THE STOICS ON BODIES AND INCORPOREALS

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I

It was a widespread view in late antiquity that the Stoics maintained theses contrary to common conceptions—absurd, incomprehensible, or simply false. In other words, the Stoics were generally accused of having been guilty of incongruity, self-contradiction, and absurdity. Indeed some specific Stoic claims must have been particularly baffling for authors coming from the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, mostly because these sorts of tenets were in disagreement with some basic assumptions of such a tradition. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, correctly suggests that the tensional movement,
attributed by the Stoics to πνεῦμα, does not fall into the Aristotelian classification of χίνης.\(^3\) No doubt Alexander is right in noting this point because, according to Aristotle’s view, πνεῦμα’s movement would be neither substantial (generation/destruction), quantitative (increase/diminution), qualitative (alteration), nor locative (locomotion). Nonetheless Alexander’s attempt to reject the Stoic thesis of tensional movement on this ground is misleading. The fact that the tensional movement is not included in Aristotle’s scheme does not show that such a type of movement does not exist or that it is not possible to explain phenomena making use of an explanatory mechanism in which the tensional movement is crucial. It only indicates the impossibility of trying to grasp πνεῦμα and its properties with criteria which turn out to be useless for the assessment of such an entity that is for the most part described in our sources as moving “simultaneously inwards and outwards” (τοις τινα είναι χίνησιν περί τα σώματα είς το είσον άμα καὶ εἰς το ἔξω κινομένην).\(^4\)

I have cited and briefly commented on Alexander’s remark against the Stoics because I think that this type of criticism is representative of what we can find in the testimonies for early Stoicism, particularly in those sources hostile to the Stoics, such as Plotinus, Plutarch, Galen, and of course Alexander himself. Plotinus, for example, seems to be attacking the Stoic doctrine of principles when he says that if something is active and involves in some sense the characteristics of a form (or of an energeia), this something cannot be bodily or material. In other words, Plotinus cannot accept the Stoic thesis of the material principles\(^5\) for, as he puts it,

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\(^3\) Alexander seems to suggest this when saying “καὶ κατὰ τι εἶδος χινῆς γίνεται [that is, the πνεῦμα]; κατ’ οὖν γάρ οἷον τ’ έστι νοῆσαι τι άμα εἰς τα ἐναντία κινούμενον καθ’ αὐτό”; On mixture, 224, 25–7. On Aristotle’s distinction of the different kinds of χίνης, see Categories 14.15a13–14.

god for them [namely for the Stoics] is posterior to matter as well, for it is conceived as a body composed of matter and form. And where did it get its form from? But if he does not have matter, because of having the nature of a principle, that is to say, because of being reason (ἀφορμήτως ἄν καὶ λόγος), then god would have to be incorporeal, and the active would have to be incorporeal (ἀφομήτως καὶ ἰη διὸ θεός, καὶ τὸ ποίητον ἀφομήτως). . . . then, how could matter be a principle if it is a body?  

In fact, for Plotinus τὸ τίμιον, that which involves greater value, does not pertain to the sphere of the corporeal, since this is directly related to the material things that, as material, imply passivity and lack of form. Plutarch is in the same line of thought when arguing that if the Stoic god is neither something pure nor something simple but something composed, he must be dependent on something else (for the Stoics, matter, in being simple, involves the features of a principle). By contrast, the Stoics held that only corporeal things have a

5τὸ ποιοῦν θεός; τὸ πάροχον ἀφοιος ὑνία, ἑλῃ. Both principles are assumed to be bodies. For evidence see Diogenes Laertrius 7.134–5 (SVF 1.85, 2:299, 2:300; LS, 44B, 45E, 50E). In Diogenes Laertrius 7.134.17 (H. S. Long’s text, Diogenes Laertii Vitae Philosophorum [Oxonii: Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, 1964]), I read οὐκόματα, following MSS. Both von Arnim (SVF 2:299) and H. S. Long read οὐκόματος following the Suda lexicon. This reading puts forward philological as well as philosophical problems. As noted by Jaap Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium: Critical Observations on a Recent Study,” Mnemosyne 31, no. 2 (1978): 162–3 and 169, it is likely that οὐκόματος is an anticipation of οὐκόματος, which is said of the principles as well. von Arnim’s reading (followed by Robert B. Todd, “Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics,” in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978], 139–43) goes against a number of testimonies maintaining that, according to the Stoics, a real cause is what is bodily. Indeed, god is a cause. The new edition of the Diogenes Laertius text by Miroslav Marcovich, Diogenes Laertii Vitae Philosophorum (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1999) gives οὐκόματα following the MSS. On this point, see LS 1:273–4, who argue in favor of the reading οὐκόματα on the ground of strong philosophical reasons.

6See Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 26, 11–17 (SVF 3:315; the same remark occurs at Ennead 2.9. 1). The passage is quoted following the text established by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwzyer, Plotini Opera (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).


real causal power with respect to other things. It seems to me that this thesis contains an implicit and serious attack on the Platonic and Aristotelian view according to which forms and ends are not only the real causal factors but also the items that especially deserve to be called causes, at least if they are compared to the material things whose causal agency is primarily restricted to the domain of necessary conditions.9

Among the ancient authors there was a wide acceptance that the Stoics were the champions of the idea that the corporeal is the essential hallmark of the existent.10 According to the Stoic orthodoxy, something is actually real if it is corporeal. Thus, the Stoic philosophers did leave aside the Platonic and Aristotelian ontology which gave the intelligible the highest place in the hierarchy of beings, and they did so by maintaining that only what is corporeal is capable of acting or of being acted upon.11 The Stoics are also said to have developed a complex theory of incorporeals (ἀσώματα), “somethings” which, albeit nonexistent in a strict sense, are subsistent.12 But if the


things truly existent are bodies, what role do incorporeals play in Stoic ontology? Why did the Stoic philosophers consider it necessary to put forward a strict distinction between the corporeal and the incorporeal in their world’s explanation, an explanation so strongly dominated by the thesis that only the bodily beings are real? These are some of the questions this paper intends to answer.

In the first part, I shall begin by making reference to some Ancient interpretations of the Stoic doctrine of incorporeals. At this point I hope to show that some views on Stoicism held by authors like Proclus, Plutarch, or Alexander are misleading, mostly because either they take incorporeals to be secondary realities (bodies being the primary ones) or because they raise their objections to Stoic claims starting from quite a different conceptual scheme. Although the view that incorporeals are inferior realities would seem to be plausible (and in fact this view has been accepted by conspicuous contemporary scholars), I shall endeavor to demonstrate that this sort of interpretation is not consistent with Stoic philosophy as a whole and that, accordingly,

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11 As David Hahn points out, the characterization of body as what is capable of acting or of being acted upon does not appear in our sources as a theoretical definition but it is always presupposed in a number of arguments as a distinctive aspect of what is a body. See his The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977). 3. See also Cicero, Academicus (SVF 1:90; LS, 45A), Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 8.263 (SVF 2:363; LS, 45B); Tertullian, On the Soul, chapter 5; Nemesius, On the nature of man 21, 6–9; Diogenes Laertius 7.5 (SVF 2:40), 7.55 (SVF 2:40; LS, 33H); Seneca, Letters 106, 2–7 (SVF 3:84).

incorporeals can plausibly be thought to be of such a kind that they turn out to be essential in accounting for bodily things as well. Second, and following this line of thought, it will be suggested that bodies and incorporeals are complementary terms. At this point my argument will be that bodies and incorporeals serve to complement each other in the sense that one cannot exist without the other. Thus, between σώματα and ἄσωματα there seems to be a reciprocal dependence. Finally, in the last part some key passages of Stoic physics and ethics (in which the mentioned dependence can be corroborated) will be examined and I shall provide arguments to clarify the corporeal/incorporeal issue in Stoic philosophy.

