



Civil victimhood: Citizenship, human rights and securitization in post-dictatorship Chile

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Abstract

Based on two cases from Santiago, the article develops a theory of ‘civil victimhood’ to explore how civil conduct is paired with notions of victimhood in performances of citizenship in situations such as post-dictatorship Chile. In this context, victimhood is informed by two discourses, namely human rights and securitization. While the human rights discourse works to situate evil in the dictatorial past and victims as forgiving and deserving citizens, securitization practices operate within a temporality of the potential and generate new forms of othering and exclusion. This understanding of the civil citizen as (potential) victim delineates the forms of social and political action that are seen to have a legitimate place in public life. It is argued that the combination of civil victimhood and securitization is emerging as a form of governance that serves to exclude many of the poor from the full benefits of citizenship.

Keywords

civility, victimhood, human rights, securitization, citizenship, democracy, Chile

Introduction

Chile’s president Michelle Bachelet used to live in the same building as the officer who interrogated and tortured her in Villa Grimaldi (Cuartel Terranova), the infamous illegal detention center in Santiago that functioned in the early years of the dictatorship. This peculiar, although not exceptional, relation came to public knowledge when Bachelet was serving as health and later defense minister during Ricardo Lagos’ presidential term (2000–2006). By then she was a rising political star, and even though political opponents tried to damage her image by

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associating her past with the militant guerrilla branch of the communist party (Frente Patriótico Manuel Henríquez (FPMR)) and journalists insisted on digging up details on possible sexual torture committed against her during her confinement, she elegantly rose above the pitfalls of being reduced to either a political extremist or a sexualized and dehumanized victim. Instead she managed to situate her personal history as a reference, if not of national reconciliation, then of necessary civil conduct in the midst of the democratic transition. The following excerpt from an interview with her is illustrative,

Journalist: What did you feel when you found out that Moren Brito [the torturer] was living in the same building?

Bachelet: I don't remember well, but I couldn't believe it; of all the buildings in Chile he had to choose [to live in] mine. But this is Chile: you have to confront on a daily basis your history and your pain. Well, when I see him I don't start chasing him down telling him, 'when I was in Villa Grimaldi. . .'. No, the truth is that I have changed a lot. I feel deep sorrow but I feel less anger, because I have directed this anger in trying to construct [social relations, the country]. When I see Moren Brito nothing happens to me. In this country we can't afford the luxury of disposing of all of our citizens. We have to make a huge effort to see how we resolve our wound. (Revista Paula, 2002 [author's translation from Spanish])¹

Bachelet's statement is interesting because it demonstrates a form of civil conduct that has made coexistence among former enemies possible and enabled a democratic horizon in which the atrocities of the past will hopefully never be repeated. Her focus on what she does, and particularly what she does not do (i.e. chase him down), when confronted with her torturer underscores the complexity of civil relations and points our attention to the performative aspects of civility. Being civil is not something we are, but rather something we practice; civility helps to ensure coexistence in a plural society with widely divergent understandings of moral good. Following Cheshire Calhoun we can understand civility as a display which functions 'to communicate basic moral attitudes of respect, tolerance, and considerateness' (Calhoun, 2000: 255). This performance can often take the form of putting restraint on ourselves. Calhoun quotes Mark Kingwell (Calhoun, 2000: 256–257) and indicates that civility can require a willingness to not tell every aspect of the true or to not express one's inner and deeper moral convictions. In a liberal democracy we may, in other words, have all kinds of feelings and desires but we should not always express them, and I believe that it is this kind of civil restraint that Bachelet refers to when she states that 'nothing happens' to her when she faces her torturer; however, the above quote does not reflect civil restraint in a society among equals. It is indicative of how civility is practiced in an actual existing democratic society where citizens formally hold universal rights and obligations but in practice are situated in differentiated positions according to characteristics such as class, gender, and ethnicity. Chile is an interesting case in point because it is a very unequal society where class, gender, and ethnicity historically has worked to

differentiate social belonging and *de facto* access to substantial rights. The country is also characterized by the profound neoliberal reforms that were imposed as early as in the mid-1970s during a repressive dictatorship that left no room for contestation. Finally, and as Bachelet's remarks so clearly indicate, it is a post-dictatorship society that since the formal return to democracy in 1990 has dedicated much energy in establishing a new plural democracy, a process that in Chile is habitually referred to as '*la transición a la democracia*' (the transition to democracy). In this article I am interested in the meaning that civility acquires in this context of post-dictatorship and inequality under neoliberalism and I read Bachelet's comments as part of the continuous efforts of enhancing democratic relations and peaceful civil coexistence in a society where '*la transición*', appears to be a never-ending process of dealing with the memory of the state-violence and hatred unleashed following Allende's failed attempt to create a more egalitarian society with his democratic '*vía chilena al socialismo*' (Chilean road to socialism) and of (re)establishing substantial social, political and economic rights to the population at large (see also Stern, 2010).

It is in this regard relevant that Bachelet speaks not only from the position of someone who now belongs to the ruling elite but also from that of the victim of torture, political persecution, and exile who now engages in the task of ongoing democratization. In the context of '*la transición*' Bachelet's reference to civil conduct is paired with victimhood and this specific performance of civility becomes a requirement for proper citizenship. Rather than a victim who calls for justice or redress, this is a victim who calls for restraint, in this way shaping the new democracy in the era of neoliberalism. In the narration, the central figure is the victim who eventually *could* have opted to confront her perpetrator but decides not to. Bachelet, in other words, performs as a specific victim figure, namely that of the victim who no longer yearns for revenge and who chooses peace over justice. She rises above herself and the temptation to engage in cycles of violence in order to achieve the higher purpose of rescuing the nation from itself. She is performing what I term civil victimhood, and in this paper, I argue that performances of civil victimhood inform people's understandings of proper citizenship in Chile.

For some scholars, civil conduct is considered to be at the core of the liberal democratic ideal of moral equality among all members of a plural society, and in this sense, civility is a core feature of citizenship. According to David Hume, for example, writing in the 18th century and contemplating his post-feudal, increasingly urban, and capitalist society, civil conduct represents the opportunity to interact with one's fellow citizens on roughly equal terms (Hume 1985 [1758]: 546–547) and civility is in other words an inherent part of the social contract. Richard Boyd (2006), a scholar of political thought, maintains this stance, arguing that civility has a vital place in contemporary urban life. He indicates that in a liberal democracy, two basic understandings of civility can come together in a moral collectivity or public, namely good manners, or politeness, and membership in a political community, with its attendant rights and responsibilities (Boyd, 2006). According to Boyd we 'can only exist when we are in the habit of treating one another in ways that observe the formal conditions of civility. [...] Failure to

respect these rules by behaviors such as rudeness, condescension, mockery and other forms of incivility serves to locate others outside a common moral community' (Boyd, 2006: 865). Thus, he or she who treats another as an uncivil – in the sense of unworthy – citizen is actually committing an act of incivility himself or herself. It is for this reason that the victims of another's uncivil behavior can end up occupying the moral high ground as proper and worthy citizens.

