

VOICES OF DISSENT IN THE IRAQ WAR: MOVING FROM DEVIANCE TO LEGITIMACY?

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Using indexing theory as a framework, this content analysis of 2003-2007 Time coverage explores the range of dissenting voices of the war in news dialogue. Findings show that war criticism remained constant throughout the years and was largely targeted toward the Bush administration. While most dissent originated from official sources, American and Iraqi civilians did have space to voice their dissatisfaction. Journalists themselves became increasingly vocal in their condemnation of the war. These results suggest that clashes between public opinion and official perspectives have implications in news coverage and promotion of debate about current affairs.

During times of war and national crisis, citizens “rally around the flag” and tend to support their leaders.¹ Mainstream media serve as central agents in this process by giving voice to the administration in power and ultimately aligning publics with elites.² Indexing theory suggests that media coverage will mirror “the range of official debate” rather than encompassing dissident voices residing outside the realms of traditional power centers.³ But as initial support of a crisis fades, do voices of dissent become a broader part of mainstream news dialogue? Further, if dissent is voiced, who is allowed to speak in this legitimized mediated arena, and whom or what are they allowed to criticize?

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 serves as an interesting backdrop from which to answer these questions, particularly considering the dramatic shift in public opinion over the first five years of the Iraq War. Journalists’ discourses are very powerful in defining war and conflict, and the way reporters and editors choose to tell the story is pivotal in the public’s interpretations of this type of event. It has been posited that journalists are unlikely to challenge government narratives when policies enjoy broad support but will incorporate more dissent when consensus is lacking.⁴ The longitudinal design of this study tests this proposition.

The media outlets play a crucial role in the process of constructing public understandings, through collecting, framing, and distributing information—a key market commodity.⁵ Government officials and high-

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ranking military sources understand the importance of positive news coverage toward war as a means for winning the public's support.⁶ Leaders place great value on controlling this commodity, and during the recent conflict in Iraq, 600 journalists were *embedded* into the front lines and rear echelon unions before and during the war.⁷ Ultimately these embedded reporters became propagandists for the war, outdoing the Pentagon and the Bush administration in spinning the messages.⁸

In May of 2003, not long after the Iraq invasion on March 20, a Gallup poll found that 79% of Americans thought the Iraq War was justified.⁹ However, by June 2005, a Washington Post/ABC News poll reported that nearly 60% of Americans believed the war should not have been fought,¹⁰ and by December 2008, 50% strongly felt the war in Iraq was not worth fighting.¹¹ The Iraq War has been deemed as unpopular as the Vietnam War, but the more remarkable fact of the Iraq War was how quickly public support faded for the war efforts.¹²

The current study proceeds using a theoretical framework grounded in the indexing hypothesis, which posits that during times of crisis, mainstream media outlets serve as mouthpieces of the political elite and silence voices of dissent that differ from officials' viewpoints.¹³ The research also considers, however, whether mainstream news coverage allows more critical voices to speak over time and as support overwhelmingly shifts away from war. Using articles from *Time* magazine from the start of the Iraq invasion and for the next five years of occupation, this content analysis examines the voices of dissent within the texts, asking who critiques whom and what in the coverage. In doing so, it explores the extent to which dissenting voices gain space in mainstream dialogue.

Theoretical Context and Literature Review

News media have infused their influence in nearly every aspect of public opinion, from domestic to international issues.¹⁴ Journalistic outlets have an important role in shaping public perceptions about significant political and social issues,¹⁵ and critical approaches emphasize journalistic discourses' power to manufacture and distribute beliefs and construct meaning.¹⁶

Journalists' role during wartime arguably becomes more important, as people are not able to personally witness the news for themselves.¹⁷ How news media frame issues during war becomes essential to how people understand the conflict. Framing is a process of highlighting, packaging, and retelling the story, which results in constructing a reality from the selections and, in the process, also increases its saliency.¹⁸ Because news is a socially constructed product, the cognitive simplification of framing over time produces ideologies in society.¹⁹ Further, among the variety of ways in which journalists' texts frame news is through sources, which have a dominant effect in shaping content.²⁰ Past research shows that sources actually determine the contour of the news reports more than journalists.²¹ Sources perform such an integral role in framing a story that Sigal stated, "News is not necessarily what happens, but what a news source says has happened."²²

