Most recent discussion of the theory of the will has centred on the origins of the concept. It has been argued that there is nothing really quite like the will as we now understand it in classical Greek thought and much ink has been spent arguing whether it arises within late Stoicism or with Augustine or even later.

Here I want to pass this question by and take up instead what we might think a family quarrel. I shall argue that Anselm and Ockham take very different tacks on a crucial question which defenders of the notion of a will must face and that each thus provides a crucial piece of what has become in recent times a rather muddled picture. Along the way I hope to argue some new (though not original) readings of both Anselm and Ockham.

I. The archaeology of concepts

Philosophers tend to view concepts sub specie aeternitatis. This is not indefensible. To the extent that philosophical analysis is conceptual analysis one can easily argue that it doesn't much matter how the concepts in a system of concepts came to be as they are—they are as they are and the task of the philosopher is to describe and perhaps to reform the current system of concepts—thereby one hopes, carving reality at the joints. But this approach has its dangers. One important danger is that we will come to be unable to think alternatives to a very contingent and even historically recent system of concepts—that is the
danger emphasized by Richard Rorty and by Michel Foucault and some extent by Michael Frede. Another is that we will forget just what we were talking (and thinking) about and perhaps even, mislead by superficial similarities, will conflate quite different concepts, thereby engendering philosophical confusion that is often quite difficult to clear up. I have argued elsewhere that the concept of Nominalism has suffered this fate and I think that the concepts of matter and spirit have too. To guard against these dangers it is often useful to perform a work which may not be philosophy at all—the careful unpacking of the process whereby a concept grew up to show just what elements went into it and so to understand better the mixture which has thus resulted. That is what I would like to begin to do this evening for the notion of free will.

I have a thesis: it is that there are two very different families of theories about free will which have each shaped the current concept in a way which leaves it unclear (to me at least) whether our current concept is a coherent one. To sort out the resulting confusion I think we have to engage in several projects. One, and not the only one, is to trace the development of our current concept so as to reveal just how the different strands in it grew up and how they came to be combined.

It is highly controversial whether we find in the Greek philosophical tradition before it was influenced by Christianity any conception of deciding to act which is neutral about the motives from which the action is taken. Much of this controversy has focused on whether there are in ancient Greek words which would be well translated by the English words will' (as either noun or verb) or choose'. For example Albrecht Dihle argues:

"the word "will" and its equivalents in modern languages as applied to the description and evaluation of human action denotes sheer volition, regardless of its origin in either cognition or emotion....Moreover, the idea of will as a factor separate from both reason and emotion or instinct permeates all layers and periods of European thought. The idea has always been difficult to express distinctly and unmistakably, as can be seen from the usage in many languages....The Greeks had no word of this kind in their language to denote will or intention as such. ....During the period when the two verbs Boulomai and (e)qelw were still different in meaning, the first signified primarily the planning and reflecting which precedes action. The second only meant "to be disposed" "to be prepared". [Dihle, A. The Concept of Will in Classical Antiquity, p. 20]

Obviously we are dealing here with very difficult hermeneutical issues. One is the extent to which the availability of a conception of
will or choice as we might now understand it depends upon there being words which would be well-translated this way. Another is just how certain Greek words ..... are to be translated. For what it is worth I think we must be very cautious about such questions and I doubt that we can read off the lack of a settled terminology much about the lack of a concept. Let me illustrate this with a chapter from the later history of this same problem. Dihle and others find the concept of will' well-established in Augustine. I myself will suggest later that we find all the will we could wish in Anselm writing in the 11th century. In both cases it is the term voluntas' and the verb "velle' which is at issue. But we can find mainstream writers as late as the second quarter of the twelfth century for whom voluntas' means something much more like motive or desire than it does will' in our sense. Abelard, for example, thinks that one sins by consenting (consentire) to an act which one believes wrong or by having an intention (intentio) for such an act but explicitly rejects the view that one sins by willing such an act.