While Boyd undoubtedly is right that civil conduct is required if democratic coexistence is to succeed, such a model of civility is in danger of treating it simply as a neutral form of respect, ignoring the ways that its invocation is always situated within histories of inequality and violence. Civility is therefore not only a model for coexistence, but is also a grounded and, at times, contested and exclusionary practice. Following Thiranagama, Kelly and Forment (see introduction to this special issue) I approach civility as a range of practices and norms aimed at promoting restraint and respect in the face of difference. These authors remind us that these practices can be seen as moral injunctions with multiple histories linked to specific experiences of colonialism and bourgeois life. Practices of civility are tied to conceptions of citizenship and James Holston (2011) has indicated that, in inegalitarian regimes of citizenship, many different people might be formally included as citizens in the nation state but the state then uses the differences to distribute rights, powers, and privileges differently among them. It is therefore possible to be internally excluded within the nation state and Holston underscores that civil idioms of inclusion and consensus can in fact create habits of the public that entrench citizenship's inequalities. Thus, while civil conduct is a necessary requirement in a democratic society we must not lose sight of the ways in which it can be used to obscure and perpetuate unequal access to substantial citizenship.

In this article, I argue that, after the dictatorship, civil victimhood has become a quintessential indicator for proper citizenship in Chile and I underscore the unequal social relations and histories of violence embedded in this performance of civility. I sustain that performances of civil victimhood essentially rely on two victim categories: the first category is that of the forgiving and unremorseful victim of human rights violations (exemplified by Bachelet in the opening vignette) and it was installed with the end of the dictatorship by the ruling democratic coalition (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*) as an ideal citizen figure. This was done as a way of ensuring governance and coexistence in a country marked by profound cleavages and in a context where General Pinochet and the military were still a *de facto* political force. The second victim category is that of the (potential) crime victim which was also installed with the end of the dictatorship. This figure was first evoked by the right-wing opposition that despite the comparatively low crime rates insisted that Chile under democratic rule was turning into an insecure country because the 'criminals' could now do as they pleased without fearing repression. This discourse manages to embrace two basic social figures, namely the good and law-abiding citizen who is a potential crime victim and the 'criminal' who is often portrayed as coinciding with the urban poor.

While these two discourses of victimhood were originally very different in scope, both victim categories have eventually been embraced by both the center-left and the center-right of the political spectrum, and, these visions have by and large become 'common sense' in Chile regardless of people's position in terms of class and gender. While the victim figure who has suffered from torture and exile in the past works to situate the victim as the quintessential democratic citizen with an undisputed moral high ground, the figure of the (potential) crime victim makes the victim position an available citizen category for a large part of the population. The crime victim is a very important figure because it has helped to transform the definition of danger from a politically defined otherness (i.e. the 'communist') to a criminal definition. I therefore develop a theory of civil victimhood that shows that the figure of the constituent uncivil other has not disappeared with the new democracy; instead it now turns on a class-based notion of proper conduct in a context of increasing criminalization of the urban poor, and everyday recognition of citizenship unfolds in the moral realm where people struggle to prove themselves as worthy and deserving victims.

In the next section I detail the intersecting genealogies of the above-mentioned victim categories and their relation with discourses of human rights and securitization under global neoliberalism. For now, I wish to note that not everyone finds it possible to enter the space of performed civil victimhood and through two cases I describe the stigmatization suffered by those who fail to properly perform this kind of civility: the first case study focuses on what it means to be a good civil victim in the context of the move away from dictatorship. It is based on an interview conducted in 2014 with 'Pablo', a Chilean in his early 40s whose continued political engagement and discomfort with what he perceives as continued injustice in democracy has driven him into a semi-clandestine lifestyle.² His testimony is interesting for the purposes of this article, not because he is representative of the Chilean population at large but because his case illustrates the embodiment of a continued exception and the kind of excess that an imposed consensus on proper civil victimhood in a 'transitional' democracy produces. This case shows, that at least from the perspective of the governing elite, certain victims of human rights' violations can still appear as a threat to democratic coexistence if they fail to perform civil victimhood and therefore threaten to destabilize the discourse that effectively situates the victim as the ideal civilized citizen.

The second case focuses on how the notion of civil victimhood has been transformed through the growth of criminalization of the poor. It is a longer ethnographic description of 'Maria', a poor single mother who struggles to perform decency and proper civil conduct in her community at a moment (the year 2004) when definitions of 'friend' and 'enemy' are migrating from the political field (right wing versus left wing during the dictatorship) to the social field (law-abiding democratic citizens versus criminals). Maria fails and ends up being stigmatized as a criminal even though nobody in her local community has suffered from a crime. Her case illustrates how the poor are often unable to fully participate in publically acknowledged claims of citizenship and it indicates how the divide between

‘citizens’ and ‘criminals’, first introduced by the right wing, works to morally justify the continued exclusion of the poor in the context of a neoliberalism imposed during the dictatorship and perpetuated in the new democracy (see also Risør and Arteaga, 2018). Tellingly, both cases also indicate that appropriate civil conduct becomes a *de facto* requirement for gaining substantial citizenship and that not everybody succeeds in performing civil victimhood as well as Bachelet. To understand these cases I first want to situate civil victimhood in relation to two global discourses and forms of governance, namely human rights and securitization, and to indicate how these quite different frameworks come together in contemporary Chile and define grounded notions of proper citizenship.

Citizenship, human rights and securitization

Citizenship is sometimes understood as the formal status bestowed on members of a national community who hold equal rights and obligations. Citizens are thus imagined to interact on equal terms and in this sense the notion of citizenship indeed holds an emancipatory promise. Yet, the study of practices of citizenship reveals how differentiation in terms of class, ethnicity, race, and gender intersect with this principle of equality and eventually impede vast groups of society to access full or substantial citizenship (see, for example, Marshall, 1950). Concerned with the differentiated access to fulfill the potential of full citizenship, feminist scholar Ruth Lister has argued for the need to adopt a conception of citizenship grounded in a notion of ‘differentiated universalism’ (Lister, 1997: 42) which seeks to simultaneously recognize the universal aspects of citizenship while keeping in mind that rights and needs can be particularized as a way of countering the past or current disadvantages of certain groups (Lister, 1997: 41).

