'/'unnatural' binary. 'Unnaturalness' at this level may be related to spasticity, movement disorders, compulsive movements, or seizures; to lack of training; and to anatomical and physiological features of atypical bodies. If we refer to the qualities of movement, we may say that these 'unnatural' movements are full of tension, the paths they describe are jagged and choppy, they are either 'too' expansive or 'too' constricted, and energy is released in uncontrolled bursts. All these characteristics may be grouped under the idea of lack of control, and so I propose that attitudes towards lack of control determine attitudinal stasis at this level.

Second, to analyse attitudes at the intra-corporeal level we begin by distinguishing between intra-corporeal movements that may be considered 'unnatural' in themselves and intra-corporeal movements that are related to 'unnatural' corporeal movements. The first kind includes conditions such as arrhythmia or the neuronal hyper-synchronisation that occurs during epileptic states. In general, it includes internal processes of the organism that deviate from expected typical parameters, a deviation that may or may not lead to clinical conditions, and that may or may not lead to 'unnatural' movements at the corporeal level. While the second kind may include movements from the first kind, it also includes intra-corporeal movements that are considered 'natural' in their context but that nonetheless build up to 'unnatural' movements at the corporeal level. As example, let us consider the electrical activity across the body of an untrained actor: even if the sensorimotor system behaves within expected typical parameters, each particular activity builds up to corporeal movements that are perceived as representing a lack of mastery in a particular technique, an 'unnatural' movement in that context.

Third, we analyse attitudes related to inter-corporeal movement. At this level we can distinguish between two kinds of 'unnaturalness': one perceived by the participants in the inter-corporeal movement and other perceived by its spectators. As an example of the first kind we may refer back to eye contact as a privileged set of movements for verbal exchanges in Western culture. Imagine a verbal exchange between an autistic person that prefers less eye contact and an allistic[31] person who has not had previous contact with autistic people: the allistic person will seek the eyes of the autistic person, while the autistic person will try to avert their gaze. From their individual perspectives, both of them will probably feel that the whole interaction was 'unnatural' . While a spectator of this exchange may find it 'unnatural', the second kind may also include inter-corporeal movements that the participants feel 'natural'. A person raised in a specific sociocultural context, for example, may find 'unnatural' the interaction between two immigrants raised in another context; their postures, voice inflections, use of personal space, may be quite different from what the spectator is accustomed to and so the interaction feels 'unnatural' even while it is not so for the people participating in it. Attitudinal stasis depends on outwards expressions of difference and the attitudes towards them. The question, then, is how do we shift it?

Contact, as an action, causes shifts of attitudinal stasis that follow a pattern of habituation similar to the pattern of foregrounding/fading-to-the-background that I described in the previous examples of stasis shifts. The action causes the perceiver to focus on the characteristics of the difference, first highlighting their 'unnaturalness' (foregrounding them), and after continued contact those characteristics become 'natural' (fading to the background). This pattern may be explained by the relationship between stasis and expectation: an action that causes a shift in stasis is an action that breaks our expectations but, as expectations do not remain broken, they are restructured to include the action that broke them.

Performative stasis

The example of the previous section suggests that there may be a general mechanics of stasis and its shifts, regardless of the domain we are applying the concept to. First, when a performer executes an action, the perceiver notices the action and its characteristics, and adjust their expectations to accommodate it, either by reinforcing those expectations or by breaking and

[31] 'Allistic' is a word that originated in the autistic community at the beginning of the 21st century. It was originally used as parody but has, since then, gained usage as a more accurate term for non-autistic.

restructuring them, shifting stasis. Second, the stasis shifts caused by an action that breaks expectation follow a pattern of habituation described by these steps: (1) the performer executes an action, (2) the action breaks the expectations of the perceiver, (3) the perceiver now notices the action and focuses on it, (4) the performer keeps on executing the action, (5) the perceiver familiarises with the action and restructures their expectation to include it, and (6) the perceiver stops noticing the action and focuses away from it. This entails that, if we want to shift stasis towards not-moving, we need to execute actions that, by their characteristics, cause the perceiver to focus on the threshold.

If we go back to the definition of stasis—the perceptual threshold where moving becomes not-moving—we can argue that there are actions that may be performed above the threshold (and are perceived) and actions that may be performed below the threshold (and are not perceived). I will coin the term 'performative stasis' and define it as *the act of performing actions below the threshold*. In the case of bodies, for each level of movement we can describe one fundamental action available for performative stasis, actions that are related to the not-moving state at each level: 'stillness', 'immobility' and 'apathy'. Thus, you can 'be still', you can 'remain in the same spot', and you can 'avoid interaction with others'. What I find interesting about framing these actions in terms of stasis, is that we may characterise their potential for participatory sense-making by analysing their relationship to perceptual thresholds at all levels, how they afford participants to shift them, and how those shifts become the foundation for bodily resonances that may enrich the theatrical event. The primary mechanism of performative stasis is to call attention to the perceptual threshold of each level and that, as a result of this operation, the threshold is shifted. This occurs because, as soon as we become aware of the threshold, we become aware of actions occurring below it. To illustrate this I want to offer three examples, one for each level of movement.

First, let me address the action of 'being still'. I have already written about my experience working with Alberto and how his stillness became full of movement, how our interactions were enriched because of that shift: stasis at the inter-corporeal level changed due to a shifts at the inter-corporeal and corporeal levels. A different example, one of voluntary stillness, is that of *The Artist is Present*, by Marina Abramović (2010)[32]. The performance was staged in the Museum of Modern Art of New York in 2010, in an empty room where two wooden chairs were placed one in front of the other, in the middle of square space delimited by a white line, spectators could observe from behind these lines while Abramović sat in one of the chairs, waiting for spectators to come and sit in the other chair, facing her. She was still, whether there was a person in front or not. I want to focus on those moments when there was a person in the other chair. As one after another sat there, trying to be still while facing the artist, a pattern began to emerge: people were moved and started crying. My reading of the situation is that the action of 'being still' performed by both artist and participant focused their attention in the threshold of stillness and caused it to shift. As stillness gave way to activity, immobility began to dissolve into micro-movements, and apathy gave way to social interaction. The effect was that movement at all levels was magnified, both bodies were tightly coupled in participatory sense-making, and the intensity of the experience caused strong emotions that made some people break down crying. In this case, performative stasis facilitated an interpersonal connection in a context of voluntary immobility by shifting the scale of perceived motion and amplifying the effects of the intra-corporeal movement, suggesting possible ways in which it might be a productive tool for exploring the theatrical potential of involuntary immobile bodies.

Second, I will address the action of 'remaining in the same spot'. In 1977, April 5th, the San Francisco offices of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) were occupied by more than 150 people with disabilities; they remained there for 28 days[33]. They were protesting the lack of regulations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the first law in the United States that codified federal civil rights protection for people with disabilities; a situation that lent itself to contradictory rulings at the judicial level as there was no "consistent, coherent interpretation of 504's legal intent" (Cone 1997). The demonstrators protested this situation by performative stasis at the corporeal level, their action was to remain in the offices of the HEW until an acceptable response was given by the government. Beyond the shifts in stasis of metaphorical mobility caused by their action—the attitude of the government changed and the regulations were signed, public perception about disability started to move away from the medical model to the social model—I want to highlight a particular exchange between the Regional Director of the HEW and some demonstrators as recounted by one of them in the *We shall not be moved* documentary:

> Reporter: What about the restroom facilities and that sort of thing? Are they equipped to handle that many handicapped people and could they get that help?

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[32] As I was not present at the performance, the following discussion is based on audio-visual records of the performance ([Contemporary Art Fashion Slub Pop Kitsch] 2012)

[33] This discussion is based on a recollection of the sit-in written by Kitty Cone, one of its organisers (1997), and *We shall not be moved*, an audio documentary about the sit-in produced by Asata Iman (1997). Both documents were published as part of the 20th anniversary of the demonstrations.

> Demonstrator: They are absolutely not equipped to handle them. That comes up with a very interesting story this afternoon that shows some of the people are maintaining their sense of humor. The Regional Director asked before 4 o'clock if he could try to get out of this room, because he needed to go to the restroom. And the group here said, "no, we have had to learn all of our lives to control our bladders, and you must learn that lesson, now, too. That might give you just a hint of what it's like to be handicapped." And so, he sat here until almost 6 o'clock (Iman 1997).

Even if we feel the need to go to the restroom, it is a need that tends to be solved quickly— unless we require support to access the bathroom —and there is almost no perception of intra-corporeal movement. The action of 'remaining in the same spot' performed by the demonstrators caused the Regional Director to remain himself in the same spot and, as a result, he became aware of the actions occurring not only at the corporeal level, but also at his intra-corporeal level, and I can only imagine that the intensity of those internal movements was uncomfortably magnified during his wait. Performative stasis helped communicate knowledge about part of the disability experience to a nondisabled person.



36. Pre-expressivity as a result of stasis shifts

Finally, let me refer back to Barba's anecdote of boarding the train and experimenting the reactions of other passengers to his presence. He writes that they reacted to his presence, a presence "which communicated neither aggression nor sympathy, neither desire for fraternization nor challenge" (1995, 4). We might say that Barba's social stance when boarding the train tended to the apathetic in avoiding interaction with the other passengers. If we analyse his actions when boarding the train by framing them as performative stasis, we could argue that by the mere act of keeping social distance he was calling attention to himself and, as a result, the threshold at the inter-corporeal level was shifted and his actions were now perceived as interactions. This shift then caused cascading shifts of thresholds at the other levels, small movements that would have been imperceptible before were now perceived and became part of the process of participatory sense-making occurring at that moment. In a way, perception of the 'pre-expressive' in that situation became possible because there was performative stasis at the inter-corporeal level. This example points to the possibility of applying performative stasis as a tool for analysing performances: we might characterise the actions of a performer in terms of its effects on stasis shifts and trace how spectators react. It can also be deployed as a creative tool for devising performances: certain actions may be explicitly chosen due to performative stasis and its cascading effect on the perception of movement.

Dissidence

Besides expectations of movement, we also have expectations of fit. If we experience fit most of the time, we expect others to experience fit most of the time, and that expectation biases our understanding of other bodies and their lived experiences. What does this imply? I contend that the dynamics of noticing misfit follows similar mechanics to those described previously for stasis. If we attend to one body, whether we realise it is experiencing misfit depends on our past experiences and on which characteristics of that body and their experience we are attending to. Empathy towards misfit is a function of our perception and our expectations about fit. As we expect human bodies to be a certain way and to behave in specific ways, we expect them to fit most of the time. As long as we do not notice other bodies experiencing misfit, this expectation is reinforced and assumptions of normality surrounding bodies in a specific context are strengthened. However, when the misfit experience of others exceeds some threshold, we notice their misfit, our expectations regarding fit are broken and we are forced to contend with the precariousness of the relationship between all bodies and their environments.

We may also interpret this process in terms of participatory sense-making. I have touched before on the idea that living organisms continually enact their particular worlds of meaning by adapting dynamically to their environment, and that expectations are part of an organism perspective regarding the environment and the 'ways of acting' available at any given moment. I have also explained that these expectations of individual organisms may be brought together as environmental expectations about organisms and that they are placed in tension to the experience and behaviour of each individual organism. In this context, misfit occurs when this tension exceeds what we may call an *environmental expectation threshold*: if a particular organism does not conform to environmental expectations and this non-conformance brings about discomfort for them, then said organism experiences misfit. Now, we may understand the expectation of fit as an environmental expectation placed upon all organisms. As such, it may be broken by a particular organism experiencing misfit and thus all organism involved are forced to make sense of the changed situation by modifying their own expectations and bringing about a new set of environmental expectations.

If we think of the experience of disability as the experience of a human body when environmental expectations are broken by some specific bodily configuration, then we may ask how the presence and actions of disabled bodies in certain contexts may push other bodies to notice misfit and thus facilitate a change of environmental expectations. In the previous section I suggested that involuntary immobility may be understood as a radical action that breaks all expectations of mobility and forces us to rethink our notions of communication and social participation. I contend that this interpretation may be extended to account for breaking expectations of fit. When confronted by such immobility, we are forced to rethink our notions of fit and how the materiality of environment supports our bodies or not. This section aims to conceptualise this process of changing environmental expectations and characterising which actions may induce this process. To begin with, I need to go back to misfit.

Feedback loops of misfit

Garland-Thomson refers to fitting and misfitting as part of an account of "a dynamic encounter between flesh and world" (2011, 592). In other words, fit and misfit may be understood as a function of body, environment and time. A specific body inhabiting a particular environment experiences fit at given moment if, in that moment, such body is supported by the environment and lives in that environment without difficulty. In those cases, when bodies fit, they have an "experience of material anonymity […] that often goes unnoticed" (Garland-Thomson 2011, 597). Being supported by the environment means that its characteristics meet the expectations of the body at that moment; when those characteristics break the expectations of the body, the contingency of the relationship between flesh and world is foregrounded and the material

anonymity is lost. Thus, changes in the environment may cause broken expectations and misfit. Fitting and misfitting are also related to bodies and their history; their expectations towards the environment they inhabit are not fixed, they depend on knowledge, familiarity, fatigue, or bodily changes. Given an unchanging context, a specific body that experiences fit now may experience misfit later because it gets tired and the environment offers no supports for the new bodily state. Thus, changes in the body may also cause broken expectations and misfit.

The reverse is also true: given an experience of misfit, changes in body, environment or both may produce an experience of fit. Changes in the environment range from everyday acts of kindness, such as giving a glass of water to the thirsty, to profound structural societal modifications to make space for everyone. Bodily changes, in turn, may go from seemingly simple acts like resting when tired and eating when hungry to extending our bodies through prosthetic devices[34]. Bodily changes also include incorporating knowledge about our environment, thus changing our expectations and providing us with tools to perform the "tactical navigations through space and time" that are fitting and misfitting (Garland-Thomson 2011, 597). This constant flow between fit and misfit is represented in Figure 37: the black dot is a particular body and the black area is the zone of fit, where bodies experience that unnoticed material anonymity mentioned by Garland-Thomson, with a point of maximum fit in the lower left corner; the white area is the zone of misfit, where bodies and environments clash, and the material contingency of their relationship becomes salient, with a point of maximum misfit in the upper right corner. The size of both areas depends on the state of the body and the characteristics of the environment; the fuzziness of the boundary represents whether the transition between fit and misfit is abrupt or gradual.

This flow between fit and misfit, between material anonymity and awareness underlies the experience offered by Mowry Baden's *Seat Belt* devices and my *Misfitting Resistor*. Jess Thom's version of *Not I* offers an illustration of the dynamics of fitting and misfitting during both the creative process and the performance itself. The original conception of the play precludes the participation of bodies like Thom's because it is bound by a set of expectations regarding which and how bodies should perform the piece. The process by which Thom reworked the play is akin to an environmental modification that updates expectations of fit by modifying the performance to shift the expectations implicit in the play and move towards an experience of fit, in her case, a performance devised to afford her participation as Mouth. During each performance, however, the randomness inherent in Tourette's causes a destabilising influence in terms of the flow of the spoken words and the experience of fit reached during the creative process is contested. I venture to say that part of the richness of Thom's performances comes from the constant shift between fit and misfit and how she as performer productively navigates it.

Going back to Figure 37, there is one dot in each figure, representing one body and its current state of fitting and misfitting in a specific environment. The characteristics of the areas of fit and misfit—their shapes and sizes—and the fuzziness of their boundaries depend on the features of the body and the environment and whether the body what kind of knowledge has the body about the particular environment it is inhabiting. In other words, each fit/misfit configuration at any given moment depends on the interaction between body and environment and the history of that body's interaction with that environment. As we know that, when present, other bodies are part of the environment, it is important to reflect on the dynamics of misfit for two interacting bodies. What happens when one body misfits and the other fits? How do their respective fit/misfit configurations change over time as they interact with each other?