II

The four species of incorporeals (λεκτόν, ἄενόν, τόπος, χώνος) are listed by Sextus Empiricus.13 As already indicated, due to their “physicalism,”14 the Stoics made corporeality the essential clue of the existent, of the real. Yet if the existent in the strict sense consists of bodies, one can legitimately raise doubts about the role (if any) incorporeals play in the Stoic account of reality. Some ancient authors have assumed that incorporeals must have a dependent way of being, and for this reason they were thought to be “subsistent.” This was Proclus’s view. He maintained that the Stoics made time a mere thought, insubstantial and very close to the nonexistent. This is so, Proclus goes on to argue, because time is one of the incorporeals, which are despised by Stoics as being inactive, nonexistent, and merely subsistent in mind (ἐν ἐπινοίας ὑφιστάμενα ψήλας).15

In spite of what Proclus says, I do not think that the Stoics regarded incorporeals as secondary or dependent “somethings.”16

13 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218.
15 See Proclus, On Plato’s Timaeus 271D. I agree with LS 2:304, that “nothing in reported statements of Stoic philosophers justifies Proclus’s reduction of time to a mere thought.” According to Long and Sedley, Proclus may have been influenced by some doxographical formulations as Sextus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.277: “ἀοίματον τι καθ’ αὐτὸ νοούμενον ἐπιστήμων τὸν χῶνον.” A very similar formulation occurs at Adversus Mathematicos 10.218 (SVP 2:301; LS, 27D).
Neither do they seem to have assumed that incorporeals should be despised because of being inactive and nonexistent. The difficulty raised by Stoic philosophers is that, even though place, time, void, and sayables\footnote{Nonetheless, this is what Andreas Graesser seems to think when pointing out that “in Stoic usage the Greek language equivalent to our ‘subsist’ clearly signifies what may be called a subordinate or rather dependent mode of existence, one that is distinct from being real in the sense of being tangible and thus capable of acting and being acted upon.” See Graesser, “The Stoic Theory of Meaning,” in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 89. Long (“Language and Thought in Stoicism,” 90) seems to imply the same thing in saying that “hyphestanai hyphistasthai expresses a state subordinate to that denoted by hyparchein or einai.” It is true, as Graesser observes, that an incorporeal like a lekton is not real in the sense of being tangible. As I hope to show, however, it does not follow from this that “the lekta are not something in the world”; Long, “Language and Thought in Stoicism,” 80. In analyzing the Stoic theory of categories or genera of being, Graesser appears to imply the same thing. See Andreas Graesser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und Probleme (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1975), 18–23.} are incorporeal, they turn out to be fundamental to constitute the realm of the existent. The case of time is especially suggestive: despite being an incorporeal, time is a necessary condition for the constitution of objective reality (by “objective reality” I mean the realm of the corporeal things, the set of objects that constitute our “objective experience”). There is a passage in Clement of Alexandria, in a context that is supposed to be Stoic in character, where time is shown to be a cause in the sense of a necessary condition.\footnote{I follow LS (section 33) in rendering lekta as “sayables.” For recent discussion on the difficulties involved in translating the term lekton and its philosophical implications in Stoic philosophy, see Frede, “The Stoic Notion of a lekton,” especially 110–19.} In this text Clement says that time is that which offers the notion of the conditions without which the effect cannot be produced (ό δὲ χρόνος τῶν ὅν οὐκ ἄνευ λόγον ἔτεχε),\footnote{Clement, Stromateis 8.9.25, from Clemens Alexandrinus. Stromata. VII und VIII, ed. Otto Stählin and Ludwig Früchtel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1970), (SVF 2:346). Indeed it would be inconsistent to speak of time as a species of causality because, as suggested above, if a factor is a cause of another one, such a factor must be corporeal. Actually, evidence that time is a cause is scanty and Clement’s example is, as far as I know, the only source which takes time to be a kind of causality.} This is specially applied to the case of learning: the father is a preliminary cause (προκαταρχηκτῶν αἴτιων) of learning, the teacher the synectic cause (συνεκτικῶν αἴτιων), the natural disposition to learning is the auxiliary cause (συνεξογόνων αἴτιων),
and time, finally, is the necessary condition of the learning process. Here it is suggested that learning, because it is a process, is supposed to imply a certain duration. In other words, if learning is understood as a process, it requires a before and an after: a before in which the individual has not yet learned and an after in which the individual has already learned. If one seeks to establish a coherent account of this phenomenon, one has to take into account time, because learning involves a process that is only understandable in time which, despite being incorporeal, measures motions or shifts of corporeal things in orderly sequences.\(^{20}\) However, this does not resolve the aforementioned inconsistency, according to which time cannot be considered a cause in the strict sense because of being incorporeal. It could be suggested, though, that Clement is making reference to a very general use of the word "cause," one of the Stoic uses of the term.\(^{21}\) Following Clement’s line of thought, according to which “if something is a ‘because of which’ (ὅτι ὁ ὅ) it is not in all cases also a cause” (“in the strict sense,” I would add),\(^{22}\) one could think of time as being a cause just in the sense of a “because of which.” As a result of the fact that time is an indispensable requirement for the explanation of any phenomenon in the material world, it is a “because of which” cause inasmuch as it gives assistance to the constitution of the existent, that which, in the strict sense, is a cause.

Therefore, despite the fact that time is incorporeal, it is, like the other incorporeals, a necessary condition for the existence of bodies. All existent things must exist in a place; but in addition to this it is impossible to establish causal relations among things if there is no time, that is to say if there is no factor capable of setting the before and the after of the possible combinations among the existent things, so that it can be possible to determine, for example, that A in \(t_1\) is a cause of B

\(^{20}\) Chrysippus is said to have posited the basic distinction between time as the dimension of motion, according to which the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of, and time as the dimension “accompanying the world’s motion”; Stobaeus, *Excerpta* 1.106, 5–9; see *SVF* 2:500; LS 1:304.

\(^{21}\) See Frede, “The Origina

\(^1\) *Notion of Cause,* 1.22–1 and Stobaeus, *Excerpta* 1.138, 14–23, who clearly attributes this wide sense of cause both to Zeno and Chrysippus. As Ioppolo puts it, “to say that the cause is ‘that because of which’ means to know what the thing is in its generality but without capturing its essential feature”; “Il concetto di causa,” 4526.