Concerns with the relationship between citizenship, difference, and inequality are indeed present in contemporary scholarship on Latin America. In recent years this analysis has often been paired with an awareness of the partial or decentered presence of the state under neoliberalism and focus has been on how people in the social, economic, and legal margins seek to ensure their citizens’ rights, often ‘despite the state’ as Lazar (2008: 61) has eloquently put it (see also Goldstein, 2012; Holston, 2008). Analyzing informal or ‘a-legal’ street vendors in Argentina, Forment (2015; see also this special issue) has argued that the urban poor engage in pragmatic ad hoc political negotiations which he associates with the emergence of a ‘plebeian citizenship’ (Forment, 2015: 124). Writing from contemporary Chile I am equally concerned with differentiated citizen positions, albeit the cases presented do not in any univocally way point to a general tendency towards ‘insurgent’, ‘extra-legal’ or ‘plebeian’ political practices. Rather, the analysis deals with how conceptions of citizenship unfold in the encounter between state and citizens and among people in urban communities, and with how competing notions of victimhood intersect with performances of civility in the new democracy.

Human rights

The relationship between universal human rights, citizens' rights, and culture is a concern in social theory (see Arendt, 1973). Merry (2003), for example, has shown how notions of universality and cultural particularity are being reframed in legal debates when human rights violations become explained as a matter of harmful local cultural practices. From this perspective, human rights are a transnational practice that is always embedded in pre-existing relations of meaning and production (Goodale, 2007: 24) and activists and communities embrace these discourses and frameworks in surprising and contradictory ways. Goldstein's (2007) analysis of how discourses of human rights and claims for security and police protection in Bolivia intersect as people claim security as a human right and are willing to inflict lethal violence upon the bodies of alleged criminals is a good case in point.

In Chile, human rights discourses were originally embraced by opponents of the dictatorship as a way of pursuing international protection from the systematic use of police violence, torture, forced disappearances, etc. committed by the regime. The legal human rights framework constructs different categories of social actors, such as victims, perpetrators, bystanders, and passive beneficiaries. Yet, in transitional Chile, the state-led transitional justice primarily focused on the victims. There has been less focus on the perpetrators and the role of bystanders and passive beneficiaries is rarely discussed. If we understand victimhood as the ways in which suffering is contextualized and acted on (Jensen and Ronsbo, 2015), in Chile the deaths and sufferings of the past are framed as a kind of foundational sacrificial violence for the new democracy. In 1988 Pinochet, who by then faced continued protests (Garreton, 2001), decided to hold a national referendum to let the population decide whether they wanted to continue under his leadership until 1997 (voting *si*) or proceed with democratic elections (voting *no*). The 'no' option won with 55.9% and the transition to democracy was initiated when Patricio Aylwin was elected president in 1989. Yet, because Pinochet was defeated within a constitutional framework of his choosing, the cost of forcing him to step down was that the opposition acquiesced to the institutional order entrenched in the 1980 constitution (Navia, 2010: 301). In other words, Pinochet was not defeated by a revolution, and in exchange for his reassignment, his constitution to a great extent remained in force. The 1980 constitution conceived of Chile as a 'protected' democracy. Compared to a liberal democracy, a protected democracy is based on the premise that people must be protected from their own tendency towards unruliness and from organizations that might subvert the existing political order. Intents to generate change, even when legal, must be thwarted at all cost and are subject to repression (Loveman, 1994: 11). In Pinochet's vision, social order was constituted in traditional values such as Catholicism and love for the fatherland and the family, and these values required the special guardianship of the military (Heiss and Navia, 2007: 167).

While the 1980 constitution still remains in force today, in the months following Pinochet's historic defeat, and before the beginning of Aylwin's democratically elected government, an intense negotiation took place between the junta and the democratic coalition. Some reforms were introduced, namely article 8 which deemed illegal and contrary to the institutional order of the Republic, '[a]ny act of person or group destined to propagate doctrines that attempt against the family, advocate violence or a conception of society, of the State or of the legal order, of a totalitarian nature or based on the struggle of classes. . . ' adding that, "[o]rganisations and movements or political parties that for their purposes or by the activity of its adherents tend to those objectives, are unconstitutional" (Diario Oficial de la República, 2005: 394, [author's translation from Spanish]) was abrogated and the defense of human rights was established as a state duty (Heiss and Navia, 2007: 176). The cost of these innovations was the budgetary and administrative autonomy of the military and an election law that supported right-wing parties with the appointment, as opposed to election, of senators (including Pinochet himself). Right up until 2005 during president Lagos' term when more substantial reforms were introduced to the constitution, this clause prevented electoral majorities from becoming a commanding majority in the senate (Heiss and Navia, 2007: 184). Also, the neoliberal economic model violently imposed during the dictatorship was perpetuated, and Chile remains one of the region's most unequal nations in terms of income, access to quality education, pensions, and proper housing (Barton, 2002; Han, 2012; Schild, 2013). Finally, the infamous 1978 amnesty law made it next to impossible to prosecute human rights' violations committed between 11 September 1973 and 1978 when most of the forced disappearances and systemic torture took place, also remained in force (Collins, 2008). The new authorities were thus handed a government still bound hand and foot, a reality succinctly expressed by the late president Aylwin's bitter remark that Chile would have justice 'to the extent possible'. In this new democracy, human rights are an integral part of the constitution, but relatively few human rights' violators have been prosecuted and sentenced, even though Pinochet's 1998 arrest in London triggered new interpretations of Chile's 1978 amnesty law and the economic gains of private citizens (including members of Pinochet's own family) were handed over to companies that were privatized under the neoliberal reforms and have not been contested.