We can map the possible paths of interaction to attempt answering those questions. At the beginning, there are two bodies, a *dissident* and a *bystander*—represented by a circle and triangle—each experiencing fit within their own fit/misfit configurations. Then, something causes a change in the dissident's state, causing them to leave the zone of fit and start experiencing misfit (Figure 38, 1). What happens with the bystander? What is their reaction to the dissident's experience of misfit? Given that the dissident is part of the bystander's environment, we can assume the change in the dissident may imply a change in that environment. This change has the potential of causing the bystander to begin experiencing misfit both because the environmental change itself may place the bystander in a materially unsupported state or because the change may break either the bystander's individual expectations of fit or the environmental expectations placed upon them. Depending on whether the environment keeps sustaining the bystander and which, if any, expectations are broken, there are four possible result: the bystander maintains their current experience of fit (Figure 38, 2a), they start experiencing misfit (Figure 38, 2b), they move towards the boundary between fit and misfit but do not cross it (Figure 38, 2c), or they move away from the boundary between fit and misfit (Figure 38, 2d). Let us unpack these possible results:

1. If the bystander's environment keep sustaining them and no expectations are broken, then they may keep fitting at their current level. This may occur because they do not have the necessary knowledge to support recognition of the dissident's state of misfit and thus they cannot perceive it, hiding the dissident's situation from them. Such is the

[34] For example, as part of my daily routine I perform a small act that helps me experience fit: I put on my glasses as soon as I wake up.

case, for example, of people leaving scooters on sidewalks because they cannot even imagine scooters being obstacles for wheelchair users, old people, blind people, people with baby carriages, etc.

2. If the dissident's misfit causes the bystander's environment to stop supporting them—whether because it causes material changes that affect them or because environmental expectations are broken—then the bystander experiences misfit. Imagine, for example, two autistic persons sharing a conversation while eating. One of them does not tolerate certain kinds of food and the other does not like loud noises. If the first person is served one of their disliked foods, they may start experiencing a meltdown with shouting. In turn, the shouting causes the other person to experience misfit as the noise escalates beyond their threshold.
3. the dissident's misfit may cause the bystander's expectation of fit to be broken. In this case, the bystander may experience misfit if such broken expectations cannot be readily accommodated by previous knowledge and the bystander has to embark on a process of discovery to reach a new state of fit. Whether the bystander feels more or less empathy towards the dissident, or outright disgust, depends on previous knowledge and attitudes about the dissident's situation, and attitudes towards their own experience of misfit. For example, when faced with a wheelchair user that cannot reach a higher level because there are no ramps, a walking person may feel discomfort about the situation and either (1) feel empathy towards the wheelchair user and offer help, (2) feel embarrassment and move away, (3) feel angry because they feel forced to do something, or (4) feel disgusted by the misfitting body[35].
4. the dissident's misfit may cause the bystander's environmental changes that cause the bystander to experience more discomfort than before but not enough to make their experience cross the boundary between fit and misfit. Once again, whether the bystander experiences more or less empathy depends on their previous knowledge and attitudes. In this case, however, the reaction would be less strong than in the case of experiencing misfit.
5. The final case occurs when the dissident's misfit causes the bystander to experience more comfort, thus moving away from the boundary between fit and misfit. This may occur because the environmental changes related to the dissident's misfit create better sustaining conditions for the bystander, or because the bystander's expectations of fit are reinforced and thus their feeling of being right increases. Whatever the reason, this means that the bystander is actively benefitting from the dissident's misfit[36]. An example of this would be the police reaction to being approached by Kyle Rittenhouse, a 17-years old White man, carrying a military-style semi-automatic rifle. Rittenhouse shot dead two people during the protests against racial inequality in the United States in 2020 and he walked up to the police to give himself up. They did not stop him at that time and he left (Willis et al. 2020). Evidence from similar encounters between the police and Black people suggests that, had Rittenhouse been a Black man, he probably would been killed by them ("2017 Police Violence Report" 2017). In a non-racialised context, he would have experienced a more strict process but, instead, he benefited from the collective misfit for Black people.

At this point, given that the bystander is part of the dissident's environment, we might ask what happens to the dissident's experience of misfit. Do they move back to their zone of misfit? Do they experience more discomfort and move away from the boundary? Do they move a bit towards fit without crossing the boundary? I am interested in following the paths where the bystander experiences misfit and that misfit either reinforces the dissident's misfit or causes epistemological changes that help them move towards their respective zones of fit. For this to occur, the bystander needs to notice the dissident or, in other words, the dissident must exist for the bystander. This begs the question: when do we exists for others? Going back to Garland-Thomson, she argues that

> a reasonable fit in a reasonably sustaining environment allows a person to navigate the world in relative anonymity, in the sense of being suited to the circumstances and conditions of the environment, of satisfying its requirements in a way so as not to stand out, make a scene, or disrupt through countering expectations (2011, 596)

To exist for others we must leave that anonymity and this implies experiencing unreasonable fit or outright misfit; others must register our presence and perceive us; we must break some of their expectations or otherwise recede into the background. When we embody the unexpected, we are foregrounded and start existing. In the theatrical event, the first action is always an exhibitory action that foregrounds the performer and incites a reaction from the spectator. Building on Linda Martín Alcoff's work on the formation of racial and gender identity (2006), Garland-Thomson argues that "how we look, and look at each other […] determines in large part how we make our way through the world and how we treat one

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[35] I vividly remember one example of the last point: some years ago we were working with Alberto to stage a brain-controlled music concert and, during one of the meetings with the funding institution, their representative said that they felt Alberto's presence on-stage was unnecessary because it would be "unduly shocking for the audience".

[36] Or *bene-fitting*.

another" (2011, 596). There is an ongoing process of recognition and identification between ourselves and others that affect our experiences of fit and misfit. Garland-Thomson further elaborates this relationship between recognition, identification, fitting and misfitting:

> Alcoff suggests that we are called into subjectivity through an exchange of mutual recognition, which may of course often be misrecognition. Misfitting adds to this primarily perceptual field stronger elements of materiality; our bodies move, meet, negotiate, and come into direct contact with the built and natural worlds. The degree to which that shared material world sustains the particularities of our embodied life at any given moment or place determines our fit or misfit. Our particular embodiments are as unchosen as the narratives of our identities upon which Alcoff focuses. Identities are narratives accessed through visual perceptions for Alcoff; fitting and misfitting are largely tactical navigations through space and time. Both these visual and tactile relations make up the process of identification both as it is imposed and felt. Both sets of relations turn on material particularity, the way we look and how we function. Frequently, we do not choose our particularities, but as Alcoff reminds us, the meaning and the substance of our bodies can be reshaped to some degree. The concepts of fitting and misfitting speak directly to the issue of reshaping body and world (Garland-Thomson 2011, 596–97)

We exist for others, that is, we become subjects, when we are recognised. Recognition implies processes of identification that rely both on our individual and environmental expectations. This would seem to imply that the anonymity afforded by reasonable fit implies a kind of implicit recognition of others that prevents noticing them in their full material relationship with the world. Conversely, unreasonable fit or misfit may lead to an explicit recognition of others that forces us to consider how they inhabit the world and how the world sustains them or not. When we misfit by breaking environmental expectations, which include other people's expectations of fit, we exist for them and they notice us. Our actions might then cause them to experience misfit and force them to reconsider their existing knowledge and attitudes, that is, the frame within which they recognise us or not. This epistemological process may end up restructuring what and how they think of us, and how they treat us. This back and forth between bodies becomes a feedback loop of misfit that may end up "reshaping body and world" (Garland-Thomson 2011, 597).

When we misfit, we experience the material precariousness of living bodies and their continual process of self-enablement to keep existing as a form of resistance from the material world against our existence. In our race to constitute ourselves through our actions, we might cause other bodies to experience such resistance. Our shared experience of being-in-the-world becomes more difficult, the disjuncture between ourselves and our environment becomes salient, and we "recognize that disjuncture for its political potential, we expose the relational component and the fragility of fitting" (Garland-Thomson 2011, 597). This relational component implies that feedback loops of misfit are one way of realising the political potential of misfitting. When such loops occur, more than one body is affected and more than one body needs to account for their broken expectations and the unreliability of their actions; then they all need to come up with new actions that are reliable in the changed context and that bring them back to fitting. In other words, actions that cause feedback loops of misfit may also cause groups to work together towards achieving fit.

From misfits to dissidents

Misfit, as something that happens to us and we experience it, seems a rather reactive and passive concept. However, there is still space for our agency in this process. We experience misfit when some change in either environment or our bodies pushes us beyond the threshold of fit. It stands to reason that those changes may be initiated by ourselves, knowingly or not. In some cases we would be unaware that our actions will make us experience misfit, in other cases we would act knowing that we will experience misfit because of what we did. In the latter case, we might perform actions that lead to our misfitting because we have no other option or because we want to. Why would we strive to misfit through our actions? I contend that we act to misfit when we want to realise its politic potential by forcing feedback loops of misfit leading to new knowledge that could benefit us all. Garland-Thomson argues that

> the experience of misfitting can produce subjugated knowledges from which an oppositional consciousness and politicized identity might arise. So although misfitting can lead to segregation, exclusion from the rights of citizenship, and alienation from a majority community, it can also foster intense awareness of social injustice and the formation of a community of misfits that can collaborate to achieve a more liberatory politics and praxis (2011, 597).

I argue that in order to initiate the process described in the previous quote, instead of waiting for misfit to occur, we might act in such a way to induce misfit for ourselves and create feedback loops. Our possible actions would have to be chosen so that we experience misfit and others recognise us and our misfit and they need to be carefully chosen to avoid inducing misfit in others while benefitting us, that is, making us fit thanks to other people misfitting[37]. The *Misfitting Resistor* may be understood as a model of this process: by changing the embodiment of the Unspooler they experiment misfit and their experience of misfit, in turn, causes misfit in some of the other pedestrians. In this case, however, the political potential was not fully realised as I did not facilitate a space for sharing the knowledge produced by the resistor with those pedestrians. An example with consequences would be the 504 Sit In mentioned the section about stasis. In that case, the protesters put themselves, through their actions, in a situation of misfit that created a feedback loop affecting San Francisco's city authorities and opened up a space for the shared creation of new knowledge regarding the rights of disabled people, and the realisation of this new knowledge in more inclusive urban policies.

A body that deviates from the norm—whether because of their disability, gender, race or some other aspects of their embodiment—has two choices regarding how to confront an unsupportive environment: they may choose to pass, to strive for apparent material anonymity by hiding their misfit, in an attempt to fulfil other people's expectations of fit; or they may choose to act out their misfit and break those expectations, to make their misfit salient and disruptive, with the hope that such disruption would bring about a feedback loop that facilitates collaboration towards better conditions. A body that actively seeks to misfit and through their own misfit expose underlying exclusionary structures may be called a *dissident* body; and their actions should be characterised as *dissidence*. In other words, we may think of *dissidence* as the performance of misfit-inducing actions by a specific body in order to create misfit for that body and to generate feedback loops of misfit with other bodies aiming to facilitate shared production of new knowledge towards an experience of fit for all.

When they choose to reveal their misfit, disabled bodies are dissident bodies. Whether they perform their misfit in grand gestures such as the Capitol Crawl of 1990 or in small intimate acts of rebellion like stimming[38] when told not to, disabled dissident bodies are actively pitting themselves against environmental expectations that ignore them at best and exclude them at worst. These bodies, through their actions, break those expectations and force everyone around to begin researching for new technique that accounts for them and their existence. Which actions they choose to take depend on their specific embodiments and their own technique of disability. What to make, then, of still and immobile bodies as dissident bodies?

The politics of immobility

All roads lead to Rome, they say, but that is not true. What is true is that all roads lead to Rome only if you have the right kind of body to access those roads. While expectations about movement exclude immobile bodies from participating in theatre practice, these exclusionary attitudes impact a broader context of theatre. We might also consider, for example, theatre-going, the whole process of finding out there is a performance you might be interested in attending, buying tickets, going to the location and accessing it, attending the performance, and leaving. Each of these steps is filled with assumptions regarding which kind of bodies may participate. Finding out about the performance requires that information about it exists in a form that is accessible for you, that it is posted in forums you frequent, that it reaches your friends and contacts so they may tell you about it, and so on and so forth. How many times have you received an invitation by email that has as content a single image and no text? By this I mean that there is no textual alternative to the text in the image itself, hiding it from screen-readers for the blind. Or, say you found out about the performance and went to the theatre to buy tickets, only to reach the ticket office and no one uses sign language.

What can we do to demand change? We stop the flow. There is a tradition of stopping the flow in activism, but this stoppage is usually marked by dynamic action, by revolt, by taking to the streets and grand gestures. In all those actions there is also the assumption that bodies can act in certain ways, can perform activism in certain ways. What happens when the bodies demanding change cannot perform in such ways? Or what other ways of action there may be if we attend to diverse bodies and the rich knowledge embodied in them? In particular, what happens when an immobile body is present in a theatrical context? Alberto has attended performances as spectator and his mere presence in that space forces a reflection about his exclusion from theatrical practice; just by attending and being there, immobile, an action is executed that calls attention to the exclusionary practices. Why? How does 'being there' force such reflection?

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[37] This is basically the template for exclusionary and discriminatory practices. The interested reader may read McNamarah's account of White people weaponizing police calls to exclude and attack Black people (2019).

[38] Stimming is "a self-stimulatory behavior that is marked by a repetitive action or movement of the body" (Merriam-Webster 2021). Pathologizing approaches to autism characterise it as undesirable behaviour. Autistic self-advocates and researchers, however, reclaim stimming as an integral and joyful part of their lived experience .

I contend that disabled bodies can engage in political action through not-moving by weaving the power of historical actions of protest based on stoppage, their particular embodied perspectives and their specific possibilities for performative stasis. In the previous section I defined this notion as the act of performing actions below the threshold where moving becomes not-moving and that shift the threshold. I also described the related fundamental actions for each level of movement: 'being still', 'remaining in the same' spot, and 'avoiding interaction with others'. These actions become political when they are part of the potential misfit-inducing actions of dissidence.

Dissidence, in the context of stasis, may be understood in terms of actions that shift stasis and, through these shifts, induce misfit for the performer and force others to recognise them and their misfit. In stasis shifts, the expectations broken by the actions of the performer are expectations about movement but not necessarily expectations about fit. To connect these shifts to dissidence, we need to focus on actions that also break expectations of fit; in this way, we can tie shifts in stasis to the induction of misfit. Given this connection, the pattern of habituation to stasis I described in the previous section may be extended to give an account of how fitting and misfitting change for both performer and perceiver and how habituation to stasis becomes a part of the process of restructuring expectations and producing new knowledge about the shared moment of misfit. In other words, the process is extended to include the production of new expectations of fit guided by the reformulated expectations of movement. This new process may be described by these steps:

1. The performer executes an action that induces misfit for themselves and breaks the expectations of movement of the perceiver
2. The performer's misfit breaks the expectation of fit of the perceiver
3. The broken expectations of fit of the perceiver causes them to experience misfit
4. Performer and perceive execute concerted actions that intend to decrease their respective levels of misfit and to restructure the expectations of movement of the perceiver
5. If the restructured expectations of movement of the perceiver account for the movement of the performer, stasis is shifted
6. If either performer or perceiver are still experiencing misfit, repeat 4

A dissident action based on immobility at any level uses stasis shifts towards not-moving to generate feedback loops of misfit between performer and perceiver by executing actions not only break both expectations of movement and fit. These loops, in turn, may realise the political potential of immobility-related misfitting. Step 5, in particular, is the core of this realisation as it entails a process of participatory decision-making to choose which actions may improve both performer and perceiver's respective experiences of fit. What possibilities does performative stasis offer to this process?