\(^{22}\) *Stromateis* 8.9.27.3, 1–3 (*SVF* 2:347).
in \( t_2 \). Although time does not seem to fit into the more orthodox characterization of cause (for it is not a body), it is the factor which allows us to establish a relation of causality, a relation for which the temporal component is essential for distinguishing what the cause and the effect are. Time, as incorporeal, appears to have an intermediate position between that which is absolutely (body) and that which is nothing (time being a something for it is different from nothing). Regardless of time being incorporeal, we should not conclude, as Proclus does, that time is something purely mental and only subsistent in the mind.\(^{23}\) The Stoics also introduced the notion of “being present” or “being there” (\( \nu\pi\alpha\alpha\xi\epsilon\nu \)): time, insofar as it is an incorporeal something, is subsistent; but according to a subtler distinction, the past and the future only subsist (\( \nu\phi\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon \)), while the present is there, that is, exists in some way.\(^{24}\) I suggest, then, that, in Stoic terms, there is no existent which, in order to be what it is, can exist without time.

The same thing can be said about void and sayables: singular objects (the existents) cannot exist unless they are in the domain of specifically defined spatial-temporal relationships. There is a passage in Sextus Empiricus that might confirm, at least partially, my hypothesis that there must be a relationship of complementarity between bodies

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\(^{23}\)The expression “nonexistent” should be understood in two senses: (a) in the technical Stoic sense that something (as time or void) does not exist but subsist, and (b) in the common sense that something does not exist in any way. The confusion between (a) and (b) is probably the one that Proclus has in mind when attacking the Stoic position. I am indebted to Ricardo Salles for urging me to clarify this point.

\(^{24}\)See Stobaeus, Excerpta 1.106, 5–23 (SVF 2:509; LS, 51B). However, according to Chrysippus, no time is wholly present (\( \epsilon\nu\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\iota \)). There is no present in the strict sense, although broadly it can be called such. The expression “to be present,” “to be there” (\( \nu\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota \)) can be properly applied to the present; by contrast, the past and the future merely subsist (\( \nu\phi\pi\eta\epsilon\tau\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\iota \)). For a very clear and persuasive discussion of this passage, see Frede, “The Stoic Notion of a \( \lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\)”, 117–18, whose translation of \( \nu\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota \) as “being present,” “being there” I am following. It would be convenient, it seems to me, to avoid rendering \( \nu\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota \) as “to be real” (as David Sedley does in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Kenimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 398). According to Sedley, the point of Chrysippus’s remark with regard to the present is “to make it a special kind of incorporeal.” That is probably true but the present is already an incorporeal and, as such, it is not “real,” at least in the sense of something fully existent. Whatever the case may be, the language in the case of the incorporeal time is very misleading and extremely hard to render.
and incorporeals. In effect, he quotes\(^{25}\) the Stoic distinction between ὅλον and πᾶν, and notes that, in accordance with the Stoics, the world is a whole (ὅλον) whereas the external surrounding void together with the world is an all (πᾶν). Clearly what is involved here is that the void (one of the incorporeals) does not subsist without the world, which is of course a body. Yet the world does not exist without void. Therefore, neither the world nor the void can be what they are except in close connection. Sayables (λέγειν) also play a crucial role in the constitution of the real and corporeal world, for one of their basic functions consists in establishing the logical-linguistic relations which permit us to categorize the object, so that we can know it. To be sure, for the Stoics there is a crucial difference between saying (λέγειν) something and uttering (προφέρεσθαι) it: sounds are uttered (or “pronounced”) but things or the states of affairs (τὰ πράγματα), which indeed are sayables, are said (λέγεται).\(^{26}\) It is obvious from this passage not only that for the Stoics sounds are uttered and meaningful things (or simply “meanings”) are said (because they are lekta) but also that if a corporeal thing X is something to a human, it must be meaningful, and X is significant if and only if it is analyzed through the logos.\(^{27}\) So sayables are clearly important in the constitution of the material world for a human being. A sayable, as the significant intention of the discourse (whether this is a true or false proposition, or a complex argument) plays a relevant role in the Stoic psychology of action, too. According to the evidence, the structure of the Stoic psychology of action is described as having the following steps: the first one is the presentation (φαντασία), which in the case of the human being is expressed through articulated language. The presentation is followed by an assent (συγκατάθεσις) which is the act of accepting such a presentation as true.\(^{28}\) Finally, when one gives assent to the proposition expressing the content of a presentation, the assent becomes an impulse (δύναμις) for action. This accounts for the fact that, as Stobaeus reports, “all the impulses are assents.”\(^{29}\) The relevance of sayables can be seen more clearly when looking into the Stoic thesis


\(^{26}\) Diogenes Laertius 7.57 (LS, 33A; compare *SVF* 2.149).

\(^{27}\) For a clear discussion of the Stoic distinction between “saying” and “uttering” see Catherine Atherton, *The Stoics on Ambiguity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 283–4.
that there is no rational action in the strict sense unless there is an intermediate process of “rational evaluation” between presentation and action itself. The capacity of expressing in words the contents of presentations is a typically human feature for, as Diogenes Laertius says in reporting Stoic doctrine, the human thought is capable of

28 The sequence presentation-aspent-impulse is reported by Cicero, Academica 2.24–5; this testimony is confirmed by Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1057A (SVF 3.177; LS, 538) and partially by Diogenes Laertius 7.49. Seneca, for his part, offers the sequence presentation-impulse-aspent (Letters, 113, 18) but his evidence is isolated and does not fit into the orthodox explanation. However, when explaining how anger is produced Seneca appears to go back to the supposedly orthodox account. In fact, he says that anger (ira) is set in motion by a presentation (species) received of a wrongful act (injurio), and suggests that anger does not follow immediately without the involvement of mind giving assent to the presentation (On anger 2.1.3). Seneca is probably rendering the Greek synkatathesis (“assent”) with the expressions “accedents animus” or “animus adprobans” and “phantasia” with species. For a detailed discussion of the topic see Janine Fillion-Lahille, Le De ira de Sênèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions (Paris: Klincksieck, 1984), 164–6; Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 42–101, and “Seneca and Psychologcal Dualism,” in Passions & Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially 164–80; Ana Maria Ioppolo, “Presentation and Assent: A Physical and Cognitiw Problem in Early Stoicism,” Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 444, and more recently, “L’òmì ἡ πλεονάζουσα nell’attribuzione della passione,” Elenchos, 1 (1995): especially 49–54, where she examines the assent in the case of the passionate person; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 75–85; A. W. Price, Mental Conflict (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 146–7, 153. I agree with Richard Bett that “it is hard to accept that there is any sense in which impulse precedes assent.” See his review of Annas’s Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, in Ancient Philosophy 14 (1994): 195–6, where he argues against Annas’s suggestion (Mind, 97–8) that the Stoics use the word impulse in both a broad and a narrow sense.