As Chile emerged as a democratic society that valued the testimonies and moral dignity of victims rather than justice, a performance of civility by victims gained great importance and this reality can productively be analyzed with Robert Meister's (2011) theory of how human rights has come to work as a global framework for governance and consensus. He argues that, since the end of the Cold War (and hence at the same time as neoliberalism became installed as a global form of governance), human rights discourse has tended to work in such a way that evil is discursively situated in the past, thus turning the present time into an era in which references to current disagreements and political reforms appear as a dangerous endeavor that puts everyone at risk of returning to the violent past. The 'after-evil'

temporality thus depoliticizes the victims while political action and demands for retributive justice tend to be conflated with the 'evil' that produced the victims in the first place. These insights are relevant for the analysis of transitional democracy in Chile because they help us understand why political disagreement and demands for justice and universal social rights can easily evoke collective memories of violence and repression. In this post-conflict context, it appears as a utopic endeavor to attempt generating structural change of the neoliberal model that was violently imposed during the dictatorship. Not only would structural changes towards a post-neoliberal society go against neoliberalism as a contemporary global form of governance, but it would also appear as a hazardous risk of provoking the economic elite that still benefits from the privatizations and the privileges they were given during the dictatorship. In this sense, the new democracy indeed becomes a never-ending '*transición*', because it is not possible to 'return' to democracy if this is to be conceived outside of the neoliberal frame.

This depolitized 'after-evil temporality' was materialized in the otherwise important and thought-provoking National Museum for Memory and Human Rights inaugurated in 2010 (Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos, 2010). The museum's permanent exposition is based on the reports generated by the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1991) and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2004, 2010). According to its website, its purpose is to make 'visible the human rights violations committed by the Chilean state between 1973 and 1990; to dignify the victims and their families; and to stimulate reflection and debate about the importance of respect and tolerance so that these acts will never be committed again'.³ Human rights' violations thus become circumscribed to the time of the dictatorship and this period is implicitly defined as a parenthesis, a state of exception in the nation's history. The permanent exhibition is dedicated to the victims' experiences of suffering, rather than their resistance, and to international expressions of solidarity; and while documentation of acts of torture, ill-treatment, executions, and forced disappearances abound and acts of perpetration are highlighted the actual perpetrators recede into a shadowy background. What we are left with are the innocent, non-combatant victims as worthy citizens of the new democracy. I argue that this conflation of the victim with the citizen has important repercussions for how rights-claiming and proper political action is perceived, because the everyday definition of whom appear as truly deserving citizens to an important extent depends on the performance of civil victimhood.

Securitization in the new democracy

The new democracy does not simply work to situate politically motivated violence in an evil past, it also assigns alternative forms of violence in the present a new symbolic importance. During the early years of the transition and following much media coverage on crime and right-wing politicians' insistence that crime was out of control, the Chilean population at large began to show increased concern about

crime and criminals (Dastres, 2002; Helsper and Manzi, 2003). In parallel with the global human rights framework therefore, came a proliferation of security measures as part of a global discourse and as a form of governance (see Buur et al., 2007). This framework not only emerged in Chile, as elsewhere, with the advent of neoliberalism and the persistence of socio-economic inequality (see Wacquant, 2012) but is also consistent with the ‘protected democracy’ doctrine of the dictatorship. At the same time, it draws on the elite’s historic fear of the poor. Further, in Chile, concerns about crime and security gained force in a moment in time in which the dictatorship’s internal enemy by default, the ‘communist’, fell into disuse and these factors in their combination facilitated the emergence of the ‘criminal’ as the constituent other so that the democratic transition gradually gave way to a state that actively securitized the poor.

In 1992, the influential foundation Paz Ciudadana (Citizens’ Peace) was founded. Focusing on research and public policy concerning crime and public violence, it began publishing crime statistics, victimization indexes, and data on the population’s perceptions of crime and insecurity, thus helping to raise their priority among the population (Ramos and de Guzmán, 2000). While initially associated with the right wing, the foundation’s directory soon integrated members of the center-left parties and since the mid-1990s enhanced crime control has been a generalized concern across the political spectrum. Hence, in parallel to the depoliticization of human rights violations, crime has become a subject that defines elections, and dangerous otherness is increasingly defined in terms of ‘criminals’. Lucia Dammert (2012) emphasizes that this process of othering is tightly associated with social distinctions such as race, social class, and age. In short, we see how the Chilean urban poor are gradually being targeted as potential criminals and as unworthy citizens of the new democracy.

The threat of violence to sociality and social relations does not, in other words, disappear with democracy. This juxtaposition of discourses of civil security and human rights has produced a form of policing of social relations and the political field in which those citizens who enact civil victimhood can appropriate social rights and substantial citizenship. As a result, the individuals and practices that become situated, or consciously situate themselves, outside this framework – be this in the form of criminal activity or in the form of a politics of contestation that is categorized as inappropriate or as a criminal or terrorist endeavor – are at risk of being cast as enemies of the social order. It is in these cases that the apparently neutral definitions of belonging to the polis reveal an extreme form of politicization in which the new criminal enemy faces continued securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). Also, human rights and securitization brings together two different temporal forms of governance. While the human rights framework primarily works to encapsulate violence in the past and prevent it from being actualized in the present, the securitization framework works to pre-empt the actualization of potential threats in the present and in doing so it fixes social actors in terms of (potential) victims and perpetrators. With these notions in place we can now turn our attention to the cases of first Pablo and then Maria.

Pablo: outcasts of democracy

Pablo's story and conduct stand in stark contrast to president Bachelet's performance of civility. Instead of transiting from victim to ideal citizen, his behavior has turned him into an uncivilized outcast of democracy that can easily be securitized. During the dictatorship and at the age of 13 he became a militant member of the FPMR, the armed branch of the Communist Party that had almost succeeded in killing Pinochet in 1986. His political engagement was inspired by his father's commitment to the unions, and he had spent his childhood and teenage years witnessing his father's political trajectory and enduring his absence during several political imprisonments. Pablo had never been convicted, but with the return of democracy his father was among the 255 political prisoners that the new government inherited from the dictatorship. At that point, the democratic transition was fragile: Pinochet was still commander in chief, the military dominated the senate through the figure of 'designated senators' and the 1980 constitution was firmly in place. So was the controversial anti-terror⁴ law by which these prisoners had been given lifetime jail sentences for 'blood crimes' committed against the former dictatorship.

These prisoners embodied the legal and political limbo of the time. On the one hand, their sentences could not be recognized by any democratic standard. They had been convicted by military courts and confessed under torture to acts of aggression against representatives of an internationally discredited and repressive dictatorship. On the other hand, the new regime had accepted the laws under which these people were convicted. The prisoners thus constituted a social, political, and legal headache. If they remained in prison the government would face international repudiation and continued social unrest and protests. Yet, they could not be released either, due to the *de facto* powers of the military. The so-called Leyes Cumplido, a set of special laws issued by the then Minister of Justice, Francisco Cumplido, resolved this impasse. With this measure the prisoners were granted a retrial (now confessing without being subjected to torture) and they were effectively reconvicted for acts of terrorism. However, they were also granted the status of victims of violations of human rights and as a consequence some sentences were commuted to 25 years of expatriation, thus expelling the convicted and their families from the nation. In an interview with the online Chilean newspaper *Ciper Chile* (2010), Cumplido argues that with the help of Catholic analogies deeply rooted in the Chilean imaginary of proper and civilized conduct.