Not all sources, however, are treated or relied upon equally. Journalists typically depend on routine contacts from traditional sources, which usually means elected officials and various bureaucrats.²³ In other words, elite and official sources frame the news. This occurs because it benefits the news organizations' economic interests and allows journalists to perform their duties within the framework of news norms, values, and routines.²⁴ In addition, official sources are often easy to access, and information they deliver is often timely.²⁵ This access, along with deadline pressures, pushes journalists into using these "information subsidies" even when suspect. Compounding the problem, when these sources consistently voice the same message and opinions, the tendency to quote them—and, in turn, the overall story frame—becomes even stronger.²⁶ By consistently selecting these official voices to be on record, journalists are systematically excluding other viewpoints.²⁷

Indexing Theory. Bennett's "indexing hypothesis" explains that journalists tend to represent political issues from the variety of perspectives of those in power.²⁸ This means that while there may be various viewpoints reproduced in the news, journalists tend to mirror a "balance of power" within the assortment of policy positions or the "range of official debate."²⁹ Mainstream news reporters thus generally rely on government officials' perspectives and reflect levels of "consensus and conflict" expressed by officials on a given topic. Indexing theory explains the narrowness of viewpoints in the news as officials' public statements, in essence, "regulate the discursive parameters of coverage."³⁰ It also aids in explaining why dissenting voices are nearly absent in news, as opinion outside of this official debate—particularly voices in opposition—find little space in mainstream media discourse.

Researchers have found evidence to support the indexing hypothesis,³¹ however, others have not.³² Althaus³³ and Entman³⁴ have both argued indexing theory portrays the press as more dependent on official voices than is illustrated in reality. An analysis of media coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis showed journalists reported news stories that were independent of perspectives from U.S. officials, introduced oppositional viewpoints from outside the U.S. government, and overall included statements that did not mimic the official voices in Washington as indexing theory would predict.³⁵ The independence was identified through sentence-level content analysis and suggests more micro-level research might be needed.

This research joins discussion about the validity of the indexing hypothesis and considers ways in which the theory might be nuanced and amended. In particular, we were interested in three sources of dissent in news stories of the Iraq War: official sources (government and military, American and Iraqi), civilian sources (American and Iraqi), and journalists' opinions that disagree with administration views. Based on indexing theory, we expect to find official sources favored.

Voices of Dissent. War dissenters are frequently framed in news media as radical groups whose voices are marginalized and undermined.³⁶ Often portrayed as groups who are simply against the war

for its sheer violence without taking into account national security, anti-war voices tend to be situated negatively in news media. Anti-war voices stand at the bottom of the media's hierarchy of legitimate political actors, with little access to shaping news, extremely limited influence, and easily falling into a "sphere of deviance."³⁷ Thus, both the object of their criticism—what exactly they are criticizing—as well as their own voices as subject of such critique—the source—tend to be ignored or neutralized.

Additional studies have indicated a "protest paradigm" through which protest activity is commonly framed in ways that "marginalize," "delegitimize," or "demonize" dissent, its subjects, and its objects.³⁸ Among the most common ways news media undermine anti-war voices is through a focus on the appearances of dissent as a spectacle and by marginalizing the viewpoints of those who challenge the dominant perspectives.³⁹

This study considers who journalists allow to voice dissent and whom and what these sources are authorized to critique. Journalists rely on official sources, but considering public support about the war waned, we hypothesize:

H1: Official sources will comprise a larger proportion of dissent than either civilian sources or journalist opinion in *Time* coverage of the Iraq War.

Consensus and Disagreement over Time. Research has offered inconsistent support to indexing theory. Niven offered one explanation, suggesting two mitigating factors: the political climate and the costs and benefits journalists face in constructing stories that challenge government and military elites. In the post-9/11 United States, the political climate likely influenced how journalists covered foreign policy.⁴⁰ Studies have shown that, historically and consistently, major U.S. media outlets have supported the early stages of the government's foreign policy decisions and shown reluctance to challenge such policies.⁴¹ This initial support is especially important because it is often during a time when public opinion is still not well-informed and there has not yet been a foundation of attitudes about the policy.⁴²