30 Diogenes Laertius 7.49.
expressing (διάνοια ἐξάλλωσιν), and communicates with language that which it experiences due to the agency of presentation.\textsuperscript{31}

In all these cases the core function of a sayable seems to be both to articulate and to give meaning to the reality through the discourses in which existents are expressed or accounted for. In other words, incorporeals cannot be despised (\textit{pace} Proclus) since they are necessary conditions for understanding the existents. To be sure, it is through language, which involves a connection between thinking and reality, that we articulate reality in such a way that it is significant to us. The fact is that the (incorporeal) meaning of something can be only conveyed by words (which are corporeal); indeed, words are indispensable for the expression of a sayable (namely a proposition or an argument). Thus words and meanings never appear separately. Sayables, despite being incorporeals, are somethings that enable us to establish the connections between ourselves and the universe, utilizing the \textit{logos} through which we articulate reality.\textsuperscript{32} Incorporeals, then, are not placed on a level lower than bodies because we cannot fail to include incorporeals as part of what constitutes and accounts for the objective reality, that is, the corporeal reality. The Stoic standpoint seems to be that although incorporeals are inexistences (and therefore they are "unreal"), they are yet indispensable conditions that make up the reality of the corporeal. In this sense incorporeals occupy an intermediate position in Stoic ontology: because they lack body, which gives an objective reality to beings, they are incorporeal. However, at

\textsuperscript{31} At this point I am assuming (without argument) the orthodox position according to which the Stoics distinguished the psychological states of non-rational animals from those of rational animals. Salient holders of this thesis are Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions," in Frede, \textit{Essays in Ancient Philosophy}, 151–76 (especially 152–70); Inwood, \textit{Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism}, 73–5, and LS I:239–41. For the other interpretation (that is, that the Stoics are not taken to hold that perceptions of animals are completely devoid of propositional contents) see Richard Sorabji, "Perceptual Content in the Stoics," \textit{Phronesis} 35 (1990): 307–14, and more recently, \textit{Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate} (London: Duckworth, 1993), 20–8.

the same time they have the status of "somethings" because they are different from absolute nothing.

It has been suggested in recent years that "it is apparent that in the Stoic philosophy the term 'incorporeal' is a cause of embarrassment and that further analysis of the question of time might increase their perplexity."\textsuperscript{33} The same suggestion is repeated later when Tzamalikos says that "for Origen incorporeality and reality are not incompatible ontological realities, as they virtually are for the Stoics."\textsuperscript{34} As far as I can see, this scholar gives no arguments to prove the alleged Stoic embarrassment with regard to incorporeals and, as far as I know, there is no evidence that the Stoics have regarded their incorporeals as embarrassing to their ontological scheme. Tzamalikos's opinion may be understood once one realizes that this scholar believes that for the Stoics incorporeality and reality are incompatible ontological statuses.\textsuperscript{35} If Tzamalikos's assumption concerning the term incorporeal is correct (\textit{quod non}), the role of incorporeals in physics and ethics would become inexplicable. However, from the distinction between \textalpha\textit{πινον} and \textalpha\textit{ρια} and between the adjectives in \textalpha\textit{νον} and \textalpha\textit{νον} (in both the spheres of physics and ethics respectively) it becomes plain that incorporeals not only play a relevant role but also they are not incompatible ontological realities, that is to say, their status as incorporeal is not at odds with the "real" things. I have briefly quoted this interpretation of Stoic incorporeals because this type of explanation is paradigmatic of what I take to be misleading when trying to account for the relation between \textalpha\textit{ν} and \textalpha\textit{ν} \textit{ν} within the sphere of Stoic ontology. Tzamalikos's view on Stoic incorporeals is very similar to that of Proclus and, as I have said above, I cannot find evidence for this sort of interpretation.

There is another piece of evidence (in the domain of Stoic dialectic) which should be briefly commented on for it might be useful to throw light on the issue. In a well known passage Sextus suggests that the Stoics seem to have made an interesting connection between the discussion of the problem of truth and ethics.\textsuperscript{36} Sextus says that,


\textsuperscript{34} Tzamalikos, "Origen and the Stoic View of Time," 553.

\textsuperscript{35} The issue of Stoic "embarrassment" is repeated again later (see "Origen and the Stoic View of Time," 554).

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes} 2.81–3 (\textit{SVF} 2:132; LS, 33P); see also Sextus Empiricus, \textit{Adversus Mathematicos} 7.38–45.
according to the Dogmatists (that is to say, those who systematically maintain positive theses on different topics).  

the true (ἀλήθεια) is different from the truth (ἀλήθεια) in three ways: in substance (ὁνομα), in constitution (συστάσει), and in function (δυνάμει). The Stoics considered that the true in substance is an incorporeal (ὁνομα μέν. ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἀφώματον ἐστὶν) because it is a predicate taking part in a discourse (it is a sayable). The true, understood in terms of a property of the proposition, turns out to be an “incorporeal quality” pertaining to the genus of lekta, but the truth is a body (namely, something corporeal) since it is knowledge declaratory of all true things, and knowledge is conceived of as the commanding part of the soul in a certain condition, the commanding part being a body (for it is breath, pneūma, in a certain state). In constitution the true differs from the truth since the true is something simple (like “I am talking”), and the truth consists of the knowledge of many true things. Finally, in function the true differs from the truth since the latter always exists within the sphere of knowledge and, therefore, it just belongs to the virtuous person. The true can also exist in the base person, since such a person can say something true but the truth is related to the mental disposition proper of the wise person and such a mental disposition (that is, knowledge understood in terms of the commanding part of the soul disposed in a certain way) is a body. In this case it is also clear enough that for the Stoics the true/truth distinction involves a concern which is not only epistemological but also ethical. The mentioned distinction implies crucial connotations in the field of ethics and it is helpful to understand the rigid Stoic differentiation between the wise and the base person: to account for the epistemic state proper to the wise person (“knowledge”; episteme) and that to the base or “inferior” person (“opinion”; doxa) one has, once more, to presuppose incorporeals as well as corporeal somethings.

As indicated above, in order to speak of a body or of a series of bodies related by order of occurrence, we must always posit certain temporal, locative, and linguistic determinations and, in general terms, a number of factors connected with what the Stoics used to

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57 In this passage the Dogmatists Sextus is referring to are the Stoics.

58 Sextus, Pyrrhonianae Hypotyposes 2.81: “ὥ δὲ ἀλήθεια σώμα ἐστι γὰρ ἑπιστημή πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀλοφαντική.”

59 For a complete discussion of the distinction at issue see Long, “Language and Thought in Stoicism,” 98-104.
call "the incorporeal." On this ground it is possible to argue that between bodies and incorporeals there is a relation of reciprocal dependence. This proposal, it seems to me, helps to clarify at least two points: first, the reason why the Stoics think it is necessary to include incorporeal things in a strongly corporealistic ontology. Second, this interpretation may help us to understand why the Stoics did not talk about incorporeals as "ways of not being in an absolute sense," as Plutarch misleadingly suggests. In fact, in Plutarch's opinion, "it is absurd and at odds with the common conception to say that something is but is non-existent."40

It is obvious here that Plutarch is putting emphasis on the Platonic doctrine of μὴ δὲν in the sense of "an absolute non-being."41 But this way of interpreting the issue, I contend, would not have been accepted by the Stoics. The absolute not being (like ἐννοήματα, for instance) would be a nothing, not an incorporeal.42 Concepts (ἐννοήματα) and ideas (ιδέα) are figments (φαντάσματα) of the soul that neither subsist (a distinctive feature of the incorporeal) nor are somethings.43 Despite Plutarch's view, and as far as I can see, there is no evidence to suggest that the early Stoics have maintained that incorporeals are "not beings," that is to say ways of not being in an absolute manner. What seems to be suggested in Stoic sources is that incorporeals "are not" or they "are nonexistent" in the sense that they are not bodies. However, the fact of not being a body does not imply not being absolutely.