We opted to apply the penalty of expatriation, which is temporary. We believe that it was necessary to compensate for the inhuman and degrading treatment to which they had been subjected and lighten their [prior] sentences. I would say that we applied justice in the form of mercy, because these people were responsible for crime. They were not angels [Author's translation from Spanish].⁵

Cumplido's reference to these expatriated persons as not being angels is significant. Akin to what in Argentina has become known as the 'theory of two demons'

(Vezzetti, 2002) he situates them outside the framework of innocent victims and emphasizes them as politically motivated actors. As politics is “evil” in an after-evil reality, they stand out as one kind of demon (revolutionaries) who confronted another kind of demon (the military dictatorship). In democracy, however, both demonic forms of behavior must be overcome, and it is for this reason that the prisoners had to be expelled.

This divide between innocent victims and politically motivated demons is congruent with Meister’s (2011) description of the global transformation that the human rights discourse has undergone. He argues that with the end of the Cold War human rights underwent a transformation from being a political and revolutionary means on the one hand, to presenting itself as an ethical transcendence of politics on the other. The former political approach to human rights was built upon doctrines such as Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* in the 1790s and the civil rights spirit that infused the American and French revolutions in the same era, when people felt justified in using violence to seek expansion of their civil rights against colonial rule and aristocracies. In this framework of uprising and resistance, violence is not necessarily considered an evil but can also serve the higher purpose of justice, and a revolution does not come to an end when power is seized but only when those who benefited from the former regime no longer maintain their privileges. This approach to social transformation and against domination was present in the Latin American independence wars, and the 1959 Cuban revolution marked an important precedent in the continent. It was also present during the time of Allende’s *Unidad Popular* although Allende did not instigate an armed revolution but famously insisted on bringing socialism to the country via constitutional democracy and did not subscribe to violent means. An ethically-based approach to human rights, on the other hand, situates physical harm *per se* as the ultimate evil in an effort to transcend ‘the politics of revolution and counterrevolution that together produced the horrors of the twentieth century – Nazism and communism’ (Meister, 2011: 7). In this approach the focus is set on rescuing all witnesses to human cruelty and the primary end is to stop any conflict and struggle that produces harm. As indicated in the section above, this is an ethical framework that goes well with contemporary global neoliberalism because it obscures structural violence and securitization that occur in the present. This ethically-based definition does actually require victims to be ‘angels’, in the sense that they must be ‘morally undamaged’ individuals who will not pursue justice at any cost and who are willing to permanently situate evil in the past (Meister, 2011: 23). Within this non-revolutionary framework, bystanders are included as witnesses to evil and the ongoing (economic) beneficiaries are not expected to relinquish their privileges if they subscribe to the condemnation of the violence that secured their benefits in the first place. Forgiving victims and remorseful beneficiaries thus constitute the prime citizens of a transitional society, while the few remaining unremorseful perpetrators or beneficiaries and the unreconciled victims become the biggest threat to peace, and revolutionary politics appears as an unacceptable and uncivil position.

While this division between ethics and politics might appear artificial from an analytical perspective where ethical commitments are indeed always caught upon in politics and economics (see Zigon, 2014; introduction to this special issue), in the Chilean case it has undoubtedly been productive in terms of ensuring a relatively peaceful coexistence among 'former' adversaries. Yet, it produces excess: as radically unreconciled victims there is no place left for Pablo's family in the new democracy. While their cases might be included in the Valech report on political imprisonment and torture, it is reasonable to think that they possibly do not even consider themselves as victims, but instead as combatants who lost their battle. At the return of democracy their presence made it problematic to situate political disputes in a discrete past, and therefore, they embodied a threat to civilized relationships. They could not, or would not, perform Bachelet's (or any other) kind of civil victimhood in order to make Chilean democracy possible. Consequently, a relatively small group of 29 individuals and their families were exiled in European countries. Thus, at a time when many exiles were returning to Chile, Pablo's family was deported, and from his perspective the dictatorship continues.

Listening to his life story one gets the impression that his identity is inevitably linked to being an oppositional matter out of place. From the perspective of the average middle-class Chilean enjoying the regained civil rights of democracy Pablo's narrative offers an annoying, stubborn, and somehow adolescent insistence on a different, almost parallel, world that does not synchronize with what has become common sense reality across the political spectrum. He, therefore, becomes a paradigmatic example of how civil victimhood in democracy can work to maintain the status quo and the violent forms of othering and securitization that take place against those who are deemed uncivil: he begins a political career in the Communist Party during the dictatorship, and then, as democracy comes about and the FPMR lays down its weapons, he chooses to resign from this organization. After the deportation, in his new European country of residence, he becomes affiliated with autonomous and anarchist movements. As a matter of fact, his country of residency has refused several of his applications for nationality (instead of residency), accordingly because he was 'too integrated', as he euphemistically refers to his involvement with these groups. He later became involved with anarchist groups in Santiago and with the indigenous Mapuche movement. In 2004 he returned to Chile and began to study at a private university that has historically been associated with left-wing intellectuals and opponents to the dictatorship. Yet, even in this space Pablo felt questioned:

I return to Chile with the intention to start studying. [...] And so, after a political interrogation before I can begin - because I [already] did the test [academic admission test] - [first] a vocation interview about why you want to study ... and then the other [interview] conducted by a different person who asks me, more than asking, he warns me: He says, 'I know very well what you think, where you come from and all that stuff, and want to be clear that here the young people are into different stuff. They don't want to organize; they are not interested in a [student] federation.