Now if we took very seriously the idea that a concept depends on a clear terminology to express it we might doubt whether there is a notion of 'will' even in Abelard. I shall argue in a minute that we should not have such doubts.

II.

But what of the two traditions of which I spoke earlier? What are they and where do we find them?

The first tradition I have in mind is one which focuses on an action as the outcome of a process of rational deliberation. One particularly clear form of this can be found in Aristotle. We start with the idea that there is a single end at which any deliberative process aims. I suspect that Aristotle thinks that there is in fact a single treelike structure in which all of an agent's deliberative activity can be located but that is not crucial at this point. It is enough if any single deliberation has this structure. The end of the deliberation is given for the deliberation and is not itself in any way determined by it. Deliberation is always with respect to means for attaining a given end. The given end of the deliberation is perceived as good by the agent.

Aristotle and the tradition which follows him maintain that everything which is changed is changed by another. Nothing is precisely the cause of its own change. Prohairesis (the outcome of a process of rational deliberation) is a change in the agent. So Prohairesis is caused by something. Aristotle and his tradition suggest that it is
caused by a combination of a desiderative state and a belief state. The combination produces what Brad Inwood has called an ‘activated desire’ and that, if nothing interferes issues immediately in action.

Aristotle himself gives few examples of this process. Here is one of them. An example of how desire and knowledge function together in Aristotle (De Motu Animalium, ch 6):

1. One must taste every sweet thing (expresses desire)
2. This is sweet (expresses information) the conclusion is 'the immediate performance of the action' i.e. tasting.

A. None of this need be verbal or explicit.

The process of deliberation which Aristotle outlines here is a causal process. If we abstract for a moment from whether we are dealing with final or efficient causes we can say that the action (the tasting in Aristotle's example) is the effect of the pre-existing desiderative state and the pre-existing knowledge. Given those and given that nothing interferes we will simply get the tasting. Since the desiderative state expresses a perception on the part of the agent about what is good it would seem then that action is simply the causal result of the good and the agent's beliefs about how to obtain it.

It is here, of course that the Socratic problem of akrasia enters—the problem which seems to structure much of Aristotle's account of prohairesis. If the end of deliberation is given and if the beliefs about how to obtain it are given, how can it happen that an agent sometimes acts for the worse?

This problem has been central to the entire Aristotelian tradition. It remains so today in the work of modern Aristotelians like Davidson and Kenny

I don't want to trace out this dialectic here. What is crucial for my purposes is that the model of action involved is one in which a process of deliberation simply leads to a conclusion which either is the action or leads to the action without any additional step that we might plausibly call choosing. Since this process of deliberation just is an assessment of what is either a good means (one view) or the best means (another) to accomplish a given end the agent will fail to bring about that end only if either it is mistaken about the efficacy of the means or something interferes with the process of deliberation or something prevents the conclusion of the deliberation (if it is not itself the action) issuing in action. Passion has been the traditional case of such a something. But again this either is powerful enough to interfere or it is
not. There is no further act of choosing which determines whether it will or will not succeed in interfering.

It follows from this picture as I have outlined it that it is not crucial to human choice (prohairesis) that the agent be confronted with several means to an end. The process of deliberation may normally involve several means but it could proceed even if there were just one. In particular there is noting in the virtuous agent's conduct which requires that a vicious act be in any way a live option for her or him.

One further consequence of the model is that if we find agents whose knowledge is great enough and whose deliberative powers are strong enough we will find agents which will of their nature act for the best. Thus it is that within the late Greek philosophical tradition God acts for the best not by choice but simply by God's nature. (Calcidius).

This deliberative model is itself anchored on a number of key claims. Among these are:

A. Everything which changes is changed by another
B. Deliberation is always with respect to means rather than with respect to ends
C. Everything sought is sought under the aspect of (that is because it is perceived to be) good.

The alternative tradition to which I now turn in the end rejects each of these assumptions. But in the beginning it proceeds, I think from a rather different picture than that of choice as rational deliberation.

III.