40 See On common conceptions 1073D (Harold Cherniss's translation, Plutarch's Moralia). Indeed Plutarch's remark is in agreement with the confusion (noted above, note 23) on the two senses of "nonexistent."

41 See Plato, Sophist 258d-259b.

42 See Alexander (reporting Stoic doctrine), On Aristotle's Topics 359, 14-16 (SVF 2:329; LS, 30b): "εἴ γε τὸ μὲν ἐν κατὰ τοῦ ἐννοήματος ὁ δὲ τί κατὰ μόνον σομάτων καὶ ἀσομάτων τὸ δὲ ἐννόημα μηδέπερον τούτῳ κατὰ τούς ταύτα λέγοντας."

This section will concentrate on some specific Stoic texts that show the way incorporeals work in the different parts of philosophical discourse. Thus I shall be examining some key passages in which bodies and incorporeals display the character of complementary terms. First, my discussion will focus on Stoic physics. I shall begin by considering the presumably Stoic distinction between αἰτία (“cause” or “cause in the strict sense”) and αἰτια (“causal account”) and offer an interpretation that makes consistent that distinction with a theory of causality, according to which the bodies alone are capable of bringing about something or other on another bodily thing. Second, I intend to explore the meaning of two important distinctions in the domain of Stoic ethics: “being happy” (an incorporeal) and “happiness” (a body), on the one hand, and the adjectives with the verbal suffix -τον and those with the verbal suffix -τεον, on the other hand. The issue has been debated at length and scholars do not agree on the true meaning of these distinctions. The main passages on this point are collected in the summary of Stoic ethics by Stobaeus, who is generally thought to be quoting Arius Didymus’ ethical doctrines. In this context we will also refer to the topic of impulse and assent and will see how incorporeals work in the Stoic account of impulse, the impulse being that which goes intentionally toward what each one takes to be good. Following the intended line of argument, for each of the passages under consideration I shall endeavor to show the relevance of the corporeal/incorporeal distinction in the explanation as a whole, and offer some brief conclusions.

44 The sense of the adverb “presumably” is explained below in note 53.
45 In my judgment, by far the best discussion on the Stoic notion of causality continues to be Frede’s; see “The Original Notion of Cause.” A good abstract of the topic can be found in Jean J. Duhot, La conception stoicienne de la causalité (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Brin, 1989), 87–100. See also the penetrating and more philosophical remarks by Maximilian Forschner, Die stoische Ethik. Über den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System (Die stoische) (Darmstadt: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1995), 85–97, and Ioppolo, “Il concetto di causa,” 4494–523.
The issue that is not under dispute in our sources is that, for the Stoics, the truly existent things are bodies. Zeno maintained that the principles of all things are the active and the passive, and in saying this he implies that all that is existent is either active or passive. This also


appears to be suggesting that anything which does not have these characteristics must necessarily be nonexistent. The existent/non-existent difference can be clearly seen in the theory of causality, where a strict terminological distinction of the words meaning "cause" is noted. In Plato and Aristotle the Greek terms αἰτία and αἴτιον were used indistinctly. However, according to Stobaeus' testimony, Chrysippus asserted that aitia is the formula, an enunciation or account (λόγος) of a cause (αἴτιον). In other words, we are told that an αἰτία is a propositional item which is related to that which, strictly speaking, is a cause: a body. An αἰτία is not a cause in the strict sense because of being a propositional item; and if it is a propositional item it will be an incorporeal. In fact, a proposition is an incorporeal. However, according to the orthodox doctrine nothing incorporeal can be a cause.

It is true that Stobaeus' passage is quite brief and gives no details of what the aitia/aition distinction probably meant. Jaap Mansfeld rejects the relevance of this distinction on the ground that in some passages aitia is given as one of the names used by Chrysippus for fate (εἰμικαμένη), others being ἀλήθεια, φύσις, and ἀνάγκη. In a passage where Galen is reporting doctrines supposedly Stoic, Mansfeld goes on to argue, aitia and aition are used promiscuously and in a passage of Plutarch's, an alleged (although not necessarily) verbatim quotation of Chrysippus, the term aitia appears twice (and not meaning λόγος τῆς αἰτίας). To sum up, according to Mansfeld, the words aitia/aition are indistinctly used. At first glance Mansfeld's remarks seem to be persuasive; but at any rate, the following should be noted. First, Galen's text is a very hostile passage where he is trying to show the absurdity of the Stoic thesis of synectic cause (συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον; συνεκτικὴ αἰτία); if this is so, we cannot assume that what he is saying is what the Stoics effectively intended to say. To be sure, in the Galenic passage there is no difference between aitia and aition, and Galen uses both terms as meaning the same thing, but the fact that he does not take the distinction for granted is not very significant because he does not accept the sort of causation he is criticizing (the

49 Diogenes Laertius 7,134 (SVF 1:85); Aetius 1,3, 25 (SVF 1:85).
50 Timaeus 28a4–5; Philebus 26e; for Aristotle, see Physics 2.3.
52 Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.79, 1–20 (SVF 2:913; see LS, 55M).
synectic cause), either. Second, there is another place where Galen
tells us that there is clearly no difference between saying the word
“cause” either in feminine or in masculine gender.\footnote{See Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium,” 157. Frede (“The Original Notion of
Cause,” 223) accepts the distinction as Stoic and holds that although the dif-
ference between \textit{aition} and \textit{aitia} (that is to say, causes, on the one hand, and
reasons and accounts, on the other hand) was not generally accepted, the dis-
\section*{Synopses of the Books on Pulse} (SVF 2:994).

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\textit{Gottlob Kühn (Berlin: Gnobloch, 1821–33; reprint, Olms: Heldesheim, 1964–5): “Εὐνήμων δ’ ὅτι διαφέρει μηδὲν ἡ ὅρθρως εἰπεῖν οἰτίας, ἢ οὐδετέρως οἰτία.”}
same way does not account for the distinction which Stobaeus explicitly attributes to Chrysippus. It is not impossible that, depending on the context, Chrysippus would have made wider use of the two terms. Perhaps this distinction might be a peculiar technical usage which, although it could be acknowledged by authors like Plutarch and Galen (cited by Mansfeld), should not be necessarily admitted. I would suggest that while making this distinction Chrysippus was thinking of something like this: when you say “the sun warms the stone,” you are uttering the “causal account,” the propositional item describing the fact or event caused by the aition and, eventually, the truth of the proposition describing such fact or event. Such a causal account does describe the phenomenon of temperature’s increasing which acts upon the stone, and the increased temperature is produced as a result of the sun’s caloric energy, but the cause in the strict sense (causio) is the sun (a body) acting upon the stone (another body). The cause (the sun) and the caused object (the stone) are bodies; on its part the effect (“being hot”) is, as the orthodox Stoic doctrine on causality requires, an incorporeal. Thus the sun (a body) becomes the cause to the stone (another body) of the incorporeal predicate “being hot.” But if this is so (as it is), the effect is a predicate, an incorporeal. If the effect is a predicate, the difficulty of how to analyze the causal processes whose result is the production of new entities arises. Such a difficulty probably led some Stoics to think that the effect is a predicate as well as an entire proposition such as “a ship is built.” Such a proposition becomes true as a result of the shipbuilder’s activity.