The media's heavy dependence on official sources, ideological factors such as patriotism, fear of undermining the war effort, and fear of disrespecting troops who risk their lives are reasons argued for why news media are timid in highlighting dissenting voices.⁴³ For instance, during the first Gulf War, U.S. mainstream news media failed to serve the public by not supplying information from diverse sources or providing viewpoints that countered the support for the war.⁴⁴ In an analysis of the *Washington Post*, most of the reported stories during the same war contained supportive viewpoints and had then-president George H.W. Bush as the main source.⁴⁵ A more recent examination of network news coverage of the second Gulf War illustrated that official voices dominated network newscasts accounting for more than 60% of all sources, and only 3% of the U.S. sources were anti-war.⁴⁶

Initially, in the Iraq War a consensus of government and military elites supported action against Iraq. More than two-thirds of the House of Representatives and more than three-quarters of the Senate voted in favor of the Iraq War resolution, but public opinion later split,⁴⁷ as did support in Congress for President Bush's war policy. According to Niven, when consensus breaks down, journalists will feel less constrained and more likely to include voices of dissent, as the costs of challenging the government position are lessened under disagreement. To investigate the possibility that indexing theory is mitigated by these factors, we examined coverage longitudinally with these research questions:

RQ1: With each continuing year of the Iraq War, will the voices of dissent by American civilians targeting the war efforts increase, decrease, or remain stable in *Time's* coverage of the war?

RQ2: With each continuing year of the Iraq War, will the voices of dissent by American military targeting the war efforts increase, decrease, or remain stable in *Time's* coverage of the war?

RQ3: With each continuing year of the Iraq War, will overall criticism about the war increase, decrease, or remain stable in *Time's* coverage of the war?

Anti-terrorism rhetoric playing on Americans' residual fears from the 9/11 attacks dominated much of the early coverage of the Iraq War. Studies illustrate that both *Time* and *Newsweek* contributed to linking Iraq and terrorism by using graphics and images to invent a connection between the two.⁴⁸ An analysis of 386 stories from the Associated Press and eight U.S. newspapers found that coverage of pro-war and anti-war rallies from the pre-war State of the Union to the "Mission Accomplished" photo opportunity demonstrated that news articles delegitimized anti-war events as opposed to pro-war events.⁴⁹ Similarly, most news stories about the war highlight military happenings on the battlefield and allow government officials and spokespersons the single voice.⁵⁰ Research also shows that other voices that form the framework of war stories are weak—with victims of war and alternative viewpoints forming the weakest of all voices.⁵¹

Accordingly, this study also aims to identify changes in the circumstances when these voices were circulated in *Time*. Thus:

RQ4: Throughout the years, what changes and trends, if any, exist in terms of:

- (a) the subject of condemnation?
- (b) the object of condemnation?

Methods

This study uses data from a content analysis, a research technique that aims to quantitatively analyze the meaning and characteristics of any message that allows extracting inferences from it.⁵²

The analysis included all stories about the Iraq War published in the print edition of *Time* magazine since the beginning of the Iraqi invasion in March 2003 and the following five years. News magazines offer a unique source of news information, as the publications are circulated weekly, typically giving journalists more time for crafting a story after an event has occurred. These publications may serve as a kind of news digest—“compressing, recapitulating, elaborating upon, and sometimes even critiquing the other news outlets of a previous week,”⁵³ while at the same time taking advantage of more in-depth reporting and more space to develop a broader array of sources than in news outlets dealing with daily or multiple-per-day deadlines.

With a circulation of 3.3 million, *Time* is the most widely read national publication of news in the United States.⁵⁴ A flagship of news magazines in the United States, it represents the national media agenda.⁵⁵ Its weekly news cycle allows for the in-depth analysis and reporting particularly relevant for the purposes of this study, making *Time* a publication that theoretically might have more diversity of sources, as the pressures of time are not so much a constraint as, for example, in a daily newspaper. This theoretical positing allows for a possibility of a greater set of source data than might appear in the usual choice of sources in daily deadline-driven news outlets. Further, *Time* is widely distributed around the world, with multiple international editions, and is one of the major U.S. news organizations with several correspondents in Iraq and surrounding countries since the war began. Thus, *Time* magazine was equipped with the journalistic and financial means to be able to provide strong coverage of stories from Iraq. Focusing on one publication allowed for a more thorough microanalysis.