There is considerable controversy over just who to include in the tradition which I am about to discuss. Some, H.A. Wolfson, for example, see Philo of Alexandria as among the earliest defenders of what Wolfson calls 'absolute free will". Others, like Dihle, think that while it arises in the context of first century Judaism, it is not unambiguously present until Augustine. I think that an enormous amount of very careful historical work will have to be done to sort this out—and as I indicated in the brief remarks on voluntas‘ a few minutes ago I think even the phrasing of the question will be very difficult.

What seems to me as clear as anything in this area is that Wolfson is right to think that the Second tradition is developed in a context in which the issue is how humans do good and evil acts. On the first tradition we do good acts (that is acts which bring about the
(perceived) good) exactly when the process of deliberation is not impeded. But on this second tradition we find within ourselves distinct sources of motivation which can (or at least can be perceived to) lead us in different directions. Whether we do good or evil in this context depends on which source of motivation we follow. Here it is not the case that one source of motivation is seen as an impediment on the other—both are in some sense positive and neither is 'really' the agent. The agent chooses which to follow.

Although it is unusual in some other respects we can find a particularly clear example of this central theme in the second tradition in the work of Anselm of Canterbury. In his treatise *De Casu Diaboli (On the Fall of the Devil).* In chapters 12-14, Anselm presents a thought experiment. He begins:

"Leaving aside the fact that every nature is called good, we commonly speak of two goods and of two opposing evils. One good is called justice, whose opposing evil is injustice. The other good is what seems to me able to be called benefit (*commodum*) to which the opposing evil is disadvantage (*incommodum*)..." Ch. 12 (H&R II, 154)

Anselm then claims that no one can be happy who does not will (vult) his own advantage and that no one ought to be happy who does not will (vult) justice.

Anselm then proceeds to suppose a being so constructed "....that at first God gives him only the will-for-happiness" and argues that in that case he "does not yet will anything other than happiness". He continues by arguing that in such a case "it is obvious that he is not at all able by himself to keep from willing the only thing that he has received to will" and further that "he wills a greater happiness in proportion as he understands it to be greater". He concludes that if such a being thought he would be happier by being like God (which is what Satan is said to have wanted) then he would of necessity seek that.

Anselm then turns to imagine a being constructed only with a will for justice and argues that in that case the being could only will just things and further that this agent "would not thereby be just, since it would have received this capability in such a way that it would not have been able to will otherwise." (158)

He then concludes:
"Then since he cannot be called just or unjust merely because he wills happiness or because he wills what is fitting (for he would will these of necessity)...it is necessary for God to make both wills so agree in him that he wills to be happy and wills justly."

On Anselm's account Satan (or anyone else sins) when, in a situation in which it seems to the agent that what would increase happiness is not identical with what is just that agent follows the will for happiness and does not follow the will for justice.

The key element of Anselm's account to which I wish to direct your attention is his claim that an agent chooses by following one will (voluntas) rather than another and the associated claim that free choice requires (at least) two wills because a one-willed agent would act out of a (natural) necessity.

In De Casu Diaboli and the closely associated De Libertate Arbitrii Anselm uses the terminology I have just employed. He speaks both of our having an intellect and voluntas and of our having two voluntates. By the time of his later De Concordia he seems to have concluded that 'voluntas' was being asked to do too much work and he speaks instead of our having two affectiones one for happiness (beatitude) and the other for justice. I think this a mere terminological shift.

In De Casu Diaboli (and subsequent works) Anselm is no doubt working up suggestions he finds in Augustine but there are striking parallels to this two-wills doctrine in other traditions as well. So for example the great Moslem theologian al-Ashari reports (in his Maqalat):

"Ibrahim al-Nazzam said: there must be hatirani, one which one inclines to approach (al-ikdam) the other to avoidance (al-kaff) in order that one's choice between them may be a genuine choice." (Maqalat p. 427-8) translation somewhat modified from Wolfson Philosophy of the Kalam. P. 628.

This doctrine of the hatirani is tricky. The word hatir roughly means spirit but has almost all of the senses of that English word. Sometimes it means a visiting spirit like an angel, sometimes a something very like a desire, sometimes something like soul.