One could wonder why a distinction between cause (a body) and causal account (an incorporeal) should be put forward in a strongly

57 The example of the sun is taken from Sextus, Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes 3.14, who probably has the Stoics in mind in writing: “the sun or the heat of the sun is cause of the wax melting or of the melting of the wax”; translation by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

58 The other example, also collected by Sextus, is that of the scalpel: a scalpel (which is a body) is a cause to the flesh (another body) of the incorporeal predicate “being cut.” See Sextus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.207–11 and Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes, 3.14, with Jonathan Barnes’s remarks in his “Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 2671–2.

corporalistic ontology like the Stoic one. I would offer for consideration the following conjecture: according to the basic Stoic ontological classification, the first and highest genus is “the something” (τὸ τί), in which bodies and incorporeals are included.\textsuperscript{60} If my approach—that bodies and incorporeals are necessary components of reality and that between them there is no one component more important than the other—is correct, one might draw the conclusion that incorporeals should somehow play a role even in the sphere of the doctrine of causation. The causal account (αἰτία), despite not being a cause in the strict sense, is relevant for the whole causal account insofar as it is the means through which a determined causal event can be expressed by language, and thus through which the object can be grasped. On the other hand, it should be noted that the cause/effect relationship is closely related to the process of knowledge. For the human being the first contact with the world is through the senses; they offer the material aspect of knowledge. Although the soul (or rather “the commanding part of the soul”; τὸ ἴδεμονίζον) is like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon,\textsuperscript{61} there are “ingrained or implanted preconceptions” (προδότιμες ἐμφύτευ) as well,\textsuperscript{62} which are natural rational components whose function is to determine and to help interpret the stuff provided by the senses. According to Diogenes Laertius’ report, for the Stoics a preconception is a “natural conception of the universal things” (or simply “universals”; ἐννοια φυσική τῶν καθόλου).\textsuperscript{63} The function of preconceptions in the Stoic theory of knowledge seems to have been searching for and finding out a new knowledge.\textsuperscript{64} Possessing the

\textsuperscript{60}Compare Alexander, On Aristotle’s Topics 301, 19–25 (SVF 2:329; LS, 27B) and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218 (SVF 2:331; LS, 27D).

\textsuperscript{61}Aetius 4.11 (SVF 2:83; LS, 39E).

\textsuperscript{62}Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1041E (SVF 3:69; compare LS, 60B).

\textsuperscript{63}See Diogenes Laertius 7.54. Sometimes Chrysippus is said to have held that prolepsis is, along with aisthesis, the criterion of truth. The issue is quite complicated and I do not intend to discuss it here. For a very detailed and clarifying account see Gisela Striker, Essays in Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–76 (see especially 57–68).

\textsuperscript{64}Clement, Stromateis 6.15, 121, 4–5 (SVF 2:102); Cicero, Academica, 2.26 (SVF 2:103); Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1037B (SVF 2:129; LS, 31P).
general notion of the distinctive characteristics of an object allows us to search for a more accurate knowledge of such an object. Human reason is completed from our preconceptions during our first seven years of life. With the full development of reason\textsuperscript{65}, the ability to discriminate in conceptual terms and the relation among things is stressed, and this relation can be expressed more accurately. The cause/effect relationship is not left out of this process: if we want to have a full understanding of the causal relationship, we are to make the aition/aitia distinction, so that the true causal agent can be distinguished from the causal formula that makes intelligible a particular phenomenon by the agency of the articulated language. Moreover, as indicated above, in the Stoic account of causality the effect is a predicate, a sayable. Thus predicates are closely involved in the causal explanation of a bodily entity; in this sense, we should accept that sayables (one of the canonical incorporeals) are quite “real” and they do not depend on the human mind for their subsistence.\textsuperscript{66} In sum, both aspects, the logical/linguistic and the strictly causal one, are indispensable for accounting for anything which can be explained in terms such as “A is the cause to B” or “between A and B there is a causal relationship.”

As we have already said, in the sphere of Stoic ethics the corporeal/incorporeal discrimination also appears, and in this domain it is highly relevant as well. In this context the Stoic thesis that the truly real is corporeal also played a distinctive role. In the Stoic sources we find the following argument: if quality is “matter disposed in a certain way” (as, according to the Stoics, it is)\textsuperscript{67} and if the substance of a thing can be compared to the material constituent of an object (and the qualities of things must be themselves corporeal), the different states of the soul (namely virtues, passions, impulses, assents, and so forth) are to be corporeal, too.\textsuperscript{68} Virtue is the soul (or, more accurately, its commanding part) disposed in a certain way. Once the material char-

\textsuperscript{65} When the person is fourteen; see Diogenes Laertius 7.55-6 (LS, 33H); Stobaeus, Excerpta 1.48.8, p. 317, 21-4 (SVF 1:149).


\textsuperscript{67} See Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 29; Plutarch, On common conceptions 1085E.
acter of the soul has been shown, it follows that the affective states of
the soul must be so, too. In fact, the states pertaining to the realm of
emotions or feelings (such as shame and fear) become evident in
one’s face.\(^{69}\) Since there is neither action nor change that can take
place without contact, states of the soul, as well as the body, have to
be capable of acting or of being acted upon. Soul, then, shares its af-
fections with the body. This picture largely describes the Stoic corpo-
realism, but even in Stoic ethics the corporeal/incorporeal relation
was significant.

According to Stobaeus’ evidence, Chrysippus and his followers
held happiness (εὐδαιμονία) to be a goal or a target (σκοπός), while
the end (telos) is attaining happiness (τυχεῖν εὐδαιμονίας), which ac-
tually is the same as being happy (εὐδαιμονεῖν).\(^{70}\) Like Aristotle, the
Stoics used to hold that there was an end (“an ultimate object of de-
sire”) for the sake of which the other things should be done, that is,
being happy. As a matter of fact, according to the Stoics just being
happy is the end (telos), for they take happiness and being happy to be
two different things. Unlike Aristotle, who had used telos and skopos
interchangeably to make reference to the end,\(^{71}\) the Stoics distin-
guished two kinds of finality.\(^{72}\) Attaining happiness is the end, the

\(^{68}\) For evidence see Plutarch, On common conceptions 1084A; Seneca,
Letters 102, 2–7; 113, 7–11. See also Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions
1042E–1043A, where the thesis that goods are perceptible is explicitly attrib-
uted to Chrysippus.

\(^{69}\) Nemesius, On the nature of man, chap. 2, p. 21, 6–9, reporting a Stoic
doctrine.

\(^{70}\) Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1–5; 25–7 (see LS, 63A); see also Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus Mathematicos 11.30, and Diogenes Laertius 7.88 (LS, 59f).

\(^{71}\) Politics 7.13,1331b30–4. Note that in 1331b31 (“For sometimes the
goal is rightly proposed [ὁ μὲν σκοπός ἐξεταί καλὸς] but in practice men
fail to attain it”) the language is the same as we find in the Stobaeus Stoic ex-
tract (Excerpts 2.77, 25: “happiness is proposed as the goal”; τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμο
νίαν σκοπόν ἐξετάσαμα), but in Aristotle’s case there seems to be no
difference between skopos and telos. See also Rhetoric 1.5.1360b4–7.