The analysis was conducted in two steps. First, a Time.com search helped identify all the stories mentioning Iraq and any of the words “war,” “invasion,” or “occupation” published between 2003 and 2007. After collecting 406 stories and following Althaus’ suggestion of micro- and sentence-level analysis,⁵⁶ we coded and evaluated each condemning assertion, which served as the unit of analysis ($N = 1,609$). We defined “condemning assertion” as any statement, cited or otherwise, that noticeably reproached, censured, or expressed complete disapproval with the events related to the war in Iraq and held responsibility while identifying responsible subjects.⁵⁷ Three people, including two of the authors, coded the stories for date, issue, authors, the absence or presence of condemnation, the source of the assertion (or “subject”: Iraqi official, Iraqi civilian, American official, American civilian, American military, other civilians, world leaders/UN, journalists/media, and other) and the object (who or what was condemned: terrorists/Saddam Hussein, Bush administration, Iraqi military and police, new Iraqi government, American military, and other).

Having multiple coders, we used Cohen’s *kappa* to measure inter-coder reliability.⁵⁸ Preliminary measures ranged from .74 to .99. After fix-

TABLE 1
Comparison of Voices Criticizing the Iraq War, 2003-2007

Subject of Criticism	2003 (%)	2004 (%)	2005 (%)	2006 (%)	2007 (%)
Iraqi Civilians	25.0	14.2	12.7	12.3	9.9
Journalists	19.1	20.9	21.9	35.2	38.5
U.S. Officials and Politicians	17.7	28.9	15.8	10.5	17.8
U.S. Military	10.1	11.0	19.8	23.7	17.7
U.S. Civilians	8.8	6.9	8.1	5.5	5.2
Iraqi Officials/Military	5.8	6.7	8.6	5.5	5.2
Other*	13.5	11.4	13.1	7.3	5.7
(Valid Cases)	(328)	(677)	(193)	(219)	(192)

* "Other" includes world leaders and the United Nations; officials, military, and civilians from other countries; insurgents and militia members; scholars and experts; human rights advocates; and international aid workers.

ing some conflicting instructions and adjusting some of the categories, the reliability improved and ranged from .89 to .99, based on 15% of the sample.⁵⁹

For the sake of easy comparisons, a breakdown by year informed the analysis. Given that we compiled a census of all published stories discussing the war in Iraq in a five-year period, inferential statistics were not necessary for the analysis.

On average, 83% of the stories had some kind of condemnation, a percentage that remained constant during the five years under study. President George Bush himself and his administration were the most common object of the condemnations (41%), while the most vocal critics were American officials and military (33%), followed by the media and journalists (27%), and Iraqi civilians (15%).

Thus, as predicted by **H1**, most of the criticism came from official voices. Still—further supporting **H1**—civilians from both the United States and Iraq voiced 23% of the criticism in *Time*. Thus, the range of debate still focused mostly on traditional power centers—even when it came to criticizing the war. While there was space for dissent, journalists' reliance on official sources allowed elites to dominate this debate as well.

A year-by-year analysis (see Table 1) helps to answer **RQ1** and shows that the "regular people" became less vocal over the years, and their criticism lost prominence as the war progressed. Iraqi civilians gradually lost their voice in *Time*, whereas the criticism by American civilians had two peaks, one in 2003 and one in 2005. In contrast, a group that became louder about their concerns with the Iraq War were media professionals themselves, whether they were the reporters writing the stories or journalists from other news outlets cited by *Time*, in

Results

TABLE 2
Comparison of Objects Criticized Regarding the Iraq War, 2003-2007

Object of Criticism	2003 (%)	2004 (%)	2005 (%)	2006 (%)	2007 (%)
Bush Administration	53.0	38.7	41.2	34.7	30.7
Terrorists, Saddam, & Insurgents	17.7	15.2	10.9	5.5	6.8
U.S. Military	11.3	12.6	17.6	31.0	18.8
Iraqi Military & Police	3.1	1.3	3.2	5.0	6.2
Iraqi Government (post-Saddam)	0.0	2.1	6.3	8.7	10.3
Other*	14.9	30.1	20.8	15.1	27.2
(Valid Cases)	(328)	(677)	(193)	(219)	(192)

* "Other" includes the United Nations; U.S. politicians (e.g., "GOP delegates"); U.S. and Iraqi civilians; officials, military, and civilians from other countries; news media and journalists; and Abu Ghraib.

particular by 2007. By then, their criticism represented more than a third of the condemnations in the magazine. This evolution seems to mirror the shift in public opinion. Consistent with Niven's argument, when consensus was absent, journalists seemed to feel more inclined to include dissenting voices, including their own.