Wolfson points out that hatir is used by Saadia ben Gaon to translate the Hebrew yeser and he, and others point out that there are similar doctrines of humans having to decide which of two opposing
spirits to follow in first century Jewish sources and even in Zoroasterian texts.

However the detailed history of this idea goes it seems pretty different from the First Tradition picture of the agent as a rational deliberative apparatus which may be impeded. The criticism of this picture Anselm suggests is that it is inevitably deterministic.

But The two-wills doctrine seems to suggest an analogous philosophical problem. When an agent acts on one will rather than the other why does it so act? If it is for a reason then the agent seems just as determined as before. If it is for no reason at all then the choice seems not so much free as arbitrary.

I think there is an interesting problem here about the relation between a choice and the reasons for it but the two-wills theorist has at least an immediate reply. Think of the structure of each of the two wills as just like the structure of an agent on the First Tradition picture. Notice, for example that the will-to-happiness seems to be very much like the Aristotelian ultimate motivating desire for happiness. Now in the case of the Aristotelian agent we do not find it arbitrary or unintelligible that the agent pursues its happiness and so acts as it does. If the two-willed agent does exactly the same thing and for exactly the same reasons how can we find it more arbitrary or less intelligible? If Anselm were to ask Satan why he acted as he did he expects the reply "Because I thought it would make me happy". Thus the Anselmian agent does not engage in unmotivated action. But if Anselm asks Satan why he followed the will-to-happiness rather than the will to justice he can expect only the same reply. All that Anselm can add is that he so acts, because the will is the will. Thus there is a question for which the Anselmian agent has little reply –namely why pursue happiness rather than justice– but since pursuing happiness in this context just is the same act as pursuing happiness rather than justice there is no act for which the Anselmian agent has no explanation.

I should add hastily that I have spoken as though the two voluntates or affectiones are, for Anselm, on all fours but this is not so and that it is not so raises some tricky issues of Anselm interpretation. Anselm claims in *De Casu* ch. 12:

"... duo bona et duo his contraria mala usu dicuntur. Unum bonum est quod dicitur iustitia, cui contrarium est malum iniustitia. Alterum bonum est quod mihi uidetur posse dici commodum, et huic malum opponitur incommodum. Sed iustitiam quidem
Thus there is a clear asymmetry between the two voluntates and indeed Anselm says at the beginning of ch. 15 (S. 259) that:

**MAGISTER.** An putas aliquid esse quod additum eidem uoluntati temperat illam, ne plus uelit quam uelle oportet et expedit?

**DISCIPULUS.** Nullus intelligens nihil hoc esse putabit.

**MAGISTER.** Hoc credo satis animaduertis non aliud esse quam iustitiam.

**DISCIPULUS.** Nihil aliud cogitari potest.

Thus the agent who wills justice does not will against his own happiness but tempers his desire for happiness. He wants the appropriate beatitudo.¹

Anselm defines justice as "rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata" (De Veritate, ch. 12)² and he defines free choice as the "ability to keep justice for its own sake". He explains the keep" thus: (Schmidt 195)