In the context of theatre-going, for example, a Deaf person may 'avoid interacting with other people' while 'remaining in the same spot' at the ticket office to highlight the dependence on audio for the ticket-buying transaction, the lack of sign language and the possible paternalistic attitudes of other theatre-goers; a dialogue may hopefully be established to change both the specific conditions of the moment and the overall process of ticket-buying thanks to the production of shared knowledge between the Deaf person, the people in charge of the ticket office and the rest of the theatre-goers. Another example: a wheelchair user might move beyond their assigned place in, leave their chair at the entrance of a seat row, sit in a chair and performing both 'remain in the same spot' and 'avoid interaction with others', effectively stopping the flow of people into the seats and starting a feedback loop of misfit. Last example: when Alberto attends to a theatre performance as an spectator he is performing 'being still' and 'remaining in the same spot' and, through these actions, he calls attention to the fact that he should have a space on stage. I might say that these actions extend from the physical space of theatre to the conceptual space of Chilean theatre practice where he 'remains in the same spot' and has motivated an ongoing process of shared knowledge production regarding which bodies may or may not participate in theatre practice, a process of which my research project is part of.



37. The moving and blurring boundary extends the zone of fit and engulfs a body



38. Simple model of the dynamics of misfitting with two interacting bodies

Back to the theatrical event

Besides expectations of fit and movement, we have expectations about what constitutes theatre. Whether we are a laypeople or expert researchers of worldwide theatrical traditions, we bring our prior experiences to each performance we attend to. As I wrote in the introduction, my initial expectations of theatre were informed by the imaginary of the traditional Western proscenium arch theatre where a story is told by actors representing characters. These initial expectations were obviously broken as I attended more performances and delved into my research, forcing me to restructure them and reach a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes theatre. My epistemic arch bears repeating because it reproduces at the individual level, what I expect to be the more collective dynamics of contesting exclusionary attitudes against immobile bodies in theatre, through the productive application of dissidence and stasis to the theatrical event. This brings me to a question that should weave together all the threads I have been laying down: what do the concepts of dissidence and stasis bring to the discussion about immobile bodies in theatre practice? I want to address this question by focusing on Sauter's call to describe "the interaction between performer and spectator, the nature and mutuality of this interaction and its relation to various contexts within the life of the theatre and outside" (2014, 390–91 [Kindle]) and show how dissidence offers the opportunity to explore body diversity during this interaction and how stasis provides a mechanics for analysing the action/reaction loop that forms the core of the theatrical event.

Sauter argues for understanding the actual experience of theatre in terms of an event unfolding between performer and spectators, the theatrical event (2014, 118–19 [Kindle]). He characterises it as occurring in a communicative field between what the performer does and what the spectator perceives. In turn, this field may be conceived of as constituted by three levels—sensory, artistic and symbolic—each dealing with specific modes of communication. Finally, the event unfolds in time and is always constrained by the layers of context in which it occurs. Figure 39 is a diagram representing Sauter's extended model of the theatrical event. What follows is my reading of the model according to my work in this research[39].

The event may be interpreted as an unfolding loop between presentation and perception where the actions of the performer elicit reactions from the spectator. In turn, those reactions affect the performer and modulate their subsequent actions. Sauter explains that the performer's actions may be divided in three kinds: *exhibitory*, *encoded* and *embodied* (2014, 664–727 [Kindle]). It is important to remember that these three kinds of actions are always performed at the same time. Sauter explains that

> when an actor speaks a line such as Shakespeare's famous "A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse," he is simultaneously carrying out the three actions described above. He uses his voice as part of the exhibitory actions, delivers the line according to codes determined through individual, cultural, and aesthetic choices, and gives them a embodied quality partly through the use of real actions (for example, shouting the line) and pretended actions such as indicating despair. All the three types of actions described here are involved in this act. I think it is only possible to distinguish them clearly in analytical terms, while a real experience in the theatre easily might blur the distinction (Sauter 2014, 718–22 [Kindle])

Exhibitory actions refer to the performer's act of being present on what we think is a stage, how they expose both their "physical appearance and their mental condition" and how the perception of this exposition is conditioned by cultural norms (Sauter 2014, 672–73 [Kindle]). Following from the discussion about stasis and pre-expressiveness, I would say that there two mechanisms at work during exhibitory actions: first, intra- and corporeal movements that occur below the threshold of perception shift stasis and become salient changes influencing inter-corporeal movement; and second, spectator's expectations mould their perception and thus have an effect on stasis and how it may shift. Exhibitory actions may thus be understood as actions based on movements occurring below stasis at the intra- and corporeal levels that intend to produce changes at the inter-corporeal level.

[39] I am also attempting to account for body diversity in both performer and spectator as Sauter's language tends to be biased towards non-disabled bodies. For example, when he is discussing the presence of an actor on stage, he focuses on their appearance and how the spectator might react to how they look, thus privileging the visual and implicitly excluding the possibility of blind spectators (2014, 667–69).



39. Extended model of the theatrical event (taken from Sauter 2014, 137 [Kindle])

Encoded actions account for the performer's expressive means; these actions are conditioned by the performer's behaviour, broad cultural patterns and specific aesthetic norms of the tradition a particular performance is inscribed in, including the skill with which these actions are performed (Sauter 2014, 679–97 [Kindle]). These actions may be considered correct, valid and appropriately skilful depending on the expectations around the specific performance they occur in. Expectations, for example, about performer status within their discipline or their adherence to the aesthetic traditions of their genre. We may conceive of encoded actions as building upon exhibitory actions by focusing on perceivable movements at the corporeal level that are expected to follow specific cultural norms according to the context of the performance, and that intend to express something.

Embodied actions are the third type defined by Sauter and refer to those actions performed with the intention "to produce some kind of symbolic or fictional meaning" and that are directed towards the spectator. These actions may be further divided in actions that are intended to mean the action itself or actions that are intended to mean something different from the action performed (Sauter 2014, 697–713 [Kindle]). While I take issue with Sauter's choice of 'embodied' to describe these actions because all actions are inevitably embodied, I reconcile his choice by interpreting it as meaning that this kind of actions embody specific meanings intended by the performer[40]. Embodied actions are intended to produce meaning and thus may be interpreted as actions based on movements at any level that are performed in order to engage in the process of participatory sense-making that is always occurring during the theatrical event.

All these actions from the performer elicit reactions from the spectator. According to Sauter's interpretation of previous reception studies, there are four kinds of responses from audiences: "reflections of prior experiences, emotional reactions, cognitive reactions, and value judgments" (2014, 728 [Kindle]). He further explains that

> since prior experiences, producing expectations, preferences, and prejudices, have a strong impact on both emotional and cognitive reactions during and after the performance, they become part of the actual theatrical experience and can be dealt with as direct responses to the performer. Value judgments, in turn, influence as well as result from the emotional and intellectual effects of the encounter with the performer and can therefore be seen as part of these reactions (2014, 728–31 [Kindle])

From these types of audience responses Sauter proposes two broad types of reactions that he calls *intuitive* and *cognitive*: intuitive refers to emotional reactions and cognitive refers to reactions based on intellectually processed information (2014, 740–41 [Kindle]). In the context of this project, conflating intellect and cognition and separating emotion from cognition is wrong as embodied and enactive approaches to cognition argue that emotion is a part of cognitive processes and that it cannot be separated from reasoning because it provides the substrate in which intellectual processes occur. Instead of these

[40] We might say that they are embodied symbols.

concepts, it may be more productive for this discussion to frame reactions in terms of whether they happen above or below the threshold of awareness and whether they refer to automatic processes or not. For this reason, I will use the notions of *implicit* and *explicit* to describe the two main modes of reactions: implicit refers to those reactions that happen automatically without awareness of how and why they occur, and explicit refer to those that occur above the threshold for awareness and that imply a conscious process of elaboration. Once again, this separation is productive for analysis but during a real theatrical experience they occur at the same time and inform each other.

Actions and the reactions they elicit may be analysed in three levels of communication, one for each action type: the *sensory* level, for exhibitory actions and reactions such as affection, curiosity, disregard, repulsion or recognition; the *artistic* level for encoded actions and reactions that encompass aesthetic experience and judgements about the performer; and the *symbolic* level for embodied actions and those reactions related to identification and interpretation of the performed actions (2014, 137–51 [Kindle]). We may interpret these levels of communication in terms of how actions and reactions shape the loop of participatory sense-making between performer and spectator.

In the sensory level, the implicit reactions to exhibitory actions are automatic, somatosensory responses related to the presence of the performer. In turn, as the spectator becomes aware of them, they may recognise those reactions and elaborate them. These reactions become the foundation of participatory sense-making and mould the rest of the process because, much in the way that emotions shape reasoning by constituting the substrate in which it happens, both implicit and explicit reactions at the sensory level form the substrate from which reactions at the other two levels emerge. For example, a fat-shamer spectator may feel disgust when a fat person performs and elaborate that disgust as contempt. This contempt, in turn, colours their expectation about the skilfulness from the performer and the spectator may judge more harshly the encoded actions of the performer.

Beyond this substrate, in the artistic level both encoded actions and the corresponding reactions to them are also shaped by previous knowledge about which actions are possible and expected given the expectations set by characteristics of the performance. Such knowledge includes performer's knowledge gained through practice guided by the specific technique of the artistic tradition of the performance, spectator's knowledge incorporated by attending performances of that tradition and by engaging in discourse about the performance and its artistic tradition. This prior knowledge is constituted both by the knowledge incorporated by participating in performances and by incorporation externally encoded knowledge about the artistic tradition and, in turn, constitutes the shared artistic language that is reaffirmed or restructured during each theatrical event. When, for example, an spectator faces a performance of Hamlet that follows their expectation regarding the play and the character, their previous interpretations of the subject matter are also reaffirmed. If, instead, the performer playing Hamlet deviates from the encoded actions for the character expected by the spectator, then they may be forced to reconsider previous readings of the performance and have to create new meaning from the unexpected version.

Knowledge production in loops of participatory sense-making seems to follow a pattern whereby some stimulus elicits first some kind of automatic response from the participants that is in turn elaborated through a shared reflection process that ends up creating more stimuli for sustaining the loop. In this reading, even if they deal with implicit and explicit reactions, the sensory and artistic levels may be thought of as representing these two stages: the sensory level would be the automatic portion of the process and the artistic level would be the reflection process. Reactions to exhibitory actions build up to form the substrate where reactions to encoded actions become judgements of the artistic aspects of the performance. This split carries over to the symbolic level where embodied actions may be readily interpreted as they are, that is, in terms of their actual movements and effects on stage, or reflectively in terms of their referential possibilities in the cultural sphere shared by performer and spectator.

The flow of information going from the sensory to the artistic and the symbolic also occurs in the opposite direction during the theatrical event. Interpretations about the performance may bring to the fore expectations from other artistic traditions or from other performances that modify which encoded actions are thought of as valid or skilful enough. These modifications of the shared artistic language in which encoded actions are evaluated may change the disposition of the spectator towards the presence of the performer and shift the valence of their reaction to exhibitory actions towards the positive, in turn setting up a different substrate for the emergence of reactions during the rest of the event.

The process of participatory sense-making is also shaped by the contexts in which the theatrical event occurs in: (1) the *conventional* context, that contains knowledge about theatre in a specific location and moment; (2) the *structural* context, referring to how theatre is organised in society; (3) the *conceptual* context, which maps ideological positions regarding theatre and the political outcomes of those positions; (4) the *cultural* context, relates theatre to other art forms and to the wider spectrum of cultural dimension of other areas of society; and (5) the *life world* context, encompassing any and all things that may affect the theatrical event (Sauter 2014, 156–63 [Kindle]). Contexts determine which actions are possible for

the performer and which actions are expected of them by the spectator given shared knowledge. The idea of 'neutral bodies' in theatre, for example, is part of the conventional context of Western theatre we are discussing and it is also a consequence of ableist assumptions about bodies in art that are part of the cultural context. These ableist assumptions, in turn, may affect a spectator's reactions to exhibitory actions: a spectator may react to the presence of a disabled body on stage with pity and interpret it in terms of inspirational porn, or react with disgust and elaborate their feelings in exclusionary terms by arguing that the role in a play should have been given to a 'real' actor. Which bodies can perform or attend a performance may also be determined by the physical characteristics of the venues—the structural context—or choices regarding accessibility made during urban planning—the life world context.

Contexts shared by performer and spectator during the theatrical event are the environment in which the process of participatory sense-making takes place. They are the shared languages and assumptions that form sets of expectations regarding different topics related to the performance and the traditions it is inscribed in: which kind of movements are valid, which bodies are allowed on stage, how strict is the enforcing of norms, etc. Actions that fall within the expected range of actions—or barely outside—reinforce those expectations and cause reactions that also fall within an expected range of responses: when performers do what is expected of them given a specific genre, for example, spectators enjoy the performance without tensions regarding the art-form, reacting to pre-determined points of the performance as prior experience dictates. On the other hand, when actions break expectations about some topic in any of the contexts, they may cause a cascade of broken expectations in other contexts. Sauter gives an unfortunate but illustrative example when he writes that "a fat dancer needs special skills to make a favourable impression on the audience" (2014, 144–45 [Kindle]): given fat-exclusionary attitudes, the body of the fact dancer is unexpected and thus their exhibitory actions cause strong reactions at the sensory level that inhibit finding potential encoded actions at the artistic level, thus breaking expectations at the conventional level. What happens to the theatrical event in these, and similar, cases? What further actions are possible when expectations are broken and how those actions may foster a change of expectations to sustain the current event and broaden the field of performing bodies in all contexts? And what are the implications for my question about immobile bodies in theatre practice?

El otro es tan importante que me disuelvo en él
(Vega 2013, 82)

Still bodies, still theatre

Back at the beginning, I asked if immobile people could act in theatre. During my research, I realised that the question itself was shaped by assumptions about theatre, acting, bodies and movement that rendered moot my first naïve approach. Thus, answering the question by simply stating that 'yes, immobile people can act in theatre when supported by technology' was not enough because I was ignoring the nature of theatre and acting, and the ableist assumptions underlying theatrical practice. Assumptions that, in turn, have excluded immobile bodies from participating in such practice. While technology may provide tools for particular performances, the answer to the original question does not have to be constrained by the use of technology.

Instead, after undertaking this research, I can state that immobile bodies can act. To support this statement I have to give an account of what actions are possible for them, how those actions can be productively and creatively applied to theatrical performances, and how the idea of immobility itself is tied to the way the theatrical event unfolds. Two ideas introduced in the previous section are central to this account: *stasis* as a way to explain how movement and stillness are dependent on the observer and how this dependence affects the flow of the theatrical event, *dissidence* as a frame for describing which actions are suitable for contesting ableist assumptions and map how those actions shape the theatrical event as an instance of political participation.

In this section I will offer an account of *still theatre*, an approach to theatre that highlights the common structure of knowing processes shared by the theatrical event, stasis and dissidence to centre immobility as a source for analysing and creating performances. This account is organised in two parts: an extension of the theatrical event to include stasis and dissidence; and an proposal of how to apply this extended model to theatrical creation and analysis.