The findings also reveal that throughout the five years analyzed, the presence or absence of criticism from American military personnel remained for the most part constant, particularly the first two years. There is an important increase in 2006, however, amidst news of increasing setbacks to insurgents and debates about eventual surges and extended tours. This answers **RQ2**.

Regarding **RQ3**, the level of overall criticism remained constant (and for the most part, evenly distributed) throughout the five years analyzed. The Bush administration was the most common target of the condemnations each year, but the voices critiquing the U.S. military increased steadily the first three years of the war and then had a peak in 2006. As Table 2 shows, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi government also was put in the spotlight as contributing to the failure of solving the conflict in Iraq and thus putting the war to an end. In other words, while criticism itself remained a constant, the object of this criticism shifted. This suggests that as the conflict progressed and consensus broke down, the culprits and their responsibilities diversified in the eyes of the sources, official and otherwise. For example, criticism of the role of clerics and Muslim factions also increased.

Finally, in order to answer **RQ4**, the analysis compared who was criticizing whom over the years. The data show that the culprits were not uniformly identified by voices heard in the stories analyzed (see Table 3). Thus, while American civilians directed their criticism mostly to the Bush administration, Iraqi civilians focused their attention on terrorists, the U.S. military, the Bush administration, and the new Iraqi authorities.

TABLE 3
Comparison of Critical Voices and Their Targets Regarding the Iraq War, 2003-2007

Object of Criticism	Subject of Criticism						
	U.S. Officials (%)	U.S. Military (%)	U.S. Civilians (%)	Iraqi Officials & Military (%)	Iraqi Civilians (%)	Journalists (%)	Other (%)
Bush Administration	45.1	31.8	55.1	32.1	26.5	46.5	41.1
U.S. Military	6.0	27.4	14.7	10.4	25.7	12.6	15.5
Iraqi Military & Police	2.0	6.0	0.0	1.9	5.1	2.9	1.1
Terrorist & Insurgents	9.2	11.4	5.2	26.4	18.6	10.8	11.5
Iraqi Government (post-Saddam)	4.7	2.5	0.9	7.5	11.1	4.7	5.1
Other	33.0	20.9	24.1	21.7	13.0	22.5	25.7
(Valid Cases)	(342)	(195)	(109)	(101)	(251)	(438)	(173)

Also telling is the fact that Iraqi officials were among the most vocal critics of the insurgent groups and terrorists acting in Iraq.

Public opinion is largely mediated by the news media's framing of events and issues, and the coverage of the Iraq War is one example of this. While the media's role during the beginning of the war has led to self-reflection and self-criticism, this analysis of *Time* sheds light on how mainstream news media promote official views, acknowledge or validate dissent, and how the relationship between public opinion and story framing shifts.

In our analysis we did find that most disagreement originated from official sources, which supports indexing theory. However, we also found that while indexing theory was supported, results demonstrated that journalists voiced and sourced voices independent from official sources. Criticisms by journalists increased through the years, and the amount of disagreement that differed from official voices in Washington proved that journalists were more than mere official parrots. Our argument then rests on the notion that although indexing oftentimes occurs in media coverage, there is a tipping point where it no longer dominates journalists' stories. This research lends evidence for the argument offered by Niven⁶⁰ that when government officials and public opinion increasingly clash on a particular issue, journalists are more likely to deviate from relying just on official sources. However, if

Discussion and Conclusion

government and the majority of the public's opinion are in sync, journalists will not be as likely to seek out alternative viewpoints. This research, then, contributes to theory-building in indexing, offering a more nuanced understanding of the original argument.

The finding that journalists were more likely to criticize the war is also important and builds on Niven's original supposition. Our findings suggest that as public opinion rises in opposition to dominant official views, journalists are more comfortable and more likely to speak out against the topic.

As documented by journalists in *Time* magazine, the voice that most often criticized the war came from American officials and military. This finding is interesting and also expected under the indexing hypothesis—it shows that even when questioning or criticizing a president's decisions, critique comes from an official voice.