\(^{72}\) See Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1–5 and Damianos Tsekourakis, Studies
in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag
GMBH, 1974), 107–8. Galen, an extremely hostile critic of the Stoics, none-
theless accepts the Stoic distinction between goal and end. The goal of med-
icine, Galen says, is health; its end is having health (see De sectis 1, Scripta
Minora 3,1, quoted by Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early
Stoic Ethics, 108).
effective achievement of happiness, possessing happiness in the sense of fully having it. Attaining happiness is the end in terms of our overall telos, “that for the sake of which everything is done but which itself is done for the sake of nothing,” “the ultimate object of desire (τὸ ἐνχριστὸν τῶν ὑστερῶν), that to which everything else is referred.”

Each one is concerned not actually with happiness as a goal (skopos) but with happiness in the sense of the effective achievement (telos). We are happy just when we have effectively reached happiness. On the other hand, happiness understood in terms of a goal (skopos) can be regarded as an object external to the virtuous activity; it is the body set forth or proposed which the human beings aim to attain, that which I should pursue as an agent to be really happy. But the end as the virtuous activity itself is the achievement of the intended goal; actually it is the ultimate object of desire, to which all the others are referred. According to the Stoics, then, we aim at being happy, not at happiness, which is our immediate goal.

As is obvious, the distinction underlying the difference between goal and end is the ontological distinction between corporeal and incorporeal. While a skopos (expressed by a noun: “happiness”) is a body, a telos (expressed by a verb or, in the Stoic jargon, by a predicate: “being happy”) is an incorporeal. The expressions “living” (ζητήν) and “being happy” (εὐδοκίμων) used in Stoic definitions of end (telos) were considered predicates. This can be verified by considering some Stoic passages, and is confirmed by the Stoic thesis that the

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73 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 16–17 (SVF 3:16; LS, 63A); 76, 22–3.
74 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1–3.
75 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.76, 22–3.
76 In Adversus Mathematicos 2.61–2 Sextus reports that a certain Ariston, “friend of Critolaus,” maintains that “persuasion is set up or proposed (ἐκπαιδεύασι) as the goal (συνοπτικός) of rhetoric, whereas its end (τέλος) is the attainment of persuasion” (τὸ τιμητικὸς τῆς πεποιθοῦς). See Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 25–7 (SVF 3:16; LS, 643A), where the same language is used in distinguishing between happiness (the goal) and the attainment of happiness (the end). Certainly this Ariston is not the Stoic Ariston of Chios (the terminology is too technical for him and presupposes a theory of predication first attested for Chrysippus). The evidence is not certain enough for assuming that this Ariston is the Peripatetic philosopher Ariston of Ceos, either. Perhaps the Ariston mentioned by Sextus is a third one, maybe a student or colleague of Critolaus in the Lyceum around 150 B.C. (I am grateful to Stephen A. White for this suggestion).
77 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.78, 7–11; 2.86, 5–7; 2.97, 15–98, 6.
end consists in “living according to virtue” or in “living consistently.” In both cases the end in the strict sense turns out to be a predicate, an incorporeal, not the thing itself but the agent’s attaining the thing. The goal can be set up before the agent, but in practice he can fail to achieve it; so the agent is not happy unless he or really attains the end. The goal’s being set up before one does not suffice for being happy. This is a good case against the purely nominalist interpretation which holds that Stoic incorporeals are inferior realities, since in the Stoic account the last object of desire is a predicate, an incorporeal something, not a corporeal one.

The second point to be discussed here is related to the Stoic distinction between the verbal adjectives -τον and -τεον (such as αἰγετέον and αἰγετέον). It is true that in none of the extant fragments which have come down to us and are commonly attributed to the first generation of leading Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus) does the contrast between the verbal adjectives -τος and -τεος explicitly occur. However, such a contrast is frequently presupposed in the Stoic accounts of the psychology of action and is closely connected with the already mentioned distinction between skopos (a body) and telos (an incorporeal). As a matter of fact, in the Stoic canonical definition of end attributed to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, such a distinction is explicitly referred to and sometimes it is taken for granted. So I shall take the mentioned distinction as belonging to the older Stoics.

78 Stobaeus, Excerpta 2. 77, 18–19 (SVF 3:16; LS, 63A).
79 See Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics, 104.
80 Stobaeus, Excerpta, 2.77, 16–27 (SVF 3:19; LS, 63A). Certainly the evidence is controversial: according to Galen, Chrysippus thinks that terms such as “to be chosen” (haireteon), “to be done” (poieteon), “to face with confidence” (tareteon), and “good” (agathon) refer to something different (Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 7.2. p. 436, 30-3, in Galen on the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 3 vols., edited, translated, and commentary by Phillip De Lacy [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1978–84]). Later (7.2, p. 438, 5–6, ed. De Lacy) Galen says that, in accordance with Chrysippus, only the good itself (to ἀγαθόν αὑτό) is to be chosen (αἰγετέον), and done (ποιεῖτεον), and faced with confidence (θυγγητεον). Plutarch, on his part, attributes to Chrysippus the thesis that “the good is choiceworthy” (τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰγετέον), which seems to fit into the doctrine we find in Stobaeus, Excerpta 2.97, 15–98, 6. What is uncontroversial is the fact that for the older Stoics “to be happy” is a predicate (not a body) since it consists in “living according to virtue” or “living consistently,” which is the same as “living in accordance with nature” (see the first reference to Stobaeus cited at beginning of this note).
In what follows some of the most representative passages (included in Stobaeus’ excerpt of Stoic ethics) are fully quoted; then, a brief commentary is offered to show the body/incorporeal thesis at work.

1. They say that what is worth being chosen (αἰσθέτον) and what should be chosen (ἀξιώματον) are different. What is worth being chosen is every <good>, while what should be chosen is every beneficial act (δοφελήμα), which is considered in relation to having the good. This is why we choose what should be chosen; for instance, “acting prudently”, which is considered in relation to having prudence. But we do not choose what is worth being chosen, but if in effect <we do it>, we choose to have it.81

2. Among the correct acts (ματοθοματα), some are included in what is necessary <to do>; others are not included.82 Among what is necessary are the beneficial acts, which are predicates, such as “acting prudently and with moderation.”83

3. They say that just as what is worth being chosen and what should be chosen differ, so too what is worth being desired and what should be desired, what is worth being wished and what should be wished, what is worth being accepted and what should be accepted differ as well. For goods are what is worth being chosen, wished, desired <and accepted, whereas benefits are those things which should be chosen, wished, desired> and accepted, since they are predicates, which lie alongside the goods. For we choose things that should be chosen and wish for things that should be wished, and desire things that should be desired. Certainly, choices, desires and wishes are included among predicates, such as are impulses, too. By contrast, we choose, wish and similarly desire having goods; this is why goods are not only what is worth being chosen and wished but also are what is worth being desired. For we choose having prudence and moderation, (τὴν γὰρ φρονήσειν αἰσθήματα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην) but not acting with prudence and moderation (οὐ μὲ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν), which are incorporeal, that is to say predicates.84

These three passages are closely linked from a thematic point of view. They are also a good example of the three parts of philosophical discourse at work. Although one can assume that the main subject of these texts is ethical (due to the fact that they are within an allegedly ethical context), there are crucial elements of Stoic physics and logic, too. In fact, the Stoic thesis that the truly real are bodies