²MAGISTER. Quoniam ergo nec solummodo uolendo beatitudinem, nec solummodo uolendo quod conuenit cum ex necessitate sic uelit, iustus uel in iustitiam potest apellari, nec potest nec debet esse beatus nisi uelit et nisi iustae uelit: necesse est ut sic faciat deus utramque uoluntatem in illo conuenire, ut et beatus esse ubi et iustae uelit. Quatenus addita iustitia sic temperet uoluntatem beatitudinis, ut et ressecet uoluntatis excessum et excedendi non amputet potestatem. Ut cum per hoc quia quo uelit beatus esse modum possit excedere, per hoc quia iustae uelit non uelit excedere, et sic iustae habens beatitudinis uoluntatem possit et debeat esse beatus. Qui non uolendo quod non debet uelle cum tamen possit, mereatur ut quod uelle non debet nunquam uelle possit, et
Quod autem 'seruata' dicitur, forte dicet aliquis:
Si rectitudo uoluntatis non nisi cum seruatur
dicenda est iustitia: non mox ut habetur est
iustitia, nec accipimus iustitiam cum illam
accipimus sed nos seruando facimus eam esse
iustitiam. Nam prius illam accipimus et habemus
quam seruemus. Non enim ideo illam accipimus nec
id circo illam primitus habemus quia seruamus; sed
ideo incipimus illam seruare quia accepirimus et
habemus. Sed ad haec nos respondere possumus, quia
simul accipimus illam et uelle et habere. Non enim
illam habemus nisi uolendo; et si eam uolumus, hoc
ipso illam habemus. Sicut autem simul illam habemus
et uolumus, ita illam simul uolumus et seruamus;
quoniam sicut eam non seruamus nisi cum illam
uolumus, sic non est quando eam uelimus et non
seruemus; sed quamdui eam uolumus seruamus, et
donec seruamus uolumus. Quoniam ergo eodem tempore
contingit nobis illam et uelle et habere, nec
diverso tempore in nobis sunt et uelle et seruare
illam: ex necessitate simul accipimus et habere
illam et seruare; et sicut quamdui seruamus habemus
illam, ita quamdui habemus seruamus; nec ulla ex
his generatur inconuenientia.

Thus to be just is to will to be just for its own sake and that is
just to keep justice for its own sake. When an Anselmian agent deserts
justice it cannot get it back unaided for since it has ceased to want justice
for its own sake if it came to want justice at all if could only be for the
sake of its happiness—but then it would not want justice for its own sake
and so would not be just. Once lost both justice and the will for justice
—though not the ability to keep justice for its own sake—must be
restored from outside.

Anselmian agents are motivated agents. I argued above that the
Anselmian agent has reasons for whatever is chosen and had the other
option been chosen there would have been different reasons in play.
There is something unusual left unexplained on the Anselmian account

semper tenendo iustitiam per moderatam uoluntatem nullo modo indigeat; aut si deseruerit
iustitiam per inmoderatam uoluntatem, ormi modo indigeat. (Op.cit., 258)
but it doesn't seem to be an action. It seems to be something more like an action under one description.

Anselm's two-wills doctrine was taken up and discussed by a long line of theorists in the Middle Ages—especially in the Franciscan tradition and once Aristotle's work with its clear statement of the competing model was available—and especially once it was championed by Aquinas and his followers—two-wills theorists were compelled to work out in some detail an account of how the intellect worked, how it was related to choice and what the causal structure of choice might be. Thus there grows up a tradition which is characterized by thesis which are precisely the denial of those I suggested earlier were characteristic of the First tradition, namely by .

A. The will is a self-mover
B. There is deliberation with respect to ends as well as means
C. The will has no necessary orientation towards the good

The full history of these claims has still to be worked out. I will confine myself here to discussing how they are handled by one of the key figures in the second tradition: William Ockham.

A. The Will is a self-mover

The shaping of Ockham's account begins it seems, with the late thirteenth century Franciscan theologian Peter John Olivi. As Bonnie Kent has argued, Bonaventure and his immediate disciples, though certainly unwilling to accept Aquinas' formulation of the relationship between intellect and will, nonetheless hesitated to break with the Aristotelian idea that the will was to some extent a passive power and that it was moved by the intellect. Olivi has no such hesitation. He writes:

Therefore the first thing in which Catholics differ from certain pagans and Saracens, namely that free acts are totally produced by the will or that free choice, or the will in so far as it is free, is totally an active power, should necessarily be maintained both according to the Catholic faith and according to right reason. For as is evident from the preceding question it is necessary that free choice may have the ratio of a first mover so that it is able to push and move and pull back itself and other powers and active virtues subject to it—and this not only when nothing is pushing it to the contrary, but also when there is something inclining to the contrary. Hence it is able to act against the inclination of its habits; otherwise the virtuous
would not be able to fall away from virtue to vice nor on the contrary [the vice-ridden turn to virtue].... Therefore the very essence of our liberty both according to faith and right reason calls us to hold evidently that the will insofar as it is free, is totally active.  