A model for still theatre

There are shared elements between the models of the theatrical event, dissidence and stasis that suggest they may be modelled with a common structure that should facilitate addressing how they interact. The three can be understood as processes of knowing unfolding in particular domains or, in terms of the epistemology of practice, they are explorations of what bodies can reliably do in the domains of theatre, disability and movement. In other words, the theatrical event is a knowing process about the technique of theatre, dissidence is a knowing process about the technique of disability, and stasis is a knowing process about the technique of movement. Specific realisations of these processes, that is, specific moments when people meet and do explore these domains together, are instances of practice structured by each particular technique that are susceptible to the breakage of expectations and thus open to the creation of new technique. These processes may be organised as loops of participatory sense-making in which agents both provide actions as stimuli and react to them while reinforcing existing knowledge or accommodating new experiences by producing new knowledge. I have identified seven elements common to these processes:

1. *Participants*: as instances of participatory sense-making, there are agents involved in these processes. At any given time, one participant is performing actions and the other is reacting to those actions. Depending on how we are analysing the process, we can reverse the roles at a later time. For the remainder of this text, I will call the participant acting at a given moment as *producer* and the participant reacting to those actions as *receiver*. These roles may be assigned and re-assigned to the (a) performer and spectator of the theatrical event, (b) the dissident and bystander of dissidence, and (c) the performer/perceiver of stasis, depending on the flow of the actions and reactions.
2. *Expectations*: both producer and receiver expect things to happen in certain ways depending on their individual prior experiences and their shared cultural backgrounds. Expectations are previous knowledge related to the specific domain of the knowing process: (a) the nested contexts of the theatrical event, (b) the environmental expectations of fit in dissidence, and (c) the expectation of motion at any given level of movement in stasis. Expectations are both embodied and externally encoded knowledge about the relative reliabilities of bodies in the given domain.
3. *Actions*: at any given moment, the producer wilfully does something that is supposed to affect the receiver and impact the process of knowing. The activity of the producer is supposed to sustain the process of knowing through the continued production of stimuli that have to be accommodated according to the expectations of the participants. The potential actions in each kind of process are (a) the exhibitory, encoded and embodied actions that constitute part of the performance in the theatrical event, (b) the misfit-inducing actions that jumpstart and maintain the feedback loop of misfit in dissidence, and (c) performative stasis that shifts the threshold of perceived motion in stasis.

4. *Reactions*: at any given moment, the receiver responds to the action of the producer both implicitly and explicitly, that is, they react automatically and elaborate on that automatic response through a reflective process. Reactions are always shaped by expectations and may account for their breakage. The potential reactions for each kind of process are (a) affect, disgust, recognition, identification or interpretation in the theatrical event; (b) empathy, rejection or changes in the experience of fit in dissidence; and (c) shifts of the perceptual threshold towards moving or not-moving in stasis.
5. *Loops*: the processes of knowing we are discussing take the form of participatory sense-making loops that are maintained as long as participants are willing and able to be involved in them: (a) the theatrical event is a loop between the actions of the performer and reactions of the spectator, (b) dissidence, by definition, is a feedback loop of misfit between the actions of the dissident and the reactions of the bystander, and (c) in stasis, changes in the perceptual threshold entail further changes in the perception of movement that eventually lead to new changes in the threshold, thus looping back. In all these processes, the roles of producer and receiver move back and forth between participants giving way to diverse and productive exchanges.
6. *Expectations update*: the expectations of the receiver at any moment are updated after the producer performs an action depending on whether they are reinforced or broken, that is, if the action is congruent or not with prior knowledge of the domain. In turn, the reaction of the receiver is moulded by this update: (a) in the theatrical event, the use of specific vocal techniques from opera is expected in that genre and reinforces the expectation of opera spectators but, if those same techniques are used in another genre, they cause a breakage and reactions of surprise at different levels; (b) in dissidence, the explicit goal of each action is to break expectations of fit as long the process has not managed to change the environment towards resolving the original situation of misfit; and (c) in stasis actions that reinforce expectations of movement cause habituation and shift the threshold towards moving, thus potentially hiding some of the next actions, while those actions that break expectations produce shifts towards not-moving, thus potentially making salient some of the subsequent actions.
7. *Production of new knowledge*: when expectations are broken, the actions that broke them need to be accommodated by the creation of new knowledge that restructures those expectations. In other words, the producer and receiver have to produce new technique in the specific domain that should include those actions. In some cases, the breakage may cause the loop to be finished before a previously agreed-upon moment because it is not possible to restructure expectations concurrently. In those cases, a process of externally-encoded participatory sense-making is initiated in the community of people involved in each domain. This posterior modification of expectations becomes more relevant as it is from there where new loops that include prior actions as expected may be started. In general, then, there are two instances of knowledge production related to the loop, one that is concurrent to it and one that occurs afterward: (a) in a theatrical event where the presence of a fat dancer is unexpected the spectator may concurrently learn to read the new kind of body on stage or share and discuss their experience in formal and informal dance forums afterwards; (b) in dissidence, the bystander may take actions during the loop to improve the fit for everyone in the situation, or reflect later on the experience to update their expectations of fit and become an ally; or (c) in stasis, the perceiver starts noticing smaller movements from the performer and eventually incorporates those smaller movements as expressive movements, thus improving their communication with the performer.

This common structure enables me to ask specific questions about the interaction between stasis, dissidence and the theatrical event. I can review, for instance, how dissidence further constrains the potential actions of the performer in a theatrical event and broken expectations of fit may be connected to unreliable theatrical technique, thus opening the way for new technique that accounts for misfitting bodies. I can also inquire about the role of stasis in the theatrical event at each level of communication. For example, I have already described how stasis may be used to explain pre-expressivity and we know that the pre-expressive is connected to the sensory level of the theatrical event; the common structure should help me explore how performative stasis causes stasis shifts that can be mapped to implicit reactions at the sensory level that cascade



40. A common structure for stasis, dissidence, and the theatrical event

to explicit reactions at other levels. In general, the common structure is a body-agnostic model for analysing how the three knowing processes affect each other as they occur simultaneously during a performance. The model may also be as a tool for theatre creation that centres body diversity because its body-agnosticism should afford an explicit focus on how bodily characteristics shape the three knowing processes. Depending on the goals of analysis or creation, applications of the model may privilege one process over the others to explore the interaction from a specific perspective or to explore how specific embodiments perform. To address the question of immobile bodies in theatre, for example, we may apply the model to analyse performances from the perspective of stasis and find what happens in terms of dissidence and the theatrical event. In turn, those findings may suggest ways of devising performances that centre immobile bodies as performers and the model could be applied to guide their creation. Before that, however, I have to explain how stasis and dissidence intersect with the theatrical event to provide a context for the introduction of the analytic and creative tools I devised based on the model.

Dissidence as a constraining factor for actions

I have defined a dissident body as one that actively seeks misfit to expose underlying exclusionary structures, and dissidence as the performing of misfit-inducing actions that should elicit either misfit-inducing reactions sustaining the loop or fit-inducing reactions that change the environmental expectations of fit for everyone involved. In the context of the theatrical event, dissidence implies that some of the actions of the performer must be explicitly chosen to cause them to experience misfit and to elicit reactions from the spectator that sustain the misfit loop or restructure environmental expectations of fit. As there may be exhibitory, encoded and embodied actions constrained by the particular contexts in which the performance takes place in, and expectations from those contexts that are unrelated to fit but that nonetheless impact the expectations of fit, it may be productive to explore the dynamics of the theatrical event when considering dissidence as a factor constraining valid actions and reactions[41].

What kind of actions may be considered misfit-inducing? We have already established that misfit is related to an incongruence between body and environment, thus actions that create misfit would be those that produce the necessary

[41] Validity in this case refers to the goals of dissidence and not to the aesthetic appropriateness of the deployed theatrical devices.

conditions for that incongruence to occur. That entails that such actions should either modify embodiments or environments towards inducing the mismatch, or place bodies in already unsupportive environments. Let us explore several examples from different performances. To begin, I will refer to McCaffrey's analysis of a particular moment in Back to Back's *Super Discount* (2018b). At the end of the play, performer Sarah Mainwaring has to place a hand-held microphone in its stand. The matter is, she does move in atypical ways and thus the action of clipping the mic to the stand becomes a sudden and unexpected dance. McCaffrey explains that

> as spectators, we see her attempts toward the completion of this action and the involuntary movements that, despite herself, take her away from it. We can clearly see what she is intending to do, what she is moving toward doing. In advance of its completion, we know the function the movements are intended to perform, yet her progression toward completing the action is threatened with its undoing. Her movements—both intentional and unintentional—seem to take her at times three steps forward and two steps back, and at times two steps forward and three steps back. Due to the fact that the microphone is switched on, we can also hear her struggle to complete the action (2018b).

Neither the microphone nor its stand are designed to be manipulated by people that move like Sarah Mainwaring. She places herself in an environment that does not support her and then she performs an action that causes her to experience misfit. In turn, that misfit break spectators' expectations and forces them to reconsider the action of clipping the microphone to the stand both in terms of the actual movements being performed towards reaching that goal and in terms of what those movements may mean and their aesthetic value. Mainwaring's

> performance of this action calls attention to itself, but it is pointing to both her inability to perform the action, and the theatricality of that inability. The spectator is caught between measuring Sarah's distinctive movements against a norm of simplicity, economy, and elegance—according to which criteria she would be found deficient—and in finding what is fascinating, beautiful, and compelling in the embodied difference of her movements (McCaffrey 2018b).

An environment may also be unsupportive because the people in it have expectations that preclude certain bodies from participating. Normative standards of beauty, medicalised approaches to disability and moralistic stares against the naked body were the unsupportive environment against which Mary Duffy pushed back with her performance invoking the classical Venus de Milo (see Snyder and Mitchell 1995 for a fragment, 0:10:45 to 0:12:54). She entered a dark stage and

> when the lights came up on stage, the viewer saw only Duffy's disarming naked form. Her unclothed, armless body remained motionless, like a statue, medical model, or frozen subject of a clinical photograph, as she spoke calmly and provocatively: "You have words to describe me," Duffy began in her condemnation of the medical profession: "Congenital malformation." Duffy remembered herself as a frightened child, searching for self-definition in the dictionary. "Congenital meant 'from birth,'" she stated, leaving the idea of "malformation" to the audience's imagination (Millett-Gallant 2010, 25–26).

Duffy exposed herself naked, an atypical body that ought to be hidden, in an environment that was not supportive of such action. She also misfitted on stage because she spoke about the stigmatising expectations of others around her body, thus breaking the ableist expectation of silence from disabled people. While Duffy's performance was more explicitly confrontational of expectations of fit than Mainwaring's, both performances broke expectations of fit in their respective environments by using misfit as a theatrical device to highlight those expectations and contest them. Millett-Gallant argues that "in a self-objectifying act, Duffy explained how her body was already objectified in society, and in the act of talking back, Duffy's monologue became social dialogue" (2010, 25). In the case of Mainwaring's performance that social dialogue was facilitated because

> the time she takes to (eventually) complete this action is different from what might be expected. There is a durationality about her actions. But how has this durationality been deployed in performance? It is a kind of de facto durationality. Presumably, Sarah Mainwaring has no choice over the duration of her actions; this is how she moves. It is the particular theatrical *dispositif* of the production that chooses to display her distinctive durationality in performing this action. In the time that they are not used to waiting for such an action to be completed, the spectator is invited to question what is being performed by

> the allocation of this task to Sarah Mainwaring: whether her "embodied difference" is being curated, displayed or exploited (McCaffrey 2018b).

We can also analyse how the action of *placing my body in an unsupportive environment* maps to the different kind of actions in the theatrical event. Both Duffy and Maiwaring, by exposing their atypical embodiments on stage, perform an exhibitory action that is intended to create reactions related to their misfit. At the encoded level, Mainwaring is subverting the expected skill associated with to the simple action being performed along with the expected motion flow and duration. In the other case, while Duffy's performance fits in the tradition of the monologue at the encoded level of it is nonetheless affected by the parallel exhibitory action. Finally, at the embodied level, both performances complicate the idea of what atypical embodiments signify on stage: in Mainwaring's case by pointing to how her embodied difference is framed and highlighted by the theatrical device, and in Duffy's case by referencing classical standards of beauty and following established practices of monologuing as a familiar frame that makes explicit how her body has been excluded and rejected from certain spaces.

These examples also point to another way of approaching the issue of misfit-inducing actions. Placing a body on stage implies the question of *how to* place that body. To address this question, I want to refer to *FANCY*, a 2006 performance by Edgar Stephen Curo and Lisa Bufano[42]. As the performance begins, we meet The Fella (played by Curo) who is facing a problem: he wants to eat soup but he has no table. The Fella has two hands, two legs and, while he apparently moves typically, he also moves with exaggerated gestures, stomping and making loud noises with each step. He attempts placing the bowl of soup on the air, balancing it, sitting on the air, without success. The environment is literally unsupportive: he wants to eat and there is no place where he can do so. Off stage he goes and brings back a chair and repeats his attempts. Off stage he goes, again, and brings back a cardboard box where we can see table legs protruding from it. The Fella takes out the wooden legs and a set of instructions, and starts reading them trying to understand how to assemble the table. Meanwhile, the box starts moving, plays around, sprouts human legs that end at the knee and starts wandering aimlessly until it bumps against The Fella, who tries to capture it and ends up throwing the box away and revealing The Table (played by Bufano) who runs away and has to be convinced to be assembled. The Table finally accepts and The Fella carries her to the chair, places her on top of it and goes back to the instructions. They then proceed to work together in the assemblage process: the wooden legs are really custom-made prosthetic devices that attach to Bufano's legs and arms, extending her reach and providing support (literal and figurative) for her role as The Table. The Fella finishes by putting a tablecloth on The Table and his bowl of soup on top (on Bufano's back, that is). He starts eating but The Table is bored, itchy and starts fidgeting while The Fella eats. The Table finally cannot take it anymore and walks away while The Fella follows her, spoon in hand, one of his legs intertwined with the chair, dragging it as he walks behind. The Table moves her hind legs gesturing for him to go away, but he persists and they leave the stage, The Fella eating while walking, The Table trotting happily away from him.

The performance plays with notions of support, interaction, interdependence, agency, and fluid embodiments by setting up a space where the typical body is unsupported by the environment and providing a solution through the participation of an atypical embodiment that expands the possibilities of support. One body is placed in an unsupportive environment but only representatively, that is, the environment still supports Curo's actions on stage. What about Bufano's actions? At no point is the stage unsupportive of Bufano's actions. Where is, then, the misfit-inducing action in this case? We can identify one basic misfit-inducing exhibitory action: the presence of Lisa Bufano and her atypical embodiment on stage. This action is drawn out, in contrast to Duffy's sudden appearance when the light is turned on the stage; Bufano slowly reveals herself, first by animating the box, then by standing on her legs that visibly end in metallic stumps, and finally by cavorting around with an expression of mischievous bemusement. Here, the misfit comes from the expectation of what was inside the box and the expectation of abled bodies on stage. But the performance offers another layer that points to a second kind of misfit-inducing action: when The Table is assembled and Bufano wears the wooden legs, her embodiment changes and, with that change, we are forced to shift our expectations regarding what her body can do, what her body represents, and what the boundaries between bodies and technology are.

What I find most interesting about this performance is that while our expectations of fit may be teased by the bodies on stage, those bodies are supported by the environment and they can be perceived as skilful, pleasant, and funny. Instead, the real misfit in the performance comes from another place: the representation of unsupportiveness that is the starting point of the performance morphs into a presentation of the dynamics between bodies and environment and how fit and misfit occur.

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[42] FANCY was originally presented in a conference on disability in Vienna (Austria) but it was performed several times afterwards in other venues. There are several recordings of the performance and I will be referring to one from June 25th, 2006, recorded in Cambridge (Massachusetts, USA) (Curo and Bufano 2006). That recording is available here: https://vimeo.com/165322716

The Table comes to play the role of an environment that actively moves towards unsupportiveness. This is possible because Bufano changes her embodiment and creates an incongruence with The Fella's actions.

