A Processive View of Perceptual Experience

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Abstract

The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O'Shaughnessy's claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O'Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject's experiential life. Even if this case is coherent, however, it does not show that perceptual experiences are processes..

Keywords

O'Shaughnessy, Perceptual experience, Process, State, Mental freeze.