From the beginning of his return Pablo felt that he was being politically persecuted. He was repeatedly faced with his 'past' and warned against joining any kind of political activity at university or in other spaces. Nevertheless, he continued with his political commitment and in 2006 he participated in a student occupation of his university (*toma*), and other activities in support of the Mapuche movement. Without going into detail, he recalled how the persecution reached its highest level in 2009, when in fear of his personal safety he finally decided to return to Europe. That same year, a young Mapuche activist was killed by police in an action of land recovery at the site of the death of the iconic Mapuche activist Alex Lemún, whose 2002 killing had motivated Pablo to engage with the indigenous movement in the first place.⁶ After these experiences, he once again left Chile and from a distance he explained via Skype why he finally decided to return to Europe:

Having lived under the dictatorship was useful for me to realize that something was being prepared, as if they wanted a swoop against alternative movements. And I remember that I pointed this out to my comrades: 'I'm leaving – you have to be careful, because something heavy is coming.' They [undercover police officers] took pictures of us during the last indigenous march, and they even introduced themselves to a friend and said to her: 'At this moment there are nearly fifty police agents here and we are watching you.' They were so confident about what they were doing that they even introduced themselves to us! They were worried about the approach that several radical alternative groups were making towards the indigenous cause. In that context I left Chile and came here [current country of residency] in 2009. I get here and they surprise me with the huge repressions in 2009, the murder of Jaime Mendoza Collio [a young Mapuche activist]. So things continue.

From Pablo's lived perspective, there is no radical break between dictatorship and democracy because he has been pushed into a position of radical incommensurable difference (cf. Povinelli, 2001) that indeed reveals how, the very same practices of civil victimhood that facilitate democratic coexistence also work to conceal the exclusion of his voice and the forms of violence that have made this coexistence feasible in the first place. As a combatant in an 'after evil' time of peace 'things continue' and he is exposed to securitizing measures and turned into an extremely political figure, first, because he is unable to embrace the position of the victim and, second, because he refuses to situate political violence and human rights violations in the past.

Maria: 'poor but clean'?

I remember clearly when President Lagos appeared live on national television after the evening news in November 2004 with a heartfelt speech to the nation. He presented the results of the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, a report in which the Chilean state officially recognizes its responsibility in 40,018 cases of political imprisonment, torture and ill treatment committed

during the dictatorship (1973–1990). After stating the need to recognize these events in order to heal as a nation, Lagos indicated that the state would offer a minor compensation in the form of a lifelong pension to the victims. I never heard the rest of the speech because Maria, on whose TV I was watching it, changed the channel. We were sitting outside on a chilly spring night in an improvised tent on the local plaza in one of central Santiago's neighborhoods drinking tea and eating *maraquetas* (buns of white bread) with ham and cheese. Maria earned some extra money working as an informal security guard at nights for a local handicraft market, and I kept her company on weekend evenings.

Maria had been visibly bothered during the speech. She had moved uncomfortably on her chair, half listening to it and half paying attention to the municipal guard from *seguridad ciudadana* who was chatting with her teenage daughter outside the tent. She also made a few comments indicating to me that I should 'not believe everything he [President Lagos] said'. These crimes had not been committed, or at least not all of them, she said, thus adopting the voice of the right-wing. And then, at what I considered a historic moment, she simply switched the channel and began watching *Morandé con Compañía*, a popular show with scantily dressed *señoritas*, sexualized jokes, and game competitions. *Morandé con Compañía* was running a special section on the *modus operandi* of a serial killer (*el descuartizador de Valparaíso*) who had chopped up his victims. A 'doctor' in a white suit resembling the forensic staff from US TV shows was illustrating on a life-size doll how the victims had been quartered with a chainsaw. Maria was now paying full attention and, visibly moved, she turned toward me and said, 'I don't know how anyone can be so cruel'. I didn't answer but instead stepped outside for a bit of fresh air.

At first, I exclusively contextualized Maria's attitude and my own reaction as an illustration of how political cleavages fourteen years after the formal return of democracy still marked social relations, obliging us all to a specific civil performance that allowed us to circumvent certain topics or take part in uncomfortable silences in order to preserve friendship and make family and work relations doable. Yet, as I came to know Maria and her daughter Clara and their situation within their community better, I also began to contextualize her reaction as an attempt to situate herself within the new competing framework in which proper citizenship was performed in opposition to criminal activity. She was not only adopting the 'tough on crime' discourse of the right-wing but was also speaking from the specific position of a poor person at risk of being criminalized. I had met Maria and Clara through the local Advance Committee in a lower- middle-class neighborhood in process of gentrification in central Santiago. The Advance Committees were established with the return of democracy as part of the Democratic Coalition's program of strengthening local democracy and inviting citizens' participation by creating community organizations. This was seen as a way of regenerating people's confidence in the authorities, and these organizations functioned as a guarantee for participative allocations of municipal funds. These kinds of initiatives can be seen as a controlling and surveillance of the poor but they also constitute a sincere

effort to (re)organize people in their local communities and make democracy flourish from below.

In the everyday, the committee functioned as a social club where one could be updated on everything from robberies and murders to lost dogs and the health status of elders; it constituted a social network for the participants, who supported each other in case of illness and in the ongoing search for stable employment and social mobilization that characterizes life among Chile's urban poor (Han, 2012). One of the committee's stable activities was a weekend handcraft market at the local plaza. At first, I did not understand why it was necessary to have night guards at the market considering the fact that municipal guards patrolled the plaza 24 hours a day and the police also did their rounds at night, but anyhow I volunteered to accompany Maria and Clara on their nightly rounds and did so until the market was abruptly closed down by the new municipal administration. Later on, I understood that our guarding related to the latent conflict between the committee and the municipality concerning the (il)legality of the market: the newly elected mayor carried out his security politics by persecuting street hawkers, who did not pay taxes. The committee also argued within the security framework, though the other way around, claiming that the market created 'new life' on an otherwise abandoned plaza that could easily be overtaken by criminal subjects and young people on drugs. In this way, different perceptions of crime and security were confronted at the local plaza and suddenly turned our night guarding into, if not a criminal activity, at least a borderline matter since we were protecting the goods of unlicensed peddlers. At a practical level, however, the guarding came off quite well, with good relations between the municipal guards and their supervisors; and if 'something' happened (such as fights, young people making a noise or taking drugs, or neighbors' complaints) we could take refuge in his shelter and he would call the police.

In spite of the quiet nights and the presence of the municipal guard, it was obvious that Maria felt uncomfortable with staying out at night, and she explained that she had only accepted the job because of her state of poverty. The nights were passed by making rounds, talking with the guard, sometimes commenting on people passing by, but mostly sitting alongside the handicrafts. Maria was normally extremely concerned about the subject of crime and security, but during the nights she had other concerns.