I will come back to this performance later as there is more to unpack. For now, I want to follow the thread of this second kind of misfit-inducing action: *changing the embodiment to produce incongruence with the environment*. Changes in embodiment may be related to the use of body extensions, as in Bufano's case or Wilde's *Swing that thing*; or to modifications in the way we present our bodies, like Curo's exaggerated motions or my own *Disabling Lecture*: I gave a formal academic lecture on disability as a complexly embodied phenomenon by shifting between Spanish and unintelligible gibberish that nonetheless felt like a real language. My intention was to produce an incongruence between the people attending this lecture and myself, my changed embodiment creating an incongruence that made them misfit. On reflection, it was the same basic operation performed by Bufano in *FANCY*: a change in one body that causes misfit in other bodies.

It is important to point that merely changing the embodiment may not be enough to produce some incongruence. *Rey Planta* offers an example of this: the embodiment of the king is altered by dissociating Body and Voice but such dissociation does not produce incongruence. Instead, the performance follows the conventions of the voice-over to reinforce dualist expectations of the relationship between mind and body while using disability as a narrative device to address issues of power and politics. In contrast, the staging of *FANCY* follows the conventions of comedic skits to provide a known frame against which the fluidity of embodiment and its fraught interaction with environment is highlighted. There is, however, another change of embodiment in *Rey Planta*: the mobile actor performs immobility for the duration of the performance and, while it is used as a narrative prosthesis, I would argue that this specific change does produce incongruence by shifting stasis and forcing spectators to attend to motions from Body at smaller scales and connecting those to Voice.

In terms of the theatrical event, changing the embodiment entails an exhibitory action that, at the very least, should be cause for curiosity and that, when deployed to produce incongruence, should lead to misfit. There are misfit-inducing exhibitory actions related to changes in embodiment in both *Rey Planta* and *FANCY*: in the first, the action is performative stasis; in the second, it is the slow reveal of Bufano's fluid embodiment. At the encoded level, those changes may either reinforce our expectations regarding the specific aesthetic norms the performance is inscribed in or contest them. I would argue that both *FANCY* and *Rey Planta* reinforce norms as the performer's actions can be described as correct, valid and appropriately skilful given their respective cultural contexts. This suggests an important point: misfit-inducing exhibitory actions do not necessarily translate to misfit-inducing encoded actions. Regarding the embodied level of the theatrical event, the performed immobility of the Body in *Rey Planta* is intended as a symbol and not as immobility itself and at no point during the performance does immobility-as-symbol induce any kind of misfit. What the symbol means may be disruptive but the action itself as a symbol is not. In *FANCY*, something similar happens at first: Bufano pretends to be a table and performs accordingly, both symbol and action are not disruptive as the comedic tone of the performance allows for the deception. But then she starts fidgeting and suddenly everything shifts, The Table is something else while remaining a table, and the action is revealed as productive of incongruence for The Fella. There is misfit and meaning related to that misfit.

There is a third kind of misfit-inducing action: *modifying the environment towards unsupportiveness*. Basically, this entails taking a supportive environment and altering it to produce incongruence with the bodies interacting with it. It is the complementary operation to the changes in embodiment; in this case, bodies remain stable but the environment shifts and stops supporting those bodies, causing misfit. These environmental modifications may be alterations of the material characteristics of the stage, variations in the scale of the props, reconfiguration of devices to produce unexpected results, and the use of standard objects in unusual ways. As with the changes in embodiment, not all environmental modifications produce incongruence, they have to be chosen and performed with that intent. Billie Whitelaw's performance in *Not I* is primarily a change in embodiment; however, there are environmental modifications that enhance the incongruence and extend it to the spectators. The fact that Whitelaw is being constrained and suspended high in the air is hidden by the darkness surrounding Mouth. Nonetheless, the urgency of the monologue, affected by the changed embodiment, is exacerbated by the black emptiness; the incongruence of a disembodied Mouth is amplified by the device. In this case, the presence of darkness around Mouth is an exhibitory action that facilitates the misfit-inducing encoded action of Mouth monologuing.

To summarise: an action is misfit-inducing if it places the performer's body in an unsupportive environment, if it changes their particular embodiment to produce incongruence with the environmental, or if it modifies the environment to stop supporting the performer. Given these three possibilities and the three kinds of actions available for performers, we can characterise nine potential dissident actions in a theatrical event; these are exemplified in Table 5. As I constructed the table, I realised that dissident exhibitory actions seemed easier to find than dissident encoded and embodied actions. This may be explained by arguing that fitting and misfitting are materially immediate experiences closer to implicit reactions at the

sensory level. It may also be explained by arguing that expectations of fit are related to how bodies present themselves to others and how they interact with others; thus connecting expectations of fit directly to exhibitory actions.

In any case, there seems to be a scale of 'easiness to find' misfit-inducing actions going from exhibitory to encoded to embodied that might be connected to the increasing need for reflection involved in choosing and performing each kind of action: exhibitory actions are always already occurring when the performer is present; encoded actions occur when the performer actually performs; and embodied actions are a result both of exhibitory and encoded actions during the performance, and of a choice taken prior to the event regarding which actions to perform. In other words: dissident exhibitory actions are directly related to expectations of fit; dissident encoded actions occur at the intersection between expectations of fit and the convention of the artistic form; and dissident embodied actions depend on both dissident exhibitory and encoded actions and are chosen to present and represent the experience of misfit.

	Exhibitory	Encoded	Embodied
Placing body in unsupportive environment	An immobile actor chooses to be on stage in a traditional Western theatrical venue. A fat dancer appears dressed in ballet garb in a dance stage.	An opera singer performs an aria in an open windy space. A Deaf poet signs to a blind audience.	An actor performs underwater. A Black singer performs in front of a white-supremacist audience.
Changing the embodiment to produce incongruence with environment	A short-sighted performer chooses to avoid using their glasses or contact lenses during the performance. A mobile actor chooses to be restrained for the duration of the performance.	A speaking actor recites a monologue while emitting no sound. A classical piano player wears headphones playing strident noise during their performance.	A lecturer delivers a keynote speech using gibberish. A prosthetic-using dancer slowly removes their prostheses during the choreography.
Modifying environment towards unsupportiveness	The stage floor is slanted to a degree that impedes standing still or keeping a wheelchair in place. A play with Deaf performers takes place in absolute darkness.	The keys of a piano are rearranged to produce incorrect notes but the musician has to follow the score nonetheless. The props used in a play are sized slightly larger or smaller than their usual and expected size.	A poet recites a poem using an oversized lectern. An actor pretends to sleep in a bed placed vertically.

Table 5. Examples of theatrical event actions by misfit-inducing action type

How all these actions induce, sustain, present and represent misfit is important due to the goal of dissidence: the production of new knowledge to aiming to restructure broken environmental expectations of fit. As we are understanding the theatrical event as a process of knowing involving performer and spectator, then some of the actions of the performer should elicit reactions from the spectator that are directly involved with this production of knowledge. This means that any performance intended to produce a dissident theatrical event should be designed in such a way that the whole situation guides spectator's reactions towards modifying environmental expectations of fit during the event and afterwards. We have discussed that there may be implicit and explicit reactions of the spectator to the actions of the performer. Given that the goal of dissident actions is to induce misfit, reactions in this case should elicit enough discomfort to make the spectator question what is going on, without spilling over to outright rejection because the discomfort is too extreme.

What kind of reactions to dissident actions might be possible? When faced with broken expectations we may be surprised, confused, awed, afraid, disgusted or angry. We experience the emotional fallout of bumping into something that cannot be readily accommodated by our beliefs. Our reactions will depend on our own histories, cultural backgrounds, exclusionary attitudes, the specific dissident action and who performs it, and the way we handle being confronted by the unexpected. In his analysis of *Not I*, for example, Enoch Brater writes that "*Not I* makes us desperately aware of the agonizing limitations of seeing, hearing, and speaking" (1974, 199). He is referring to a sense of urgency building in the spectators as Mouth monologue progresses; after the initial surprise, there was discomfort and confusion. Sara Mainwaring's performance at the end of *Super Discount* traps spectators "somewhere between anticipation of the completion of her actions and anxiety at the possibility of their failure", an experience empathy and frustration at the same time (McCaffrey 2018b). In general, reactions

to disabled bodies on stage and their dissident actions will inevitably be shaped by ableism. There will be spectators who interpret them in terms of inspiration porn[43]. In his essay about the experience of creating *FANCY*, Curo writes that

> people crying in response to seeing Lisa perform was not unusual, nor was it an occurrence Lisa was fond of. Like many performers, Lisa tended to be private and self-contained in civilian life, and didn't enjoy strangers invading her personal space. And it wasn't just after staged performances. People sobbed while watching Lisa as she was jogging, walking her dog, or grocery shopping. Crying strangers tried to touch her hands as though she were the risen Christ, and told her in unintentionally insulting terms that witnessing her "tragedy" and "triumph of courage" inspired them to overcome their crisis in their life, because she symbolized the very worst that could happen to a person. Their own overwhelming personal problems now seemed inconsequential compared to her misfortune. They confided that they were sick, divorced and despised by their own children… BUT then they saw her and realized their lives were wonderful by comparison! It's a testament to Lisa's self control that she never punched any of them… Lisa's punches were not to be trifled with! (Curo 2016)

Nonetheless, there is space for spectator's reactions that move past ableist interpretations and find unexpected connections that provide rewarding aesthetic experiences related to disability. As a contrast to inspiration porn reactions, Curo recounts his encounter with a friend's guest that attended one of *FANCY*'s performances in Vienna. This person was moved to tears, not because he found inspiration to overcome his own difficulties, but rather because the performance connected to his own experience as a craftsman. Curo writes that

> the crier, still moist-eyed, sat at the table drinking. He told me he was a furniture builder. (I later saw one of his furniture creations. It was lusciously crafted Gaudiesque art nouveau. He was truly an artisan.) He told me that for him, the interplay between Lisa's and my stage characters captured the essence of building a unique piece of furniture from scratch... initially there's a plan, but as work progresses, the grain of the wood speaks to you and informs you what it wants to be and what contours it wishes to assume... Eventually, one must accept that creation is a collaboration between the creator and the object being created (Curo 2016)

It seems the reactions described flow from sudden visceral feelings in response to broken expectations and then, as they are abstracted and elaborated, an attempt is made to frame them according to the context of the performance. The interaction between The Table and The Fella in *FANCY* was met with surprise and joy from the furniture builder who recognised his own practice in the performance and elaborated those feelings by providing a description of the matching processes. Mainwaring's microphone dance created a mixture of anxiety and empathy in spectators that opened up a space where they began to reflect about her embodiment and whether how it was presented on stage was a result of curation or exploitation and, in turn, paving the way for further reflection on the ways disabled bodies create and are created in theatre (McCaffrey 2018b). In a similar manner, the original dissident actions of *Not I* provoked a feeling of urgency in spectators that overflowed the performance and sparked a dialogue about the nature of theatre and the bodies that participate in it; a dialogue that is still ongoing and in which Jess Thom's version of *Not I* inscribes itself by inquiring about the urgency itself from the vantage point of Tourette's. These reactions move from the implicit, almost automatic responses to the performance, to the explicit elaborations we build upon them as spectators. Table 6 presents some potential reactions, both implicit and explicit, to dissident actions during a theatrical event.

	Implicit	Explicit
Dissident exhibitory	Confusion, disgust, joy	Curiosity, anxiousness, rejection
Dissident encoded	Surprise, nervousness, exasperation	Wonder, concern, exclusion
Dissident embodied	Misidentification, mistrust, recognition	Inquiry, disagreement, violence

Table 6. Examples of theatrical event reactions to dissident actions

[43] *Inspiration porn* is a term coined by disability rights activist Stella Young. It refers to an media and attitudes that objectify disability so that "non-disabled people can put their worries into perspective" (2012). Inspiration porn perpetuates ableist assumptions about disability and implicitly blames disabled people for their situation.

It is important to remember that this separation between action and reaction types may be productive for analysis but that actions and reactions always occur concurrently during the theatrical event. Exhibitory actions impact both encoded and embodied actions, while the performance of embodied actions affect, in turn, the way the performer present themselves and thus impact further exhibitory actions. In the case of dissident theatrical events, choosing a dissident exhibitory action also impacts the kind of dissident actions available from the other two kinds of actions. Performing in absolute darkness, for example, entails that, given a sighted hearing spectator, those actions that depend on visual information will be more affected than those that depend on aural information. Reactions, on the other side, build up from implicit responses towards explicit ones and, when we consider dissident actions as their source, we expect that some of those implicit responses are directly related to misfit and build up to explicit reactions that either reinforce or tension the assumptions of fit shaping the performance. Following the same example of absolute darkness, a sighted hearing spectator might find themselves confused at first by the apparent lack of action from the stage but then start wondering about what is happening and gradually realise there is action by listening intently and modifying their own expectations about what bodies on stage can do and what it means.

In a dissident theatrical event, this interplay between actions and reactions should contest expectations of fit and expose the blurriness of the boundary between ability and disability. There is a moment in DV8 Physical Theatre 2004 film *The Cost of Living* when disabled contemporary dancer David Toole sets the norm for embodiment and effectively flips the expectation of who can perform adequately the dance (DV8 Physical Theatre 200419:25 to 20:00). The piece was choregraphed in such a way that

> instead of excluding Toole from dances he couldn't perform without legs, in one scene, his body set the standard of movement and ability as other dancers attempted to move like him, crossing the stage on their hands. These 'able-bodied' dancers, with their legs dragging behind them, were less agile, less strong in the arms, and ultimately less able than Toole was at this kind of movement (Harvie 2002, 70–71)

What about dissidence and immobility? An actor may use performative stasis to induce misfit by performing one of the three not-moving actions: being still, remaining in the same spot, and avoiding interaction with others. Those actions by themselves are not dissident, they become so when deployed as part of misfit-inducting loops. For example, Wilson's performance in *Krapp's Last Tape*, specially at the beginning, constantly plays with 'being still' and 'remaining in the same spot' to destabilise our perception of motion, blurring the boundaries between activity and inactivity to highlight the emotional state of the character. Those not-moving actions, while deployed to great effect during the performance, are not dissident when we consider mobility as the context of fit. Either because we are aware of Wilson's previous work or because he reads as a mobile person, expectations about movement are not broken by his actions.

Something similar happens in *Rey Planta*. The actor playing Body is performing the three not-moving actions during the whole play; the only difference is that he is a mobile actor who can stand and leave the stage voluntarily. Spectators know this beforehand and expect his performance to be made up of such actions. Thus, there is no dissidence there, no breakage of expectations about fit. I would argue quite the opposite: his status as expert actor set up expectations about his ability to play the role of an immobile person and this expectations were reinforced during the theatrical event and afterwards[44]. What would have happened if the actor playing Body was truly immobile? Would his performance be dismissed because such an actor would not be expected to move and thus would be expected to 'naturally' be immobile and thus his actions would not be considered performances? These will remain open questions for now.

My reading of *Krapp's Last Tape* and *Rey Planta* in terms of dissidence does not imply that not-moving actions are only dissident when performed by immobile bodies. There is another example that highlights how mobile bodies productively use not-moving actions as dissident actions: *Not I*. When Billie Whitelaw is tied to the structure that holds her high and restrains her movements, she is performing 'remaining in the same spot' and 'avoiding interaction with others'[45]. Why, in this case, do I consider these not-moving actions dissident? Because, in this case, the dissidence is not related to mobility but gender. In the other examples, I framed not-moving actions in the context of expectations of fit regarding motion; in *Not I*'s case the expectations of fit are related to gender and mental health. The initial exhibitory action in *Not I* is dissident because, at least when first performed, it was unexpected. It was also related to the embodied action of being hidden and immobile, both presenting and representing a state of restriction. Further actions in the play, in particular the way the monologue is delivered, are also dissident because they broke the expectations of how such monologues were delivered and the aesthetic

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[44] This is part of the reason he won an award for this performance.
[45] She is not performing 'being still' because she is speaking.