Professor Kent has emphasized that Olivi’s rejection of the view that the will is moved by another is part of an overall rejection of Aristotelian psychology. Olivi harkens back explicitly to Augustine. He follows Augustine in denying that any spirit can be affected by any material object and in claiming that our knowledge of material things comes from God’s movement (illumination) of our intellect. By rejecting the doctrine of abstraction, he rejects the view that the exercise of a power need be either efficiently or formally caused by its object. He is thus in a position to reject not only the view that the intellect moves the will to act but the view that the object of desire so moves it.

This he does, arguing that the object of volition is not in any way an efficient cause of the volition. Nonetheless, as Professor Kent has stressed, Olivi does not deny the object of volition any role in the volition; it remains as what Olivi calls a *causa terminativa*—which he locates in the genus of final cause.  

Thus on Olivi’s picture the will is a totally active power that moves toward some object as a terminating cause, but is not efficiently moved toward that object by anything outside itself. It is thus a self-mover in the strong Anselmian sense.

As Peter King points out, Duns Scotus seems to have been the first thinker to insist that the principle that everything moved is moved by another had to be restricted not just to corporeal substances but even further. As Prof. King stresses, Scotus argues that in a wide variety of cases a corporeal thing can move itself in virtue of there being in it some less than real distinction between two principles, one of which serves as the agent and the other as the patient, of the change. This is genuine self-motion since what is really the same thing moves itself but it is connected to the tradition that nothing strictly speaking can move itself.

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3 Primum igitur in quo catholici a quibusdam paganis et Saracensis dissentient, quod scilicet actus liberorum totiér potestas activa, est necessario tenendum tam secundum fidem catholicam quam secundum rationem rectam. Sicut enim ex praecedenti quæstione patet, necesse est quod possessio se et alias potentias et virtutes activas sibi subjectas impelli et movere et retrahere, et hoc non solum, quando nullum est impellens ad contrarium, sed etiam quando est ibi aliquid inclinans ad contrarium. Unde et potest agere contra inclinationem suorum habituum alter virtuosus non posset declinare a virtutibus ad vitia nec e contrario. Ipsa igitur essentia nostræ libertatis quan secundum fidem et rationem rectam oportet nos ponere clamavit evidenter quod voluntas, in quantum est libera, est totiér activa.  

by including a distinction (though not a real distinction) between the thing as mover and the thing as moved.

On the subject of the will itself Scotus seems to have begun with a position very like that of Peter Olivi but, after he returned to Oxford from Paris, seems to have moderated this position to grant the intellect a greater role in the determination of the will than Olivi would have allowed. In his Paris lectures Scotus insisted, as Olivi had, that the object of the will was in no way an efficient cause but was rather a cause sine qua non. For example he writes:

An object of apprehension is required for there to be a volition, however it is not required except as a cause sine qua non.1

II

Ockham is the heir to both Olivi and Duns Scotus. From the former he receives his picture of the freedom of the will and much of the associated metaphysical framework. From the latter he receives the view that Aristotle did not accept an unqualified form of OQM and that what he did accept can be reconciled with right reason and the faith. Ockham has no analogue of Scotus's discussion in his Questions on Metaphysics IX; rather, his views are scattered throughout his work. I will discuss them under two heads: 1) the freedom of the will, and 2) the omne quod movetur principle itself.