Maria was very concerned about Christmas coming soon and the fact that because the night shift had totally changed her daily rhythm, she had not had time to do the Christmas cleaning yet. She told me about how she *used to* clean the windows, polish the floors, wash the curtains and generally clean up everything. [...] We had taken some blankets of hers with us outside to keep us warm; during the early morning we both fell asleep inside the 'tent' (Clara was outside with the guard) and my blanket had slipped and was touching the ground. Though it was not dirty at all (at least I could not see any difference), Maria immediately said that now she had to wash all the blankets because she could not bring something that had touched the outside ground into her house (Field note, December 2004).

Initially I did not consider Maria's remarks of any particular relevance. However, as my fieldwork in the neighborhood evolved and I came to spend considerable time with the women of the house where I rented a room, and their female friends, I came to understand that cleaning narratives and public performance, such as 'disinfecting' the outer wall and stairways after a vagabond had sat on them constituted a crucial dimension to the gendered performance of proper female neighborliness. I therefore read Maria's concerns as a performative expression of civilized manners tied to conceptions of citizenship (see also Holston, 2011). When analyzing from this perspective we are moving into a sphere where the notions of criminal conduct and proper citizenship, rather than the juridical terms, essentially constitute moral categories. As such, though every Chilean may legally be a citizen, the right citizenly behavior and characteristics are disputed within moral spheres of a community where pure and ordered conduct is defined and evaluated according to notions of decency, class, and gender that are not only rooted in the recent dictatorial past but also draw from colonial and postcolonial concerns regarding governance of the uncivilized masses (see, for example, Gallardo et al., 2002; Salazar, 2000 [1985]). Notions of proper civil behavior are thus tied to processes of state formation and following Elias (1994; see also introduction to this special issue) violence becomes reorganized and put out of sight as the state acquires monopoly over its legitimate use. Civil relations are made possible through state narratives that project violence into other times, actors, and places (often at the expense of the poor and marginal) but maintains its differential use as well as the possibility of its more general resurfacing. Moreover, crime and repression are only out of sight for the privileged and the middle class because crime mainly strikes in poor areas where people do not only fear to fall victim of crime but also to end up becoming criminalized. Police surveillance, as the present case also indicates, is therefore an everyday reality among the urban poor and people tend to blame and criminalize each other rather than looking for structural explanations for their situation.

Living as a poor person in a relatively mixed neighborhood in terms of class, Maria did not feel that her moral status was not something she could take for granted. When I first met the family, they were surviving on her weekly cleaning job and the sporadic night watching at the plaza, which was not always sufficient to make ends meet and even less to repair her old and dilapidated house. The wooden floor was riddled with termites, the walls were damp and stained, the toilet did not drain properly and the house had a characteristic fusty smell of damp mixed with cat piss. Sometimes the power supply was cut and there was no gas for cooking, so lunch – the main meal of the day in Chile – consisted of biscuits and tomatoes. Maria's characteristics as a poor, single mother with a daughter who had not finished primary school and was diagnosed with some kind of depression or nervous disease – sadly common in contemporary Chile (see also Han, 2012) – placed her in a fragile position. Though both mother and daughter had an almost obsessive interest in the municipal guards and police and showed great preoccupation with the security issue, the fact that two single women were working as night

guards did not improve their gendered status, because staying out at night could be interpreted as a transgression of (female) manners and norms. From this point of view, Maria's emphasis on her *normal* cleaning habits appears as a narrative strategy to (re)position herself as a decent woman to the local community. The cleaning narrative can therefore be seen as a tactic for creating a distance from her state of poverty, presenting herself as *pobre pero limpio* (poor but clean), as the saying goes.

Who is the criminal on the roof?

In the year of 2000, when the right-wing leader and former candidate for presidency Joaquín Lavín became mayor in Santiago, he established the municipal guards and *Comités de Seguridad* – Security Committees – as part of a zero-tolerance program inspired by New York police commissioner William Bratton. In these community organizations a group of neighbors (of a block, alley or small street) are organized to prevent crime. The committees work with the supervision of a municipal functionary and once a month a meeting is held at the local police station with representatives from all the local committees, the municipality and the police. Even though nobody had been robbed in Maria's alley, a committee had recently been founded. As in other committees, its task was not only to prevent crime but, in order to do so, also to recognize danger.

A common preoccupation in the lane was the fact that the roofs of the houses were connected, and some neighbors reported hearing mysterious noises on the roofs at night. These soon became described as the steps of men – possibly thieves – walking on the roofs with the intention of breaking in. However, nobody had ever seen anybody on the roofs, and a first activity had been to put up electric entrance alarms and entry-phones at the doors of the houses. The daily leader of the committee, a widow who lived with her adult son and who had moved to the area in recent years, told me about the complications involved in her task. She pointed out her effort to include all the neighbors in the committee's meetings, although not everybody 'agreed on security', and it was difficult to get people to pay the monthly quota for maintenance of the entrance security features.

Still, being active in the committee permitted her to stay in contact with the municipality administration and be offered courses as well as applying for economic support for projects in the lane. This was a relation of mutual benefit between particular citizens and the municipality, where the former received the mentioned advantages and the latter was kept updated on what was happening in the neighborhoods and what was considered a threat to peace and order. Thus, as a municipal worker once expressed to me: 'They [the committee members] are our eyes in the street, because nobody but the neighbors knows more about where the dangerous spots are'. Security became an important link between the administration and the inhabitants of the quarter as well as a way of performing citizenship. Therefore, the committee leader had a privileged position not only in relation to the municipality but also within the lane. Her opinion about security and other local matters was important to most of the neighbors, and she endeavored to create

good local relationships and maintain her position, for example by inviting people over to tea or giving sweets to the children at Christmas time.

The activities of the Security Committee had resulted in the free painting of the facades of the houses. However, two of the house owners had rejected the offer; one of them was Maria, who explained that she feared a deterioration of the already bad condition of the wall if it was painted without structural improvements, which she could not afford. This lack of cleaning up of her facade became the point of departure for a number of apparently insignificant neighbor quarrels that eventually emerged as security matters.

Approximately six months later, Maria gave me her version of the story: among other minor incidents, the non-painting of her house had caused estrangement from the committee leader; Maria refused to participate in the committee and one October day, in the context of a municipal election activity at the plaza, the conflict escalated. Clara supported the candidature of the former mayor's wife for the city council, and with other youngsters she had been blowing up balloons with an electric machine in the alley. As Maria came home, neighbors, and in particular the Security Committee leader and her visiting daughter, had called the police and complained about the level of noise and the number of youngsters in the lane. As Maria tried to intervene in the conflict, the Security Committee leader's daughter yelled at her, saying that she was dependent on municipal support, that she was not a house owner but someone who could be thrown out, and that she was a political fence-sitter because she greeted both the right-wing and the governing coalition candidates for mayoralty.