41. Dynamics of the theatrical event framed by dissidence

codes were pushed to their limits. The materiality of the voice in *Not I* is a dissident exhibitory action that shapes the meaning attributed to the speech delivered as an embodied action making the embodied action also dissident, foregrounding a relationship between mental health, gender and exclusionary custom expressed as restrictions.

Dissident actions are dissident because they are directly related to expectations of fit. But fit and misfit are fluid experiences depending on many variables. In the case of immobile bodies, they are closely related to mobility, and thus dissident actions may be closely related to movement. In other cases, the experience of fit and misfit are related to other bodily characteristics and then dissident actions have to account for that. Even when we consider only not-moving actions, they become dissident if and only if they can be connected to the specific expectations of fit in the domain of interest.

An interplay of stasis shifts

The initial exhibitory action of a performer is being present on stage. We might say that, even before any explicitly chosen expressive action is performed, they are performing not-moving actions by virtue of being there, not-moving. This is connected to Barba's notion of the pre-expressive and the reading I gave of his anecdote in terms of stasis shifts. In the

moment between the initial appearance of the performer on stage and the first explicitly chosen expressive action, the actor is indeed performing not-moving actions at all movement levels: they are being still, remaining on the same spot, and avoiding interaction with others. I have already described how such performative stasis entails cascading stasis shifts that make salient otherwise hidden motions. We may extend this application of stasis to performer's actions to the whole theatrical event to offer an account of the dynamics of the event when actions and reactions are interpreted in terms of stasis and stasis shifts. That is, performer's actions and spectator's reactions may be analysed in terms of stasis shifts at the three levels of movement for all communicative aspects of the event. As stasis may also be productively applied to domains where movement works as a metaphor, we can analyse all kinds of actions and reactions beyond those directly related to motion.

According to Sauter, the fundamental basis of communication during the theatrical event occurs at the sensory level, between exhibitory actions and their corresponding reactions, from the very beginning of the event; that is, from the moment the performer presents themselves on stage (2014, 406–8 [Kindle]). In his description of exhibitory actions, Sauter explains that

> these kinds of actions are not limited to the performer's physical qualities, but also include the performer's mental status at first appearance and throughout the performance. An actor may feel very self-assured and confident when appearing on stage, but can also suffer from nervousness or from a more destructive stage fright. Even when actors try to conceal such emotions before the eyes of the audience, it certainly will affect their exhibitory actions. What will be visible is the degree of their concentration and attention, which is directed toward their own self, toward other actors, and toward the audience. Actors are usually employing different techniques to reach full concentration, an aspect which is well known, but important to note in this connection (2014, 675–79 [Kindle])

Given that I am working under the theoretical assumption that body and mind are not separate entities but rather two expression of the same phenomenon, I can argue that what Sauter names mental status is related to the bodily status. We also know that emotions have physiological correlates that are intra-corporeal movements not readily available for being perceived by the spectator. Nonetheless, their characteristics may cause cascading effect at the corporeal level that, in turn, affect the inter-corporeal level. This entails that the spectator may indirectly notice them through their effects at the corporeal level and react in two ways to them: by emotionally resonating with the performer state because the inter-corporeal movement cascades down to the corporeal and intra-corporeal levels of the spectator, and by shifting stasis in the spectator thus enabling them to focus on previously hidden motions at the corporeal level. This creates a feedback loop of stasis shifts that brings into focus the full range of exhibitory actions performed initially by the actor[46].

The resonance felt by the spectator constitutes an implicit reaction to exhibitory actions. As the intra-corporeal movements keep going, the spectator would probably start being aware of them and consciously elaborate them into explicit reactions. An accelerated heart rate may support emotions of excitement, fear or anticipation. These reactions also imply movement at all levels in the spectator and that movement, those reactions, may be perceived by the performer who, in turn, is attuned to them and adjusts their performance to what is happening to the spectator. Thus the sensory aspect of the theatrical event loops back and forth, in the form of feedback loop of stasis shifts related to movement, affecting both performer and spectator and constituting the sensory substrate for the whole performance. Encoded and embodied actions are always shaped by this substrate and their evaluation and interpretation is always framed by it.

What happens moment to moment during a performance depends on how the actions performed by the actor may be decomposed into motions at each of the three levels of movement and how those motions affect the spectator causing resonant motions at each of their own levels. Encoded actions, for example, involve previously learned motions shaped by the cultural context of the society the performer inhabits and the conventional context of the theatrical practice they work in. As the cultural context has been present for the whole of the performer's life, the motions related to it are deeply ingrained, old technique and sedimented agency that is difficult to break. The training of the performer in the aesthetic traditions of their discipline may be understood as a constant push against those cultural motions to incorporate new technique structuring the practice of movement along the lines dictated by the aesthetic expectations. We can think of this push and pull between these two kinds of motions in an action as the push and pull between motions occurring below stasis and those occurring above stasis.

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[46] This may be understood as one of the mechanisms supporting Fischer-Lichte's 'autopoietic feedback loop'.

In this case, stasis is applied to the domain of encoded actions by interpreting them as aesthetically moving or not: those action that are congruent with the aesthetic requirements are supposed to move the spectator in aesthetic terms; those incongruent to the requirements are not supposed to move the spectator. An encoded action may move an spectator at the sensory level but, if it does not move the spectator at the artistic level, it failed its goal. Stasis in this domain may be shifted through training; the amount of experience of a performer would be helpful to shift their actions towards more aesthetically-valid motions and to notice when the performed actions slip back to culturally-shaped motions. On the other side, imagine a naïve spectator sharing the same cultural background of the performer: they would not readily notice culturally-shaped and aesthetically-invalid motions because they are always expecting them. Instead, an expert spectator knowledgeable in the artistic requirements expected of the performer might feel uneasiness during the performance, focus on the feeling and realise that the performer is riddled with mannerisms outside the expected motions given the expected artistic tradition. In this case training also plays a role; how much experience attending performances of this kind the spectator has facilitates them to shift stasis between aesthetically moving and not-moving.

Stasis in the symbolic aspect of the theatrical event is related to whether embodied actions may be readily interpreted in terms of their actual motions and effects, or reflectively in terms of their referential possibilities in the cultural context of the event. In this case, the threshold would be placed between presentation and representation: how much the embodied action presents and how much it represents. The location of this threshold depends on the exhibitory and encoded actions actually performed on stage and how they resonate with the spectator, and on the amount of shared cultural context between the participants. When exhibitory actions are recognised and encoded actions are positively assessed in artistic terms, they support the identification of the embodied actions, that is, incorporating their presentation and broaden the scope for interpretation. If the encoded action are negatively assessed, identification of the embodied actions may be delayed or otherwise stopped, thus hindering the process of interpretation. If the exhibitory actions are not even recognised, the spectator is forced to try to identify the embodied actions, constraining the path towards their interpretation. Whatever the reaction to the underlying exhibitory and encoded actions, an embodied action can only be potentially interpreted in the sense chosen by the performer when there is a shared cultural context. A Western spectator without prior experience in Japanese Nō theatre would miss many symbols and might misinterpret them through their own cultural perspective[47].

To illustrate how stasis may work in the symbolic aspect, I will refer to Teatro La Re-Sentida's *La Dictadura de Lo Cool.* The play is a social satire about contemporary privileged bourgeoise life and how it appropriates the symbols of resistance (Teatro La Re-Sentida 2016). It begins as a celebration party that slowly devolves into a feast of recrimination. My wife and I attended a performance in 2016 and we had contrasting experiences. She reacted to the exhibitory actions with dislike and this reaction coloured her reading of encoded actions: she found those overwrought, exaggerated, noisy and chaotic. She disliked the play almost from the beginning and, as time passed, dislike turned into disgust and frustration. This led to a reduction of the scope of identification and interpretation of embodied actions as the focus of her reactions became the exhibitory and encoded actions. Her dislike of what she was perceiving blocked the path for elaborating embodied actions. In my case, I was mildly amused by the exhibitory actions and more relaxed to reflect on what was happening on stage.

From time to time, while the party guests are interacting, a person in a bear costume appeared from nowhere, walked around, and disappeared again. I recall being barely aware of the bear and I am sure I missed several of its appearances; I only really paid attention to its shape when it was quite obviously standing there. I was aware of the basic exhibitory actions of the bear but I ignored what they might mean. During the performance, the closest I came to see the bear as representing something was a recollection of the now classic experiment in selective attention where you watch a video of people playing basketball and are told to count how many times the players dressed in white pass the ball. Counting the passes, you end up missing the person in a gorilla costume dancing among the players (Simons and Chabris 1999). I was aware of a person representing a bear but I was not aware of what the bear presented on stage, not what it might represent in the context of the play. My gorilla moment came months later, when I encountered a short essay about a stage direction from Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*: "exit, pursued by a bear". In the text, the author explains that the bear appears at a turning point of the play:

> *The Winter's Tale* begins with visceral, searing tragedy and it ends with redemption, reunion, and marriage (in other words, the classic hallmarks of a comedy). The bear interlude occurs smack in the middle, caught between the tragedy of Sicilia and the comedy of Bohemia. Is Antigonus' death by bear the final "act" in the tragedy? Or does it kick off

[47] The spectator, however, may enjoy other aspects of the performance (Sauter 2014, 803–13 [Kindle]).

> the comedy and set the tone for the second half of the play? To which genre does the bear belong?

After reading that, the bear from *La Dictadura de Lo Cool* was no longer merely a person representing a bear present on stage. It became a dangerous presence in itself and a representation of comedy and drama occurring sat the same time, and of death and the change it brings, by referencing its symbolic forebears. Whether those meaning were intended or not by the creators is irrelevant to this discussion. What I find interesting is that my own threshold between presentation and representation for the bear walking around as embodied action shifted and now, whenever I encounter a bear on stage, I bring my previous experience to bear in attributing meaning to it[48].

Stasis, then, may be applied to each of the communicative aspects of the theatrical event and their corresponding actions and reactions. In the sensory level we have stasis applied to movement at the intra-corporeal, corporeal and inter-corporeal aspects of both performer and spectator. The mechanics of stasis shifts between them describe how exhibitory actions are performed and how they elicit bodily reactions from the spectator that are elaborated emotionally. In the artistic level we have stasis applied to the level of compliance with aesthetic expectations, shifting between culturally-dominant actions that are not moving aesthetically and artistically-dominant actions that are moving aesthetically. In this case, stasis shifts occur on a longer timeframe due to training into the artistic codes of the aesthetic tradition. Finally, in the symbolic level we have stasis applied to a scale between presentation and representation, shifting between how much an embodied action merely presents or how much it means something besides its actuality. The threshold in this case depends on the characteristics of the underlying exhibitory and encoded actions and whether they can be recognised and evaluated, and on the scope of shared cultural context between performer and spectator.

A thought experiment

Now, let us focus back on dissident not-moving actions and use this extended model of the theatrical event to imagine a dissident immobile body performing on a traditional Western theatrical venue. In this case, the initial exhibitory action is dissident because the performer's body is not expected in this space. Let us unpack how such theatrical event may unfold from this initial action:

- The intra-corporeal component of the initial exhibitory action is 'being still'. At this level there are involuntary physiological states of which the performer may or may not be aware. These states are directly related to the emotional state of the performer and may indicate whether they are calm or anxious (Figure 42, 1).
- The corporeal component of the initial exhibitory action is 'remaining in the same spot'. The whole body of the performer remains at the same location as all actions are performed; the cascading effects from the intra-corporeal level may cause swaying, blinking, irregular breathing, sweating, twitches, or tics. (Figure 42, 2a). The spectator is affected by all these movements both implicitly and explicitly; that is, some of these movements occur below stasis and others above. There is an implicit reaction to all these movements that jumpstarts a resonance process (Figure 42, 2b) that leads to conscious motions informed those occurring above stasis (Figure 42, 2c). This prompts the first explicit elaboration of the action.
- The inter-corporeal component of the initial exhibitory action is 'avoiding interaction with others'. This is the level in which the sensory aspect is established as the foundation for the process of participatory sense-making between performer and spectator (Figure 42, 3). The connection between the exhibitory action and the reaction of the spectator at the corporeal level is framed in terms of prior experiences regarding social interactions. An spectator with experience interacting with people with mobility impairments, for example, may bring that experience to bear upon the recognition of the performer's movements thus facilitating further elaboration at the artistic and symbolic levels (Figure 42, 4a). Conversely, an inexperienced spectator would not be primed to recognise those movements and would either ignore them or be confused by them, leading them to further difficulties evaluating and interpreting what the performer is doing on stage (Figure 42, 4b).
- The dissident initial exhibitory action supports a dissident encoded action: the culturally unexpected action of an immobile body presenting themselves on stage (Figure 42, 5a). As we are imagining a dissident theatrical event then, for the performer, this action is also aesthetically-dominant because it is part of the new technique they would be bringing to structure theatrical practice. For the spectator, however, the aesthetic component of the action is missing and thus their evaluation may tend towards a negative assessment at first because the action would simply be read culturally (Figure 42, 5b).

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[48] All puns definitely intended.



42. Dynamics of stasis shifts in a theatrical event

- In the symbolic level something similar happens at first. The performer may be intending to symbolise something through their actual action of being there (Figure 42, 6) but the referent may be lost for the spectator as there may not be shared cultural referents (Figure 42, 7a). However, the spectator may associate freely the actual presence of the immobile actor to other symbols and, from there start making sense of the performance (Figure 42, 7b).
- At this point the spectator has an explicit reaction to the embodied action that will flow back to the other communicative levels of the event. First, the referents they found to make sense of the actions of the performer shift the threshold between the presentation and representation to broaden the scope of potential symbols (Figure 42, 8)
- Then, this shift cascades back to the artistic level allowing some encoded actions to be evaluated as aesthetically-dominant instead of culturally-dominant, thus shifting the threshold at this level (Figure 42, 9).
- This shift, in turn, may create a space for feeling aesthetic pleasure that modifies the expectations of fit of the spectator and help them recognise exhibitory actions at the inter-corporeal level (Figure 42, 10), enhancing the enjoyment of the performance as the shift cascades back to the corporeal and intra-corporeal levels building an empathetic emotional response (Figure 42, 11a and b).

This flow of stasis shifts between the actions of the performer and the reactions of the spectator keeps going until the performance ends. Whether this imaginary dissident theatrical event has an impact or not depends on changed expectations of the spectator or, at least, in their new knowledge regarding immobile bodies. Nonetheless, this example points to a way in which immobile bodies may be included as dissident performing bodies. It also points to the usefulness of the stasis-extended model of the theatrical event I have introduced in the design and analysis of performances. The example also shows how stasis and dissidence may be folded into the theatrical event to provide an account of the possibilities of immobility in performance, first by highlighting their close relationship through stasis and second by illustrating how dissidence may be applied to devise performances aiming to break exclusionary attitudes and combat ableist assumptions.

Towards a methodology of still theatre

The model I described in the previous section may be used to guide the creation of dissident performances or the analysis of performances in terms of dissidence and stasis. In the case of creative processes, the model is intended to be applied as a

framework for workshopping actions in different domains of fit, mapping their intended dynamics in terms of stasis, dissidence and the layers of communication of the theatrical event, evaluating their design against the experience of performing, and providing a way to structure feedback about them. For performance analysis, the model works as a theoretical framework in which the actions of one or more performances may be decomposed according to the three knowing processes at play, facilitating tracing their dynamics in the context of a guiding research question, and providing a common architecture for comparisons between actions. In this section I will introduce two tools to support using the model, and two quick guides as suggested plans for following the model during processes of creation and analysis.