As noted, another noteworthy finding is how journalists themselves became more vocal in their criticisms of the war as the years progressed. The "rally around the flag" mentality could explain why at the beginning of the war news media professionals' criticism was less apparent. But as evidence for war proved nonexistent in the eyes of many and public opinion shifted, journalists seemed to have felt safer in voicing their own dissatisfaction with the war.

Iraqi civilians' voices lost momentum and visibility as the years progressed, despite their being among those most directly affected by the conflict. Further, those who came to power because of the war eventually became a target of the criticism related to an increasingly unpopular conflict—from the very civilians they governed, the press, and other actors. The tendency for journalists to take a nationalistic perspective might explain this finding.

Considering the prominent role American military members play in the Iraq War, it is not surprising that they were overall some of the sources most likely to voice condemnation of the conflict. The frequency of these sources might also be explained by the fact that journalists were embedded with the troops. Further, if journalists were to include condemning voices, this was a way to maintain the dominant journalistic routine of quoting officials. What was unexpected was the fact that collectively these official voices of dissent were included in the stories analyzed starting at the beginning of the invasion. Their critiques in *Time* were steady, suggesting that journalists were open to providing a space for dissenting voices among those elite sources that populated most of their stories. An important caveat to this finding, however, is that the object of these military sources' criticism was more often civilians and journalists and rarely the Bush administration.

This study adds to literature on the Iraq War, contributing to an area that has garnered little research attention in recent years—voices of dissent during times of war. Even though there have been a number of studies conducted on the selection of sources used by news media, there has yet to be an in-depth look into which sources the news media allowed to criticize the war, and by focusing on one publication, we have aimed to fill this void. Language is political when it is used to empower some groups

at the expense of others,⁶¹ and for this research, the news media's choice to amplify certain voices of dissent offers an important look into whom the media empowered by allowing criticism of the war and also by covering who or what these sources were critiquing.

Rather than excluding dissension, *Time* considered these opinions newsworthy, and they had an impact on the meaning of their stories. In doing so, even tangentially, the news magazine contributed to the debate surrounding the war, as deviant voices were granted the legitimacy that comes with mainstream media. In turn, these voices were allowed to be heard and shape the debate. That said, this study does not imply that *Time* was completely sympathetic toward dissent or disruptive views regarding the war. Further, how exactly these discourses found a way to enter into a public arena is out of the scope of this research.

It is now widely accepted that news media failed to question the Bush administration on the most outrageous and false assertions about the justifications for going to war in Iraq.⁶² News media should have served as a filter to sort out information and act as a reliable source where citizens could have based accurate judgments about the war, and many believe that was not the case.⁶³ Many argue that the U.S. news media did not act responsibly, and, therefore, misinformation about Iraq spread rapidly throughout the public.⁶⁴ The watchdog had become the parrot for the administration.

These results, however, offer important new information to consider. Journalists in the case of *Time* magazine and the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent war allowed voices of dissent into stories from the start. Official voices typically dominated the discourse, but voices from civilians, particularly Iraqis during the first year of the conflict, were allowed to shape the story. These results call for a more nuanced and qualified approach to indexing theory. The findings also illustrate how blame shifted, with the Iraqi government and citizens increasingly being the objects of condemnation. In the end, however, the U.S. official voice may be echoed after all, even when those who voice dissent are not officials.

The results invite further reflection on the power of journalists and news outlets in legitimizing voices within the public sphere and, in turn, framing stories through the inclusion and exclusion of sources. This quantitative analysis has allowed for a deeper knowledge of how certain voices of dissent become more visible in mainstream news media. A qualitative approach would better illuminate how these voices of dissent were situated within the broader discourse of the stories and add depth to this analysis. Further examinations of the alternative media—which have shown more affinity with counter-hegemonic discourse⁶⁵—would also offer important information.

This study shows the merits of analyzing news magazines and paying attention to formats that go beyond the daily and breaking news cycle. Arguably, the in-depth reporting and weekly news cycle that characterize *Time* may be reasons why the magazine managed to incorporate dissenting voices in its coverage since the beginning of the conflict.

These results also stress the importance of expanding the indexing hypothesis by examining events, which may have a changing interpretation in the eyes of the media and the public. In particular, the fact that journalists themselves started to voice some of the dissent further supports the merit of such approaches. Ultimately this may enrich our understanding of how the media make sense of the world, as well as the scope and content of the news.

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