1. Ockham on the freedom of the will.

Ockham takes up the discussion of the freedom of the will in Quod. I q.16. There he first defines the freedom of the will:

I call 'freedom' the power by which I am able indifferently and contingently to hold (ponere) different things so that I am able to cause and not to cause the same effect there being no difference existing anywhere outside that power.4

Obviously to be free in this strong sense the will has to be an active power, and Ockham does claim that it is. Indeed on his account it is active in a very strong sense, for it is able to be in a given state for a period of time and then alter that state without any influence whatsoever from anything else. In response to the objection that no agent existing

4 "voco libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenteret et contingenter diversa ponere, ita quod possum eundem effectum causare et non causare, nulla diversitate existente alibi extra illam potentiam" Quod. I, q. 16 OT IX p.87.
for a period of time in essential potency to an act can alter itself in this way Ockham writes:

I answer that the assumption is true in natural agents whether they are corporeal or spiritual but there is an obvious counterexample in free agents of the sort the will is because the object can be cognized and present to the will and all the other requisites to the act of willing can endure through a time and yet afterwards [the will] is able to elicit \( (elicere) \) its act without any outside action and this because of its freedom. \( (Ibid\ 4) \).

And he concludes the discussion by claiming baldly:

to the principal [objection] I say that the same thing is able to be active and passive with respect to the same thing nor is this unreasonable \( (repugnat) \). \( (Ibid\ 4) \).

This is a direct rejection of the position explicitly endorsed in the previous generation by Thomas Aquinas's follower Godfrey of Fontaines and commonly attributed in Ockham's day to Aquinas himself. Ockham's position gives the will a very special place. Alone among kinds of agent both corporeal and spiritual, the will is able to move from potency to act without a "triggering" cause. This feature of the structure of the will is crucial to Ockham's account.

C. The will is not necessarily oriented to the good

The medieval tradition is fully aware that we use the word 'good' \( (bonum) \) in many ways. For example, Peter Abelard points out (in his \textit{Dialogus}) that we speak of a good thief and a good human being and that we admit that on the whole the better the thief the worse the human being.

We also have another use of 'good' as in 'good thing \( (bona\ res) \) according to which we compare for goodness across kinds—it is that use according to which we speak of a mangy dog as nonetheless better than the most perfectly formed rose and of the wickedest human being as better than both. One problem which an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of medieval ethical theories must face is that of sorting out and accounting for these uses. This task is complicated and one of the complications comes from the antique idea—apparently unquestioned in the Middle Ages—that in some sense 'good' and 'being' convert—so that goodness, at least in the sense in which we speak of good things, is
not a matter of qualities but a matter of essence. (It is this point to which Boethius devotes his *De Hebdomadibus*.)

If being and goodness convert and if *perfectus* hovers between a simple sense of complete and a 'value-added' sense then it is a short step to the thought that to aim at being is to aim at goodness. Boethius also argues that to aim at being is to aim at unity because each thing—to the extent that it exists—is unified. We thus find already in Boethius, what might be termed the 'classical' argument that to the extent that something tends toward its own completeness as a thing—that is its own unity and being—it tends toward goodness and the equivalent idea that if something tended away from goodness it would tend to its own destruction.

These are murky waters. There is first the issue of just how and why each thing tends toward its own completeness. There is second what I will call the *Principle of the Concomitance of all Goods*. This is the idea that true goods can never conflict. Something like this principle will be needed to explain how it is that a multitude of objects each aiming at its own completeness and unity do not 'naturally' get in each others way. This in turn will be a necessary (though insufficient) condition for it being the case that in aiming at its own completeness each thing can be said to be aiming at goodness itself or at the good of the whole universe.

**II. Final Causes**

Why couldn't something tend to its own destruction naturally? This seems to me one of the hardest problems what I might call a 'naturalized' natural teleology has to face. Within a Christian theological framework there need be no difficulty explaining why nothing in fact tends to its own destruction—the short answer is that that is the way God makes things. But the question whether God could make something which tended by nature to its own destruction is more vexed. It won't do to point out that such things would not long exist because that need not even be true—one might at least think one could imagine something which tended to its own destruction but which is prevented by other things from realizing that tendency for a long time—even long enough for reproductive success.

Ockham does indeed believe that the natural universe is ordered to a single end. I suggest that this ordering is precisely divine providence. But Ockham does not think that we could prove this by reason apart from revelation. As I read *Quod*. IV q. 1 Ockham is admitting that the faith requires us to believe that every effect has a final
cause properly speaking (*proprie loquendo de causa finali*) namely God—whose providential plan lies behind everything—but that if we simply followed reason we would not suppose so.