These were three accusations concerning Maria's status as a proper citizen in which economic independence and a fixed abode are considered important elements. At this point Maria interrupted her own narration and stated that the accusations were all false: first of all she did not receive economic support from the municipality, implicitly stating that she was not indigent, secondly the house was inherited from her grandmother and as such she was the legal owner and not a tenant, and finally, although as one of the *gente educada* she did greet both candidates, she was perfectly clear about whom she would vote for (letting me know that this would be the right-wing candidate). A few days later Maria received a letter from the committee pointing out that for 'the safety of everyone' one was to ask permission from the committee before holding 'events' in the lane. Maria showed me the letter while expressing something between sadness and anger. She said that she wanted to move out but did not know how, and finally she told me how police and municipal guards had begun to show up at her door, insisting on inspecting her house because anonymous neighbors had reported that she let thieves enter through her patio, putting the security of the whole lane in jeopardy. In the lane, Maria's moral status had vanished to the point where she was now considered a danger, and the fact that municipal officers were policing her private home illustrates how her very being had become a public matter. She was no longer considered a civilized person and people no longer felt compelled to treat her according to civil standards. At the end of her narrative Maria told me that the security

leader, living in front of her, had now put up a surveillance camera pointing right at her front door, and as I went home, for the first time I became aware of a small camera below the neighbor's roof.

It seemed as though the enigma of the noises on the roofs had been 'resolved'; a dangerous otherness had been fixed within the lane, and the one made responsible for the crimes that had not happened was Maria. Morally speaking, she was little by little being singled out as non-civilized; she was becoming the object of other people's fear and a public matter that could be policed. The security committee leader and her neighbors were performing as civilized victims of a crime that had not yet been committed. This performance demanded Maria's participation as a potential criminal, and it became validated by the municipal officers' backing of the security committee as the true representatives of the community. Maria's biggest problem was that she had not been able to read how the local norms for proper civilized behavior and belonging were changing from a political definition between left- and right-wing supporters to a social and class-based definition that drew the line between *gente educada*, or proper citizens, and criminals.

Significantly, these practices unfold in the temporality of the potential, meaning that in order to engage in securitizing measures against the other (in this case Maria) it is not a requirement that any actual criminal offence has been committed. Rather, it is the pre-emptive act, (in this case of the security committee) of deeming somebody (in this case Maria) as a threat to community that allows for the (momentary) fixation of the social categories (see also Risør, 2013). Often these cases of securitization occur as states perform their sovereignty and act to outcast certain forms of behavior or individuals within their territory (or on a global scale as it is the case with the current global war on terror), something that Pablo's case indicated. Yet, Maria's case illustrates that these practices also take place in local communities characterized by a relative social, cultural, and economic similarity and that national and global discourses of victimhood and securitization allow people to police each other and in liaison with the state.

Conclusion: civil victimhood and democracy

Pablo and Maria's cases cast light on how discourses and practices of human rights and securitization intersect in contemporary democratic Chile where they define notions and practices of civilized conduct and forms of citizenship across gender, class, and ideological positions. Rather than simply working as two competing discourses, they both serve to police proper and civilized conduct. They work to situate the citizen primarily as victim, and as such, 'citizen participation' – the policy buzzword of the transition – must comply with the performance of civil victimhood. These genealogies of civility and victimhood point to how situated understandings of civil conduct relate to violence as an inherent threat to sociality, how structural and state violence is not recognized within this assessment of civility and how the civilized citizen is subjected to violence but must show restraint in his or her response.

At the same time, the relationship between civility and violence is patent in liberal thought, where life in a plural society is imagined as made possible by ceding the use of legitimate violence to the state. As discussed in the introduction, it is also present in the understanding of civility as a matter of good manners, respect and tolerance because such deferential treatment of others makes it less likely that differences in perceptions of the moral good will burst into violent conflict. Thus, at the heart of liberal democratic citizenship there lies an implicit understanding of how our own victimhood is always already in place as a potentiality, and this relationship has been highlighted in the cases. Yet, the analysis also points to the dangers of civil victimhood: it emphasizes how these performances in inequalitarian societies can easily be converted into practices of violent differentiation of (un)worthiness, for example when paired with global discourses of securitization that resonate way too well with the 'protected' democracy's doctrine on National Security.

The two cases offer an analysis of civil relations in Chile by showing performances of civil victimhood are sustained by a transitional 'after evil' ethics and temporality imbued in the constitutional framework and neoliberal economy inherited from the dictatorship. They speak to the excesses produced by the new democracy and the unfilled promises of inclusion, equality and peaceful coexistence that it has brought about. Pablo's and Maria's (deliberate) failure to comply with proper performances of civil victimhood come to mirror the many concessions that the Democratic Coalition had to make to the dictatorship and the slow and incomplete process of regaining rights. The analysis of the dangers of civil victimhood also speaks to how democracy has come to be understood and valued in a country where scholars debate what the indications of the end of the transition would be (see, for example, Alexander, 2009; Barton, 2002; Portales, 2000) and where only 55% of the population consider democracy to be the best form of governance (Latinobarómetro, 2017). One can of course argue that this disconformity reflects that people have adopted a utopic notion of democracy as if this form of governance was some sort of end point that can someday be reached instead of assuming that democracy is always an incomplete process. Yet, discomfort with democracy can also be taken as an indication that the dictatorship has been overcome but that democracy, in Chile and elsewhere, struggles to fulfill the expectations it evokes in terms of equal opportunities and access to substantial citizenship, and that this horizon appears particularly truncated in the context of global neoliberalism.

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Notes

1. <http://www.paula.cl/entrevista/michelle-bachelet-la-historia-no-contada/>
2. The interview was conducted via Skype by my colleague Francisca Massone in the context of a research project on non-indigenous participation in indigenous organizations in Santiago.
3. <http://www.museodelamemoria.cl/el-museo/sobre-el-museo/>
4. Law number 18.314.
5. <http://ciperchile.cl/2010/10/07/la-vida-en-europa-de-los-presos-condenados-a-extranamiento-por-delitos-terroristas/>
6. It is relevant in this context that in democracy the anti-terror act has been evoked only against the Mapuche movement and more recently against individuals accused of placing bombs in public spaces, and who allegedly belong to anarchist groups (see Richards, 2013).

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