Main tools

The basic unit for working with this methodology is the action. Analysis and creation are conceived as processes focusing on actions and how they come together in a performance. Following the model, an action within a performance may be characterised in terms of stasis, dissidence and the theatrical event. It may be described in terms of fit in a given domain, whether it induces misfit or reinforces expectations; it may be decomposed in terms of levels of movement, that is, we may describe an action following what is happening in at the intra-corporeal, corporeal and inter-corporeal levels; and it may be interpreted according the levels of communication of the theatrical event as exhibitory, encoded or embodied. As these knowing processes occur simultaneously, I realised it might be useful to map how the specific characteristics of actions according to one process connect to characteristics from the other processes. I designed two basic tools to support this mapping: a matrix of actions that help us connect misfit and the layers of communication of the theatrical event (Table 7); and an action decomposition diagram that break down how a specific action flows in the three knowing process in terms of what came before, what is happening, and what comes/did come after the action is/was performed (Table 8).

Purpose	To characterise actions according to how they relate to misfit and to which layer of communication they are focused on.
Allows for	• Focusing on the particular embodiments involved in the performance and the environment in which they perform, in order to facilitate the discovery/construction of theatrical devices that take them into account. • Exploring the relationships between misfit-inducing actions and their interpretations at each communication level. • Building an archive of actions to guide both creation and analysis. • Comparing sets of actions from different performances.
Format	A matrix of three rows and three columns. Rows in the matrix correspond to the three levels of communication of the theatrical event (exhibitory, encoded and embodied) and the columns correspond to the three kinds of misfit-inducing actions.
How to use	Actions are placed in each cell according to how they can be characterised in terms of dissidence and theatrical event. One action may appear in different cells if required. For example, if we consider academic discourse as the domain of fit, the action of speaking in gibberish during my *Disabling Lecture* was misfit-inducing in all three levels: in the exhibitory level I presenting my speech in a modified way, in the encoded level I was following the expected patterns of lecturing in an unexpected language; in the embodied level I was also presenting and representing the complex embodiment.

Template	

Table 7. Matrix of actions

Purpose	To detail an action in terms of precedents, consequences and its characterisation according to stasis, dissidence and the theatrical event.
Allows for	• Characterising an action in terms of the levels of movement. • Characterising an action in terms of dissidence in one or more domains. • Characterising an action in terms of the layers of communication in the theatrical event. • Mapping the relationship between the three knowing process during one specific action. • Detailing the precedents of an action in terms of the three knowing processes. • Detailing the consequences of an action in terms of the three knowing processes. • Mapping the relationship between precedents, the decomposition of the action, and its consequences • Comparing one action performed at different moments. • Comparing different actions. • Sequencing actions.
Format	The action to be decomposed is placed in the centre of the diagram. The rest of the space is divided in four triangular sections pointing to the central action: the left section represents the previous state of the performance, the right section represents the posterior state of the performance, the top and bottom sections represent the present state of the performance as the action is occurring.
How to use	The action to be decomposed is placed in the centre and described in the top and bottom sections. This central action is supposed to be performed when certain conditions are met and these conditions can only be met by precedent actions; these actions are placed and described in the left section. After the central action is performed, subsequent actions that we expect to flow from it (or that flowed from it) are placed and described in the right section. Actions are described in terms of the stasis, dissidence and the theatrical event and those descriptions may be connected between them to establish how the central action is located in the context of the performance and how it flows from its precedent actions to its subsequent actions.

Template	

Table 8. Action decomposition diagram

Quick guides

Both tools are intended to facilitate creative processes or performance analysis. These tools are expected to be adapted to the needs of whoever uses them. They may be realised as paper formats to be filled for archival and reference; as chalk drawings on the floor to suggest paths for exploration; as post-it notes splattered on walls organised according to the templates; as transparencies scribbled on and stacked for projection. Action descriptions in the decomposition diagram may be coded in such a way to highlight aspects of them related to stasis, dissidence or the theatrical event; different encodings lead to diverse interpretations or paths for practical exploration. How they are used should follow the needs and preferences of the users; their overarching goal is to foster a dialogue about how different bodies perform and how those differences shape a theatrical event. They should also make us to reflect on how we can share knowledge in ways that consider for body diversity and how those bodies perform in the different layers of movement. For example, how do we give accounts of intra-corporeal movement? Should we follow meditative practices to focus on our inner motion and describe that? Should we use devices that trace bodily states and map them to sounds, images or shapes? In turn, addressing those questions may suggest theatrical devices to be deployed. In general, both tools should be understood as supports to apply the model of still theatre while considering body diversity.

For creative processes, the goal of applying the model is to select which actions will become part of the performance. Actions, in this case, are potential actions to be performed. These actions will be workshopped and assessed according to their potential for dissidence in one or more domains of fit. As the model is to consider body diversity, we need clarity regarding who will be performing and how. We also need to map the embodiments of potential spectators and trace their reactions according to the different possibilities afforded by their bodies. I suggest six major steps for applying the model to guide the creation of a performance:

1. *Identify domains of fit*. These domain may be chosen because the performance wants to address a specific issue, they may emerge from the interaction of the performers, or they may emerge from interaction with a chosen location for the performance.
2. *Find potential actions*. The matrix of actions provides the frame for working in this step. Considering the specific embodiments of the performers, the matrix should be filled for each selected domain of fit by asking which kind of actions are available, which kind of environments would be supportive or unsupportive, and what alterations of embodiment may create incongruence.
3. *Workshop actions*. Perform some of those actions. Describe the contours of that experience, how the performers interact and how their bodies felt. Change the environment several times and reflect on how the experience of performing the action changes and what it suggests about its dynamics.
4. *Decompose actions*. With the material generated in the previous step, select some actions of interest and decompose them using the action decomposition diagram. Describe each action in as much detail as possible in the contexts of stasis, dissidence and the theatrical event. Identify what states afford performing the action. Analyse how the three knowing processes interact during the action and how the action flows through them and modifies the experience, then characterise the resulting state.

5. *Sequence actions*. Review the decomposed actions and verify whether they may be sequenced given previous and posterior states. If there are gaps, check the matrix to find new actions to workshop and include to fill them
6. *Repeat*.

How can these steps guide a creative process? Let us imagine that the domain of fit we are interested in is movement and that a person with Locked-in Syndrome will perform. What are the potential actions? The first idea might be to perform the three not-moving actions in a traditional theatrical venue, the unsupportive environment related to my original research question. There are more actions, however, suggested by the matrix of actions. For example, the performer might alter their embodiment by connecting to sensors that translate their breathing to environmental modifications that produce incongruence. They might also extend their embodiment through sensors and network connections to expand the stage and create layers of access and motion: the performer's body, the stage, the live spectators, the online spectators[49]. In turn, these extended and expanded body might suggest ways of exploring the idea of the 'pre-expressive' as stasis shifts as it ripples back and forth through the layers of access[50].

For performance analysis, the goal of applying the model is to characterise one or more performances in terms of body diversity given a research question. Actions, in this case, are those actions executed during a performance. The research question should provide a clear framework for selecting which performances will be analysed and whether they should be compared or not; it should also refer implicitly or explicitly to one or more domains of fit. As the focus is, once again, body diversity, for each performance analysed we should have information about the embodiments of both performers and spectators to trace their interactions according to the possibilities afforded by their bodies. I suggest six major steps for applying the model to explore a research question:

1. *Identify domains of fit*. These may be implicit in the research question or explicitly stated as part of it.
2. *Identify relevant actions*. For each performance and domain of fit, fill a matrix of actions by identifying relevant actions occurring during each performance and characterising them in terms of misfit-inducing type and the layers of the theatrical event. This should force the researcher to consider the embodiments of the performers and spectators, and the environment of the performance.
3. *Compare matrices*. If required by the inquiry, compare the matrices resulting from different performances and attempt to find similar actions, strategies, changes in embodiment, environmental modifications, etc. Check whether they are applied to the same domain of fit; and if not, whether there is a relationship between the domains of fit identified.
4. *Decompose actions*. If relevant, select one or more actions to be decomposed. Gather as much detail as possible for each action, describe the action in terms of stasis, dissidence and the theatrical event. Characterise previous states for each action by describing what was occurring before it. Characterise posterior states for each action by describing what happened afterwards. Map how precedent and consequents map to the decomposition.
5. *Compare actions*. With the information gathered in the previous step, actions may be compared, either between different performances, in different moments of the same performance, or in different stagings of the same performance. Check whether their decompositions are similar or not, trace how the state of the performance changed in each case, review how the action performed by the same person in different moments changes.
6. *Repeat*.

These steps should provide a frame for addressing specific inquiries. For example, if we wanted to explore whether the *Misfitting Resistor* destabilised the concept of proper motion in public spaces, we should start by stating that our domain of fit is mobility in public spaces and then we would characterise the actions that occurred during the performance guided by the matrix of actions. One such action would be *tying a spool of thread to the body of the Unspooler*, which is a bodily modification that creates incongruence and that may be analysed as a exhibitory action (the body has now a spool of thread tied to themselves) and an embodied action (it presents the thread hanging from the body and it also represents the history of the interactions between body and environment). Another action would be *walking around the public street with the altered embodiment*, which works as an action that creates an unsupportive environment that can be interpreted in terms of embodied actions both as the obstacle the thread presents itself as, and the representation of the fatigue caused by constantly misfitting. The model also allows for analysing what happens with spectators and how roles change. Decomposing this last action, for instance, helps us understand that the inter-corporeal level of movement is increasingly being affected by the constraints at the corporeal level creating a situation of misfit for the other pedestrians: some reacted by averting their gaze, others by playing around, and others with confusion and anger. From these reactions, we could circle back and shift the role

[49] This idea is based on a suggestion Kaite O'Reilly made during a conversation about this research.
[50] We wanted to explore this possibility with Alberto but there was not opportunity.

of specific spectators towards performers and analyse their actions. That is what happened in *Misfitting Resistor* with the lady that started complaining.

Moving on

These guides are built as loops both to emphasize the circular nature of the model and the knowing processes underlying it, and to offer an iterative method for exploring body diversity during creation and research. They are intended to support these processes by making us question how embodiment and environment interact during performances. I imagine both tools and guides as devices helping tease out the dynamics of misfit and how bodily and environmental differences influence the flow of experience during a theatrical event. These guides encapsulate my research and provide a starting point for further explorations of body diversity in theatre and I want to close this dissertation by building my expectations of what may come next upon key aspects of this research.

Still theatre is a model that approaches theatre as an epistemological voyage to generate knowledge about our bodies in the world. Its cyclic nature affords the continuous reflection, reviewing and restructuring of expectations regarding the multiple ways diverse embodiments interact between them and with the environment. The primacy of bodies in this process is made explicit by anchoring the model in the epistemology of practice and by framing the theatrical event, dissidence and stasis as knowing processes related to the specific techniques of theatre, disability and movement. The model is supposed to help us identify what bodies, any bodies, can do and build from that. My experience during this research process leads to me expect that applying the model may help blur binaries and offer a rich, continuous, dense material from which to create performances that celebrate our body diversity.

Regarding research, I think that applying the ideas of still theatre may open up ways understanding theatre that incorporate body diversity and, in turn, offer new approaches to standing questions. For example, applying the model with a focus on dissidence as the technique of disability to the tension between theatrical productions and performance art may yield insights into their similarities and differences and add another layer to their interpretation, comprehension, and explanation. Or, for instance, focusing on stasis and how it shifts at the symbolic level of the theatrical event may refine our understanding of the dynamics behind presentation and representation and how spectator reactions are both shaped by and shape the performance.

I contend that my research, beyond presenting still theatre, is also an example of the potential richness of this approach and of the way the notion of disability, when applied critically, ethically and empathically, may enrich creation and research. In particular, I believe that placing the focus on misfit as the underlying common experience between the disabled and nondisabled experiences offers the opportunity of bridging the gap between them and highlight how our complexly embodied experiences can be interwoven to explore and inquire about theatre practice. I expect that this framework will facilitate creators and researchers in the process of centring body diversity, finding ways to connect different embodiments in one performance experience. Perhaps, still theatre will also offer a way of understanding immobility not as an impairment to performance but rather as a productive site for creation.

Coda

To paraphrase a famous quote: life is what happens to you while you're busy researching. As I was writing this dissertation, reflecting on immobility and diving deep into stasis, the year 2020 happened. The pandemic suggested itself just as 2019 was finishing but its effects appeared in full force around the next March. We all misfitted at the same time and were forced to research new technique about daily life, relationships, work and more. Since then, we have been in a never-ending loop of broken expectations and frantically exhausting epistemic repositioning. We had to experience life from the confines of our homes when lucky or the confines of hospitals, hospices or shelters when unlucky. In all cases, the space of our daily actions was constrained and we focused inward, discovering nuances and textures and richness in the bland walls around us. As the physical space was reduced, our social interaction space seemed to grow. The constant presence of others through the internet helped foreground the precariousness of the network as support layer and made more salient old and new divides between those with internet access and those without. Economic barriers were deepened and the social unrest that spilled over from 2019 exploded into the weird shapes afforded by common spaces modified by public health requirements.

I will always remember 2020 as the year when our collective stasis was shifted and we experienced a slice of life while locked-in. My findings about stasis and the levels of movement were starkly realised as the boundaries of our individual bodies became both more clear and more diffuse blurred through social distancing and the effect of online connections. It is in this new context of (in)mobility that I come to a close with this text. The original questions morphed and were reinterpreted, recontextualised, and then came back. Now, I have to ask once again: what may I say about stillness? And what about stillness in theatre when that stillness is related to disability, to bodies that cannot move? Did I answer those questions? In some ways. Stasis, as a concept, builds on the idea of stillness and offers a way to understand movement, both real and metaphorical, in different dimensions while centring the notion of not-moving as a productive site for creation. Indeed, not-moving wound up being the central experience from which I developed the model of still theatre, a way for understanding, modelling, approaching and centring body diversity in theatre practice. Hopefully, I have made a compelling case and it is now clear that immobile bodies can, indeed, act.

Meaning is relational
(Johnson 2008, 10)

Appendix 1: Transcription of debriefing from Experiment 2

In Kolding, Denmark on July 16th, 2019, Danielle Wilde and I discussed two versions of the Misfitting Resistor experiment we had performed during the morning of the same day. What follows is a transcription of that conversation.