Rather it is only when a cause does not act of necessity that we have reason to ask why it acts rather than does not act.

Now it is central to Ockham's account of human choice that human acts of will are not necessary. But Ockham seems to go even further. Not only can we *nil* God because we falsely believe that God is an obstacle to our pleasure, it seems that we can be commanded by God to hate Him and forbidden by God to love Him. (*Quod III, 15*). In such a case we would have a motive from love of God to refuse (*nil*) him.

Now this case deserves careful attention. Ockham seems to believe that God could command us to hate him. But Ockham does not seem to think that we could obey such a command. Consider the case. To obey the command is to do what God commands us to do because God so commands it—in this case it is to hate God because God commands us to. Now in our actual present state right reason dictates that God is to be loved above all else and so God's will is to be carried out above all else. If that remains so in the imagined situation then right reason would then tell us to obey God's command to hate him that is to obey God's command not to obey God's command—a classic case of what Gregory Bateson used to call a double bind. Like "Ignore this command" it is a command which cannot be obeyed.

On the other hand we can suppose that God can so arrange that in the imagined situation right reason would dictate that God is not to be obeyed. Then we could indeed follow right reason and disobey God—but we could not do it because God commanded it—so we could not obey the command. But if to love God is to obey all of God's commands then here is a situation which God could create in which we would knowingly—indeed inevitably fail to love God (even refuse in some sense to love God) even though we have no false beliefs whatsoever.

There is much puzzling in this case but one feature may be especially interesting here. The situation just imagined is one Ockham thinks possible for us. But it is a situation in which we could not be moved by love of God as a final cause. In such a situation we could not love God. If God is indeed our final cause then here is a possible situation in which it would be impossible for us to attain our natural end. But the notion of tending toward the impossible is arguably incoherent. I venture that this by itself shows that it cannot be part of what it is to be
a human being that we have a natural end. (Consider an analogy. Suppose something is essentially rational—in the sense that s/he always does the rational thing—and that it is part of rationality that one not do an act which promotes ones ends less than an available alternative. Suppose God now announces that He will ensure that no rational act attains its end. Then nothing we might do would be the rational thing—so we cannot be essentially rational after all.)

Ockham seems to hold that the will can will directly contrary to right reason (O. Th VIII, 338). Indeed he seems to think that no reason whatever can be compelling for the will and (and the other side of the coin) that any reason whatever can serve the will as a ground for action. Does this make action arbitrary? Not so long as there is an answer to which acts of the will are acts of following right reason. So long as there is an objective standard for right reason the mere fact that the will has the power to follow it or not does not make what we do arbitrary.

We have come to a tangle I think it important for us to unravel. The tradition of which Anselm and Aquinas are members think that the objectivity of value claims must be grounded in natural teleology. Thus it is important for them that it turn out that things have natural ends. Indeed something stronger is required—since the objectivity of value judgments is not thought to be a contingent matter that natural things have ends whose promotion simply constitutes goodness is not contingent either. But Ockham separates these two issues. I agree fully with Prof. Marilyn Adams that Ockham recognizes objective metaphysical value which is not subject even to the divine will (God could not make it that this pen while remaining just as it is be nobler than Mother Teresa just as she is). But this recognition seems to me completely distinct from the question whether things have natural ends whose promotion is metaphysically good in this sense. We have seen that while Ockham does think that things have a final cause this is as a result of a free act of God's will and could have been not so. We have also seen that in our own case God could create circumstances in which the notion of our tending to our final end would not even make sense. So it can be at most a contingent matter that things tending to their ends is constitutive of (their) goodness. But it is not a contingent matter that there is will independent goodness.

God could have made things with no final cause at all and could have made it that the liberty of indifference promoted no end. So, I suggest, Ockham is in the end what we might term a modal radical in matters of teleology. He thinks that God has in fact set up a world which has the actual teleological features someone like Aquinas would