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81 Stobaeus, Excerpta 2.78, 7–11.
82 That is to say, some acts are mandatory and other acts are not mandatory.
83 Stobaeus, Excerpta 2.86, 5–7.
84 Stobaeus, Excerpta 2.97, 15–98, 6 (SVF 3.19; LS, 33J).
and the doctrine of *lekta* is present here. If one did not take these points into account, this piece of evidence would be difficult to interpret. The evidence is indeed hard and there is no agreement about the way it should be understood.\textsuperscript{85} The last lines of the third passage are really puzzling. It is hard to understand clearly what is the difference between “having prudence and moderation” and “acting with prudence and moderation,” since one might think that you cannot act with prudence and moderation if you are not in possession of prudence and moderation. According to the Stoic position, we choose what should be chosen, “to be happy” (*eudaimonein*), a predicate. The direct object of our choice is the goal which is “proposed” or “set up before” us, a body. By contrast, the ultimate object of our choice is “to act with prudence and moderation” (a predicate), namely that for the sake of which everything is done but which itself is done in view of nothing. In other words, we actually choose what should be done, “acting prudently,” an incorporeal predicate.

If one concentrates on the distinction between -*tos* and -*teos* adjectives, it is easy once more to realize that it deals with the ontological difference between things or bodies and predicates or incorporeals. The above cited passages show goods and prudence (a virtue) as suitable examples of something which is worth being chosen (goods and prudence, as any other virtue, are bodies).\textsuperscript{86} Virtue is a body insofar as it is the commanding part of the soul disposed in a certain way and, as every good, it is worth being chosen, desired, and so on. A beneficial act, on the other hand, due to its being a predicate and adjacent to the goods, should be chosen. The notion of ὁφέλημα involves some difficulties. In fact, owing to its being adjacent to the goods (which by definition are bodies) and happening just to virtuous people, it sometimes suggests that it is a sort of “correct act.”\textsuperscript{87} But in other cases, like the one we are commenting on, a beneficial act is characterized as a predicate and, albeit adjacent to the goods, it continues to be incorporeal (at this point we can again clearly see the *lekta*, under the form of predicates, at work in the explanation of the difference between good and beneficial act). While the adjectives with the suffix -*tos*, then, are used to indicate the thing as something

\textsuperscript{85} For a full discussion and philosophical interpretation see Enghberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis*, 25–35.

\textsuperscript{86} Stobaeus, *Excerpts* 2.57, 20–2.

\textsuperscript{87} Stobaeus, *Excerpts* 2.101, 7–9.
desirable, something worth wishing for, and so forth (that is to say, to indicate the immediate or direct object of desire, wish, choice, and so on), the adjectives in -teos will make reference to the action itself. What should be chosen, desired, or wished for are the beneficial acts: acting prudently, moderately, courageously, and justly. This is so because what should be chosen, wished, desired is what produces action in the practical context. Predicates, which are incorporeal, in some cases do not express an actual state of the world but in other cases certainly do express an actual state of the world (for instance, "to be a prudent person" said of the Stoic wise person). In general, however, it must be said that predicates are incorporeal because they are lekta. Once more it is clear enough, it seems to me, that even in the domain of the Stoic account of action we could constitute neither our personal world nor the objective world without taking into consideration the bodies and the incorporeals working together. The actual world is not real to us unless we evaluate it with incorporeals and, more accurately, with the sayables. Incorporeals appear again playing a central role since they are crucial items for assessing the information given by the things affecting our perceptive capacities. Once we have evaluated this stuff, we have to put it in place and time, so that it becomes a "real" object.

IV

I am aware that giving definite conclusions on the corporeal/incorporeal issue in Stoic philosophy is, if not impossible, at least quite difficult. My conclusions and inferences are at best tentative. The conjectural character of our assertions on ancient Stoicism is sometimes justified due to the state of the extant remains. Indeed, our attempt to reach an accurate account of Stoic doctrines is always thwarted by the scanty and frequently confusing evidence. In spite of this, it seems to me that it is possible to be sure about the fact that the issue concerning the existent/nonexistent relationship appears to be functioning all the time in Stoic philosophy. Thus it is necessary to

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88 In this last sentence I am following Pedersen's line of thought (The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 31). However, although provocative, his suggestion that "phronetikos will be most appositely translated 'becoming (as opposed to being) phronimos'" seems to me an over-interpretation.
read the ὄντα-μὴ ὄντα distinction as a whole in the different parts of the philosophical discourse (physics, logic, ethics), and not simply as a point belonging just to physics. In this sense I would venture to say that, on the Stoic view, we should seriously consider existents and nonexistents in all the fields of research, and that these must be understood as working together. If my approach is right, it might be easier to understand why the Stoics were so proud of the coherence of their philosophical system. They are said to maintain that there should be a close connection among the parts of philosophy, since if one changed a single letter the whole system would fall down. 

It may be objected that my general proposal regarding bodies and incorporeals is rather radical since if it is true, the Stoic ontology resembles that of Plato. Thus, according to this objection, bodies appear to be not substantial entities—they do not exist by themselves but they need incorporeals to be what they are. I do not think that this consequence follows necessarily because the Stoic incorporeals are within this level of reality—they are immanent in the corporeal world. Thus there is no room to compare incorporeals to Platonic Forms. For Plato, Forms are causes of and ultimately responsible for sensible things. For the Stoics, I contend, there are no real things without incorporeals nor incorporeals without real things. This is not the case with sensibles and Plato’s Forms.

My primary purpose in this paper was not to reach secure conclusions regarding the true sense of the bodies/incorporeals issue in early Stoicism, but rather to provoke discussion in a field of research that has been interpreted in a number of different ways since antiquity (which surely proves how misleading it was for generations of philosophers and interpreters). I have tried to answer the basic question of whether Stoics held incorporeality (ἄσωματα-μὴ ὄντα) and corporeality (σώματα-όντα) to be incompatible ontological domains (as both some ancient and modern authors have maintained). My answer, as is obvious, is “no” because, as I hope to have shown, for the Stoics reality is the result of the combination of bodies and incorporeals. There is no break between the two levels of reality. I think that the Stoics would agree that incorporeals without contents are empty, and bodies without incorporeals are blind. This is the way in which a human

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80 Cicero, On Ends 3.74. For further evidence see Diogenes Laertius 7.40 and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.17–19.
being is able to know and to categorize the world: by joining two realms which, in order to exist, must be linked to each other.\footnote{The initial work on this paper began while I held a research fellowship from Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Argentina) as a visiting researcher at the Department of Philosophy of Georgetown University (1994–95). The final version was done thanks to an appointment to the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D. C., as a Junior Fellow in the academic year 1999–2000. I am grateful to the directors, Deborah Boedecker and Kurt Raaflaub, for their permanent support and encouragement. I am especially indebted to Richard Bett, whose detailed and acute remarks helped me to avoid a mistake. I would also like to thank Maximilian Forschner and Ricardo Salles for their criticism and concern. I read an abridged version of this paper at Departamento de Filosofía, Universidade de Brasília, Brazil, in December 1996. I benefited from comments of the audience in Brazil and especially from an observation by José Gabriel Trindade Santos. Responsibility for errors remains my own.}