> DW: I kind of walked through it in my brain, singing and remembering my physical feeling and sometimes I was singing and remembering the emotional feeling of what was going on, at one point, there's the scribbly bit, that's when the girl gave the string back, and in the second one, one of the scribbly bits was with the policeman, and the other scribbly bits, the big one here, was with the, um, a combination of with people just standing on it, and that was like a nice interaction, and then, you know, with that woman, and that was a combination of what that woman was like and what I was like, so sometimes it was like what it felt like on the receiving end of her, and sometimes it was like being me who was responding, and the scribble at the end, so the scribbles seem to be the interactions, and the others are the movement through space and encountering objects, but the scribbles are people, you know, at the end, it was like being looked at, with that accusatory tone, by those women, it was like "how dare you, what the hell are you doing" but kind of it was like also the interaction with the little girl who was so open and friendly […] it's funny to see the shape of them, I mean, the first one doesn't resemble the spatial thing at all, the second one does resemble it a bit…
>
> AA: it might be an effect of the place, because this one was a street, so, we sort of moved in this way, in Netto, is, always, um…
>
> DW: yeah, but I could as easily have mapped it out, but I didn't, cause I was also, I've never done this before, so I was also, it was just like a feeling that I wanted to draw, at the same time I was singing, because I've felt it would help anchor it somehow, and so I've never done this before, so I was also experimenting with what it means or what it feels like to do this, you know, it's like you asked me to do something that I don't know how to do that not difficult, but that I have no point of reference for, and that becomes interesting because this negotiation of the enactment of that task as well as the enactment of the task
>
> AA: what would you say, what it is, sort of go and go back shapes turn you, what do you think about that, because I think it's interesting that you stopped, in both cases, your drawing reaches a point and then either you turn around because you want or because you can't
>
> DW: yeah but I think it's a mistake to compare them like that because Jernbanegade I went forward then I went into the shop, then I came out, and looked around, then I went up the street, then I went back and then there was that little interaction, so the Jernbanegade one is spatially coherent, but the Netto one is not spatially coherent at all, and it was more, the unfolding journey that I was on, rather than how it was spatially
>
> AA: but the experience is second in Jernbanegade, did it mirror or mimic in some way the experience at Netto? Or were they different, the feeling was different?
>
> DW: the feeling was quite different because in the first one I was negotiating structures, and it turns out the structures were sticky, the first time I went around an aisle I got caught in milk cartons, and things, so I went around the corner and got stuck around in the corner, stuck in the structure of the building, of the space, whereas the second one it was the people that I was getting stuck with, stuck on and stuck with, like a little bit with, um, you know, a little bit with the space like I got stuck with the post box and so that stopped me for going further into the shop, and then I had to come back, so I didn't, so the that car didn't go through and I had to let the cars go pass, so it prompted a very different kind of negotiation with the space, it was like, in Netto I was negotiation with the furniture, in Jernbanegade I was negotiating with architecture, like the scale was different, it was the interior architecture in the first one that dominated, and I mean, it was also very interesting because, um, it was kind of like nothing I am just tied up and walking around doing whatever and it didn't really

affect what I did, but it prompted things anyway, like it, because it was nothing, it enabled what did happen, to be very present somehow, because is like tie this piece of string around you and and you know walk, go for a wander, it's like I am going for a wander, why I am walking around here, well I might as well buy you know, some lentils, and, something else, I cannot remember, some avocados, and walking in the street, is well, we're just like the eponymous flaneur, just like, flaneuring, it's not a word but you know what I mean, um, but, um, and I think, you know, in the first one it was the shelves, the stock, the products that was getting in my way, but in the second one as I was negotiation the architecture it was the people that would get in my way, it's a bit hot here

AA: and about the reactions of the people…

DW: so in the first one, people were curious and laughed, and the girl on the shop got a bit pissed off

AA: she was pissed off?

DW: no…

AA: not like the lady on the street…

DW: no, not emotionally pissed off, she said 'this thing is caught up, you can't do that, in here'

AA: she was more like 'you're gonna throw things on the floor and I'll have to pick them up'…

DW: yeah, it's like 'you did this on purpose, you are giving me shit', so, whereas in the second one, which was in public space, so there is certain amount of public space associated with a supermarket, but it's a private business, whereas in the second one I was in public space, and so in the first one people said 'what are you doing', it's a design experiment, oh, laughed, stepped over, and said ok, but in the second one I was someone violating public space and I felt like, people were confused and offended, in the first one they weren't offended, you know, the girl got a bit pissed off when she realised we did it on purpose, cause she was like 'oh common, give a me break', but in the second one people got pissed off as they were outraged, there was outrage, that woman was outraged, and the two women who just looked with an accusatory tone I would guess that they were outraged too but they didn't know how to respond, it's like the first woman had a framework for responding, she could make everything, she has the moral imperative of her disabled husband, which, you know, is interesting in and of itself, this is an inquiry into disability, and and um disability action and activism and the theatricality of it, so it's interesting that, the most vocal, who intruded, who said 'cut it', and I said 'ok, so do you have scissors', and she said 'no' and [laughter] like she was absolutely outraged, she thought she had not only the right but the power to force me to conform to her understanding of what was appropriate behaviour, and I think that is very interesting when you start thinking about disability because there is this question of conforming or not confirming, what constitutes disabled or normative, or outside of the norm…

AA: how how how can you be a good disabled person, the social… because, I am gonna reference places like this, where some of the fights have been already won, but they have been won, uh, in a way that forces disabled people to conform to certain expectations about what disabled people should look…

DW: yeah, you will be looked after very well so long as you behave like this… and if you behave like this, we are on your side

AA: I am just imagining things, about, where, let's think about people with mobility issues that don't use a wheelchair, but instead I don't know uses a bike, and pedals with their hands, and move quite quickly, that wouldn't conform to what people look at, and…

DW: it would confuse people, and people don't like things that don't conform, here, in this society, in this culture, so you don't see a lot of radical youth here

AA: no I haven't seen them

DW: but you also don't see homeless people, you don't see beggars, you know, it's like Kolding is like the drug capital of Denmark because it's a direct line to Germany to Sweden and to Norway, um, but you don't see it because heroin addiction is treated like an illness rather than a crime, and so heroin addicts are given money to pay for their heroine because it's seen as an illness so it doesn't play out in society in the same way because the society sees it as very different, but, I think, while that all sounds very reasonable, I think it fits with this kind of, conform, ok, well, you're sick, we will need you what you need to conform

AA: so you don't disturb

DW: yeah, yeah… I mean it could be very interesting to talk with some disabled people here, uh, M one of my students who is in a wheelchair, I don't know if he's around cause I know he goes to his summer house, um, but I can email him and you and see if he's around and see if you can have a chat

AA: if he has a chance, because, maybe we could try the same experiment with him

DW: yeah, cause imagine, it's like people are gonna but say my husband is in a, um, needs to get around, and it's like yeah me too

AA: because, one of the things I've thought about this experiment, is that, it should be able to be replicated with any body, that's my, whether walks, slides, crawls, rolls

DW: I mean what is interesting is that I wore a skirt today and I thought should I wear this, should I not wear this, should I wear pants, and then I thought this well it needs to be able to be done with anyone so I'll wear a skirt… should we, this sun is very uncomfortable…

AA: yeah…

Appendix 2: Transcription of debriefing from Experiment 3

In Kolding, Denmark on July 17th, 2019, Danielle Wilde and I discussed the Misfit Tree experiment we had performed during the morning of the same day. What follows is a transcription of that conversation.

DW: ok, so this tree, it's doesn't fit, it's very big, and it's standing alone, and it's standing alone, in a way that is different, you know, there are other trees that you can say are separate, but they're all, they all seem to be touching each other, you could argue that this one is touching the trees behind, but they are so much smaller than, they seem inconsequential that they are close, that there's this big space around, whereas if you look at the other trees, their placement is as a piece of architecture if they are on their own within the little huts and barbecues and stuff… or, in a stand-up trees, whereas this one is just completely different, it's so much bigger, that suggests it's probably older, but it's a different kind of tree, this tree doesn't exist anywhere else in here… that's it

AA: ok… I am going to show you the tree I found

DW: ok [walks]

AA: what did you expect to find? When I asked you to find the tree that doesn't fit

DW: I didn't have an expectation, I was just looking for what stood out as different, um…

AA: so, my question, didn't put you in a frame of mind in respect to a specific kind of tree, just difference

DW: no, it put me in a frame of mind of being inquisitive, of being kind of like hyperalert, I mean, I am generally a very good observer of details, generally, um, but it made that observation of details very conscious, and so I also tried to step back and blur, so I that I don't go too deep into detail, so it's like a look into this and I say 'it's so interesting' and go 'there's another one'… there's any like, I haven't seen any like this before, and I'll just keep it my head, I mean, I could stand here and say that one is the one that stands out, the one that has the, it's not a great mystery, here, I'll take a photo and show you [shows me], because the way is lit up is completely different to everything around it, so it feels a little bit like wherever you are you would probably will find something that doesn't fit because it depends on your perspective

AA: and your perspective on how you its placed on the environment, because, that light…

DW: well, that's what I mean it depends on your perspective, so if you think, culturally your perspective comes from your background and your experiences, physically your perspective comes from your position in space, your viewpoint, and so your viewpoint can be seen as a physical thing, or a cultural thing, a sociocultural thing, um, so when looking for the tree that doesn't fit, because I am not Danish I don't really know which trees are native, you know, I haven't been here long enough and haven't had enough of an interest to

AA: that's a good point…

DW: to be able to look at them and go 'well, that doesn't belong here' but I imagine, uh, so, if I was in Australia and we were wandering around and we saw all of these fir trees, even though there are so many, I would still say that's the one that doesn't fit because it's an introduced tree, it's not a native tree, it's introduced, so while they are everywhere they don't fit, they don't belong

AA: this works here with you because you are not a native

DW: yeah, so, I can can tell you very clearly Australia has very particular flora and fauna so we can do that very easily, I mean, curiously apparently the flora and fauna in Australia is quite similar to that in Peru,

AA: ok… how weird

DW: so maybe in other parts of South America, as well, because I just had a Peruvian friend who went to Australia and just said 'oh my god, it's the same'… so I said 'oh my god, really', she said 'yes, same colours, same topography, same… it's so similar, I never encountered it before', so, but there is something, it's like if you listen to the language I am using when, as I explain how my brain is kind of categorising of trying to work its way towards a categorisation of difference, of what doesn't fit, it's what constitutes 'what doesn't fit', and I get, the same language could be used in someone who didn't realise that they were discriminating against difference, it's just that we don't think about it in those terms when we are thinking about trees, if I was to use the same tones for people, you know, it's like looking at people, well, you know, all of these people are Danish and this one is not so they don't fit, and it's like well that's a criteria, you know all of these people walking and this guy is in a wheelchair, or all of these people identify either male or female, and these three kids say they have no gender, all, of you know, all of these things, uh, the way of saying what doesn't fit it's actually a way of making visible discrimination, whether, making visible bias, whether is spoken or acted upon or not, it's a little bit like, um, you know, it's interesting if we come to the, we were talking yesterday about, because I am white the police would let me get away with a caution or something, um… we can't pretend that we don't see differences in skin colour and yet I don't see a difference between your skin colour and mine, whereas Frank who we went past yesterday, Frank is from Ghana, he's one of the students, he's very very black, in his skin colouring, and so there's obviously a difference in melatonin, um, I mean, it happens to also go along with, um, very very cultural differences, but… you know, it's like how do we navigate these things, because we can't pretend we don't see difference and yet you identify yourself as black and I identify myself as white but I can't see the difference between us

AA: well, I did not identify myself as black, I did it as not-white…

DW: but, maybe as coloured, in some of your writing

AA: but it depends on the circumstances, in the example, I don't remember if I left the example in the text…

DW: there was an example in your text

AA: it happened last year in Belgrade, I was with a German woman and a Thai woman, having lunch, in terms of skin colour, we were quite close to each other, a bit darker, and a bit darker…

DW: so the Thai person was the darkest?

AA: yeah, but not by very much, and the German person was lighter but not by very much, more like reddish but… the Thai person I was with…

DW: see, I don't think of Asian people as coloured, I think them of them as Asians

AA: well, they have a different colour but it's coloured in general, well, Black and PoC intersect but are not the same…

DW: yeah, so it was very interesting for me, when you, that wasn't the example that was in your writing, I can't remember what the example was but it was a different one, and it was very interesting for me to read it because it reminded me once I was I was on the train, I was on the train in Manhattan…

AA: oh, maybe the Barba example, the one where he entered the train and tried not to interact and caused this looks and stares

DW: yeah, I think that was it, so I was in the train in New York, going from Manhattan to Brooklyn, and there were these two Russian guys talking to each other and I was kind of looking over at them and, um, because they were so loud, and I was just like crazy, and I like that train, it's the one that goes over the Manhattan Bridge, so I get to look out the window, and it's really nice and it's usually quiet, and they were so noisy, and I just kept looking and I forgot that the train did not stop at DeKalb and went straight through, and I stood up to get off, so then I was standing up and standing up through a station, and they started yelling at me, and, calling me 'whitey', and telling me to go back to where I came from…

AA: whitey?

DW: they were calling me whitey, and it was really, it was really, I mean they were really aggressive, so it was quite confronting, but it was really interesting because they were calling me 'whitey' and it was like…

AA: they were blond Russians?

DW: … and if I look at my skin, their skin was whiter than mine, you know, it's like, it was really, kind…

AA: confusing

DW: yeah, it was confusing, but then, at other times the Hispanic community in New York, see themselves as people of colour, and they describe themselves as black, like they are not white, they are black…

AA: but Black or PoC, because…

DW: well now it's PoC, but it's been fifteen years since I was living in New York, more, when did I left, so it's almost twenty years, and they used to call themselves black, and it was so interesting for me because I am not from that culture, I am not from New York, I was only there for a couple of years, and, you know, when I first got there it was really unexpected people that were the same colour as me were calling themselves black, and it was so interesting, it became clear imm3diatlye that this was, it seemed to me, that this was a politically stance and it's a political identification, it's nothing to do with, well maybe it is to do with colour, but not with colour in a simplistic way, which is why I guess it changed to PoC, because it's not black and it's not white and I am not white anyway, and that's not what skin colour is anyway, um, but then now that it is PoC it's suddenly, like for me it becomes clear, as someone who is not within the culture where this issues and tensions are present every day, um, and so it was really really interesting between I would be unaware of many of the politics of the situations that I was in because I was white I was never made aware of them but because I was not from that culture, so even though I am highly politicised individual, um, you know, it's like, I could wander through these worlds in a way that sometimes felt really strange because there's a whole lot of shit going on here and I have no idea what it is and sometimes I felt really uncomfortable, and sometimes I just felt there's stuff going on and I have no idea, and, you know, other times I felt uncomfortable because it's like ok, I have no idea, but they don't know why I have no idea, so there are assumptions and biases being put on me because I am a privileged white girl [laughs]

AA: but you weren't their usual privileged white girl so they all exercised some kinds of biases and discrimination towards you

DW: so, as soon as I opened my mouth things changed, things changed because I have an Australian accent, and or close, you know I have it's probably called a cultivated Australian accent because I've being out of Australia for so long that it's become quite neutral, but it's not American, so, and they are quite fond of the British accent and they are quite fond of the Australian accent, and so, it would shift things because I think they would be aware that I

had no awareness of what the hell was going on, and being from a culture where these difference are not pronounced in the same way, they don't play out the same way they do, we have our own issues, but they are not the same, um, so all of that, it's just about, the two things, one is your physical perspective and the way you discuss things from a physical perspective can, may, I felt like it was making me intensely aware if I was talking about people like this it would be outrageous…

AA: the way you described the tree, the tall one, that stands out, that is different, that is alone, it's the same description you used yesterday to describe what people, the Danish people don't like

DW: how interesting

AA: they don't like people who stand out, who are different, blah blah… it was the same

DW: so which doesn't fit, it doesn't fit culturally as well as…

AA: [stops the recording, starts a new one]

AA: so, try again…

DW: [plays with the cardboard circles]

AA: how is that [*] tree?

DW: well, because it is really tall but it has hangy-downy bits, and the hangy-downy bits kind of get thinner as they go up but they start at a certain point, it's like it has climbing, it has good climbing bits, but not until you get quite up quite away, and then there's a whole lot going on, but it's quite tall

AA: ok, now I want you to separate the circle things in two groups… you have to show her something, it's true…

DW: [plays with the cardboard difference]

AA: what difference?

DW: the light side up and the dark side up… and it was just what they felt, and they happened to be ten here, and eight here, I think it's ten and eight, it's more… [counts]

AA: I thought it's on purpose…

DW: sorry, it's eleven here

AA: …and it's on purpose they have this two sides? Or it's just the material? The way it's made?

DW: I think it just has one side and the machine…

AA: oh, and accident in the way they are made

DW: that's just the way they felt when I put them out, yeah

AA: ok, um… I like the first thing that happened, that you didn't describe the tree but the relationship

DW: I think a lot about relationships lately, did I mention to you the other day about relational ethnography?

AA: yes

DW: so I am reading a lot about, um, climate change and…

AA: do you want to move a bit? [because of the sun]

DW: yeah… [laughs]

AA: I'll… let me move all this, the lenses, the caps… these things are so easy to misplace…

DW: what don't they have a little string to connect…?

AA: they do but I don't know where…

DW: yeah, that's the first thing that gets misplaced

AA: um… this one, never had one but… [fumbles with the lenses and caps]

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